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VOLUME TWO

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MORRIS GINSBERG

Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy

VOLUME TWO

REASON AND UNREASON
IN SOCIETY



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PREFACE

THE essays here collected fall into three groups. The first gives an account of the principal problems and methods of sociology and an analysis of the work of some outstanding sociological thinkers. The second is devoted to a study of national character and the causes of antagonism between nations. The third deals with a group of problems on the borderline between sociology and social philosophy, such as the factors making for unity in the history of mankind, the possibility of a rational ethics and of progress in morals, the ethical basis of law and the moral aspects of the relations between states. The central theme of the book is the part played by reason and unreason in human affairs.

I wish to thank the editors of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, the *British Journal of Psychology*, *Economica*, *Politica* and the *Sociological Review*, Messrs. Chapman & Hall, Messrs. Kegan Paul & Company, the Oxford University Press, and the University of Glasgow for leave to reprint.

M. G.

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PART ONE

CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF SOCIOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

SOCIOLOGY may be defined as the study of society, that is, of the web or tissue of human interactions and interrelations. It is concerned with all that happens to human beings in virtue of their relations to each other. It differs from some of the special social sciences, such as economics or jurisprudence, in stressing the interdependence of social facts and the necessity of viewing them in relation to each other, and from others, such as history, in trying to go beyond the description or classification of particular facts to the establishment of laws or generalizations.

Since social relationships are infinitely varied and subtle, sociologists have concentrated their attention on those relations which have come to assume a definite form or outline in societies, that is groups possessed of recognizable structure, and institutions, that is established forms or modes of relationship between men or groups. Sociology is also sometimes described as the study of social institutions, the term "institutions" being regarded as including societies in this case. It must be remembered, however, that behind societies there is always Society, and that the conditions under which definite forms of grouping emerge out of unorganized human relationships is an essential problem of sociology.

The principal problems of sociology may be set out under the following headings :

(a) *Social Structure.* This is concerned with the principal forms of social organization, i.e. types of groups, associations and institutions and the complexes of these which constitute societies. The study of social structure should clearly include certain parts of what is usually called demography, namely, the distribution of the population, its quantity and quality, in so far as these affect or are affected by social relations.

(b) *Social Function and Social Control.* An account of the way the structures work, are regulated and sustained. This requires a

study of law, morals and religion, manners and conventions and of other forms of social control.

(c) *Social Change.* The study of short- and long-range trends in the life of societies, including the problems of development, arrest and decay of societies and, eventually, of the development of mankind as a whole.

These groups of problems have not been dealt with equally fully by sociologists, nor can it be claimed that sociology in its present condition is a systematic body of knowledge in which these problems are considered from a common point of view. The reasons for the diversity of approach can only be understood in the light of the history of sociological thought. Broadly it may be said that sociology has had a fourfold origin in political philosophy, the philosophy of history, biological theories of evolution, and the movements for social and political reform which found it necessary to undertake surveys of social conditions. The different current conceptions of sociology and the unequal development of its branches appear to be due to the fact that one or other of these aspects of social problems has received particular emphasis in different countries and at different times.

The same reasons account for the varying importance attached by sociologists to the philosophical and more strictly scientific sides of their subject respectively. Those who have come to sociology from the philosophy of history have been mainly interested in problems of social change, and have searched for dynamic laws of human development. This was the guiding idea in the sociology of Comte, and it retains its place in more recent French sociology. Durkheim and his school no doubt considered the attempt to deal with humanity as a single whole over-ambitious, and therefore laid stress on the detailed study of specific societies. Yet the comparative method is for Durkheim the method *par excellence* of sociology, and the laws formulated are regarded as having general validity.

In England the main interest has been in studies of human development, although here the influence of biological theories of evolution made itself strongly felt and directed attention to a general study of genetic factors in the life of social groups. On this side, sociology may be said to have arisen by way of reaction against the comprehensive schemes of development suggested in the philosophies of history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

At the present time there is a great deal of scepticism regarding the possibility of a "world history" or a "world sociology." Such scepticism is due in part to the difficulty of handling a vast accumulation of historical and anthropological data, in part to the prevailing view of the "relativity" of historical and sociological research, and also to the fact that the notion of development appears to have lost its impetus. Yet the belief in the unity of mankind persists, and efforts at comprehensive syntheses are widely welcomed. Perhaps the most important empirical contributions towards synthesis will come from studies of "culture contact," but it would seem that the time is hardly ripe for all-inclusive schemes of human development, and that the discussion of the relevant problems will remain for the present on the methodological and philosophical level rather than on that of exact science.

The influence of philosophy on sociology can also be traced through its connection with political science. Among the Greeks the systematic study of political life was a branch of general philosophy. In modern times the inquiry into human affairs again began with the criticism of political authority and was not primarily an investigation of facts, but rather an evaluation of them in the light on an ideal conception of society based on the "law of nature," or later on other ethical theories. Sociology may be conceived as a development of political science in that it includes within its scope the study not only of governmental institutions but of other social institutions, such as marriage and the family, caste and class, forms of property, and economic organization. But just as in the case of political science it is not always easy to keep apart the ethical discussion of the ends of political organization from the account of actual forms of government, so in the handling of other social institutions ethical analysis and factual study are often interwoven. It must, indeed, be admitted that in a great many sociological treatises the study of actual facts receives but slight attention.

The line of demarcation has proved very difficult to draw. Durkheim, who began by insisting on the desirability of distinguishing sociology from philosophy and on the importance of treating social facts "*comme des choses*," has ended by converting sociology into a kind of philosophy, deriving moral and religious values and even the categories of thought from society. In England, Hobhouse endeavoured in the scientific part of his work, to avoid the use of terms with an ethical colouring, and to differentiate clearly between

social science and social philosophy, although some of his critics have held that he did not succeed in doing so (21). Probably a great deal of the opposition shown towards sociology as a branch of learning is due to the fact that for the philosophers it is not philosophical enough, and for empirically-minded scientists not scientific enough.

The study of contemporary social conditions has in the main been inspired by direct interest in practical reform, and in general it has not been guided by any comprehensive theory of society as a whole. Except in America it has not usually been conducted by sociologists, but by students of the special social sciences, such as economists, statisticians, public health officials and the like. With the emergence of planning on a big scale there is, however, likely to be a growing demand for broader theoretical investigations. In this way sociology may acquire a more reliable basis than it has hitherto possessed.

The desire to free sociology from the charge of vagueness and all-comprehensiveness has led some of the German sociologists to treat it as having its own special and distinct field of inquiry. Thus L. von Wiese has elaborated a "relational" sociology, the object of which is to analyse and classify social processes, and to show how social structures arise through the action of the elementary social processes of association and dissociation. The treatment of the social processes and relationships is behaviouristic, the inward aspects being relegated to psychology. A. Vierkandt, on the other hand, regards sociology as being concerned with the analysis of fundamental social relationships, such as leadership, respect, submission, struggle, and power. The method followed in his treatise, *Gesellschaftslehre* (38), is described as "phenomenological" in the sense given to this term by E. Husserl (18). To what extent this method really goes beyond psychological introspection or inductive generalization cannot here be discussed. Outside Germany it does not appear to have found many followers.

On the whole it may be granted that one of the functions of sociology is to disentangle the social factor in human life, but it may be doubted whether an abstract discussion of social relationships, or a phenomenological analysis of them without constant reference to the varied contents within which they are manifested, is as fruitful as the defenders of the "specialist" view of sociology maintain. Further, it is clearly also the function of sociology to study the

relations between the social and other factors in human life. The degree and type of influence which these exert can be determined only by inductive methods, and the problem may receive a different answer with regard to different societies and different periods. It seems evident, therefore, that sociology cannot thrive without constant contact with numerous special studies, such as economic history, law, morals, and religion, and that its function is not only to interpret social relationships, but to study their interconnections.

To illustrate the nature of sociological research I have selected for brief discussion a few topics falling within the three divisions distinguished above, and have added some comments on problems of method.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A. POPULATION

(1) *Quantitative Aspects.*

The quantitative aspects of population have generally been studied from an economic point of view. Sociologists have not yet treated the subject systematically, although it is clear that it must be the starting point of any adequate morphology of human societies. Numerous attempts have, however, been made to correlate various social phenomena with the volume and density of population. Among the most important of these is Durkheim's theory that an increase in the density of population is the main cause of social differentiation, and that "civilization," which consists according to him in an intensification of contacts, is thus essentially connected with an increasing density of population (6).

Durkheim's treatise is of interest methodologically as illustrating the difficulties of inductive generalization in sociology. In seeking to establish his law concerning the transition from the "mechanical" to the "organic" types of society, he studies the character of the legal systems of a small number of selected societies (the ancient Hebrews, the early Romans, and Christian societies since the fourteenth century). He is able to demonstrate the growing importance of the contractual, as contrasted with the repressive, elements in law, and he connects this change with the growing importance of the division of labour in densely populated societies. A much more comprehensive survey of legal systems would, however, have been desirable, as well as some attention to apparently

negative instances of densely populated areas, like China, where the organic type of society has not yet emerged. Durkheim's guiding hypothesis is nevertheless recognized as valuable, and it has suggested fruitful inquiries, among them C. Bougle's study of the relation between the size and mobility of population and the spread of democratic ideas (3).

Another example may be given from the numerous studies of the bearing of demographic factors upon war (33). Several writers have suggested that there is a definite connection between "over-population" and war. A psychological version of this theory is given by F. Carli, who argues that periods of rapid expansion in population are followed by an increase in imperialistic attitudes, which encourage expansionist tendencies, rivalries, and eventually war. In the case of the War of 1914-18, his theory is that the great increase in European population during the nineteenth century led to a disturbance of equilibrium, economic, political, and psychological, and that this was ultimately responsible for the war. The general thesis is disputed by many authorities,¹ and the relationship, if it exists, is evidently very complex.

Another aspect of the case is ably presented by A. and E. Kulischer in their work, *Kriegs- und Wanderzüge: Weltgeschichte als Völkerbewegung* (20). These authors regard war as a species of migration, and they have brought together a vast amount of data relating to (i) the military campaigns and migrations of the barbaric peoples (seventh to tenth centuries), (ii) the period of absolutism, and (iii) the world movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In their view changes in the direction of migration, of which war is only one, constitute an essential or decisive factor in world history.

A comparative study of types of expansion, and the conditions determining them, seems to be greatly needed. Is A. J. Toynbee right in saying that geographical expansion is a symptom not of social growth but of social disintegration, and that "militarism has been by far the commonest cause of the breakdown of civilizations . . . on record up to the present date?"²

(2) *Qualitative Aspects.*

The problem of the bearing of the quality of the population upon social life and change has been approached in a variety of ways, which may be briefly exemplified. First, there are the

¹ Cf. Carr-Saunders (4), pp. 305 ff.

² Cf. (37), iii, p. 150.

explanations by historians of social processes in terms of supposed racial or national characteristics. Secondly, numerous statistical studies have been made by the so-called "anthropo-sociologists" (Ammon, Lapouge, and others) of selective migration and other forms of social selection (33). Thirdly, investigations of social mobility and theories of the "circulation of *élites*" may be mentioned. In this category is Pareto's theory that the different types of social structure and civilization are determined by the proportions in which certain types of individuals are found in the population (26). Of the same type is Pirenne's extremely well-documented analysis of the social origins of the men who were responsible for the growth of early capitalism in Europe.

These and other contributions to the subject belong, of course, to very different levels of scientific precision, but they all raise problems of fundamental importance to social psychology. Are social changes definitely correlated with changes in genetic characters, or at least with changes in the distribution of these characters in the population? That the quality of the population must count is *prima facie* probable, but the relations between the inborn characters and the social environment are exceedingly subtle, and may well be such as to render possible great social changes without any real alteration of genetic type.

In the first place, the social environment may exert an influence by encouraging some qualities and inhibiting others. Thus an authoritarian political system may cause individuals of independent mind to emigrate, and so affect the general quality of the stock; but far more commonly it will simply have the effect of compelling such individuals to exercise their qualities in non-political spheres of activity. Further, the social environment may influence the form in which individual capacities and tendencies are realized, without in any way changing the hereditary endowment. The desire for the approbation of his fellows may lead a savage to collect skulls, a financier to collect millions, and a scientist to collect specimens. In short, the same hereditary element may have very different effects according to the mode of expression encouraged by the social atmosphere.

Finally, great caution must clearly be exercised whenever resort is had to supposedly "inborn" qualities in explaining social behaviour. Rules prohibiting sexual relations between near kin have often, for example, been attributed to an inborn aversion to incestu-

ous relationship, without ascertaining whether there is any independent evidence of the existence of such an inborn tendency. Acquisitiveness, again, is sometimes regarded as an inborn trait, but comparative studies suggest that it varies greatly in intensity among different peoples, and anthropologists have argued that among some primitive peoples its intensification is due to contact with Europeans and the fresh economic incentives which they bring with them. Similarly the emotions of shame and jealousy may have an innate basis, yet the forms of their expression are now known to vary widely with social conditions. An adequate social psychology should account for these variations as well as for the relatively constant elements, and for this extensive sociological studies are required.

B. SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A full account of social structure would involve a review of the whole field of comparative social institutions, which cannot, of course, be attempted here. Attention will therefore be confined to the principal conceptions which have been found useful in classifying the main types of social groups and institutions.

We may begin with the distinction drawn by F. Tönnies (36) between community and association, which has played an important rôle in German sociology.¹ Community is a form of grouping arising spontaneously or naturally, resting on an accord of feeling and on a type of will, called by Tönnies *Wesenswille*, which is deeply rooted in the entire personality. Association, on the other hand, is artificially formed, reflective or deliberate, resting on a type of will which he calls the *Kurwille*, a deliberate decision consciously adopting means to attain given ends. Community is organic, spontaneous, creative; association is mechanical, artificial, and held together by ties which belong, to use Bosanquet's phrase, "to the world of claims and counterclaims," the world of rivalries, bargainings, compromises. In the history of civilization Tönnies thinks that there has, on the whole, been a movement from community to association, from the type of solidarity exemplified in the intimate life of the family, the kindred, the village or the small city, to the type of union seen in contractual associations or in the large city where, despite spatial contiguity, individuals do not really share in a common life.

¹ For MacIver's somewhat different use of the same terms, see page 10.

In his later work the distinction between the communal and associational is combined by Tönnies with two other criteria to provide a more complex classification. These are the presence of a common determinate will enabling the group to act as a whole, and the question of whether the relationship is one of equal fellowship or of domination. This yields three types of relationship, which he designates *Soziale Verhältnisse*, *Samtschaften*, and *Körperschaften*, each of which may be either communal or associational. Thus the parent-child relationship is communal, i.e. based on deep-seated instincts and feelings, but authoritarian in character ; the *Verhältnis* of brothers, friends, or comrades is again communal, but based on fellowship or equality ; while in the communal relationship of marriage, subordination and fellowship are intermingled. Associational relationships are exemplified in the relation of master and servant, or master and apprentice, which historically has tended to pass from the communal form of the Middle Ages to the associational form of modern times. The most general form of the associational relationship is the contractual, e.g. between creditor and debtor, or employer and employed, which binds individuals in a specific way while in other respects they may remain strangers or even be enemies.

In the *Verhältnisse* there is no common determinate or unitary will, though the members are aware of their mutual relations. At the opposite end of the scale is the *Körperschaft*, which can act as a unity, whereas the *Samtschaft* is intermediate between these two. The members of a *Samtschaft* are bound by common feelings, attitudes, and desires, but it cannot act as a whole until it is organized into a definite corporate body. Examples of communal *Samtschaften* are the medieval estate or the Indian castes ; modern social classes are more associational in character.

The *Körperschaft*, as we have mentioned, is characterized by its capacity of acting as an organized whole. The contrast between the communal and the associational type can be seen by comparing the medieval guild with the modern joint-stock company. That the contrast admits of degrees will be realized when an employers' association is compared with a trade union. The former is thoroughly associational, that is, deliberately designed to serve business ends only, leaving the members no more bound to one another than are the shareholders of a joint-stock company ; but the latter has many elements of community, serving numerous social ends and providing varied opportunities for fellowship.

It will be seen that, for Tönnies, what essentially distinguishes community from association is the fact that the former embraces all the ends of man,¹ while the latter serves particular ends. This distinction, in itself fairly clear, is, however, combined by him with others more disputable, between, for example, the instinctive and the reflective, the spontaneous and the deliberate, and the mechanical and the creative. It is interesting to note that it is these latter distinctions which were seized upon by the numerous movements in German thought and politics which have for their slogan "Back to Community." They served as the vehicle of a protest against the mechanization of modern civilization and the individualism or atomism of modern societies, which are ascribed to an over-valuation of reason and a neglect of feeling, intuition, or instinct. Hence the emphasis on "soul" and "blood," and the demand for intimate and devoted group life, expressed in the youth movements and more recently in National Socialism. In this way the notion of community was turned to uses foreign to Tönnies's thought, and given a sentimental connotation rendering it unsuitable for scientific application.

As used by R. M. MacIver, the distinction between community and association is based on the range or inclusiveness of the relationships which bind the members to one another. "Wherever any group, small or large, live together in such a way that they share not this or that particular interest, but the basic conditions of a common life, we call that group a community. The mark of a community is that one's life may be lived wholly within it, that all one's social relationships may be found within it." Associations, on the other hand, exist for specific purposes. MacIver adds another category, which corresponds roughly to Tönnies's *Samtschaften* and which he calls "spontaneous configurations," which may be enduring, as in the case of the social classes, or temporary, as in the case of crowds. They are different from associations in that they are not formally set up. The term "group" is used by MacIver to stand for "collection of social beings who enter into distinctive social relationships with one another." Associations are groups expressly organized for special purposes. A community is a group occupying a given locality and serving wide and inclusive interests. There are also looser configurations of people, responsive to like and

¹ "nimmt den ganzen Menschen in Anspruch" (*Einleitung*, p. 100).

common interests, but not expressly organized to fulfil specific functions.

For MacIver there are, then, three main types of groupings : (i) inclusive territorial unities ; (ii) interest-conscious unities without definite organizations (caste, class, crowd) ; and (iii) interest-conscious unities with definite organizations, which may be either primary (face-to-face) or large scale. Apparently he does not apply this latter distinction to the two other forms of grouping. In his classification MacIver also makes use of the distinction he draws between interests and attitudes ; communities and classes, in his view, reveal more directly social attitudes, while associations, being definitely functional, stand in closer relation to social interests. Further, MacIver holds that in the course of social evolution, with increasing diversification of interests, groupings which in early society had a communal quality tend to become more associational in character, although he does not think that this necessarily involves a loss of unity.

Von Wiese (42) employs what he calls "social distance" as the criterion for classifying social wholes. By this is meant the degree of nearness or immediacy binding the members. He thinks that it is not in accordance with ordinary usage to designate all collectivities as groups ; for instance, states or churches would not be appropriately designated groups. He suggests a threefold classification, into *Massen*, *Gruppen*, and *Abstrakte Kollektiva*. In crowds (*Massen*) the relations between the members are immediate and personal ; in groups the relations are indirect, i.e. mediated by an organization ; "abstract collectivities" are thought of as impersonal, as the bearers of values more enduring than the particular individuals who enter into them.

Crowds are either "concrete" or "abstract." They consist of an indefinite number of people without any organization, held together by a common affect and vague notions of unity, the concrete type being temporary, the abstract type, e.g. "the public," more enduring in character. Groups are formations having recognizable identity and unity. They are characterized by : (i) relative permanence and continuity ; (ii) an organization based on the division of functions among the members ; (iii) an idea of the group existing in the minds of the members ; (iv) the emergence of traditions and habits ; and (v) relations to other groups. Among the "abstract collectivities" are included the State, the Church,

estates (*Stände*), social classes, the economic system, and the "collective systems of the mental life," namely the arts and sciences, with their auxiliary services.


Although the term "*abstrakte Kollektiva*" is awkward, especially in its English rendering, it is clear that von Wiese has made a valuable contribution by pointing to the existence within the community of complexes, such as the economic system or the arts and sciences, which are not associations, or even compounded of associations. Further, a mere enumeration of associations concerned with specific purposes conceals the fact that in actual life interests are interwoven and that this interweaving is represented in structures going beyond particular associations.

To provide for these structures MacIver has suggested, in the latest edition of his work *Society* (21), the term "institutional complexes" or "functional systems." It is easy to see that societies may be usefully distinguished by the different ways in which, for example, Church and State and the economic organizations are related and adjusted to each other, that is, by different types of institutional complex, and to bring out the nature of these functional connections is an important part of sociological study.

A review of the various classifications proposed, including a number not mentioned above, and a direct study of the facts

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

GROUPS



QUASI-GROUPS

E.g. social classes, "the public," or "sets" of people having common interests such as sport or social reform.

FUNCTIONAL SYSTEMS OR COMPLEXES

E.g. the capitalist system, the feudal system, or the most inclusive complexes, "culture areas" or civilizations.

classified, reveal that among the criteria which have been found helpful in analysing and classifying social structures are the range or inclusiveness of the social relationships ; the personal or impersonal nature of the bond ; the capacity of acting as a determinate whole ; the degree to which members are conscious of the whole, or of symbols representing the whole ; duration or relative permanence ; whether membership is automatic or voluntary ; and whether the group is " open " or " closed." The data do not lend themselves readily to dichotomous classification, but for the sake of clarity they have been set out in diagrammatic form (page 12).

The diagram does not, however, illustrate all distinctions of importance. It omits, for example, the presence or absence of the principle of subordination and hierarchical organization. Further, the distinction between groups and " quasi-groups," the need of which is seen in the fact that Tönnies was obliged to invent the term "*Samtschaft*" and MacIver " loose configurations," is naturally difficult to draw with any precision. It is arguable, for example, that nationalities or nations may not be organized groups, but are really *Samtschaften*.

The classification of " culture areas," or complexes of entire civilizations, is still in its infancy. Gobineau enumerated nine distinct civilizations, Spengler eight. Toynbee (37) draws up a list of twenty-one " societies." These he classifies in various ways, so as to range them in a continuous series. At the one extreme are societies which do not appear to be related to any others, either earlier or later than themselves. At the other extreme are societies so intimately related that the question arises whether they are really distinct. Between them are societies standing in various degrees of relationship. Thus they may be " affiliated " through having derived their religion from a universal Church, or the relation may consist in the fact that the later society has been precipitated by a *Völkerwanderung* which accompanied the fall of the earlier society. The classification of societies, and especially the distinctions drawn between the various modes of " affiliation," are made by Toynbee to yield a whole philosophy of civilization. The twenty-one societies are held to be comparable and to provide material for an analysis of the factors at work in the genesis and growth of civilizations.

Toynbee does not apply his method to the simpler societies, but several attempts have been made by ethnologists to work out

schemes of culture areas. Recently Montandon (24) has enumerated twelve. Unlike the complexes differentiated by historians and archaeologists, the ethnologists' schemes appear to contain units based not on complexes of traits actually found, but on hypothetical and disputed reconstructions of contacts and migrations.

The problems which emerge from the foregoing considerations may now be summarized :

(a) Under what conditions do the various modes of grouping which have been distinguished arise ; e.g. what determines the emergence of nations ? In particular, what determines the transition from quasi-groups or *Samtschaften* to definitely organized groups such as associations ?

(b) How are the different groups and quasi-groups related to the functional systems, or to the community as a whole ? Associations of employers or of workers, for example, have stood in very different relations to the political organization in different societies. Thus in Rome the corporations were not a part of the political machine, whereas in medieval cities they frequently formed the units for electoral purposes, and in contemporary examples of the corporate state they are again becoming integral parts of the political structure. Similarly the relations between religious organizations and social and political institutions vary greatly in different societies. The study of functional interconnection is therefore a necessary complement to the detailed study of specific associations and institutions.

(c) Are there any regularities in the changes which associations and institutions undergo, and, again, are these changes functionally interconnected ? For instance, are changes in the institution of property correlated with changes in family organization, and are changes in class structure functionally connected with changes in the economic and political structure ?

It will be observed that in the study of the more advanced societies, at least, the functional and the comparative methods are complementary. For it is only by means of comparative study that we may hope to be able to distinguish between mere concomitance and functional interconnection.

SOCIAL CONTROL

In developed societies we find several types of norms regulating and controlling behaviour, such as those of law, morals, religion,

convention, and fashion. The most important problems arising in this connection are :

(a) What are the characteristics distinguishing these norms from each other ?

(b) Under what conditions, social, economic, and political, do the various norms arise and become differentiated ?

(c) What influences are exerted by the various forms of social rules upon one another ; e.g. to what extent is law affected in its historical evolution by changes in moral outlook ?

(d) In relation to law in particular, there arises the important question of how it is related to ideal justice, and whether there are any valid methods for studying this relationship.

Broadly speaking, these problems constitute the domain of comparative jurisprudence, of comparative morals and religion, and of social philosophy. There is available a vast body of descriptive and analytic material, but it must be confessed that despite the numerous comparative studies that have been made, especially during the last century, the task of comprehensive synthesis remains unachieved. Here the questions involved can only be discussed in very general terms, and with the restricted object of indicating a sociological mode of approach.

With regard to legal rules, it seems to be widely agreed that wherever there are limitations upon the will of individuals which are more than casual devices, and are determined in a constant manner, we have rules which are legal in their essence. In politically organized societies, i.e. in states, these rules are formally promulgated and enforced by explicit sanctions ; but even here law is not in the main state-created. It is only as a result of a very long process of development that the State has come to take over, to an increasing extent, the administration of justice and the creation of the law, and to claim, at least in theory, supreme power over other associations which originally possessed their own law. It would seem that, historically, the need for reducing law to unity and system comes to be felt when the inner order of associations breaks down, or when, owing to changes in the distribution of power, a clash occurs between different associations and their spheres must be delimited. If a developed sociology of law were in existence it would show how changes occurring in the power of the various groups and social classes are reflected in changes in current views as to what is " fit "

or "decent," and more slowly in changes in the norms of the law.¹

An interesting historical generalization regarding the emergence of juridical rules, which seems to rest on a wide inductive comparison, is that juridical rules arise and become systematized when the central power which is to become the State must, in order to keep down its rival, the oligarchic nobility, come to an accord with the plebeians. Here both military and economic factors are clearly important, since military power is essential to centralization, while it is only when the people have attained a certain degree of wealth and coherence that they become of importance to the emergent monarchies.²

In developed systems it is usually easy to assign a given norm to the sphere of law, religion, morality, convention, or fashion, but there seems little agreement among students as to wherein precisely the difference lies, or as to why norms with apparently identical content are placed by different societies in different groups. The problems here raised have been much obscured by the tendency to confuse questions of sociological fact with philosophical or ethical considerations of what ought to be. For example, law is sometimes described as heteronomous and morality as autonomous. This distinction, however, ignores the fact that even in highly developed forms of morality the rules are in large measure heteronomous, since they come to the individual from the group and are maintained to a great extent by external sanctions. The most one can say is that moral rules tend to rely more on internal sanctions, i.e. upon a recognition by the individual of the "intrinsic" worth of certain acts, and of the intrinsic rightness of certain rules.

A similar objection holds, I think, in the case of the view that law is "the minimum of morality." This formula may be of service in defining what law ought to be, in the sense of restricting legal regulation to those acts the performance or omission of which is so essential to the good of society that they cannot safely be left to individual choice or discretion. But clearly it does not describe law as it is, or has been. For on the one hand law is not always in conformity with moral standards, and on the other its sphere is often much wider in fact than the minimum indicated; in many societies legal sanctions are provided for religious and moral injunctions. To anyone who consults the literature on the subject it

¹ Cf. Ehrlich (7), Chap. 4.

² Cf. Hubert (17), pp. 132 ff.

must, indeed, be obvious that no brief formula can describe the very complicated relations between the different types of social norms. This situation is due partly to the absence of any agreement among lawyers as to the nature of law, and partly to the fact that non-legal norms have not yet been systematically surveyed. Meanwhile the following suggestions are tentatively formulated :

(i) We may follow Ehrlich in saying that the "legal norm regulates a matter which, at least in the opinion of the group within which it has its origin, is of great importance, of basic significance."¹ What is regarded as of basic importance is a matter which will differ very widely in different societies. Thus in patriarchal societies, where social order is closely linked with the order of the family, the injunction, "Thou shalt honour thy father and thy mother," is likely to be a legal proposition, while in other societies such an injunction may be relegated to morals, or even to etiquette. It has also been observed that what is regarded as of basic importance by the group within which the law originates may not seem to be of such importance to the community as a whole (no ethical evaluation being here attached to the term "importance").

(ii) Form and precision are essential attributes of law. By comparison with the body of law, the accepted morality of modern communities is vague, uncertain in its application, and unsystematic. This, however, has not always been the case. In the later Middle Ages, for example, when casuistry flourished, positive morality did tend to approximate to law in elaborateness and precision. From the fourteenth century onwards, as Sidgwick tells us (31), "ecclesiastical writers worked out a quasi-legal body of rules applied to the detail of life through the agency of the confessional, and their authority was not seriously disputed before the Reformation."

(iii) One aspect of the lack of definiteness of moral systems is that with regard to moral rules the correspondence between rights and duties is less precise than in the case of law. Thus if there is a general duty of beneficence, this does not involve a specific right on the part of any given individual to claim assistance. On this ground some authorities have described the essential distinction between law and morals as consisting in the fact that the former is imperative-attributive, while the latter is imperative only. This distinction seems, however, to ignore the fact that we certainly admit moral claims which have as yet no legal force. The point

¹ (7), pp. 167-8

would rather appear to be that in the case of morals there are general rights and duties, the exact application of which is left in varying degrees to the individual.

(iv) The various classes of norms appeal to different feelings. In the main the violation of a legal rule evokes different feelings from those experienced when a moral rule is broken, a *faux pas* committed, or an act of indecency witnessed. Here there is clearly much work for social psychology to undertake. To social psychology belongs also the analysis of the sense of community and group solidarity, and of the psychological bases of custom, authority, and obedience.¹

The psychology of the moral life has been much further developed than the psychology of law, owing to the fact that it has long formed a part of the philosophical handling of ethical problems. Indeed there are ethical thinkers who regard ethics as consisting essentially in the history of moral development and the psychological analysis of moral approval and disapproval. To me, however, it seems clear that the psychology and sociology of morals must be definitely distinguished from ethics proper. Ethics must, of course, start with moral judgments as data, but in dealing with them its method should be critical in the Kantian sense. In other words, it should seek to elicit the assumptions latent in the judgments, the categories they employ, and in the light of this critical work to discover whether any fundamental principles can be formulated whereby actual morality could be made more coherent and systematic.

In the present chapter we are concerned only with the psychology and sociology of morals, and the main trends of study will be briefly indicated.

On the psychological side, the English moralists of the eighteenth century devoted much attention to the analysis of moral approval and disapproval. The "moral sense" school, best represented perhaps by Hutcheson, regarded approbation and disapprobation as "simple ideas which cannot be further explained." Hume considered approval to be more like a feeling, consisting in a specific or peculiar kind of pleasure, generalized and made disinterested by sympathy.

Adam Smith departs entirely from the notion that approval and disapproval are simple entities. Our approval of tenderness or humanity, for example, is qualitatively different, he holds, from our

¹ For a brief account of social conventions, cf. (11).

approval of daring or magnanimity. Approval is, in short, a perception of the agreement of our feeling with the feeling of others, made possible by our power of sympathetic identification. Similarly disapproval is a perception of disagreement or difference between the feeling of the agent and the feeling of the onlooker, when on entering sympathetically into the situation of the agent we find that we cannot share his feelings.

This perception of agreement or disagreement makes possible a further judgment of propriety or impropriety, that is, a recognition of the appropriateness or fitness of the feeling to its object. In the case of virtue or excellence this judgment of propriety is further complicated by admiration, i.e. approval heightened by surprise or wonder. Moreover, we judge not only of the propriety or impropriety of acts, but also of their merit or demerit, and these notions are connected by Adam Smith with two special emotions, namely gratitude and resentment. That act has merit or deserves reward which is the approved object of gratitude ; that act has demerit or deserves punishment which is the approved object of resentment, "approval" in both cases signifying the realization that either we or an impartial spectator would, if placed in the given situation, experience gratitude or resentment.

The above analysis relates to the judgments formed by the individual concerning the propriety and merit of the acts of others. Adam Smith notes that, in fact, our moral criticisms are at first directed upon others, and that it is only gradually that we learn to apply them to ourselves. We find that others are ready enough to judge us, and thus come gradually, and with difficulty, to see ourselves as others see us. To do this we have to place ourselves at a certain distance from ourselves, and invent the impartial spectator, "the man within the breast," to judge our own conduct. The inner spectator is aided by general rules, however, in the absence of which impartiality is difficult to attain, and the regard for general rules is what we call the "sense of duty."

Among recent writers those who stand nearest to Adam Smith are E. Westermarck and S. Alexander, although both lay greater stress on the part played by social factors in the development of moral sentiments. Westermarck's theory of the moral emotions closely resembles Adam Smith's account of merit and demerit. Westermarck believes that they are species of what he designates the "retributive" emotions, typified by resentment and gratitude.

These are not as such moral, but they can become moral when they are disinterested and impartial. Disinterestedness is made possible by the power of sympathy, which enables the individual to experience emotions on behalf of others.

The impartiality and generality of the moral judgment are due to the fact that it expresses emotions felt by society at large, and not by any given individuals. What the moral judgment expresses is not the emotions felt by the individual, but rather the tendency of certain acts to call forth emotions in the community. Like Adam Smith, Westermarck admits here an element of reflectiveness or reason, and he contends that on the whole moral judgments have gradually become more enlightened in the course of moral development. It should be noted that Westermarck uses his analysis of morals as the basis of his comparative study of social institutions, and considers that the analysis is largely confirmed by the results of his research (39, 40).

Alexander (1) follows Adam Smith even more closely than does Westermarck. The foundation of the moral judgment, he asserts, is gregariousness, which in man is transmuted into a conscious social interest. Under this impulsion we become interested in one another's actions, and by its aid the elementary impulses of resentment and gratitude grow into approbation and disapprobation. Men come to discover what will arouse the resentment of others and what others can be induced to sympathize with, and these discoveries, at least in so far as they relate to the simplest conditions of a common life, assume the character of invariable rules. Conscience is "nothing but the mass of loyalties which gather round ends which have been found experimentally in the course of time to satisfy the passions of men as adjusted to one another in submission to the social sense, and which is accordingly consulted as occasions arise as a short compendium and convenient *vade mecum* of conduct."

Alexander will not concede that the harmonizing agent is reason, although he holds with Hume that reason is concerned not only with the finding of the means necessary for satisfying the passions, but also with the cool comparison of different ends and the balancing of their attractions. No doubt he means that right and wrong cannot be ascertained by reference to *a priori* rules, but only by an experimental attempt to harmonize or adjust the desires or wills of the individuals concerned, and that this attempt is made

under the impetus of the social impulse. It follows that if an individual feels that a particular mode of adjustment is wrong, presumably all he can do is to work on the sympathies of others until his wishes are fulfilled.

Alexander's attitude towards the part played by reason appears, indeed, somewhat inconsistent. Mere sociality, and even the best of good will, are surely not enough to solve the difficult problems of social adjustment. Alexander himself admits that the business of morality is to discover a system which "satisfies objectively" the impulse of sociality. To determine these objective conditions is surely the task of reason, although it may be true that in practice reason has not yet been given much scope in securing social adjustment. According to Alexander there are "wise" and "foolish" adjustments, and in the end reason is brought back in the form of the "wise man," or *phronimos*. The wise man has to consider not only what people actually desire, but what they might desire if they had his insight. In order to be consistent, however, Alexander would have to say that the conclusions reached by the wise man are not morally good, or right, until he has succeeded in inducing others to accept them, and that until there is social approval there can be no moral goodness.

Yet perhaps, as Alexander suggests, the function of the great moralists is to enlarge the contents of human nature by revealing impulses hitherto unsuspected, or by increasing or arousing sensitiveness to claims hitherto neglected. In this contribution, he contends, rather than in any claim to authority, lies their importance. But it would appear that in the end morality has little to contribute to the difficult problems of human adjustment beyond the maxim "that ye love one another," for what is morally good only emerges when the conflicts have in fact been resolved. This would be a depressing conclusion, if true, and indeed the actual moral codes known to history, even if they incorporate elements of reason, certainly cannot be held to have been dominated by reason. If, however, as Alexander believes, morality consists in an adjustment of wills, reason may yet come to be of increasing importance in determining the objective conditions of harmonious adjustment; and, if so, ethics would necessarily be more closely related to psychology and sociology than it has been hitherto. Alexander's own discussion is of interest to the sociologist chiefly because it suggests that in order to understand the nature of morality we may usefully

begin by inquiring how changes in social adjustment are actually brought about, and especially by examining changes in the sensitivity of the community. Studies of this kind have hardly yet been systematically attempted.

That the roots of morality are to be found in the social instincts is a view which has also been propounded with great power by H. Bergson (2). Here, however, the view appears in a distinctive form due to Bergson's theory of the relations between instinct, intuition, and intelligence, and to the distinction that he draws between two types of morality, the "closed" and the "open." In the morality of "closed" groups, the rules obtaining are imposed by the pressure of social habits. Obligation is then not, as Kant thought, a matter of reason, but a form of necessity analogous to instinct. In the social animals the adjustment of individual behaviour to the requirements of the group is, according to Bergson, automatically assured by the hereditary structure. Man is also a social animal, but being possessed of intelligence he has a measure of self-dependence and the power of initiative, which necessitate a subtler power of constraint. This is supplied by the feeling of obligation, the form which necessity takes in free beings capable of reflection. Rules arise out of the structure of the group, and each has its own constraint due to habit; the specific obligations are, however, always held together by a respect for custom as such, which binds the individual to his group and expresses his sense of solidarity with it.

By contrast "open" morality is not group morality, but is found in exceptional individuals: sages, mystics, prophets, and saints, whom it inspires with a love going beyond the group to humanity, and indeed to love absolute, which is God. Closed morality acts through pressure, open morality through suasion, aspiration, enthusiasm. The former is static or fixed, the latter always in the making, always in movement. In Bergson's view the two moralities differ qualitatively, and from the one to the other there is no direct road. It is a mistake, he thinks, to suppose that we can pass from the love of family, group, or nation to a love for humanity as a whole. Group morality is limited in its nature, and is indeed infected with hate and fear of the stranger. The higher morality is open only to the few who can transcend the limitations of group life, and who by their example exercise a fascination over others. Between the *âme close* and the *âme ouverte* there is the *âme*

qui s'ouvre. Here the two moralities intermingle and are projected on an intermediate plane, in which justice is transformed by benevolence, and benevolence by justice.

Bergson's discussion has the merit that it seeks to account not only for the aspects of morality which are expressed in formed habits and the acceptance of imposed rules, but also for those forms of approval which we employ when we describe acts as noble, magnificent, heroic, sublime. But his distinction between the two types of morality is clearly too sharply drawn. In the first place, he exaggerates the immobility or fixity of the morality of what he calls the closed groups. In our own time, for example, very different and conflicting views are held regarding the major problems of social life, such as war and the use of force in general, property, or sex, and a detailed study of the thought of former ages reveals similar conflicts of opinion and attitude. Morality, in so far as it finds expression in the ideas of any social group, is always in the making, although the rate of movement may differ from age to age and people to people. In the second place, Bergson appears to be too ready to appeal to the mystical powers of the great moral innovators. There is no reason for regarding such innovators as supra-social, and their teachings are certainly not effective unless they become the vehicle of large and massive forces. For the sociologist the important problem is to show under what conditions the aspirations of the few can become the habits of the many, and in particular to explain why it is that in so many instances great moral ideas remain ineffective for ages and then suddenly inspire revolutionary fervour. If there are indeed two types of morality, as Bergson thinks, then it is the fields in which they overlap that are of fundamental interest to the sociologist.

It will be seen from the above brief survey that moral psychology has shown morality as moving between the poles of obligation and approval, pressure and aspiration, right and good. This duality has been variously accounted for. It has been ascribed to a conflict between impulse and reason, between the social and other impulses, or between free intelligence and automatic habits. Perhaps a more fundamental explanation is to be found in the fact that morality is an attempt to introduce order in the life at once of the individual and of the group, and that correspondence between the two is achieved, if at all, only with great difficulty. Moral rules arise out of the needs of the social structure, they embody an adjust-

ment of human relations to the requirements of the group. The adjustment is, however, for the most part crude and unsystematic, and the individual, in submitting to the requirements of the larger order of the group, may often fail to satisfy his inmost needs.

Moreover, as communities become more complex, stratified groups arise within them, which give rise to a division and conflict of loyalties. Obligation then ceases to be a simple reflection of the pressure of formed habits and group-suggestion, and the sense of duty becomes more complex than the mere acceptance of a rule because it is a rule. Perhaps the preoccupation of modern ethics with the notion of right and duty, in contrast with the Greek thinkers' emphasis on the notion of the good, is due to the fact that in modern conditions the view that in accepting the moral law the individual will find his own fulfilment has lost its *prima facie* plausibility. The difficulty is brought home to the reflective individual by the diversity of moral standards which he finds prevailing among the different groups within his own community, by glaring contradictions between private and public morality, and by the huge discrepancy between the ethical teaching of the spiritual religions and the moral principles which actually guide even enlightened men. Although for a great many people morality may still be conventional and authoritarian, a growing number of individuals are finding that even *Sittlichkeit* is not enough in a world of conflicting loyalties and allegiances.

In psycho-analytic literature Adam Smith's inner spectator, "the man within the breast," reappears in the form of the "super-ego," to which are attributed the functions of self-observation, moral censure, and repression. But while for Adam Smith it is the social group that provides the mirror in which the individual gradually comes to see himself, in psycho-analytic theory it is the father who provides the model for the super-ego. Without questioning the importance of the part played by early infantile experiences in the formation of character, it may nevertheless be suggested that psychoanalysts have tended to treat the family too much in isolation from the wider social group, and in particular to neglect the pervasive influence exerted by the group upon the family. Freud himself notes that in the course of the individual's development the super-ego comes under the influence of persons, such as teachers, who are in the nature of substitutes for the father, and he even suggests that the super-ego of the child is modelled not so much on the pattern

of the parents as on the super-ego of the parents, which they derive from *their* parents, and which thus becomes the bearer of the social tradition. But surely this suggestion implies that the authority exercised by the parents is itself socially conditioned, and leads us back to an inquiry into the origins of social norms, of which those regulating life within the family form only a part.¹

The account given by Freud of the process whereby the external authority of the father is turned into an inner authority gives rise to a more radical criticism. The process is explained by self-identification with the father, but it is clear that in the course of this identification the father, and the later father substitutes, are idealized and given attributes which make them worthy of love. What is the root of this idealization? Why have men to persuade themselves that the people they obey are not only powerful, but wise and just? Is there not here a basic value judgment, of which no account is taken in the psycho-analytic theory of morals? Must we not value wisdom and justice, if we have to attribute these virtues to our leaders in order to justify our obedience to them? Probably this aspect of the problem tends to be neglected by psycho-analysts because they are more directly concerned with the repressive and authoritarian elements in morals than with the source of primary approvals and disapprovals.

In the sociological study of morals perhaps the most interesting problem concerns the variability of moral judgments. Contrary to widely held views, comparative studies reveal a considerable uniformity in the moral judgments regarding the fundamental social relationships. If we compare the list of *prima facie* duties drawn up by W. D. Ross² with the duties enumerated in comparative studies such as Westermarck's, the resemblance is striking. The duties of fidelity, reparation, requital, equitable distribution, beneficence, and non-maleficence or non-injury, are insisted on very widely in the primitive world, and even the duty of self-improvement is anticipated on the primitive level in the notions of self-regard and self-respect.³ Westermarck himself concludes that "when we study the moral rules laid down by the customs of savage peoples we find that they in a very large measure resemble the rules of civilized nations."⁴

The chief difference lies, of course, in the range of persons to whom the rules are held to be applicable, a range which has

¹ Cf. Fromm (9).

² (29), p. 21.

³ (40), ii, p. 143.

⁴ (39), p. 197.

expanded in the course of history with the expansion of the social units and the accompanying widening of the altruistic sentiments. Other variations are traceable to differences in the general level of knowledge, to changes in religious beliefs, to the unequal complexity of social and political circumstances, to the degree of clarity with which the ends of life are apprehended, to the dominance of partial interests, or to confusions arising out of the difficulty of defining the relations between the collective good and the good of the component parts. Above all, with growing social differentiation hierarchical orders emerge, each with its own morality. Thus military groups, for example, inculcate codes of honour and superiority, while economic differentiation generates a class morality enjoining obedience and submission on the one side and restraint and considerateness towards "inferiors" on the other.

The problem of the relative significance of economic, political, intellectual, and religious factors in the shaping of morality is not one that lends itself to summary treatment, and in any case it may be doubted whether sociology has yet developed methods refined enough for its solution. It would be very difficult, for example, to estimate the comparative influence of economic, religious, and specifically moral factors in the changes of attitude reflected in the abolition of slavery, or the partial humanization of the criminal law. Hobhouse's elaborate survey shows a certain parallelism of ethical development with the general development of thought,¹ and of both with social development (16), but the connection which he claims to establish is not very close or direct, and he recognizes that social change frequently governs, rather than obeys, the moral conscience (14).

The association between morals and religion seems to be closest in the case of the spiritual religions and the "middle" civilizations, where religion provides sanctions for both moral and legal injunctions. Westermarck thinks that the "moral ideas of uncivilized men are more affected by magic than by religion, and that the religious influence has reached its greatest extension at certain stages of culture which, though comparatively advanced, do not include the highest stage."² The question of the definition of religion, however, enters here. It is arguable that what has occurred in the higher stages has been, not a lessening of the influence of religion, but a change in the character of that influence, in

¹ (15), Pt. II, Chap. 8.

² (40) ii, p. 747.

other words that both religion and morals have come to rest increasingly on inward experience and less on authority. In this way it is possible for the religions to provide a body of moral convictions at the very time when their formal doctrines are losing in importance. For further discussion of the complicated problems involved the works of Hobhouse and Westermarck may be referred to, as well as the rather different approach to the subject made by Carveth Read (27).

SOCIAL CHANGE

Of the large number of topics which fall under the head of social change, I shall here consider only the problem of social development or evolution.

As is well known, the notion of development was familiar to philosophers long before the emergence of the biological theory of evolution, and in the opinion of many it has, indeed, a clearer relevance to the growth of mind and society than to the process of biological change. Since sociological theory has been profoundly influenced by the conceptions of evolution as current in biology and in philosophical speculation directly bearing on biology, however, it is useful to consider social evolution in the light of these conceptions. Three trends of theory may be distinguished, all of which have affected, as they may have been affected by, the study of social change.

First, evolution has been used to describe the process of differentiation of species from a common stock or common stocks, that is, in Darwin's phrase, the process of "descent with modification." Secondly, biologists have used the term evolution to describe not merely the process of differentiation or diversification of species but also the fact that in the course of organic evolution there has occurred a movement from "lower" to "higher" levels of life. It will be seen that this can be readily linked with the notion of progress in sociology, though difficulties at once arise regarding the interpretation of the terms "higher" and "lower," which may require different definitions in biology and in sociology. Thirdly, the conception of evolution has been generalized and applied to the whole range of the natural world. Thus in theories of "emergent evolution" the attempt is made to map out successive orders of integration, exemplified in the series, say, of atom, molecule, colloidal unit, cell, and multicellular organisms of increasing com-

plexity. This has an obvious bearing on sociology, in that societies may come to be regarded as constituting the "next" level in development, and all known societies may be arranged in a series of ascending levels, whether "emergent" or not.

The theory that similarities of form or structure can be explained by descent from a common source was applied to social phenomena before the appearance of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. It was used, for example, in relation to language by Sir William Jones a quarter of a century before Darwin was born. Darwin himself used the case of language to illustrate the principles of "genealogical classification." Comparative philologists have classified the large number of languages found in the world into families or stocks, and recently there seems to be a tendency to establish connections between groups of languages which had formerly been regarded as remote from each other. Their derivation from a common source is indeed not improbable.¹

With regard to other aspects of human culture the notion of evolution was clearly enunciated by Tylor :

To the ethnographer the bow and arrow is a species, the habit of flattening children's skulls is a species, the practice of reckoning numbers by tens is a species. The geographical distribution of these things and their transmission from region to region have to be studied as the naturalist studies the geography of his botanical and zoological species.

By means of numerous illustrations Tylor goes on to show that the idea of evolution is more easily verifiable in the study of culture than in biology, and there can be no question that the combination of morphological classification with the study of geographical distribution has played an important part in the development of ethnology and archæology since Tylor's time.

It is, however, regrettable that sociologists have not paid more attention to the evidence for linguistic evolution, which raises in an interesting form all the major problems connected with the nature of social change, and also serves to bring out important differences between biological and social evolution. Thus it is clear that linguistic changes do not depend upon changes in the inherited structure of the people who create or adopt them, that the kinship or affinity of languages has nothing to do with continuity of descent in the biological sense, and that the survival of particular languages

in the struggle for existence is determined by quite other factors than those important in the biological sphere. Other relevant problems concern the rôle of cumulative individual variations in social change, the influence of unconscious factors, the contribution of great personalities, and the nature of convergent evolution. The material for the solution of these problems is far more abundant in relation to language than to any other cultural elements.

While the idea of evolution in the sense of descent with modification can thus be applied fruitfully to the study of parts of culture which can be shown to have undergone a process of diversification from a common source, the same idea has proved even more suggestive when interpreted in the second of the senses distinguished above, and applied to societies taken as constituting unitary systems or wholes. Here the biological analogy is the classification of living things on the basis of level of organization or integration. Despite the charge of anthropocentrism, few biologists would deny that in some sense vertebrates are of higher organization than invertebrates, and mammals of higher organization than other vertebrates.

The criteria of advance have been variously defined. Some have found the criterion in increasing complexity, but perhaps the most satisfactory criterion is the degree of independence of a particular environment. Adaptation to the environment is not sufficient, for the lower organisms may be just as well adapted to their environment as the higher are to theirs. What is important is rather increasing plasticity and adaptability to varying environments, with consequently increasing self-dependence. This is achieved, as Spencer saw, by an increasing specialization of the parts of the organism, accompanied by an increasing integration. The integration is traceable not only in bodily structure and function, but also in the growth of mental powers, that is, of the ability to bring different actions and experiences to bear upon one another and so form them into systems. In dealing with the higher levels comparative psychology is therefore of the greatest importance, and it becomes possible to use as a criterion of advance the degree to which control of the conditions of life is consciously guided or directed.

The extension of the concept of evolution, conceived as a change in the level of organization, to the field of sociology is readily intelligible. Whether or not all life is social in character, it is clear that mental and social development come to be increasingly inter-

connected. Moreover, beyond a certain point further organization is achieved not so much by changes in the organic structure, as by the building up of structures of a different kind, namely the systems of relationships between individuals which we call social structures. In the case of human societies the most significant change which occurs is the replacement of the mechanism of genetic transmission by that of social heritage or tradition. The new mechanism makes possible co-operation on an ever-increasing scale, and above all it immeasurably increases the power of "inter-learning,"¹ i.e. of learning from the experiences of others, whether near or distant in time or space. It is clearly this change which makes human development distinctively social development. The development or fulfilment of human potentialities through tradition, mutual stimulus, selection, and co-operation proceeds chiefly by means of those changes in the relations between individuals which constitute social structure.

Social development is thus social in two senses of the word. First, it operates through changes in social structure and especially in tradition, and not in the main through a modification of genetic type. Secondly, it has consisted in an extension of the co-operative elements in human relations. The first point raises the difficult question of the influence of "racial" and more general genetic factors on human development, and cannot be discussed here, but in my opinion there are good grounds for asserting that the course of history has been on the whole independent of germinal change.²

With regard to the second point, an enormous movement of unification is apparent throughout most of human history. It is exhibited in the increase in size of political aggregates, in the growth of political and economic interdependence, and possibly, despite cultural diversity, in an underlying assimilation or convergence in science, art, religion, and culture generally. Although some interdependence has always existed, there can be no doubt that it has grown enormously in the course of history. It is interesting to note in this connection that, according to Toynbee's recent survey, the "unrelated civilizations" are in a minority of six out of twenty-one, that these belong to the infancy of civilization, and that the present conditions of mutual influence preclude the possibility of unrelated civilizations ever emerging again.³

It might, however, be urged that in thus insisting on unification

¹ This point is treated with great thoroughness by Spiller (35).

² Cf. (4), concluding chapter, and (13), Chap. 3. ³ (37), i, pp. 184 ff.

we have ignored the element of force, pressure, and conflict, which perhaps has also increased, and that this element must be included in the conception of social development, since it has certainly played a large part in extending the area of social organization.

The problem may be approached in two ways. In the first place, an attempt might be made to show that, taking the history of humanity as a whole, the co-operative principle has been gaining ground over the principle of conflict. Even if the general movement from force to persuasion reflects no more than a change of tactics on the part of dominant groups, the fact that the change had to be made indicates a wider diffusion of knowledge and the power of self-direction among the masses of men. It might be argued, again, that the empires created and maintained by war have eventually perished by war,¹ and that enduring success has only been achieved when conquerors have managed to transmute force into authority, and to secure some measure of inward unification by winning the consent, or at least the acquiescence, of the governed.

If this attempt to estimate the net gains of the co-operative principle in humanity be deemed impracticable, it might be contended, in the second place, that we could still arrange human societies on a scale from the same point of view, by maintaining that those communities have achieved a higher organization which have secured order and efficiency in large areas with a minimum of coercion, and have thus provided greater opportunities for the fulfilment or realization of human capacities. Further, even if such a line of development were only one among many others it would retain its importance as an indication of the possibilities open to mankind. If the biological analogy is to be pursued we ought not, indeed, to expect evolution along a single line, still less should we expect all evolution to be progressive. Evolution, Julian Huxley tells us,

is a series of blind alleys, some extremely short, leading to species and genera that undergo no further development or even become extinct, others longer, to be reckoned in millions of years, which yet come up in the end against their terminal blank wall. Only along one single line is progress and its future possibility being continued—the line of man.²

Perhaps progressive evolution, as judged by the criteria above indicated, including the criterion of free co-operation, is likewise

¹ Cf. Toynbee (37), and Gordon Childe (5), p. 265.

² (19), p. 98.

only one of many types apparent in the history of mankind, and yet the societies that are moving in this line may in the long run show greater vitality than others, and more promise of further development.

On the view here briefly indicated progressive social evolution has consisted in : (i) a growing command over the conditions of life, achieved by increasing knowledge of nature, including mind and society ; (ii) the growth of co-operation, partly by an increase in the size of communities, partly by the organization of the relations between communities ; (iii) a change in the character of co-operation in the direction of freedom, and the emergence into the consciousness of men of the sense of their unity and of the need for reconciling the requirements of order and liberty on a world scale.

Taking mankind as a whole, development in one direction has clearly often been accompanied by loss and retrogression in another. Thus increase in the scale of organization has often been achieved on the principle of subordination and has meant a loss of freedom ; increasing power over nature, and even collective efficiency, may result in stultifying and thwarting the deepest needs of individuals. Yet on the balance there may often have been a net gain, and no doubt some communities will have come nearer than others to satisfying the joint requirements of development and in this sense may be further along the road of progressive evolution.

Two of the criteria of development referred to above, namely increasing control over the conditions of life and the growth of co-operation, may be readily expressed in terms which a biologist might use without committing himself to any particular ethical theory. Doubt may, however, arise regarding the third, which might be thought to introduce distinctively ethical categories. If, however, development is understood as consisting in a process whereby a full realization or fulfilment of human capacities is gradually attained, that society might be regarded as most developed which evokes the most spontaneous devotion to common ends among its members and releases the greatest fund of intelligent energy. It might, indeed, be urged that the societies which have developed furthest in such directions will have greater vitality as compared with societies which are based on subordination and deny scope for initiative to the bulk of their members.

Whether or not this form of argument would satisfy a biologist, it is clear that ethical and biological criteria of development cannot

be assumed to coincide without careful examination. Increase in power over nature, including human nature and social organization itself, may be used in the service of bad ends, and even intelligent and free co-operation within a community may be ethically bad in so far as it ignores or overrides the just claims of other communities. Clearly not all development, and not even all social development, is good. The most one can say is that on the assumptions of a rationalist theory of ethics there could be no ultimate fissure between the requirements of ethics and the requirements of a scientific sociology. This must not blind us to the fact that the development which has occurred in history has, on any theory of ethics, been decidedly uneven, although perhaps, taking mankind as a whole, a substantial advance has nevertheless been made.

The difficulties in the way of general progress arise partly from the fact that development, as judged by the criteria defined above, has been unequal, and advance in one direction has often constituted a hindrance to advance in another. Thus with respect to the growth of the power of conscious control, our control over inorganic nature infinitely surpasses our control over life, mind, and society ; and since the former type of control may be used for purposes of destruction, there is the danger that before mankind has acquired sufficient knowledge of the causes of social change, and sufficient moral wisdom to apply it aright the whole social structure may be wrecked, and the work of organizing mankind have to be begun all over again.

Further, if progress is to move more securely, it must now be on a world-wide scale. As a result of improvements in technical power, the communities of the world have become closely interdependent, and, unless their interaction is rationally controlled, a clash between them may lead to irretrievable disaster. Self-contained development is increasingly difficult and precarious. Autarchy necessitates stringent autocratic discipline, and this, besides severely limiting the individuality of the component members of the group, frequently fosters enmities with other groups and in turn demands a greater degree of militarization within.

The chances of "limited" progress are therefore slighter than they have ever been before, and increase in the scope of organization grows ever more vital as a component of development, while at the same time infinitely complicating the problem of reconciling order with freedom. The element of hope in the situation is that the

problem has at last begun to be faced on a world scale, and that the conception of a self-directed humanity has emerged, at least in theory. It is sometimes urged that the forces making for disruption are inherently discrepant and must eventually bring about their own defeat. But this optimistic estimate ignores what Renouvier has described as the "terrible solidarity of evil," the fact that greed and deceit, violence and war, breed and support each other. A theory of social dynamics must take this "solidarity" into consideration.

The place of the theory of social development in wider evolutionary theories can only be briefly mentioned here. In Hobhouse's work the evolution of society is considered as a phase in the evolution of mind. He argues that "orthogenic evolution" can be made intelligible only by assuming the presence within the system of reality of a conational force, which by a series of syntheses grows in scope and articulateness and becomes at last conscious of its efforts in the growth of humanity.

In the philosophy of holism, societies are not regarded as constituting a new type of whole: "the society or group is organic without being a whole."¹ In dialectical materialism, society appears as a sort of "emergent" or qualitatively new entity. This is hinted at also by C. Lloyd Morgan (25), and developed further by W. M. Wheeler (41).

In a different form the notion that societies constitute qualitatively new wholes had been used by sociologists long before the rise of the philosophy of emergent evolution. It was implied by Wundt, for example, in his theory of creative synthesis in relation to the general will of groups, by Durkheim in his theory that social facts are *sui generis*, and by many others who conceive of a group mind as different from the sum of its parts. On general grounds, however, we should expect to be able to explain social phenomena in terms of laws governing (i) the human mind, (ii) the interactions of human beings with one another, and (iii) the consequences of such actions. From the point of view of methodology, therefore, the question of whether there are irreducible social laws must not be prejudged in the interest of general theories of emergent evolution, or in order to secure an independent status for sociology, but should only be decided *ambulando* as our knowledge of social phenomena grows.

¹ Cf. Smuts (32), p. 339.

METHOD

A. TYPES OF GENERALIZATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES¹

A survey of sociological work shows that the generalizations which have so far been attempted may be classified under the following heads :

(i) Empirical associations, or correlations, of varying degrees of definiteness between concrete social phenomena. Thus it may be shown that in certain areas urban divorce rates are approximately double the rural rates, or that the marriage rate varies with variations in the volume of trade, or that crime rates are higher in towns than in the country.

(ii) Generalizations formulating the conditions under which institutions or other social formations arise. For example, the development of capitalism may be held to be associated with the existence of large accessible markets, a sufficient specialization of the industrial arts to make indirect methods of production profitable, the existence of a class of workers who find it difficult to earn an independent livelihood, and perhaps also the dominance of a certain mentality, which is expressed in the desire and the capacity to apply accumulated wealth to profit-making, besides other factors.

(iii) Generalizations asserting that changes in given institutions are regularly associated with changes in other institutions. For instance, the extension of public order in the simpler societies and in the early civilizations may be linked with an extension of stratification according to the principle of social and economic subordination ; or social and cultural changes may be alleged, as by followers of historical materialism, to be invariably associated with changes in class structure.

(iv) Generalizations asserting rhythmical recurrences or phase-sequences of various kinds. Examples are the attempts to distinguish the " stages " of economic development which have been made by Bucher, Schmoller, and many others, and the view that economic development passes through phases of expansion and contraction, or from phases of aristocratic control, from above, to phases of democratic control, from below.

(v) Generalizations describing the main trends in the evolution

¹ For a fuller discussion, see (10)1.

of humanity as a whole. Examples are Comte's law of the three stages ; the Marxist theory of a movement from an undifferentiated or classless society through various forms of class differentiation to a classless society again ; Hobhouse's attempt to correlate social development with mental development ; as well as many other schemes of social evolution which do not stress the notion of recurrence or repetition of given sequences, but are concerned rather with the trends that can be disentangled in human culture as a whole.

(vi) Laws stating the implications of assumptions regarding human behaviour, but leaving to further inquiry the problem of how far the assumptions correspond to fact, and to what extent deviations can be explained by reference to "disturbing" factors. Examples are the laws formulated in economic theory.

It will perhaps be generally agreed that sociological investigations should be carried out in accordance with what Mill called the "Inverse Deductive Method." In other words, inductive generalizations, whether reached by statistical methods or by the comparative method, should be further verified by deduction from more ultimate laws. Mill himself thought that these laws would be furnished by psychology and by the new science for which he proposed the name of "ethology," and which corresponds to a considerable extent to what is now called social psychology. Possibly, however, there may be sociological laws *sui generis*, and some may think that the laws of biology are also of importance in dealing with the evolution of societies.

If, now, we look back at the types of generalization enumerated above, it will be seen that the degree to which they satisfy the requirements of the Inverse Deductive Method varies greatly from case to case. Thus most of the investigations falling under the first head remain on the empirical level. It will, however, be observed that statistical associations are held to be "intelligible" when an interpretation of the relationship can be given in terms of motives assumed to be normally operative in popular psychology. For instance, the alleged relation between increase in the crime rate and economic crises is held to be intelligible if economic factors can be shown to result in a loss of morale ; a fall in the birth rate is regarded as explained if appeal can be made to generally operative motives, such as the desire to maintain a certain standard of living. The psychological factors are as a rule stated only in general terms,

although it is often felt that they ought to be more accurately investigated by a scientific psychology.

In historical generalizations, also, further explanation is sometimes attempted in psychological terms. Thus Pirenne's generalization that in the history of European capitalism there has occurred a regular alternation between periods of economic freedom and of economic control, and a similar alternation between periods of energetic innovation and periods of conservatism and stabilization, is explained by him in psychological terms. The "new men" who introduce a new phase are marked by audacity and independence, while their descendants are anxious rather to preserve what has been won, and are inclined to support any authority capable of giving them the necessary security. Here again the psychology employed is of the popular variety, as in the description of the *parvenu*.

The more ambitious generalizations formulating long-range trends in the history of humanity are usually supported by inductions from data reached by the comparative method, but in most cases they are linked deductively with wider theories of development. Only a few examples can be given here. Spencer's law of a transition from militant to industrial types of society is reached explicitly by the inverse deductive method, that is by the comparison of a number of societies, supported by a deductive analysis of the nature of compulsory and voluntary organizations. The whole argument is further connected by him with his general law of evolution, on the assumption that increasing differentiation of functions must eventually limit the scope of governmental organs and encourage voluntary and contractual co-operation over ever wider fields of social life (34).

Durkheim's law of a movement from "mechanical" types of society, which are based on the similarities between men, to "organic" types, based on the division of labour, is established inductively, and chiefly by means of a comparison of the legal systems which prevail in societies of the two types. The explanation of the law appears to be in biological terms, since he finds the cause of the development in the increasing density of population, which according to him necessitates increasing specialization and division of labour. The explanation is not teleological. Civilization, which depends on an intensification of social life, is not an end foreseen; not a function of the division of labour, but merely its "*contre-coup*."¹

¹ (6), p. 308.

Hobhouse's sociological theories are based on a wide induction of facts derived from anthropology and history. He traces the development of the human mind in the spheres of cognition, of control over natural forces, of ethico-religious belief and practice, and of imaginative creation. As a result he attempts to establish a correlation between mental advance and the growth of the social fabric, as judged by the scale of organization, efficiency in control and direction, co-operation in the satisfaction of mutual needs, and the scope afforded for personal development. The correlation is rough and indirect, and there is in particular a lag in the accommodation of social to ethical developments. Yet in Hobhouse's view it is sufficiently clear to justify the hypothesis that the underlying force of historical evolution is to be found in the growing power of the mind, gradually obtaining a firmer grasp over the conditions of its development, but as yet not completely in control.

The argument is on the whole inductive, but since Hobhouse's sociological studies are part of a wider philosophical system, they are no doubt influenced by another hypothesis which he had come to accept, concerning the part played by mental forces in the whole process of evolution. This hypothesis, in turn, is formulated by Hobhouse on the basis of both a wide empirical survey and a metaphysical analysis of the logical requirements of systematic explanation, and he attaches great importance to the fact that these two lines of investigation lead to similar conclusions.

Of the main types of generalization enumerated above, those of the sixth group alone are reached deductively. There seem to be great differences of opinion regarding the way in which, in the case of economic theory, the transition is effected from deductive theory to the empirical facts. According to some authorities, the laws of economics are analytic propositions bringing out the implications of certain assumptions regarding human behaviour. In so far as these assumptions correspond to fact the implications will be taken to hold good in fact, in the absence of disturbing factors. Other authorities, however, regard economic laws as hypotheses which have to be tested or verified by the facts. To the latter authorities induction and deduction are integral parts of one set of logical operations; to the former induction has no verificatory function, the business of empirical studies being merely to reveal the fields within which theories otherwise established may be correctly applied, or to suggest new problems for deduction (22, 28).

B. THE COMPARATIVE METHOD

It will be clear from the above discussion that in a great deal of sociological work appeal has to be made to the comparative method, and some account of it is therefore appropriate.

In essentials this method is an application of a general rule of inductive logic : to vary the circumstances of a phenomenon with the object of eliminating variable and inessential factors, and so arriving at what is essential and constant. What is peculiar to the method is the use of data derived from different regions or different times. Reference to the types of regularity distinguished above will show that the use of comparative data is of varying importance. When a phenomenon under investigation exhibits sufficient individual variations within the same society, or at the same period of time, it may be possible to establish real connections without going outside that society or period. In the statistical study of crime, for example, differences of economic status, of education, of type of family life, of psychological make-up, and of hereditary disposition within the same society afford sufficient variation of circumstances to render possible some estimate of the relative significance of the different factors involved in criminal behaviour.

Yet even in the investigation of problems of this kind comparative studies may be of great importance, and are in some cases unavoidable. A study of the causes of suicide, for example, may be conducted within a particular group by noting its incidence in different economic grades, social classes, and religious denominations, and in relation to various psychopathic traits. But if the study were confined to a particular group certain empirical associations might easily be given undue importance. Thus a lower incidence of suicide among Catholics might turn out to be connected with the fact that in the particular locality studied Catholics lived mostly in rural areas, and in order to carry the inquiry further it would then be necessary to find areas in which religious denominations were differently distributed.

As soon as we move from the study of phenomena presenting individual variations to that of complex social formations or institutions, the importance of comparative studies becomes obvious. If, for example, we wish to know the conditions under which slavery, or serfdom, or any other forms of economic organization arise, it is

necessary to study their history in different societies. The problem of the extent to which a phenomenon like the rise of nationalism is conditioned by the need for economic or political unification, by the growth of the middle classes, or by war, or the problem of the limits set to national assimilation by racial heterogeneity or differences in religion, obviously requires wide comparative study for its solution. In short, as soon as sociology passes from the descriptive to the analytic level, the comparative method is essential alike for tracing genetic connections and for establishing any other mode of causal relationship.

It is important to note that the comparative method is not as such committed to any particular theory of social evolution, still less to evolution along a single line. Its primary object is to provide a social morphology, or a classification of the forms of social relationships, with a view to facilitating causal analysis. This includes analysis of the causes which explain why one form succeeds another, but we cannot assume at the outset of the inquiry that the laws of social change are necessarily evolutionary in character. It is true that in some of the earlier expositions of the comparative method the belief in regular or uni-linear evolution was implied, but this belief is not essential to the method, nor has it in fact been held by the more important thinkers.

Even the arch-evolutionist Herbert Spencer did not believe that every people necessarily passed through the same stages in regular and progressive order, and he insists that "it is only by taking into consideration the entire assemblage of societies that the law of evolution can be shown to be at work in society."¹ There is hardly a trace of the notion of automatic development in Tylor's work. As early as 1865 Tylor explained that the similarities in institutions or beliefs which can be found in different parts of the world may be variously accounted for, sometimes by the like working of men's minds under like conditions, sometimes by common descent, sometimes by borrowing direct or indirect.

Similarly Freeman (8), using historical material, carefully explains that likenesses may be due to direct transmission, independent invention and like circumstances, or common descent, and that the comparative method is not committed to any of these explanations *ab initio*. The notion of automatic or uni-linear evolution is also entirely foreign to the use made of the method by

¹ (34), iii, pp. 598 ff.

such writers as Sidgwick, in his *Development of European Polity* (30), or more recently H. Sée and Sombart, in their studies of the rise of capitalism and of the different forms of land-ownership, or Lord Bryce, in his study of democracy. It is to be observed, further, that the method can be and has been used without reference to any evolutionary theory whatever, as by Westermarck and Durkheim.

In applying the comparative method, one should certainly not start with hypothetical first stages and then deduce subsequent developments. In the absence of direct evidence of historical genesis, reconstructions of early stages should only be made, if at all, not at the beginning, but at the end of an inquiry. In other words, when we already know something of the nature of institutions, and of the conditions under which they came into being, we may be able to infer which institutions are likely to have existed in the circumstances in which prehistoric primitive man lived. Such reconstructions should be inferences from theories and facts otherwise established, and not the foundation on which sociological theory is made to rest.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROFESSOR HOBHOUSE TO PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY ¹

THE driving force of Hobhouse's thought was an ardent humanitarianism, an intense desire to serve mankind, by bringing to bear upon the problems of human life the methods and principles of rational thought. Quite early in his career as an undergraduate at Oxford (1883-7), he became convinced that an adequate understanding of social problems could be reached only on the basis of an underlying philosophy, and throughout his work the philosophic spirit, the urgent demand for an all-round or synoptic view characterized both his treatment of scientific data and his handling of practical affairs. His passion for humanity and justice gave him tremendous energy and driving power, while his love of truth and rare intellectual candour and willingness to profit from criticism and experience led him to ever fresh fields of investigation and ever deeper analysis of the foundations of knowledge. He illustrates in his life work his own view of reason as a continuous and comprehensive effort towards harmony in experience, whether in the field of practice or speculation, and those who saw him at work, whether as a teacher, journalist or chairman of trade boards, will have recognized in his endeavours the very same spirit which in other fields was exhibited in his persistent attempts at wider and more inclusive syntheses of the results of empirical research and metaphysical speculation.

The formative influences in his early career were the work of Spencer, the positivism of Comte (especially as interpreted by Bridges), and the social philosophy of Mill and Green. From Spencer he inherited the ambition for a philosophy which should be a synthesis of all the sciences, though he came to see that such a synthesis does not exhaust the entire field of philosophy, which, in his view, should include not only the scientific interpretation of reality, but every sort of appreciation of the real which conformed to rational tests. From Spencer, too, he obtained the evolutionary

¹ Public Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science on the 5th November 1929.

bias, though he soon discovered that a more thorough examination of the results of the evolutionary sciences than was achieved by Spencer would be required, before they could be made the basis of an evolutionary philosophy.

More important perhaps was the influence of Comte, one of the founders of modern sociology. Like Comte he stresses the inter-connection of social phenomena, and the consequent need for a science of society which should give a *vue d'ensemble* of social life. Like Comte he regards the idea of development as central in sociology, and like him again he came to formulate a generalization expressing a relation between the growth of mentality as exhibited in science, art, and industry and the various forms of social organization. With Comte he considers the emergence of sociology as a positive science as a crucial point in the history of man which as it matures should render increasingly possible an expansion of the area of conscious control over the trends of human development. He shares with Comte again a kind of religious humanitarianism. Humanity, not as a collective concept including all men and women, but as a spirit working in them, a spirit of harmony and expanding life and shaping their best actions, appeared to Hobhouse as it did to the best Positivist writers, as the highest incarnation known to us of the Divine. Yet despite all these resemblances the differences are no less profound, and necessitated indeed in Hobhouse's view a complete transformation and re-interpretation of the Comtean philosophy.

These differences can only be understood in the light of Hobhouse's attitude to the philosophy of the British Idealists which was dominant at Oxford and in the English and Scottish Universities generally in the eighties and the early nineties. While sympathizing with the Idealist school in their emphasis on spiritual development as a fundamental principle of the world order, while agreeing with them in stressing the organic nature of society as against the barren individualism of Spencer and his followers, he was never able to accept the view which reduces all reality to forms of the spiritual. "When everything is spiritual," he says, "the spiritual loses all distinctive significance," and he felt in particular that the Idealists never faced the central difficulty of the existence of error and evil. The spiritual principle could not, he thought, be regarded as co-extensive with reality nor even as the ground of reality. It is rather the principle of orderly development

within the world order, a force making for growing harmony but limited by the material it works upon and closely conditioned in its purposes by the existence of conflict and indifference among the elements of the real in so far as they are unco-ordinated. These convictions led Hobhouse to epistemological investigations (*Theory of Knowledge*, 1896), which resulted in what may be termed an organic view of rationality that was to be the basis of all his future work. This has affinities with idealist metaphysics (especially as worked out by Bosanquet) but is essentially realistic in its interpretation of the nature of knowledge. Accordingly, though Hobhouse was impressed by Green's notion of a spiritual principle realizing itself in the finite consciousness, he was unable to accept the epistemological arguments upon which Green based his view. Green was led to his conclusions by a re-consideration of the Kantian theory of knowledge. He argued that our knowledge of objects implied the reality of some unifying principle amidst the flux of fleeting impressions, something permanent amidst the variable manifold of sense experience, and he maintained that this permanent was essentially a system of relations, which again in his view was unintelligible except on the assumption of a combining or relating activity, a single eternal consciousness, of which particular existents were limited manifestations. This reasoning Hobhouse was unable to accept. He was convinced that the Idealists, in their development of Kant's theory, in their insistence that even in sense awareness relations were already involved, had cut the ground not only from Kant's feet but from their own. If the relationless sense datum was a figment, there appeared to be no reason for ascribing relations to the work of the mind. The whole notion of knowledge as a making or constructing appeared to Hobhouse fallacious. In knowledge we recognize things as combined or related but we do not create the relation through the act of knowing. But though Hobhouse repudiated Green's epistemological arguments for an eternal and timeless spiritual principle, it yet appeared to him that an empirical study might be made of the growth of mind, with the object of determining its rôle in evolution and that this might lead to a transformation at once of the Hegelian view of development and of the evolutionary theories of the scientific naturalists, and to an empirically founded conception of a self-directing humanity akin to that held by Comte and the Positivists.

But if Hobhouse's realism separated him from the Idealists,

it separated him equally from Comte. He recognized that Comte's repudiation of metaphysics as merely a transient stage in the growth of thought, valuable only as a solvent of theology, was not only based on an inadequate notion of the function of metaphysics, but itself implied an unconscious metaphysics. For the distinction between phenomena and reality, the denial that ultimate causes can be known, the repudiation of problems of origin and purpose really rested on metaphysical considerations due to Kant and Hume, and were, therefore, themselves not exempt from metaphysical scrutiny and criticism. The positive method in other words should be applied to knowledge itself, and all concepts including epistemological ones be referred back to experience and tested by their power of correlating and co-ordinating the empirically given order. Knowledge based on such "experiential reconstruction," in Hobhouse's view, gave us information of the real world and not of mere appearances. This position Hobhouse was prepared to defend not only against the relativism of the Positivists, but also against the destructive attacks of the Idealists, notably Bradley. He argued that the contradictions which Bradley alleged beset the categories of science and common sense, arose from an undue hardening of the concepts and their application to the real world without the necessary qualifications, and he was prepared to show their validity if correctly formed and legitimately applied, and that not as mere elements of uncertain value merged in higher concepts but as actual expressions of some part of the truth.

The stage that Comte called metaphysical Hobhouse preferred to call dialectical, which proceeds by analysis and co-ordination of concepts. This stage, of course, has its value in the history of thought but also its dangers. These arise from the tendency of concepts to form a world of their own, remote from the experiences from which they were originally crystallized, a world which may come to be regarded as independently real, or at any rate independently valid, and one which is set up as a standard to which the world of experience must conform on pain of being pronounced unreal. The positive phase, on the other hand, or in Hobhouse's phrase, the stage of experiential reconstruction, refuses to rest content with the ideal of an internally consistent conceptual order, but seeks constantly to refer back concepts to the facts of experience and to criticize them in the light of our

growing knowledge of the conditions which determine the development of thought itself. In this sense Hobhouse would agree with Comte in saying that in proportion as the treatment of a subject becomes scientific, its method ceases to be purely dialectical and becomes positive. He would, however, deny that positive thought is debarred from dealing with ultimate questions and he would insist that though Comte was right in stressing the fact that all knowledge is historically or sociologically conditioned, yet the positive method is capable of correcting to an increasing extent the errors arising from this circumstance, in proportion as it succeeds in unravelling the conditions under which thought develops and embodies this growing knowledge in its reconstruction of experience.

In the light of these considerations we can now understand Hobhouse's attitude to science and philosophy. Throughout his work he insisted on the close relation between them. One of the weaknesses of at any rate some of the idealist systems of thought was, in his view, that they tended to regard the work of science as secondary in importance and to think that metaphysical analysis and construction could be carried out independently of any particular scientific scheme. The true function of metaphysics was to co-ordinate the underlying ideas of the sciences and of experience generally. In his earlier work, however, he eschewed metaphysical construction on a large scale and looked to philosophy rather for criticism and analysis. But he always felt that the physical sciences at best formulated only one aspect of reality, and that there were other orders of experience, æsthetic, moral and religious, which had just as much claim to be taken into consideration in a synthetic account of the whole of reality. Already in an early paper he showed that so-called mechanistic explanation which generally pretends to keep close to experience affords in fact an excellent illustration of the evils of abstract dialectics, of what Comte called metaphysics. In its revolt against vagueness the mechanical mind seizes eagerly on those concepts which appear most easily verifiable, and then mistakes these luminous bits for the whole. It treats concepts quite in the dialectical spirit as independent quasi-entities, which can be combined, separated and re-combined, forgetful of the fact that elements conceptually distinguishable do not in fact operate separately, but determine and modify each other and are affected by the wholes of which they form parts. In his view of the

limitations of the natural sciences in relation to a complete world order he was confirmed by the recent developments in the physical sciences themselves. Yet he did not share the belief of some recent exponents that the newer theories tended to a subjective interpretation of nature or to destroy the idea of universal causation. He remarks that the whole theory of relativity arose from the requirements of universal uniformity, and the conviction that the slightest deviation from calculated results required an explanation either in terms of a hitherto unobserved factor, or of a modification of the law on which the calculations were framed. It is therefore to say the least remarkable to find that the theory should end by denying the validity of the conception of a uniform causal order. While repudiating subjectivist interpretations, he did, however, think that the effect of the recent discoveries was to do away with the notion of matter as a permanent substratum of all change and this confirmed him in his view, reached by a different road, that what we call matter is a rough formulation of one aspect of the real, while the term mind refers to another aspect of experience equally characteristic of the real, and he came to conceive of reality as a developing order whose fundamental characteristic is the interweaving of the mechanical and the teleological.

Though maintaining throughout his life a close interest in the physical sciences, he confined himself in his own scientific work to psychology and sociology. Broadly he concentrated on comparative and social psychology and on comparative institutions, including moral and religious ideas and customs. To these sciences he made magnificent contributions. In his *Mind in Evolution* (1901) he traces the growth of mind in the various forms of organic life from its earliest manifestation in the gropings of unconscious effort to the full clearness of articulate purpose. His findings were based on extensive experimental investigations which are now generally recognized as among the most important pioneer contributions to comparative psychology. He introduced new and ingenious tests, for example, the draw in test, the lock and key test, the box and pole test, and others, which have since been used by Watson, Yerkes and Koehler and other students of primate behaviour. (Cf. "The development of modern Comparative Psychology," by C. J. Warden, *Quarterly Journal of Biology*, Dec., 1928, vol. III, No. 4.)

In his studies of social psychology (*Mind in Evolution, Development and Purpose* and especially *Social Development*) Hobhouse has dealt

in a comprehensive manner with the psychological conditions of social life. He is particularly concerned with the part played by impulses and rational purposes in social life and the degree to which social development can be controlled by rational will. It is safe to say that his work will long outlive most of the one-sided treatises on social psychology that have appeared in rapid succession since his *Mind in Evolution*.

When Hobhouse approached the study of sociology he found that broadly speaking four tendencies could be distinguished in the study of human relations. There were, firstly, the treatises of the political philosophers, which though in many instances worked out in relation to urgent problems of an actual political situation, yet in the main proceeded in the dialectical manner by an analysis of conceptions and ideals and presented accordingly the characteristic virtues and vices of the dialectical methods. There was, in the second place, the attempt made by Comte to bring social science into relation with the general conditions of human development, to disentangle the trends and laws of social evolution. Fundamentally, in Hobhouse's view, Comte's method, which insisted on combining critical analysis of conceptions with a comprehensive grasp of historical fact, was sound. But unfortunately the lead given by Comte was not generally followed. Sociological investigation was diverted into other channels. This was in part due to a certain over-rigidity of Comte's system, but more fundamentally to the development of biology and the efforts made to apply the new biological conceptions to social evolution. These tendencies exemplified by Spencer and others Hobhouse regarded as in the main of the nature of a reaction. His view was that important as were the contributions which the biologist could make to the data of sociology, nothing but confusion could result from the efforts to apply biological principles uncritically to the interpretation of social evolution. "The last word of biology is the first of sociology." A great deal of Hobhouse's teaching both in his lectures and his books (cf. especially *Social Evolution and Political Theory* and *Social Development*) was devoted to a searching examination of biological theories of human progress, though the lessons he has taught us in this connection do not seem to have received the attention they deserve. Fourthly, the latter half of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of several special social sciences, such as comparative religion, comparative mythology, comparative law

and comparative institutions and morals to which later the teachers of sociology at the School of Economics, Westermarck and Hobhouse, themselves made magnificent contributions. Hobhouse's ambition was to link up these varied approaches to social science and to effect a vital synthesis between them.

To appreciate his point of view it is necessary to consider on the one hand the relation between social philosophy and sociology, and on the other the relation between the latter and the special social sciences. Social philosophy concerns itself primarily with the analysis and criticisms of conceptions and categories and with the problem of values ; social science adheres to a description of facts as they are or have been and to a determination of the agencies involved in social persistence and change. Yet the two studies are clearly closely connected. For in the first place ideals and values may and do themselves act as forces determining or conditioning changes and to that extent they belong to the " facts " of social life and their mode of genesis and development may and indeed must be studied by the methods of social science. Neglect of this consideration has often led to an unduly fatalistic view of the nature of social processes. In the second place, it is important for the philosopher engaged in the study of ethical ideas to keep in touch with historical fact. As Höffding pointed out, what is ethically obligatory must be sociologically possible. But though the studies are closely related they must nonetheless be kept distinct. It was perhaps the essential weakness of some of the Hegelians that they blurred the distinction and thus tended to confuse the ideal with the actual, while some of the Evolutionists made the converse error of confusing the actual with the ideal and attempted to deduce ethical criteria from the mere facts of evolutionary process, forgetful of the fact that if it is untrue that whatever is good, it is equally untrue that whatever comes to be is good. It was necessary, therefore, to keep the study of values and the study of actual development and its conditions distinct. A complete account of social life would involve a union of the two studies.

Hobhouse came to regard the scientific side of sociology as especially concerned with the problem of correlating the various aspects of social life as reflected in social institutions. For the simpler societies he elaborated a method for correlating the various forms of social institutions with economic status as measured by the degree of control attained over natural forces. This led to an exten-

sive statistical investigation in which Dr. Wheeler and the present writer took part. (Cf. *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Societies : an essay in correlation.* 1915.) But Hobhouse did not confine himself to anthropological data. His investigations in comparative and social psychology and the history of civilization led him to formulate a theory of mental development of a far-reaching kind, and he sought to determine whether there was any correlation between mental growth and social development. In order to test this hypothesis it became necessary to lay down criteria of development and in his work in this connection he found a means of linking up his scientific and philosophical studies. For development may be studied both as a question of historical fact and from the point of view of ethical valuation. The scientific problem is to correlate the several aspects of social change in the light of non-ethical criteria analogous to those that might be employed by the biologist. The ethical problem is to determine whether the development thus established—if it be established—satisfies ethical criteria. The former set of criteria he deduces from the nature of development. They are scale of organization, efficiency in control and direction, co-operation in the satisfaction of mutual needs and freedom or scope for personal development, or briefly scale, efficiency, mutuality and freedom. He then argues that in accordance with his ethical theory, complete development, that is advance in all four directions, involves the most ample and consistent fulfilment of human purposes and is therefore a rational end, or good, while partial or one-sided developments may be good or bad according as they affect the whole. It is not possible here to follow his elaborate study of the data of history and anthropology. The result of his survey is to suggest that there has been correlated growth as measured by his criteria and the hypothesis is urged that this expresses the growing power of mind in man as evidenced in the phases of mental evolution already distinguished by him in his work on comparative psychology.

To understand the nature of this correlated growth we must consider Hobhouse's view of society. Societies or communities, he thinks, though not organisms, exhibit varying kinds and degrees of organic character. They are systems of interdependent parts, maintaining themselves as wholes, by the mutual adaptation of the parts to the requirements of the whole. In so far as there is genuine organic harmony, in so far as communities rest upon free co-oper-

ation, their parts have both interdependence and self-determination. Actual communities, of course, realize the principle of organic harmony only imperfectly, for in them the interdependence of the parts is marred by much self-centred indifference and mutuality of service is limited by inhibitions and suppressions. These limitations are deeply rooted, since they are due to the fact that human beings not only have need of one another, but also limit and obstruct one another. Individuals are mutually interdependent, yet each individual, and, which is perhaps more important, each group of individuals, is in varying degrees self-centred and even hostile to others. The result is that though somehow the community maintains itself as a whole, and the needs of the common life are somehow met, yet within wide limits individuals, in following out their own lives, impinge upon one another's activities, hinder and thwart one another, and this not only out of selfish individualism, but because genuine social needs come into conflict with one another and no one can grasp the needs of the community in their entirety or is aware of the conditions requisite for their harmonious fulfilment. The problem of social development is in fact how to reconcile individuality and sociality, how to secure those conditions in which each individual in realizing his own powers served the social whole, and in which at the same time that social whole helped him and sustained him in the realization of his faculties. Social development Hobhouse argues depends upon or expresses the growth of social mentality, that is the progressive recognition by individuals of their mutual relations in the common good. By social mentality is not meant a unitary common self or mind, nor even an articulate system of ideas and purposes, but rather a mental condition widely dominating thought and action, a sum of habits, dispositions, ideas effective in a group of interacting minds. Such a group constitutes not a mind or will, but rather a network of minds, related to one another in a thousand different ways, each conscious of himself but only dimly aware of the nature of the interaction between himself and his fellows, and certainly not aware of the whole in all its complexity. The growth of the common mind and will in range, in impartiality and generality, is reflected in the advancing movement of civilization. By this is not meant that there is necessarily a strict causal relation between them, but rather that there is a broad correlation between systems of institutions and the mentality behind them. The underlying force of historical evolution, Hob-

house claims, is to be found in the growing power of mind and the essence of his thesis would seem to be that the work of the mind lies deeper than its conscious manifestations, that it is fundamentally an effort towards unity and integration. The sense of this unity is what constitutes the spirit of the social structure, and lies at the root of religion and morals. In the world of knowledge the rational impulse is seen in the effort towards articulate system, in the world of practice, in the striving towards a harmonious life. The work of mind is social, since it depends upon interaction between countless individuals, and operates through tradition, selection, and co-operation. Not being the expression of a unitary mind, social development is not continuous nor regular.

It does not move with the assured sweep of a planet in its orbit on a mechanically determined curve, nor does it resemble the inevitable unfolding of a germ through predetermined stages with harmonious correlation of parts to an assigned maturity of type. It more nearly resembles a series of efforts to grapple with an obstacle the nature of which is only half understood, which in consequence, when forced to yield at one point returns to another.

The method throughout is one of trial and error, yet gradually the growing knowledge of the conditions underlying development come to be utilized for the furtherance of organic harmony. Social development goes on in many distinct centres and reveals far-reaching divergencies, yet by ever widening syntheses higher levels are reached.

Professor Hobhouse next contends that development as defined by him is a rational good. Whatever else the good may be it is at any rate that which satisfies human impulse. The rational good must accordingly be one in which the whole body of impulse-feeling is linked up into a harmonious system, guided and sustained by all-embracing purposes, a harmony carried consistently through the world of mind and its experience. Such harmony can only be realized by the co-operation of all mankind, resting upon free and rational conviction, and aiming at the collective control of all the conditions of life, internal and external. Social and ethical development have thus a common end and can be measured by the same criteria. The coincidence is not a mere dialectical trick, but is rooted in the fact that the good is the principle of organic harmony, and to the extent to which social development embodies this principle it is good. Nevertheless, social development only coincides

with ethical development "as a whole and in its completeness." In actual fact development proceeds by a union of partial developments and these may not be, and often are not, in conformity with ethical requirements. What is claimed is that on the whole a substantive advance has been made as judged by ethical standards. In the extension of organic harmony Hobhouse finds the reality of progress. This is essentially the work of rational mind working in individual centres, but expanding in scope and articulateness linking up partial growths into wider and wider unities and having for its final purpose the harmonious fulfilment of human potentialities on a world scale. Progress is accordingly not automatic but depends upon human thought and will. The belief in the reality of progress rests ultimately on the fundamental rationality of mind, on the possibility of forming an intelligible conception of a good common to humanity, and of securing an effective will directed to this good. Such a conception is not yet an effective force, and there is always the danger of disruptive agencies gaining the upper hand, yet in the end "it will conquer all invalid ideas, because they will at some point contradict themselves, while that which is valid will appeal at an infinity of points, and all of them will be found at last to lead to the same centre. This is the final ground of the belief that in ethics good, as in science truth, will prevail."

The discussion in *Social Development* is the culmination of a series of works which collectively are entitled *The Principles of Sociology* (1918-24). In the first of these (*The Metaphysical Theory of the State*) he gave what is now generally recognized as the most penetrating criticism of the Hegelian theory of the State, and prepared the ground for a social philosophy which would do justice at once to individual development and the requirements of the common good. In the *Rational Good* (1921) he works out his ethical theory of the good as a harmony of mind with its objects, a consilience of all endeavour in a comprehensive system of purposes. The theory is essentially eudæmonistic without being hedonistic. In the *Elements of Social Justice* (1922) he applies his ethical theory to the problems of political and economic organization and provides what is perhaps the best exposition of a liberal social philosophy. Taken together these works constitute perhaps the most scientific and comprehensive attempt that has yet been made to trace out the working and possibilities of rational purpose in social evolution.

The development of sociology as an academic discipline in

England is very largely due to Hobhouse. A study of the university syllabuses and the programmes of the School of Economics shows that together with Professor Westermarck he gradually arrived at a scheme of teaching which will compare favourably with anything to be found in the universities of Europe and America. In stressing the synthetic point of view, in his clear demarcation of the relation between the philosophical and the scientific approach to the study of society, in insisting on the importance of painstaking detailed studies as well as of comparative investigations, above all in elaborating a sociological methodology, he has laid down the general lines which sociologists will for long have to follow, if sociology is to be placed firmly "on the secure path of science." Recently, many attacks have been made on the use of the comparative method in sociology, but these are for the most part superficial and ill-founded. The urgent need of the moment is the further development of the comparative study of institutions. Co-operation is required not only with anthropologists but with the students of history, comparative law, comparative religion and so forth. Such co-operation is now the more feasible as the importance of the sociological point of view is gradually beginning to be realized by the students of these sciences themselves. Further development may also rightly be expected in social psychology. This has always formed an integral part of the teaching of sociology at the School, but there is ample room for extension particularly on the lines of what may be called differential social psychology, that is the study of the mentality of social groupings such as classes, occupations, nations, races. Biology, too, may be expected to yield valuable aid. The history of the impact between biology and sociology whether in England or abroad proves conclusively that what is now important is to get the biology treated in its right proportion, neither ignored nor allowed to dominate the subject. Above all the correlating function of sociology must be borne in mind and the danger avoided of reducing sociology to a specialism among other specialisms.

Hobhouse's work in comparative psychology and sociology forms part of a general theory of reality. The view of the good as rational postulates a moral order which is universal, binding upon all rational beings that come into relation with one another. It involves the notion of humanity, perhaps of all conscious beings as a unity, though Hobhouse is anxious to point out that this unity

must not be personified but conceived rather as a principle of growth or development, an effort towards harmony, gradually widening in scope and comprehensiveness, a unity that may be described perhaps as a unity of spirit. These implications of his ethical theory are taken by Hobhouse at least to confirm the view of reality reached by him in his *Development and Purpose* (1913; revised and largely rewritten, 1927), which may be regarded as his most comprehensive effort to synthesize his philosophical and scientific work. He shows that development consists in the extension of harmony through a series of syntheses. It proceeds by the liberation of elements originally in conflict, the building up of structures of varying degrees of plasticity and coherence. The power behind this liberation and these syntheses is mind, essentially a correlating activity, manifested in all orderly structure, but more clearly in all living organisms, which are interpreted as a modification of mechanical structure by teleological factors, and eventually emerging in the form of conscious purpose in the human mind, as expressed in the advancing movement of civilization. Mind is on this view not co-extensive with reality, but is the principle of orderly growth within it. It is limited by the material it works upon, and its purposes themselves undergo development. His fundamental principle which he entitles "conditional teleology" is examined both from the point of view of the logical requirements of systematic explanation and its value as an instrument in scientific investigation especially in the fields of biology and sociology.

Hobhouse's metaphysical theory may be profitably compared with other recent views of the nature of the evolutionary process. Lloyd Morgan's "levels of emergence," Smuts's "wholes" closely resemble Hobhouse's notion of the stages of correlation through which mind passes in the course of development. But while Lloyd Morgan excludes all problems of agency and direction from the sphere of science, relegating them to what he calls theory of reality, Hobhouse attempts a synthesis of the two and claims to show that the *nisus* towards higher levels of emergence is due to a correlating factor, which operates with cumulative effect in all elements of the real, though it is also conditioned by them. For Smuts, the holistic principle though described as an organizing, ordering, and relating activity is not to be identified with mind, which in his view is an organ only of one form of wholeness, and that a comparatively recent one in the evolutionary order. Hobhouse, on the other hand,

regards the existence of structured wholes as evidence for the operation of a central mind, which is the organ of correlation and whose final end is harmony. All, however, use the conception of a *nîsus* towards wholeness and it is arguable that Hobhouse has faced more frankly than the others the teleological implications of this conception.

Hobhouse finds it extremely difficult to characterize adequately the form of unity that belongs to what he calls the Central Mind. The Mind of Humanity, though a true constituent of the permanent mind is not identical with it nor exhaustive of it. The growth of the empirical mind as revealed in the world of organisms and in human societies depends upon conditions already laid down in the general plan of things which must be supposed to operate in some sense throughout the whole process of development. Here Hobhouse occasionally employs language which brings him extraordinarily near to the position of the Idealists. "The unity of mind," he says, "is not created, but discovered in the development of individual minds. As a reality it is that which determines development from the beginning." Yet it is not the whole of things, but only a factor within it, whose purpose is conditioned by other elements as yet unorganized. We must not expect to be able to express this unity in terms of our partial experience. It resembles neither the unity of individual personality nor that of social groupings, but is something that pervades the world structure, a common factor or principle of interconnection among all elements of the real working towards harmonious correlation, a factor which individual minds come to recognize as they mature.

This general position, Hobhouse thinks, is supported both by an empirical study of mental evolution and by an analysis of the logical presuppositions of knowledge, and he claims that its peculiar strength lies in that both types of argument lead in the main to the same conclusion. But above all it is strengthened by certain deep-rooted convictions, which, in his view, must form the fixed points of any rational philosophy and which rest, not so much on argument, as on simple, direct and deeply felt experiences. These may best be stated in his own words.

The first is the conviction of goodness—goodness neither laid up in heaven nor moving as a metaphysical principle upon earth, but warm and real in the hearts of living men and women. There are those whose faith is founded on inner certainty of the Divine. There are

others of us who have seen something of the qualities we call divine in man, sometimes doubtless sadly broken and mingled with a different clay, yet bearing to any understanding mind the ineffaceable stamp. And there are those more greatly privileged who have learnt to know some nature crystal-clear, compact of mother-love, with thoughts by instinct bent on others' needs, sensitively tender, yet of indomitable spirit, fearless and believing no evil, through very selflessness enjoying and reflecting the charm of life. This, the sceptic may say, is to describe a woman as a man sees her in the hour of romance. It may be so, and it may be that in that hour some real things flash out which are afterwards obscured. Be that as it may, there are not wanting those who have put the vision to the test of lifelong companionship only to find it gaining in clearness and truth. No other relation of life can yield such intimacy of understanding, yet comradeship in great causes does not fail to reveal men of noble thought and faithful heart, men who sink themselves in their mission, but do not let their friends sink, men whose staunchness stands the test of long years. The being of such men and women is not a matter of faith but of experience, though an experience which like every other requires the eye that can see. But what general conclusions can philosophy draw from it? you ask. If there are the noble and the good, are there not also the mean-spirited and the knaves? Why should the one be more significant than the other? To this question the theory of development supplies a ready answer. The failures are the undeveloped, and if you would know what development can do you must look at the successes. More precisely, we conceive the elements of things acting severally each on its own lines, and yet drawn together in a relation which at its height becomes Love. Whatever is repellent, fearful, suspicious, unimaginative, brutal, has remained, relatively speaking, self-centred. All that love touches has the nobler quality. But of this we may be sure. No man or woman such as I have ventured to speak of, nor yet any such quality as theirs, though less developed and marred with imperfections, ever came out of the clay, unless the clay itself has mind. No rational observer (if we may revert to that fancy) from another universe would admit such an hypothesis. With the utmost allowance for what development could do he would demand some continuity, and if he was assured that their origin was from matter he could only infer that matter was alive and instinct with some very wonderful imaginations. As the geologist is sure that the isolated boulder does not spring out of the alluvial on which it rests, but is a detached fragment of the mother rock, so with even stronger logic would he refer the radiant soul to its matrix of spiritual being. Every detailed hypothesis of origin that we may construct may be faulty. The immanent spirit may be no nearer the truth than the transcendent Creator. The idea of development may pass away like that of special creation. One truth will stand firm. The world which has engendered such beings as we have known is no mean world. It is a world worth living and fighting for, the world which they have trodden. It is the dwelling of a spiritual power, be it what it may, which will some day come into its own, be that

how it may. Of the how and the why our philosophies give what account they can, but behind them lies something surer than faith, firmer than abstract reasoning, those most intimate and sure experiences which reveal the true capabilities of the human soul.

CHAPTER THREE

THE LIFE AND WORK OF EDWARD WESTERMARCK ¹

EDWARD WESTERMARCK was born in Helsingfors on 21 November, 1862. His father was the University Bursar, Nils Christian Westermarck, whose family moved to Finland from Sweden during the first half of the eighteenth century. By temperament reserved and outwardly cold, he yet evidently took a warm interest in his son's scientific aspirations and gave him complete freedom in the choice of his career. His mother was the daughter of Alexander Blomquist, professor of the History of Learning and University Librarian. In contrast to his father, she had a sunny disposition which Westermarck in a great measure inherited. His memory of her was clearly dominated by a feeling of infinite devotion and affection. As a child Westermarck suffered from chronic catarrh complicated by asthma, and this prevented him from sharing in the normal active life of children of his own age and later from taking part in games and sports at school.

As an undergraduate Westermarck early developed an antipathy to German metaphysics which, he concluded, "gave the impression of depth because it was so muddy." He was, on the other hand, greatly attracted by the English Empiricists, where he found clearness and a sense of reality, and above all a readiness to test all hypotheses in the light of experience. In close connection with his philosophical studies Westermarck was deeply interested in religious questions, and here he was greatly influenced by Spencer's *First Principles* and Mill's essays on religion which he read in a Swedish translation. He rapidly became an agnostic and remained so for the rest of his life. In his later elaborate studies of religion there is to be detected, beneath the outwardly calm and detached exposition, a persistent mood of irritation and hostility. Yet in a deeper sense he was not without religious feeling. He retained throughout life a sense of the unfathomable mystery of the world and of the inherent limitations of human knowledge, but the only expression he found for this feeling was in music. Any attempt to embody it in a formulated creed was bound in his view to be

¹ A lecture delivered at the London School of Economics, Cambridge, 1940.

tainted with anthropomorphism, and he even regarded all such efforts as blasphemous. His attitude to death and immortality was one of humble submission to the unknowable and acceptance of the inevitable, an attitude which again can hardly be described as irreligious.

The plan of writing a work on the origin and development of moral ideas came to Westermarck during the discussions at a philosophical society led by his teacher, Professor Thiodolf Rein, by whose candid and humble search for truth he was evidently deeply moved. The problem, however, on which he began to work was the limited one of the nature and origin of sexual modesty. He approached this along evolutionary lines. He made himself thoroughly familiar with the main principles of Darwinism and early saw that the theory of natural selection, especially in its application to instinct, was to prove of great importance in the study of social phenomena. He soon found that his problem raised the much wider question of the relation between the sexes and their historical development. He became interested in the hypothesis of primitive promiscuity, which Darwin took for granted, on the ground of the investigations made by Morgan, Lubbock, and McLennan, and at the age of twenty-five found it necessary to learn English in order to go back to the original authorities. He was soon convinced that the attempt to reconstruct the primitive forms of social institutions must lead to arbitrary conclusions unless their fundamental causes, i.e. their biological and psychological conditions, were first ascertained. In particular, we had, he thought, no right to assume the universal prevalence of any social phenomenon unless it could be shown that its causes were universally present and were not counteracted. He was thus led to the hypothesis that the family, consisting of father, mother, and children being rooted in essential, biological conditions already existed in primitive times, while the alleged causes, say, of group-marriage, or marriage by capture, were not such as to justify the belief in their universal prevalence at any stage of human civilization.

These general ideas gradually took shape in a plan to write a book on the history of marriage, and in 1887 he came to England in order to collect his material in the library of the British Museum, to him an island of bliss and a "very temple as well." Through Sully, with whom he formed an intimate friendship, he was introduced to intellectual circles in England. The book appeared with

a preface by Wallace and had an immediate scientific success. The massive learning of the work so impressed reviewers that it was declared to be the "earnest labour of the chief part of a life-time." Later, Westermarck tells us, he came upon the belief that its author was a kind of patriarch, and twice he was taken for his own son. The publication of the book was in his own view the most momentous happening in his life. "It has been said," he adds, "that marriage has many thorns, but celibacy no roses. For my own part I would say that marriage has brought me many roses—and bachelorhood no thorns."

The success of the book on marriage encouraged Westermarck to proceed with his plans of a much larger inquiry into the origin and development of moral ideas. It is clear that the main concepts took definite shape in his mind quite early in his career, but it took nearly eighteen years to carry out the task he had set himself. His work was interrupted by teaching duties at his university, where he was appointed Docent in 1890; but in 1893 he was awarded a scholarship which enabled him to go back to the British Museum and to Oxford, where he met Tylor and Marett. A further scholarship in 1897 gave him three years' quiet work, which he again spent in England. At the meetings of the Aristotelian Society he renewed his acquaintance with English scholars, and it was here that he met Shand and became his warm friend. "I have in great measure," he tells us, "to thank my friend Shand for my conception of an English gentleman as seen at his best."

In planning his work on the comparative study of Morals, Westermarck saw that it would be most useful to him to acquire first-hand knowledge of other cultures than our own. He intended to go to the East to study both civilized and savage races. He sailed, however, first to Morocco and, realizing the difficulties involved in getting to know even a single country, he never went farther. In the course of three decades he spent altogether nine years in Morocco, and the results of his labours were embodied in his trilogy on the customs and ideas of the Moors.¹

In 1903 Westermarck again visited England to arrange for the publication of the first volume of his *Moral Ideas*. It was then that he first met Victor Branford, who invited his co-operation in a scheme for starting an English sociological society. Through

¹ Cf. *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*; *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco*; *Wit and Wisdom in Morocco*.

Branford he made the acquaintance of J. Martin White, through whose generous benefaction the University of London was enabled to inaugurate the teaching of Sociology, and later to establish professorships of sociology. As a Member of Parliament Martin White, it appears, came to the conclusion that it would be good for M.P.s to have a training in sociology, and his endowment was intended to provide facilities for such training. Under his benefaction Westermarck was appointed University Lecturer in Sociology for a period of three years, and during that period courses were also given by L. T. Hobhouse on Comparative Ethics and Comparative Psychology and by A. C. Haddon on Ethnology. In 1907 a permanent chair in sociology was endowed, and Hobhouse was appointed to it. At the same time Westermarck's Lectureship was converted into a chair with a five years' tenure. In 1912 the appointment was renewed for eighteen years more. Meanwhile Westermarck had been appointed to the chair of moral philosophy at Helsingfors and the two posts were held by him concurrently. For a number of years he devoted the first two terms to his work at Helsingfors, the summer term to the School of Economics, and the remaining summer months to his investigations in Morocco. In his scientific activities Westermarck adhered rigidly to the plans which he had formed when a young man. He lived long enough to realize these in his comprehensive works on the history of marriage, the origin and development of moral ideas, and on the ideas and customs of the Moors. On three occasions he took an active part in politics, namely, in organizing the International Address to the Tsar on behalf of Finland, in the movement for its independence during the war of 1914-18 and in the Aaland campaign, and it is generally recognized that the services he thus rendered to his country were of the highest value. It is clear that the chief passion of his life was the pursuit of truth, and that he found his greatest happiness in those hours when he could work in peaceful solitude. Two other sources of happiness were given him—the love of nature and the experience of deep and enduring friendships. It is a great pleasure to those who knew and worked with Westermarck to have his own assurance that in the main he had achieved the goals which he had set to himself and that the sources of his happiness were not such as to run dry with advancing age. His capacity for the appreciation of beauty and for friendship grew no less with increasing years, and he continued with his scientific work right up to a few days before

his death on 3 September, 1939. There can be few people so justified as he was in declaring that if he had to live his life over again, he would on the whole follow the same path as he had in fact chosen.

In coming now to deal with Westermarck's work, I may best begin perhaps with his conception of the scope and methods of sociology. Sociology he defined as the science of social phenomena, and in this sense it was a collection of studies, including such disciplines as economics, politics, and the history of law. He himself was, however, most interested in developing that branch of sociology which he called the comparative study of social institutions, and the bulk of his work was devoted to this task. Social institution he defined as a social relationship regulated by society and sanctioned by it. The study of social institutions thus involves an account of the general nature of society and of the different forms in which it appears and of the sanctions and regulations employed by it. This is given in the *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, in which the forms of social regulations are studied in detail and analysed psychologically by reference to the fundamental emotions of approval and disapproval. The institution of marriage was dealt with in much greater detail in a number of works, in which it is examined both comparatively and in reference to the particular area of Morocco.

The method which he employed was in the main the comparative one. This aimed in the first place at a classification of the products of culture found among different peoples in different parts of the world; for example, the classification of religious beliefs and practices under the headings of animism, totemism, ancestor worship, polytheism, monotheism, or of marriage under the headings of marriage by capture, marriage by consideration, or monogamy, polygamy, polyandry, and group-marriage. From classification, he thought, we could move to causal explanation by a comparison of the circumstances common to a cultural phenomenon and those which could be shown to vary without corresponding variation in the phenomenon. Westermarck frequently uses the terms cause and origin interchangeably. By the cause of a social phenomenon he means in the first place the biological conditions determining it or at least giving it survival value. Thus the cause of marriage as an institution he finds in the need of prolonged marital and paternal protection. Such protection, he thought, was an indispensable condition of survival in the case of

a species in which the number of the young is small, the period of infancy prolonged, and the supply of food such as to hinder a permanently gregarious mode of life. Through natural selection instincts would be developed impelling the male to stay with the female and the young and to care for them. These instincts, together with the sex instinct, are at the root of the family as an institution. Under their impulsion it became the habit in primitive times for a man and a woman or several women to live together and to rear their offspring in common. The habit was sanctioned by custom and law, upheld by the tendency of members of the group to feel resentment against a man who forsook his mate and children. Of this set of relationships marriage is an integral part. As Westermarck puts it : marriage is rooted in the family rather than the family in marriage. Further, the instincts and sentiments which gave rise to the family are so deep-rooted that they are likely to preserve it, even though they may no longer be necessary for the survival of the race. In this example, which, I think, is typical of a good deal of Westermarck's work, causal explanation is in terms of the Darwinian theory of natural selection. In other cases the causes of social phenomena are sought in the motives which may be supposed to underlie them. Thus, in his study of human sacrifice, he argues that comparative investigation shows that human victims are offered in war, to avert or stop a famine or drought, to ward off perils from the sea, or to prevent the death of some particular person. This, he thinks, justifies the conclusion that human sacrifice is largely a method of life insurance, based on the idea of substitution.¹

Two further points require elucidation. In the first place, Westermarck was not at all impressed by the objections raised against his views by the followers of Durkheim and others on the ground that social phenomena cannot be explained in terms of individual psychology. Who could deny, he argued, that even collective behaviour involves the actions of individuals? When we speak of the customs or religion of a people, we refer to something that the individual members of it have in common, and, in the last resort, they are the outcome of mental activity. Further, the force by which customs are maintained can only in the long run be understood in terms of an analysis of the moral consciousness, and he thinks himself justified in concluding that this is ultimately based on the retributive emotions collectively felt and given

¹ *Moral Ideas*, I, pp. 440 seq.

a measure of generality and impartiality within a given community. In the study of particular social phenomena such as rites and ceremonies, Westermarck did not share the view held by Rivers that the task of disentangling the motives underlying them was hopeless. He thought that valuable information could be obtained, not so much from what natives say *about* their rites, as from what they say at the moment when they perform them, and he gives many examples of such interpretations from his own studies in Morocco.¹ Westermarck here perhaps over-simplifies the issue. He does not inquire into the various ways in which social forces react upon human motives by encouraging some and inhibiting others and by determining the manner in which they find expression. Unless this is done, it is difficult to account for the variations which Westermarck himself studies in the institutions and beliefs of mankind.

The second point that requires here to be mentioned relates to the use made by Westermarck of the theory of evolution. We have seen that in explaining social phenomena he was inclined to look for the biological conditions underlying them and to appeal to the theory of natural selection in accounting for the psychological make-up of man. He was not, however, interested in tracing stages of development, and in particular he repudiated in even his earliest writings the belief in a unilinear sequence of institutional stages. From the point of view of method, the reconstruction of the past, in the absence of direct historical evidence, stands on the same footing as the prediction of the future. In both cases it is necessary to know the causes of the phenomena and to ascertain whether they are likely to be operative in the period in question without being counteracted. Thus in dealing with the family Westermarck thinks we are justified in concluding that it existed already in primitive times, because the conditions necessitating it are then likely to have prevailed, and, further, that it is likely to persist in modern society, because the instincts and sentiments underlying it have become so deeply rooted that they will continue to demand satisfaction. The tracing of trends of change is likely to be misleading unless we are able at the same time to ascertain the causes of the changes. In the controversy between the diffusionists and the upholders of independent origination, Westermarck followed the lead of Tylor. Similarity in the cultural phenomena found among different peoples is to be ascribed "sometimes to the like working of men's minds

¹ Cf. "Methods in Social Anthropology," *J.R.A.I.*, 1936.

under like conditions, and sometimes it is a proof of blood relationship or of intercourse, direct or indirect, between the races among whom it is found."¹

In dealing with widespread or universal elements of culture, such as the right of property, punishment, the various forms of marriage, the rules of exogamy, and so forth, the diffusionist hypothesis seemed to him in the highest degree improbable. But he was quite prepared to resort to diffusion in dealing with particular problems, such as those which are connected with decorative art or with proverbs, and he gives examples from his own studies in Morocco.²

The greatest difficulty of the comparative method is due to the necessity under which it labours of detaching or isolating cultural phenomena from their context and the risk it thus runs of distorting their real character. Of this risk Westermarck was well aware, but he thought that analysis and comparison were essential to sociology as to other sciences, and that if due caution was observed, the difficulties inherent in the method could in a large measure be overcome.

Passing now to the substance of Westermarck's work, I propose to confine attention to his theory of morals and to certain aspects of his study of marriage. In his moral theory Westermarck was profoundly influenced by Adam Smith, whose *Theory of Moral Sentiments* he considered as the most important contribution to moral psychology made by any British thinker,³ and by the theory of natural selection. Adam Smith had given an analysis of approval and disapproval in terms of sympathy. We approve of the feelings of another when we recognize that, if we or rather an impartial spectator were in the same situation, we should experience the same feeling, and we disapprove of them when on entering into the situation we cannot share those feelings. In his account of merit and demerit, Adam Smith had moreover laid special stress on the feelings of resentment and gratitude. According to him an action has merit if it is the approved object of gratitude and that has demerit which is the approved object of resentment. In other words, an act is meritorious if an impartial spectator can be expected to sympathize with the gratitude which it evokes, and, similarly, an act is

¹ E. B. Tylor, *Researches into the Early History of Mankind* (1878), p. 5.

² Cf. "Methods in Social Anthropology," *J.R.A.I.*, 1936, pp. 226 *seq.*

³ *Ethical Relativity*, p. 71.

to be condemned if the resentment aroused by it is likely to be shared by an impartial spectator. Westermarck's analysis starts with the emotions of gratitude and resentment, which he designates the retributive emotions and of which he gives a biological account in accordance with the theory of natural selection. He shows that gratitude or retributive kindly emotions has the tendency to retain a cause of pleasure, while resentment has the tendency to remove a cause of pain, and that these emotions are therefore both useful to the species. The difference in their prevalence is, he thinks, easily explained by the fact that living in groups is of advantage only to certain species and that even gregarious animals have many enemies but few friends. The retributive emotions are not however as such moral. They only become so if they acquire the three qualities of generality, disinterestedness, and impartiality. The disinterestedness is rendered possible by the presence in us of the power to sympathize with the feelings of others, and above all, by the altruistic sentiment which is an active disposition to promote the welfare of its object. The generality and impartiality of moral rules are due, he thinks, to the fact that they express not the emotions felt by isolated individuals, but those felt generally in a society in accordance with custom. Custom is general in its nature, i.e. it formulates what is expected from everyone in the same circumstances. Custom is also impersonal and impartial, i.e. is equally binding on all coming under the rule and under its influence there arises the feeling not so much that "I must do this" as that "this must be done." Westermarck has been accused of arguing in a circle in maintaining that custom is the factor responsible for making the retributive emotions disinterested and impartial, while holding at the same time that custom is a moral rule only on account of the disapproval called forth by its breach.¹ But I am not sure that the charge can be sustained. A moral emotion is, I take it, in Westermarck's view, a public emotion, that is, one likely to be felt generally in a given community. Customary rules are in their origin generalization of emotional tendencies, but having come to be established in a given community they are upheld by the tendency of their violation to arouse disapproval whether or not the act in itself, i.e. apart from its being condemned by custom, would arouse emotions in particular individuals. The circle is thus not vicious.

¹ Cf. Dewey, *Anthropology and Ethics*, Ch. III of the *Social Sciences*, ed. Ogburn and Goldenweiser, p. 28.

Westermarck describes his theory as a form of ethical relativity, and it is important to inquire what precisely he understands by relativity and how far his view can be consistently maintained. The most general form in which he states his theory is that the predicates of all moral judgments are ultimately based on emotions. To say that an act is good or bad is to say that it is apt to give rise to the emotions of approval or disapproval, or perhaps a little more accurately, to refer the act to a class of acts which have come to be called good or bad because of their tendency to arouse these emotions. The concepts of good and of ought are in his view distinct and not deducible from one another. But he repudiates the claim that either is ultimate and unanalysable. The notion of goodness springs from the emotion of moral approval: that of duty from moral disapproval. Thus, to say that an act ought to be done implies that its omission has the tendency to arouse disapproval, and to say that it ought not to be done implies that its performance has the tendency to call forth disapproval. It is because the ought-judgment has implicit in it the notion of a prohibition that the idea of duty has come to carry with it a suggestion of antagonism to natural inclination, and that philosophers have even tended to restrict the notion of duty to acts that result from a successful struggle against opposite inclination. In a similar way, Westermarck gives an analysis of other terms used in morals, such as right, wrong, just, and unjust, merit, virtue, and vice. In all cases he thinks the qualities assigned to the subjects of moral judgments are generalizations derived from approval or disapproval and they indicate tendencies to arouse one or other of these emotions. The assertions made in ethical propositions are in this respect similar to the propositions asserting that something is fearful, lovable, wonderful, and the like. In short, what we are asserting is the presence of dynamic tendencies or the power of arousing certain emotions in the acts of which they are predicated. In this sense they may be true or false, since these tendencies are either present or absent in a given community. The approval or disapproval on the other hand being, in Westermarck's view, emotions, are not capable of being either true or false and to claim objective validity for them is therefore meaningless.

How far was Westermarck able to maintain this position consistently? To answer this question we must consider his views of the part played by reflection in the growth of the moral consciousness and his account of the variations of the moral judgments found

in different societies. Since the higher emotions are stimulated by awareness of objects, they are bound to be affected by changes in knowledge. Thus our anger with a person who has told a lie may disappear or even change to approval when we discover that he acted from a desire to save life. In this way reflection has affected the emotions of approval and disapproval by revealing more fully the character of the objects which evoke them or by freeing them from associations which have gathered round them. A few illustrations may serve to make this clear. In the first place, we find gradually that indignation is properly directed only against acts deliberately intended to cause pain, and our anger dies when we realize that pain has been caused to us by an inanimate object or by a person acting unwillingly or in ignorance of the consequence of his acts. Historically this has been of the greatest importance in the changes that have come about in the infliction of punishment. Primitive codes, for example, fail to distinguish clearly between intentional and unintentional acts, and animals, children, and lunatics are treated as punishable even in modern times. Important changes are now occurring in the treatment of crime, partly as a result of growing insight into the psychology of the immature or the mentally unsound. In these cases the growth of thought has affected the moral emotions by deepening our knowledge of the nature of the subject of moral judgments, that is to say, the character of the agent. In the second place, there are aversions and sympathies which Westermarck, following Bain, calls "disinterested" or "sentimental," that is, likes and dislikes which are not based upon direct experience of pleasure or pain; as when we dislike persons who differ from us in taste, habit, or opinion. These antipathies have affected the moral consciousness by leading people to regard as wrong many acts which are merely unusual, new, or foreign. The morality of sexual relations in particular has, in Westermarck's view, been profoundly influenced by these "sentimental" aversions. Examples are to be found in the condemnation, varying in intensity among different peoples, of auto-erotism and bestiality. They are regarded as immoral, not because they are known to cause harm, but because they inspire disgust. In the third place, religious or superstitious beliefs may affect our views of the nature of certain acts which then evoke our disapproval. In Westermarck's view the horror of homosexuality among the Hebrews, the Christians, and Zoroastrians is largely due to the fact that they

associated it with the practices of infidels and therefore regarded it as a form of sacrilege. He argues that where no such religious influence has been operative, the moral attitude towards homosexual practices has been different and that in Christian Europe the growth of rationalism is bringing about important changes in the attitude of the law and of public opinion. Finally, many of our moral judgments are based, not on direct approval or disapproval of acts which are perceived to be the cause of pleasure or pain to others, but on sympathetic approval or resentment. In other words, we are inclined to get our resentments and approvals second-hand from those for whom we have a regard or who are in a position of authority. In this way, for example, punishment inflicted by society being regarded as an expression of the moral indignation of the community, may lead us to condemn an act which we should not otherwise regard as blameworthy. Acts which are in themselves harmless may thus, through ignorance, superstition, or prejudice, come to have opprobrium attached to them, and their condemnation becomes so deeply rooted in the moral tradition that no one ever thinks of inquiring into the original causes which led to their being regarded as immoral. In short, growing reflection may alter the direction of our emotions of approval and disapproval by revealing more fully the character of the agent, by dissipating superstitious beliefs which tend to endow acts with qualities which do not really belong to them, by revealing the existence of merely "sentimental" sympathies and antipathies, and by challenging traditional morality to disclose the original causes which brought given rules of morality into being. Westermarck thinks that comparative study shows that in a measure moral ideas have in the course of social evolution become more "enlightened" in all these respects, and that there is reason to believe that the influence of reflection upon moral judgments will steadily increase.

This account, Westermarck claims, is borne out by a study both of the differences and similarities that are found to exist in the moral judgments of different societies. With regard to the subjects of moral judgments, Westermarck concludes after a careful survey that in reflective morality moral approval and disapproval are felt with reference to persons on account of their conduct or to character conceived as the cause of their conduct. This is true in the main also of earlier and cruder phases of morality, though there is then no serious attempt to separate the external event from the

will and there is an inclination to assume that the two always coincide. Hence, in part, the failure to distinguish clearly between intentional and unintentional acts and the ascription of blame or praise to agents whom the reflective mind cannot regard as strictly responsible. The fact that moral judgments are passed always on conduct and character is in harmony, Westermarck argues, with their origin in the retributive emotions. The latter are reactions towards a living being regarded as the cause of pleasure or pain, and they are not so regarded by the reflective mind unless they are taken to issue from the character or will of the agent considered as a continuous entity. Allowing then for differences in psychological knowledge, there is, according to Westermarck, no difference in principle between the moralities of different peoples regarding the subjects of moral judgments.

With regard to the content of moral rules, the result of Westermarck's elaborate study is to show that despite certain important differences there is a noteworthy similarity in the moral ideas of mankind. This similarity extends to the so-called uncivilized peoples.

When we examine the moral rules laid down by the customs of savage people, we find that they in very large measure resemble the rules of civilized nations. In every savage community homicide is prohibited by custom, and so is theft. Savages also regard charity as a duty and praise generosity as a virtue ; indeed, their customs relating to mutual aid are often more exacting than our own and many of them are conspicuous for their avoidance of telling lies.

This similarity Westermarck explains as due ultimately to the fact that the emotions which the moral rules express are presumably similar in all groups of mankind. The differences which are found he attributes broadly to three causes, namely, differences in external circumstances which affect the consequences of otherwise similar acts and thereby their moral import, differences in knowledge of the nature and consequences of acts due very often to the influence of religious and magical beliefs, and finally differences in the strength and range of the altruistic sentiment which affect the range of persons to whom moral rules are held to apply. Examples of the operation of the first set of causes are to be found in the practice of infanticide, which is in the main due to the hardships of savage life ; and the practice of killing aged parents, which is connected with deficiencies in the food supply and is inspired by the necessity of saving the

young and vigorous and the humane intention of putting an end to prolonged and hopeless misery. Examples of the second set of causes are to be found in the different attitudes adopted by different peoples to suicide, which, according to Westermarck, have been greatly influenced by religious beliefs, such as the duty of absolute submission to the will of God or, as in the case of Christianity, the importance ascribed to the moment of death. Numerous other instances can readily be given from the varied taboos found among different peoples. The most important divergence in moral attitudes concerns the range of persons to whom moral rules are held to apply. Though the rules inculcating regard for life, property, truth, and the general well-being of a neighbour are found in all societies, they are held to be binding only in reference to members of the same group. The range is widened with the expansion of the social unit, but the distinction between the tribesman and the stranger survives even to-day, and the fact that morality is still largely group morality is seen in the survival of war and the precariousness of the rules supposed to control behaviour during war. Nevertheless, there has been a great advance in humanity with regard to the treatment of foreigners. Westermarck notes further that, so far as the teaching of the great moralists is concerned, the change from the savage attitude has been enormous. There is remarkable unanimity in this respect, in the teaching of all the higher religions. The doctrine of universal love is taught not only by Christianity but by Chinese thinkers, by the Buddhists and other Indian teachers, by the Greek philosophers, and the doctrine of a world citizenship was given definite content and historical importance by the Stoics. The most important cause of the extension of the range of moral rules has been the widening of the altruistic sentiment which has accompanied the increase in the size of social unit and the growth of intercourse between different societies. The change has been in the main due, according to Westermarck, to emotional rather than to cognitive factors. He argues further that variations in the range and intensity of the altruistic sentiment account also for the differences of moral opinion regarding the limits of the duty of self-sacrifice and the treatment of the lower animals.

We must now consider the bearing which this account of the part played by reflection in the growth of the moral judgment and of the variations of moral views among different peoples has

upon the theory of ethical relativity. Westermarck himself notes that in so far as differences of moral opinion depend on differences of circumstances, or on knowledge or ignorance of facts, or on the influence of specific religious and magical beliefs, or on different degrees of reflection, they are perfectly compatible with the universal validity which is claimed for moral judgments.¹ Analogous differences of opinion may easily be shown to exist in other spheres of knowledge where no one would on their account call in question the possibility of establishing universally valid propositions. It may be added that moralists concerned to defend the claim to objective validity of moral truths have themselves explained the variety of opinion actually found, in terms which closely resemble the explanation given by Westermarck.² Westermarck, however, claims that there is an important class of differences in moral opinion illustrated by the differences in the range of persons to which moral rules are held to apply in different communities, which depend not on differences in knowledge but on differences of emotional dispositions, and he argues that variations of this sort are fatal to the supposed universality of moral judgments. I cannot find his argument at all convincing. It rests on an unreal separation of feeling and thought. It is possible that without the power of sympathy the truths of universalist ethics could neither be discovered nor become effective in practice, but this throws no light at all on the nature of the truths once they are discovered. Just as certain feelings are only possible at a given level of rational development, so it may well be that certain thoughts or beliefs only emerge under certain emotional conditions. Certainly in grasping the essential relations between men, the power of imaginative identification, of entering fully into the situation of others, must be of the highest value, and perhaps this power only reaches its greatest intensity under the influence of the social feelings.

The difficulty here raised besets, I think, the whole of Westermarck's discussion of the part played by reason in morals. He assigns to intellectual factors very important functions, but he does not realize that he is giving them a claim to authority which is not compatible with his relativistic outlook. The statement, for example, that in the course of social evolution morality has become

¹ *Ethical Relativity*, p. 196.

² Cf. Dugald Stewart, *Collected Works*, vol. VI, p. 237, and Sidgwick, *Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau*, p. 227.

more "enlightened" implies a value judgment which goes beyond his own emotional approval of certain of the changes that have occurred. It is indeed clear from Westermarck's account that the feelings of approval and disapproval are in themselves an insufficient guide to conduct. Apart from the "sentimental" antipathies and sympathies whose origin is obscure, many other feelings have been implanted in man under conditions which no longer prevail and can therefore be no longer relied upon as a criterion of well-being. This appears to be the case in much of the morality of sexual relations and, Westermarck even feels justified in concluding that "enlightened" people will probably come to look upon sexual acts as morally indifferent and as no "proper object for punishment or moral censure" save in so far as they may involve injury to others. To be called wrong he says "an act must be productive of other harm than the mere aversion it causes, provided that the agent has not in an indecent manner shocked anyone's feelings."¹ But what is the meaning of the term "proper" in this context? As a mere matter of biological or sociological fact the aversions which are indirectly attached to acts as a result of social suggestion or of magical and religious beliefs are as proper as the primary resentments, that is, those directed against the infliction of pain, since presumably they are also rooted in the tendencies of human nature. It would seem then that discriminating or enlightened reflection does not remain satisfied with merely ascertaining the actual or probable tendencies to approval or disapproval in given societies, but also seeks to criticize them in the light of a conception of what is deserving of approval or disapproval.

There is another difficulty in connection with Westermarck's discussion of the relations between individual and social approval and disapproval. Sometimes he appears to suggest that for the emotion to be moral it is necessary that it should be "public" or general in a given community. Yet he recognizes the importance of moral innovators and he even thinks that such moral progress as has occurred has been largely due to the example of such innovators and their efforts to raise public opinion to their own standard of right.² I do not think that Westermarck succeeds in overcoming this difficulty, which in one form or another besets all sociological theories of ethics. In one place he suggests that all that is required to give to the retributive emotions of the exceptional individuals

¹ *Future of Marriage*, p. 255.

² *Christianity and Morals*, p. 15.

moral character is that these emotions should possess the characteristics of disinterestedness and impartiality originally due to the social influence of custom, and that in that case they may differ from public approval and disapproval either in intensity or with regard to the facts by which they are evoked. But surely this reference to the origin of impartiality is not very helpful. The value of the contributions of the moral innovators has often consisted, as Westermarck himself says, in showing that "the apparent impartiality of public feelings is an illusion," and, what is equally important, in showing that rules which are impartially applied may themselves be unjust. Why should such contributions be regarded as "progressive" or enlightened if the only criterion is public approval? In the end Westermarck has to appeal to an ideal society.

Even when standing alone, he (the moral dissenter) feels that his conviction is shared at least by an ideal society, by all those who see the matter as clearly as he does himself, and who are animated by equally wide sympathies, and equally broad sense of justice. Thus the moral emotions remain to the last public emotions—if not in reality, then as an ideal.¹

There is, however, in Westermarck's work no analysis of the concept of an ideal, and its use appears to introduce a value category for which it is difficult to find a place in his system.

Westermarck has defended his views with great vigour and lucidity, and has refuted many of the objections made to them convincingly. I have tried to look at his work, so to say, from within, and I do not find it quite self-consistent. Yet whatever criticisms may be made against his work regarded as a contribution to ethical philosophy, there can be no doubt of its value as a systematic and comprehensive sociological study of the moral ideas and customs of mankind. In this study he was a pioneer and he carried it out with an erudition, lucidity, and balance still unsurpassed.

Westermarck was led to his studies into the history of human marriage by his interest in the question of the origins of sexual modesty. The studies, however, came to cover the whole range of sexual relations and even in the later enlarged editions of the *History of Human Marriage*, only a single chapter is devoted to the question which initiated the whole inquiry, while in the first edition only a few lines are given to it. When it first appeared it was hailed everywhere as a scientific work of the highest importance. Of

¹ *Moral Ideas*, vol. I, p. 123.

the later expanded edition I will quote the opinion of Havelock Ellis, with which I think most competent students would agree : "In its extended and mature shape it stands out as a monumental achievement in the field of scientific sociology, recalling the other great achievement of the same generation in an analogous field by Sir James Frazer, and with no other edifice of comparable magnitude in sight."¹ Out of the vast range of topics dealt with by Westermarck the two that have attracted most attention are perhaps his explanation of the origin and significance of the rules of exogamy and his theory of the universality and primitive character of the family. As to the first, his view, which he defends with great learning and skill, is that the cause of all incest prohibitions is to be found in the want of inclination for and consequent aversion to sexual intercourse between persons who have lived together in close intimacy from childhood. He thinks that there may be a biological explanation of this disinclination. There is, he urges, strong evidence showing that exclusive and prolonged inbreeding tends to be injurious to the stock, and in accordance with the theory of natural selection it is probable that the sexual instinct has been moulded to meet the requirements of the species. The biological explanation is, however, only offered as a hypothesis, while the psychological facts which it is intended to elucidate are taken by him to be proved by common experience. Westermarck's theory has been accepted by many authorities, including Havelock Ellis. On reviewing the discussion of this whole question in recent literature I am not, however, convinced by his argument. The biological explanation certainly cannot be regarded as safely established, but without it I cannot see how Westermarck can explain the transformation from mere indifference to aversion which according to him has occurred. No doubt we have parallel cases of indifference turning into dislike but hardly into a deep-seated aversion comparable to that with which incest is regarded. The aversion may, indeed, be caused by the prohibition, but then the prohibition has to be accounted for.

With regard to his views on the family it will be recalled that when he began his work he was inclined to accept the hypothesis then widely held that primitive man lived in a state of promiscuity. He soon discovered, however, that there was no real evidence for this hypothesis. He showed (i) that no known savage people either

¹ *The Sociological Review*, January 1935, p. 94.

is or recently was living in such a state ; (ii) that statements to the contrary from ancient writers are vague and untrustworthy ; (iii) that in the case of peoples who have a form of group-marriage, the evidence suggests that it has arisen as a combination of polygyny with polyandry ; (iv) that in the case of peoples alleged to have some kind of sex communism, in which several men have the right of access to several women, none of the women is properly married to more than one of the men and individual marriage subsists. Finally, he produces positive evidence that even among the food-gatherers and hunters, who might be supposed to live in conditions nearest to those in which primitive man lived, the family, consisting of parents and children, is a well-marked social unit. With regard to primitive man, he further argues, his general conclusion is strengthened by what is known of the social habits of the anthropoids, where the family unit, consisting of male, female or females, and young, has been shown to exist.

Westermarck's arguments both as regards the universality and the probably primitive character of the family have been widely accepted by anthropologists. Recently, however, his entire position has been fiercely attacked by Dr. Briffault in a huge work of three volumes entitled *The Mothers*. Much to the amusement of those who knew Westermarck, he is depicted as a defender and upholder of moral theology, and, what is more serious, he is accused of distorting the evidence and of ignoring facts which do not fit in with his theories. Westermarck has written a lengthy rejoinder¹ to Dr. Briffault, as he felt it "a matter of honour with me to defend myself against false indictments that cast a stain on my character as a scientist and an honest seeker after truth." He performs this task with a thoroughness which was to be expected, and no unbiased reader will have any doubt of his success. Dr. Briffault's general position can only be stated here very briefly. He tries to show that the primitive human group was not the family nor an aggregation of families but the "motherhood," i.e. the biological group formed by the mother and her offspring, "a group economically self-contained through the co-operation of brothers and sisters and one of which the sexual mate forms no partner." The sexual instincts are, in his view, subordinate in primitive humanity to the deeper ties due to the maternal instincts and the bonds of sentiment connected with kinship. Nor is there a gregarious instinct as such. Gre-

¹ Cf. *Three Essays on Sex and Marriage*.

garioussness is derivative, being the effect of the offspring's dependence upon maternal protection. The group of mothers with their offspring form the clan, and the clan relationship is therefore more primitive than the family system of relationship. Individual marriage has an economic origin. Economic association between sexual partners has tended to establish individual sexual claims, and in the latter stages of social development the betrothal of females has led to a retrospective restriction of sexual freedom and to the demand that the bride shall be a virgin. The paternal family begins to be important with the growth of private property, and the individual economic power of males and marriage acquires a social significance only when the paternal family has become a medium for the consolidation and transmission of private property. To establish his position Dr. Briffault traverses the entire range of social anthropology, and at every point heatedly disputes Westermarck's interpretation of the evidence. He seeks to show that matrilocal marriage is a custom of "almost universal distribution" in uncultured societies and that everywhere the paternal family has been preceded by the matrilocal family. He argues further that there is no known case of a primitive people insisting on pre-nuptial chastity except in societies which practise infant betrothal and marriage by purchase involving a high bride price; that there is no convincing evidence of the existence of monogamous institutions in any uncivilized peoples; that the existing cases of group-marriage and sex communism suggest that in their origin marriage regulations had no reference to individuals but to groups.

Anyone who takes the trouble of comparing Dr. Briffault's study and Westermarck's Rejoinder will I think come to the conclusion that though the material used by both is often vague and ambiguous, Westermarck cannot rightly be charged with distorting the evidence in the interests of a preconceived theory, and those who knew him personally will only be strengthened in their admiration for his conspicuous candour and disinterestedness. It is obviously impossible here to examine the complicated problems raised in any detail. I have, however, in connection with the work in which I collaborated with the late Professor Hobhouse, had occasion to survey much of the evidence and will try to indicate my attitude to some of the points in this controversy.¹ I can see no

¹ *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, by L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg.

ground for believing that matrilineal descent everywhere preceded patrilineal descent. The evidence does not prove the maternal principle to be decidedly characteristic of the lowest culture, though it does suggest that the paternal principle becomes more prominent in the pastoral stage, while among agricultural principles the two are nearly balanced. As to the precedence of the clan over the family, it appears that while the family is always found wherever the clan exists, there are cases of clanless tribes who nevertheless live in groups of families. Briffault's statements as to monogamy among primitive peoples are very sweeping. So far as the hunters and gatherers are concerned, it would seem on the evidence that monogamy is the prevailing practice, though not in most cases the strict rule. The evidence regarding prenuptial chastity is conflicting and extremely difficult to evaluate. But it does not seem to support the association alleged between marriage by purchase and prenuptial chastity; the most that can be said is that purchase tightens up a pre-existing prohibition. The cases of alleged group-marriage and sexual communism are difficult to analyse, but on Dr. Briffault's own showing there is in nearly every case some form of individual economic marriage alongside the relations which are permitted outside the narrow family. He has not, so far as I can see, produced any evidence of group-marriage in any strict sense, that is, of a number of males married collectively and on equal terms to a group of females. In any event, I see no ground for believing that group-marriage was at any stage universal.

The last work in English to come from the pen of Westermarck is an impressive volume dealing with the influence of Christianity upon moral ideas and practices.¹ Here he restates the conclusions he had reached on the nature both of religion and morality, and considers in detail the effect that Christian teaching and practice has had on the institutions of the family, property, and economic organization, war and slavery, and the duties of regard for life and truth. In each of these spheres he produces an array of carefully sifted facts, and impressively challenges the claim so often made for Christianity that it has proved itself the highest ethical force in the history of man. Certain difficulties inherent, I think, in his outlook and method become here apparent. In accordance with his own relativistic ethics Westermarck should have confined his study of Christian morality to a record of the emotional responses

¹ *Christianity and Morals.*

of Christian societies to different classes of acts and of the feelings aroused in other societies by the behaviour of Christians. In fact, however, Westermarck does not impose this limitation upon himself, and his book abounds in value judgments for which general validity is claimed. A second difficulty arises from the fact that Westermarck's method does not enable us to disentangle and give due weight to the numerous factors involved in the history of civilization. If the advances in the direction of a more humane ethic cannot be attributed to Christianity alone, neither ought Christianity to be blamed for the back-slidings, and there is much to be said for the view that often the most serious criticisms of Christianity have come from the Christians themselves. A parallel difficulty would, I think, be experienced by anyone who attempted to estimate the influence of rational thought on morals. Here too, alike in its failures and successes it would be difficult to disentangle what is due to thought as such, and what to the economic, political and religious factors with which it is interwoven. Despite these doubts, however, no one who reads the work can fail to be impressed by its massive erudition and the detachment with which a subject of profound emotional significance is here handled.

Westermarck has given a lively account of his work at the School of Economics and of his contacts with the students from all parts of the world who came to seek his guidance. Those who attended his seminars will always think of him with respect and affection and will recall his kindness, his candour and tolerance, his single-mindedness in the pursuit of truth. In his own university in Finland he quite evidently exercised a profound influence. I should like to quote here a few words of appreciation from Eino Kaila, Professor in Theoretical Philosophy at Helsingfors University.

His greatest importance for many of his pupils lay, in my opinion, in the fact that he opened for us the world of English thought. For three centuries our scientific life had been completely under German dominance. Westermarck was the first, at least among the representatives of the philosophical faculties, to make himself thoroughly at home in the English language. This attitude of his became even more stimulating to us because he so splendidly developed the English tradition within the sphere of social philosophy. We admire in him equally the great scientist and the noble personality who devoted his whole life to those studies which are most essential to the advance of culture.¹

¹ This comment was kindly sent to me by Westermarck's friend and pupil, Miss Agnes Dawson.

Westermarck has on several occasions expressed his high appreciation of the contribution made by English thinkers to the study of society, but most emphatically perhaps on what must have been one of his last visits to this country. "I am convinced," he said, in concluding his Huxley Memorial Lecture given at the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1936, "that there is no country in the world that can rival it in its achievements in social anthropology, whether pursued in the study or in the field, largely owing to its sterling qualities of lucidity and good sense." English scholars will assuredly feel that of these qualities Westermarck's own work was a magnificent example.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SOCIOLOGY OF PARETO ¹

PARETO'S sociology ² falls naturally into two parts. The first is devoted to an analysis and classification of the elementary constituents of human nature as manifested in social life. The second is concerned with the interactions of these elementary traits and the changes which occur in their distribution in the different classes of society. The method followed is inductive and comparative, that is to say, it starts with empirical facts such as beliefs actually held in different societies, maxims of conduct accepted by them and the like, and it seeks to analyse out the constant and variable elements in these forms of behaviour and to discover the laws or uniformities which determine their mutual relations. Incidentally, Pareto discusses at great length the nature and importance of what he calls the "logico-experimental" method in social science, but he hardly lives up to his own requirements. The definitions given of fundamental terms are obscure, and they are not, as they might be expected to be, gradually clarified by "successive approximations." Further, what appears to me the most interesting portions of the treatise, namely, those devoted to the dynamics of social change, are very inadequately supported by empirical evidence, the facts given being hardly more than illustrative of the hypotheses put forward. The plan of the work is conceived on an imposing scale and it is carried out with great independence and a wealth of learning. It is therefore worthy of the serious consideration of sociologists.

The analysis of the fundamental forces of social life is carried out mainly by means of a classification of human actions into logical and non-logical, and by a more detailed account of the non-logical acts which brings out their overwhelming preponderance in human affairs. In this account Pareto pays no attention to the work of psychologists, but proceeds to put forward independent hypotheses suggested, as he thinks, by direct inspection of the facts. His neglect

¹ July 1936.

² *The Mind and Society (Trattato di Sociologia Generale)*. Translated by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston, 4 vols., Jonathan Cape, London, 1935.

of psychology has resulted in an extremely vague use of such terms as "sentiments," "instincts," "interests," which has made a proper understanding of his views more difficult than it needs to be.¹ But shed of technicalities and expressed as a first approximation, his conclusions are hardly revolutionary. They amount to this : that people perform and always have performed many acts without knowing why they do them (i.e. by habit and instinct) ; that the real drives of action are often quite different from the purposes which the agents consciously entertain ; that in the pursuit of given conscious ends people often attain quite other ends than those aimed at, either because they adopt the wrong means, or because they do not foresee the remoter consequences of their acts ; that men, having a hunger for logic or reason, will try to give a reasoned explanation or justification of acts they do from obscure or unconscious motives. The bulk of the treatise is devoted to an analysis of the non-rational elements in human conduct and of the fictions which are invented to give a flavour of rationality to conduct that is really the result of feeling and impulse.

The classification of acts into rational and non-rational, or in Pareto's not very happy terminology, logical and non-logical, turns upon the distinction between means and ends which he assumes without further inquiry to be applicable to all human behaviour. Briefly, acts are non-logical (i) when they serve no end subjective or objective, e.g. futile or non-adaptive instinctive acts, if such there be ; (ii) when the agent thinks a particular end is being realized but nothing is in fact achieved through the act as judged in the light of wider knowledge, e.g. in magical operations ; (iii) when there is an objective end but the subject is not consciously aiming at it, e.g. in theoretically "pure" instinct ; (iv) when an end is actually achieved which differs from the end the subject sets to himself, whether the objective end would or would not have been acceptable to him could he have foreseen it. (Briefly, acts are non-logical when the subject acts without explicit knowledge of the purpose of his action, or, having such knowledge, chooses means which in the light of better grounded information are either not likely to achieve the purpose, or to achieve something else. By contrast acts are logical when the consequences anticipated by the subject are identical with the consequences that might reasonably be anticipated in the light of wider knowledge. So far logic, or

¹ Cf. Prof. McDougall's criticism, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. I, October 1935.

rather rational reflection, is not concerned with ends at all, save perhaps that in order to act rationally you must know what you want. Logic is concerned rather with the appropriate linking of means and ends. But this position is not consistently maintained. Unfortunately, Pareto makes no attempt to classify the ends of conduct or to relate them to the fundamental drives. These are said to consist of sentiments, tastes, proclivities, inclinations, instincts, residues, and interests. The residues are said to include neither the simple appetites or instincts nor the interests, but to "correspond to" instincts or appetites. By this, as we shall see later, appears to be meant that there is a residue when an appetite or instinct does not act itself out simply but finds expression in an indirect or disguised form. Thus sex conceived as mere union of the sexes is not a residue, but it is residual, for example, in the behaviour of people who preach virtue as a way of lingering in their thoughts on sex matters. If this is the correct interpretation, the residues are not themselves drives, but rather ways in which the fundamental drives disguise themselves, and they are thus non-logical in the sense of obscuring the nature of the impulses really at work. So far it would seem that the adequate fulfilment of *any* impulse, provided it is conscious and direct, is logical. But there are many passages in which it seems to be suggested that it is more logical to act in accordance with one's interests than in accordance with other drives. What, then, are the interests? They are said to consist in impulses to acquire material goods, whether "useful" or merely pleasurable, and to seek consideration and honour (2009). It is not easy to see why these goods are singled out as rational, why, for instance, it is more logical to pursue honour and consideration than to satisfy other social impulses, or let us say, the desire for knowledge. Or is the pursuit of interests regarded as logical not because of the particular ends involved, but because in achieving them men can be shown to act with greater circumspection than in other activities in the choice of appropriate means?

The difficulty may be illustrated by reference to the frequent 'description of economic activity as typical of logical behaviour'. It is easy to see that economic activity contains a logical element in so far as the means chosen are technically appropriate to given ends. But economic behaviour is clearly non-rational in so far as men acting economically are not aware of the motives which impel them. A man's choice of profession may be as an intention clearly

envisaged. But the motives of the choice are often obscure and even unconscious. It may be influenced by all Pareto's residues, for example, by authority and prestige, by sociability, by the persistence of abstractions and what not. Further, it is clear that men in seeking economic satisfaction attain ends which they did not foresee and do not want. Men do not want war, but their behaviour leads to it. Business men and workers do not want unemployment, but the outcome of their linked activities is to produce it. If success in the fulfilment of impulses is the criterion of logical behaviour, economic activity must be largely non-logical, since it fails to secure for the masses of men the conditions of a purposeful life. In short, without an examination of the ends of human endeavour and of their relations to each other as well as to the means available for their realization, it is impossible to throw much light on the rational elements in behaviour, or on the relation of economic to other activities in human life.

There is a further complication which must now be considered. In the later portions of the treatise a person is said to act logically in so far as he tries to secure a maximum of individual utility. This means action in accordance with what is "advantageous" or "beneficial" to him and involves a comparison of different satisfactions in accordance with some norm. Presumably a logic is required for making these comparisons, but this line of thought is not pursued. In economics it would seem the individual is assumed to be the best judge of his own interests or utility and to act rationally in regard to it. But outside economics there may be an infinite number of norms and therefore an infinite number of possible maxima of utility. The choice of the norm itself is arbitrary and non-logical. Thus we cannot say whether it is to the advantage of the individual to suffer physically for the sake of a moral satisfaction, or whether it is better for him to seek wealth or to apply himself to some other pursuits. Despite the elaborate discussion of utility, there is extraordinarily little to be gained from it. Since the norm is arbitrarily chosen we can only determine the maximum utility for an individual from the line of conduct that he actually adopts. That is the maximum which in fact appears to him to be such and that appears to be the maximum which in fact he pursues. Or is it possible for the individual to make mistakes regarding what is to his advantage apart from the mistakes he may make in the choice of means? If so, a logic of ends is required which would enable the

individual to distinguish apparent and real advantage, and that would soon lead to an ethics of the teleological kind which Pareto despises along with all other brands of ethics. In brief, Pareto's treatment of the logic of behaviour leaves out of consideration what to most people will appear essential to it. Rational behaviour no doubt requires us to know what we want and to choose means in a manner which will stand the test of empirical verification. But a logic of behaviour would also have to discover whether the norms that individuals adopt in relation to the ends that they pursue are self-consistent, and whether they form part, or can be made to form part, of a systematic and ordered whole. Such a logic obviously could not be confined to the norms governing the acts of particular individuals, since it is equally or more important to inquire how far the norms of different individuals or groups are or can be made to be compatible and perhaps harmonious. Pareto makes no attempt whatever to deal with these problems and asserts as a self-evident dogma that norms are just the expression of "sentiments." There is, for example, no criterion save sentiment for choosing between a society based on large inequalities of income and one based on approximately equal incomes. If we admire supermen we will assign zero utility to the lower classes; if we love equality we will prefer the type of society which secures to the lower classes an equal share in the goods of life. Is reason really helpless in the face of such a problem?

It may be suggested that before dealing with the ultimate problems of valuation here involved there is a good deal that reason can do by way of clarifying the issues and settling questions of fact. Pareto, together with other anti-egalitarians, assigns a meaning to the principle of equality which egalitarians are not concerned to defend. The principle does not assert either that men are equal in endowment or that they should be treated equally. It is concerned, negatively, to exclude arbitrary assignments and, positively, to base distribution on a general rule impartially applied. If for the sake of argument it be agreed that this rule is that distribution should be in proportion to the needs of individuals with a view to the realization of such capacity in them as they have, it will be seen that this does not involve equality of treatment. Certain questions of fact then become very important. Firstly, what is the extent of the differences in capacity between individuals, and are these so great as to justify us in regarding some of them as supermen and

large numbers of the masses of men as having zero value? Secondly, how great are the differences in external conditions which are really required in order to enable the alleged supermen to fulfil their capacities, and can these differences in conditions only be assured them by a system of private property, involving the amount of inequality that now prevails? Thirdly, we need to know what effects upon the total available for distribution will be produced by adopting the principle of equality, and this raises questions not only of economics but of psychology also; since we need to know how incentives work in different economic systems. Ultimately, no doubt, when these questions of fact have been answered, value judgments will have to be discussed, but it may be doubted whether they would then loom so large in the minds of the disputants. Pareto, at any rate, does not discuss the nature of value judgments, but merely asserts dogmatically that they express nothing but "sentiments." He is impressed by the fact that in moral judgments, for example, people are swayed by superstitions and prejudices which deceive themselves and others. But this applies to all human thought and action and if seriously pressed would lead inevitably to the conclusion that there can be no logical thought or action at all. Pareto also makes much of the argument that if ethical judgments permitted of rational examination, ethics would have made greater progress than it appears to have made since the days of Aristotle. This, however, is not substantiated by any examination of ethical systems. Moreover, it would apply with equal force to, say, economics right up to the eighteenth or nineteenth century, since it is by no means certain that any great advances were made in it in the interval between these periods and Aristotle's discussion of economic problems. Curiously enough, Pareto thinks that ethical discussions, though logically futile, have had great influence on social life: "they are forever shaking the foundations of the social order" (2002). A philosopher might say that this was no mean achievement for mere "derivations."

The difficulties in Pareto's theory of non-logical actions are due ultimately to his failure to inquire more fully into the nature of logical, or as I should prefer to say, rational action. The function of reason is, according to him, exhausted in linking means and ends appropriately. But even Hume, who held a similar view, admitted that thought can influence action by disclosing the hollowness of objects of desire which before reflection excited lively passions, and

it is clear further that many of our most passionate devotions are only possible on the reflective level. Thought and impulse cannot, in fact, be sharply dissevered and the ends of life cannot therefore be relegated to the sphere of impulse alone. Ends and means again profoundly affect one another, and it is impossible to deal logically with means without clarification of the nature of the ends. Reason, too, is concerned with the relations of the various ends to each other, with the possibility of their mutual consistency or harmony, and in cases of conflict with the grounds of preference. An element of generality in preferences cannot surely be denied. We prefer not only particular things to other particular things, but kinds of things to other kinds, and our orders of preference have a certain constancy; the business of reason is to reflect on the standards which are implicit in these intuitive judgments. If action can be rational at all, such reflection on values and standards of values must be able to claim validity. If, on the other hand, our choices and preferences are utterly arbitrary, there can be no sense in speaking of any action as rational or as logically justifiable. All that we could then do in a theory of conduct would be to describe and classify human actions as sheer matters of fact, and at most to inquire into the relations which men subjectively set themselves and the ends which are in fact attained by them. In such a theory of human conduct the belief that some acts are "logical" would only be one fact among others, and to deal with it "logico-experimentally" would mean to inquire whether it in fact satisfies the queer hunger for logic that men appear to have, or whether it is useful as a means to other ends. Its power to satisfy the demands of logic at any rate does not seem to be very great.

The theory of non-logical actions is further elaborated by Pareto in his doctrine of the residues and derivations. Formal definition of the residues is lacking and we can only rely upon an analysis of the very numerous examples given and the classification offered of the principal types. To begin with, the residues are not identical with what psychologists call instincts. They are expressly said not to reflect all the instincts, and to include neither the simple appetites, tastes or inclinations, nor what he understands by interests. Yet the residues "correspond to" the instincts, and it is pointed out that there may be residues corresponding also to other impulses, though these are not further dealt with. The meaning seems to be this. In so far as the fundamental impulses are realized directly

without diversion or substitution of object they do not give rise to residues. Animals who are supposed to act on pure instinct can have no residues, and in human beings the simple satisfaction of food or sex impulses is not residual. The sex residue becomes important when we recognize its influence in such phenomena as asceticism. Only creatures capable of theorizing and therefore of deceiving themselves can have residues. A classification of the residues would thus be a classification of the different ways in which the fundamental impulses realize themselves in human behaviour, excluding, on the one hand, fully conscious and experimentally directed behaviour, and on the other, behaviour which is based on simple and direct impulse. If this is the right interpretation, the ultimate dynamic elements in human nature are not to be found in the residues but rather in what Pareto calls the sentiments. The residues are the patterns or principles in accordance with which the sentiments work, and they can only be discovered by an analytic and comparative study of complex acts, in which the influence of the sentiments may not at first sight be at all obvious. In studying them Pareto is thus trying to discover the different ways in which the "sentiments" unconsciously affect belief and action.

Pareto does not undertake, as might have been expected, an analysis of such processes as repression, projection, aim inhibition, substitution or sublimation, symbolization, dramatization, and the like. Of the work done in this connection he appears to have no knowledge. Yet despite his repudiation of psychological methods, what he here attempts to do is psychological and not sociological. He does not endeavour to study the social influences affecting belief and behaviour, but on the contrary finds the explanation of social behaviour in the permanent underlying psychological elements and their varying combinations in different societies, and his conclusions must be therefore tested from the point of view of their adequacy in the light of psychology. Thus regarded, his account is not very impressive. He gives six classes of residues with numerous subdivisions, namely, combinations, persistent aggregates, sociability, activity, the integrity of the individual, and sex.

The residue of combinations is of such wide scope that it really includes the whole synthetic activity of the mind, the operations of science and of constructive imagination, and, indeed, all forms of association. Behind all these there is apparently a single drive to combiné elements into aggregates. That the mind has a tendency

to combine or synthesize is true, though it is equally true that it has a tendency to break up or analyse, and no account of mental activity can be given unless both these tendencies are taken into consideration. But in any case the resort to such general tendencies takes us but a little way, and it is important to discover the principles in accordance with which the various forms of analysis and synthesis are effected. As far as the underlying motive is concerned it cannot be assumed that it is just an urge to combine. This is certainly not the case either in purely theoretical or practical activity. When Pareto comes to distinguish the different types of combination he is far too ready to rely on his assumed general tendency just to combine. This leads him to stress unduly the arbitrariness of the combinations, as in his account of magical operations, or to adopt familiar principles of association such as of similars or opposites which permit of more refined psychological analysis. Magical practices, for example, do not rest upon a general tendency to combine anything and everything, but upon a readiness, under the stress of practical needs and in the absence of a critical method, to rely on coincidences. There is always an element of experience behind them, though this is too readily generalized and no adequate means are available for disentangling the subjective and objective factors. The tendency to generalize on a slender basis has a much better claim to be called a residue than the tendency to arbitrary combinations. No doubt the experiences underlying a particular belief may be difficult to detect, and Pareto is undoubtedly right in stressing the difficulty of tracing the historical origins of ancient or primitive magical beliefs. Yet occasionally what appears to be an arbitrary association can be shown by historical analysis to be based on intelligible, though of course not scientifically founded, associations. To say "five" in order to avert the evil eye may seem hopelessly arbitrary. Yet in Morocco, according to Westermarck, this is a remnant of the ancient practice of throwing the hand forward with outspread fingers and saying "five in your eyes"; which has now become attenuated to just saying "five" or even "Thursday." Here the original practice requires examination in accordance with the psychology of the magic of gestures, and is in line with much else of the pantomimic or dramatic in magic. In all cases an analysis of the objective and subjective conditions determining belief in particular connections is necessary. It is mere evasion of the issue to appeal to purely general tendencies capable of

explaining all connections, and therefore not specially helpful in dealing with any of them.

Under the heading of the persistence of aggregates Pareto brings together a number of interesting facts, but here again the analysis is not very illuminating from the psychological point of view. At least two rather different things are here confused. One is the tendency for sets of psychological dispositions which have grown up between a person and other persons or things to cohere and persist in time. This requires analysis in terms of Shand's doctrine of the sentiments and the theory of complexes. The other is the tendency to individualize or to regard as single entities groups of experiences in relation to which sentiments have grown up, and to attribute to these entities, real or imaginary, any further attributes which our emotional attitude to them requires. The phenomena here included have usually been studied under the headings of animism, animatism, personification, and the like, and to their elucidation, I should say, Pareto makes very little contribution, except perhaps in the stress he lays on the influence of personified or reified abstractions on social life.

Under the residue of activity Pareto discusses facts which are usually treated by psychologists under the heading of the expression of the emotions and other drives and the pleasure taken in the exercise of faculty. He rightly stresses the part played by fantasy or imagination in providing symbolic expression of the emotions, but does not further analyse symbolism, nor does he inquire into the reasons why symbolic substitution is needed. The principal examples that he uses are taken from the phenomena of religious exaltation, such as revivals, mystical ecstasies, and the like. But his interpretations of these phenomena are of very doubtful value. There is much to be said for the view that ecstatic manifestations are due not so much, as he thinks, to a sheer need for activity as to the need for relaxation from the strain and monotony of ordinary life and for release from repression and conflict. In political agitation, which is another of his examples, the feeling that "something must be done" is hardly due to a desire for activity as such. On the contrary, in the case of leaders and agitators it is rooted in deep conflicts, and in the masses the readiness to yield to leaders who claim to get things done is a reflection of their own apathetic anxiety and the disinclination or inability to do anything effective themselves. The whole discussion is extraordinarily vague. It is

not at all clear whether the residue of activity is a specific tendency to act, or whether it is a collective term for the need of expressing all the emotions and impulses in outward acts. In any event, to find the residual, that is to say, the constant and invariable elements in religious manifestations in bare activity without any attention to the nature of the emotions and needs which are at work can hardly be said to constitute a profound contribution to the psychology of religion.

The residues of sociability include a number of tendencies, principally the desire for uniformity, the desire to impose uniformity on others, the hatred of the new, counterbalanced by interest in novel combinations, the tendency to pity balanced by cruelty, the tendency to share with others, to suffer for them even to the extent of self-sacrifice, the need for the approval of others, the compound of submission, fear, respect, pride, and domination which constitutes the psychological basis of hierarchical organization, and others. The account given of these tendencies, and especially the discussion of asceticism, is of great interest, but it is not very precise or systematic, and there is too great a readiness to invent instincts *ad hoc*. The desire for uniformity, for example, is hardly to be accounted for in terms of a general instinct to imitate. Psychologists are not agreed that such an instinct exists, and, in any case, the respect for rules *qua* rules is very complex. There is a rational element in it based on the recognition that for societies to cohere there must be a readiness on the part of individuals to conform to rules without insisting on a reasoned justification on every occasion of their application. Such recognition may not be very clearly present to the minds of all members, but there is always present a feeling that order must be maintained and that there must be rules. Whether rational or not, the feeling of respect for accepted rules does not rest on sheer imitateness, but on deeper social bonds. The purest form of the tendency to imitate Pareto sees in fashion; but here again the analysis strikes me as superficial. Fashion is not based on a tendency to imitate anything and everything, but rather upon an identification with those who have social prestige, and thus involves at least as much desire to be distinguished from others as to be like them. In regard to his account of the other social tendencies, it may be noted that Pareto owes much of his recent popularity to the cynical account he gives of humanitarianism. Anything more remote from logico-experimental evidence can hardly be imagined. He imputes all sorts of motives to humanitarians without the slightest attempt at

proof, and indulges in vast historical generalizations without anything like adequate inductive verification. It is one of his favourite generalizations that repugnance to suffering and the tendency to pacifism are characteristic of *élites* in decadence. One might counter this by formulating *ad hoc* the parallel generalization that brutality and war-mongering are characteristic of *élites* uncertain of their power. For neither generalization is there adequate evidence of the "logico-experimental" kind that Pareto considers essential for a scientific sociology.

The treatment of asceticism as a residue of sociability is striking. Pareto interprets ascetic behaviour as in the main due to a hypertrophy or perversion of the social instincts, or, as it might perhaps be better put, as an exaggeration of the need to control and master the self-assertive impulses. The interpretation is worked out with much insight, but perhaps insufficient attention is paid, especially in the elaborate discussion of flagellation and allied phenomena, to the sado-masochistic elements in asceticism.

The residue of the integrity of the individual broadly includes all reactions tending to maintain equilibrium or to restore a violated equilibrium. It is not at all clear whether this is a specific tendency, how it is related to what psychologists call the self-regarding sentiment, and whether it is not merely a collective term for a group of reactions. In a sense all responses whatever may be brought under it, since they may all be interpreted as the result of a disturbance due to inner or outer stimuli. The examples that Pareto gives here are mainly derived from ritual. Thus purificatory rites are regarded as efforts to restore the integrity of the individual which has been disturbed by pollution. But here, as in the case of the residue of combinations, the tendency appealed to is so general that it would explain all ritual whatever and therefore throws but little light on any. Why is the integrity of the individual endangered by contact with blood, and why is the malaise produced by this pollution got rid of just by this or that form of purificatory ritual? To say that these are just arbitrary combinations is surely to abandon the problem. There is, I think, a somewhat similar difficulty in Lévy-Bruhl's treatment of what he calls "transgressions," with which Pareto's discussion has some affinity. For example, it is not an explanation but only a restatement of the problem to say that the horror of incest is due to the fact that it is treated as a transgression.¹

¹ Cf. *Le Surnatural et la Nature dans la Mentalité primitive*.

Somewhat unexpectedly, Pareto brings under the residue of the integrity of the individual the demand for equality by inferiors. He interprets this demand as really a hidden desire for another kind of inequality or selfish privilege. Perhaps this is not as pessimistic a view as that of Freud, who suggests that social justice means that we are ready to deny ourselves many things so that others may have to do without them as well.¹ But what direct evidence is there of the real motives which inspired the leaders of humanitarianism or the mass of their followers? In general, Pareto's attack on humanitarian ethics hardly calls for detailed analysis here. His arguments are very far from being presented with the detachment which he considers so necessary in a logico-experimental sociology and they abound in value judgments. Since such judgments are in Pareto's view nothing but the expression of "sentiments," his discussion has merely biographical interest in so far as it throws light on Pareto's own mentality.

In his treatment of the residue of sex Pareto brings out with great gusto the vagaries and inconsistencies of sexual morality and he stresses the well-known fact that behind the condemnation of sex there is often hidden an excessive preoccupation with it. He might have generalized this and shown how in the case of other impulses the repression of self takes revenge in the reprobation of others. In this discussion even more than elsewhere the fundamental weakness of his method is revealed. In his anxiety to stress the constant and invariable elements in sex he fails to come to grips with the medley of social forces affecting the morals of sex-relationships and to deal with the variations that have been observed in them. One almost gets the impression that the rules regulating the relations between the sexes and the respect for chastity are based on nothing but disguised sexual greed and jealousy. There is no study of the need to canalize and control the sexual impulses in view of the manifold derangements of which they are susceptible, no examination of the relation of sex to tenderness and affection and the social impulses, or of the problems connected with precocious sexuality, or of the influence on sex relationships of the institutions of property and the family. In short, there is no treatment of the numerous factors, sociological and psychological, which must be taken into consideration in a just estimate of sex regarded as a constant and invariable drive.

¹ Cf. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 88.

The theory of the derivations is intended to furnish a psychology rather than a logic of error, that is, to reveal the hidden forces which lead to error and make it acceptable rather than to disclose the logical structure of erroneous reasoning. Clearly the derivations must be rooted in the residues. There is, in fact, a double connection between them. Firstly, men have a strange hankering after logic and they are not satisfied unless they can give reasons for their actions and beliefs. This Pareto regards as being one form of the residue of combinations which supplies the drive both for logical and non-logical reasoning. But, secondly, particular derivations owe their strength and influence to other residues and the "sentiments" underlying them. That the ultimate driving power lies in the sentiments or their residual manifestations and not in the theories which are offered to account for behaviour can be seen, Pareto argues, from the fact that the feelings or sentiments remain essentially unaltered despite changes in derivations and theories. He is fond of using in this connection examples derived from the history of morals. "A Chinese, a Moslem, a Calvinist, a Catholic, a Kantian, a Hegelian, a Materialist, all refrain from stealing; but each gives a different explanation for his conduct." Strangely enough, Pareto claims greater constancy for moral rules than is needed for a rationalist ethics, and he makes no attempt whatever to account for the variability of the moral judgment. The residue of the integrity of the individual will account for the laws of theft, but only if you are content to neglect the enormous variations that are found in the laws of property and consequently in what is regarded as theft, and so with other institutions. While both the varying and constant elements in morals contain both rational and non-rational elements, I do not think that Pareto provides any method for estimating their relative strength, for determining, for example, the rôle of reason in the history of law or indeed of any social or political movement; though nowadays no one would be concerned to deny the importance of the irrational or even unconscious factors in human life.

The interest of Pareto's treatment of the derivations lies largely in his acute and penetrating criticism of many famous social theories, for example of Benthamism or of the General Will, for which it provides an occasion. It is not particularly successful as a systematic exposition of the sources of prejudice and modes of sophistication. The derivations are grouped under four headings: affirmation,

authority, accord with sentiments, and verbal arguments. Under the first are included assertions claiming authority simply as assertions. The examples that he gives are maxims such as "Silence is an ornament to all women"; "Neither do nor learn aught that is shameful." These correspond, I think, to what Mill calls fallacies *a priori*, mere assertions claiming to be self-evident. It is not easy to see where derivation comes in here, since by definition no reason is given for the assertion, unless what is meant is that if challenged the answer will be just their indisputability. Pareto does not discuss the psychological factors which produce the feeling of self-evidence, nor why assertions that are regarded as self-evident in one age are considered nonsensical or false in another. Occasionally the examples chosen beg important questions of theory, as when æsthetic judgments are interpreted as unconscious conversions of subjective likings into assertions of objective fact. I doubt whether the derivations of affirmation form a distinct class, and in most instances they pass readily into those resting on authority or verbal argument. The derivations of authority have long been familiar, and among the writers whom Pareto quotes in other connections, he might here have referred to Bentham who has given an elaborate discussion of them.¹ The derivations of accord with feeling present a good opportunity for a consideration of the subjective factors of belief, and Pareto has much of interest to say on the influence of the self-assertive and the social tendencies upon belief. Here his analysis would have been greatly improved had he paid attention to the work of modern psychology and especially the psychology of the unconscious. In his discussion of the derivations of verbal argument the logical aspect is not kept very distinct from the psychological. Perhaps the most valuable part of his exposition is his insistence on the tendency of abstractions to persist and to become the nuclei of powerful emotional dispositions.

Pareto has no doubt that the residues remain constant or undergo only slight and slow change even over long periods. But though this may be true in a sense the proof offered is not very convincing. The residues are so vaguely defined that it is easy to find what is alleged to be the same residue in what are apparently very different social movements. In this way it is argued, for example, that behind Ancestor worship, Polytheism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Nationalism, Socialism, Humanitarianism there is the same residue

¹ Cf. Bentham, Works, vol. II, *The Book of Fallacies*.

of group-persistence. So again the residue of individual integrity is regarded as constant, because though it is not so strong in the modern plutocracy as it was, say, in the feudal nobility, the loss is made up by the growth of self-respect on the part of the lower classes and in the recognition that even criminals have a personality deserving of consideration. A humanitarian may be pardoned for thinking this "compensation" a matter of some importance. Even more surprising is the claim that the residues of combination have not changed much if the class is considered as a whole; on the ground that territory formerly occupied by magic, theology, and metaphysics is now increasingly occupied by experimental science which is also a product of the residue of combinations. Units of comparison so pliable and interchangeable are hardly what one would expect to find in a logico-experimental sociology.

The most interesting and suggestive part of Pareto's treatise is that concerned with the dynamics of social change and the factors determining social equilibrium at any one time. The social system is conceived as made up of the elements which have hitherto been considered in abstraction but which in fact are in a relation of mutual dependence. The elements in question are the residues, the derivations and the interests, and since these are differently distributed in the population, account has to be taken of individual differences and of the amount of circulation or movement from one group to another that occurs in given societies. The important influences he thinks are those exerted by the interests, that is, broadly, of economic factors on the residues and upon their distribution in the different social classes and the converse influence of the changing distribution of the residues on the interests. On the other hand, the influence of theories or derivations on the residues is slight, if not negligible. The interaction of these elements is such as to result in undulations or oscillations, movement in one direction usually setting up compensatory movements in the opposite direction, with the result that change is not in a straight line but is cyclical in character.

The individual differences that Pareto considers at length are those in the intensity or strength of the residues of combinations and persistent aggregates. He lays special stress on one particular classification. In both the ruling classes or *élite* and in the masses, though in different proportions, two types are to be found. There are, on the one hand, individuals of the speculator type, enterprising, eager for new experiences, imaginative, expansive, fertile in

new ideas. Contrasted with them are people of the *rentier* type, timid, conservative, anxious to preserve what has been won, averse to anything new. The differing relative proportions in which these two types are combined in the governing class and the extent to which recruitment from below is permitted determine the different types of social structure and civilization. In the political sphere, for example, if the governing class consists of individuals in whom Class II residues predominate over Class I residues, we find types of government which rely chiefly on physical force and on religious and similar sentiments; on the other hand, if the ruling class is chiefly of the speculator type, we find types of government relying chiefly on intelligence and cunning, and appealing either to the sentiments of the multitude, as in the theocratic forms of government, or else playing upon the interests, as in the demagogic plutocracies of modern times. The changes that occur as a result of the predominance of one or other of these types are not, however, in a continuous direction. Compensatory movements occur, whether as a result of internal changes or of war, and oscillations of varying length are thus produced. It is to be noted that the distinction between the speculator and *rentier* types does not quite correspond to that between liberal and conservative in the political sense, since the speculators will ally themselves with or make use of liberal and conservatives alike, and even of anarchists if it suits their purpose. Revolutions occur mainly when the ruling class, relying too much on the combination residues, develops an enervating humanitarianism and is disinclined to use force, especially if it cultivates a policy of exclusiveness and does not find ways of assimilating the exceptional individuals who come to the front in the subject classes. On the other hand, a governing class may also encompass its own ruin by accepting, for their economic value, individuals who are well endowed with Class I residues, and this may end in the government passing from the lions to the foxes. History shows, Pareto thinks, that changes in the proportions between Class I and Class II residues in the *élite* do not continue indefinitely in one direction, but are sooner or later checked by movements in a counter-direction. In this way the modifications in the *élite* are shown to be among the major factors determining the undulatory form of social change. They are correlated, it is claimed, not only with political transformations but also with economic cycles and with oscillations in thought and culture. Thus in periods of rapidly increasing economic pros-

perity the governing class comes to contain greater numbers of individuals of the speculator type, rich in Class I residues, and fewer of the opposite type ; while the converse is the case in periods of economic depression or retrogression. With these alternations are connected also the oscillations that Pareto traces in the history of thought, expressed roughly in the conflict between " reason " and " superstition," scepticism and faith.

It will be noted that in this theory Pareto is not merely replacing the " Marxist " conception of a struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat by that of a struggle between speculators and *rentiers*. It is essential to his thesis that the residues are differently distributed in the ruling and ruled groups, and it is on the balance of the residues in both groups that social equilibrium depends. Further, it is in this part of his inquiry that Pareto makes the transition from individual psychology to sociology proper, that is to say to a study of interactions between individuals. His view does not imply that the course of events is determined by the schemes of individual speculators who rule the world by deliberate and concerted stratagem. Their policy is the resultant of a complex set of forces and an infinite number of acts each initiated by the particular circumstances of the time, but leading collectively to results which individually they do not foresee, despite the fact that they may have a clearer conception of their own interests than the masses have of theirs. Here as elsewhere in the *Treatise* Pareto insists on the great complexity of social interactions and on the need for replacing the notion of one-sided causality by that of mutual dependence of the factors involved.

How far the theory of the circulation of the *élites* is to be interpreted in biological or genetic terms is not very clear. Pareto undoubtedly thinks that the residues are determined by inherited constitution. Further, it would seem that in his view " aristocracies " tend to die out in the sense of leaving no descendants : "History is the graveyard of aristocracies." On the other hand, one gets the impression that according to him the residues are remarkably constant in a given society taken as a whole apart from infiltration of individuals from other societies. The changes that occur are rather in the distribution of the residues in the different portions of the population and the opportunities offered for their manifestation. Such changes might well occur without involving any genetic changes in the stock and be largely socially conditioned.

Pareto refers now and again to the work of the Anthro-po-sociologists, e.g. Lapouge and Ammon, but he seems to have paid little attention to modern studies of individual differences and the effects of differential fertility, and one cannot be sure of his attitude to them. As the residues clearly involve temperamental traits in addition to cognitive ones, and as the evidence of individual differences in temperamental traits is very slight, perhaps he would not have been able to get much help from these studies.

Pareto supports his theory of social change by numerous examples derived from the history of Græco-Roman civilization and of modern Europe. Brilliant as the exposition is, it is hardly adequate to establish the periodicity of social and political movements as a regular law, or the correlations alleged between these movements and the history of thought and culture. The proof of such a law would require a much more exact social morphology than he provides and an extension of the inquiry to non-European civilizations. It would also require independent evidence of the mental make-up of the different social groups, especially of the individuals directly concerned in social movements, and a more exact determination of the nature and extent of what he calls the circulation of *élites*. It may be remarked that he makes very little use of the work of others. Occasionally he might have found support for some of his theories. It is worth mentioning that Pirenne's later study of European capitalism, and the explanation that he gives of the alternations traced by him between periods of innovation and periods of stabilization, appear to be in line with Pareto's views.

If the occurrence of undulatory movements in history be granted, there remains the important problem of their significance from the point of view of long-range trends. Pareto himself grants that in economic production and in the arts and sciences there has been on the whole a movement forward, or as he expresses it, Class I residues and the conclusions of logico-experimental science have forced a retreat on group persistences. But he insists that this growth in the power of reason has not affected political and social activities to any great extent, and that in any case there is no ground for the belief in continuous progress. The notion of progress is never mentioned by him without bitter derision. But it will be noticed that, though according to him there can be no reliable criteria of progress, he does not hesitate to speak of decadence which requires criteria of the same kind. To me it is clear that Pareto has developed no adequate

method for estimating the rôle of reason in law, morals, and politics, and that he vastly under-estimates what has on the whole been achieved in these directions. The growing interconnection between economic and social and political movements which he himself stresses is an important phenomenon and one which may compel humanity to make increasing use of rational agencies. The fact also that the notion of conscious control of social change in its application to humanity as a whole is relatively new must be taken into consideration in estimating future trends. No one nowadays believes in automatic progress or in indefinite and unlimited perfectibility. What is asserted is that it is theoretically possible to formulate a coherent ideal of human endeavour, and that from a study of the failures as well as the successes of mankind in dealing with its problems, there is ground for the belief that such an ideal permits of realization if men are prepared to work for it. Pareto's denial of human progress rests upon (a) his disbelief in any rational ethics ; (b) his view that history so far has disclosed no significant changes but only oscillations. As to (a), I do not find that he provides any reasoned justification for his disbelief. As to (b), it seems to me that he greatly exaggerates the constant elements in human history, and that if there is no law of human progress neither is there any law of cyclical recurrence. From the point of view of policy, in any event, if a choice is to be made between persistent aggregates and combinations, I see no reason for not choosing combinations.

CHAPTER FIVE

RECENT TENDENCIES IN SOCIOLOGY ¹

THE appearance of the *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie* and of a number of general treatises both by the contributors to the handbook and others ² provides a suitable opportunity for a survey of the principal drifts of contemporary sociology. I shall deal mainly with the new German works, but I have found it convenient and interesting to include a discussion of the somewhat earlier contributions of Max Weber, who occupies an important position in German thought, and because of his affinities with German thought and European sociology generally, of the recent attempt at a systematic sociology made by Professor MacIver.³

We may note at the outset certain characteristics which these works have in common. Firstly, they all show that the time has long passed when it was necessary for sociology to justify its claim to existence or to indulge in weary discussion of the relation between sociology and other social sciences. It is felt with obvious justice that sociology must be judged by its achievements and that discussions of methodology must remain barren if not tested in the light of actual investigations. Secondly, we note in all these works a keen desire to find common ground and to consolidate what has been achieved. This is especially obvious in the *Handwörterbuch*, whose contributors have been drawn from different sociological schools and from different fields of social science. Thirdly, though they differ very widely in their sociological theory, there seems to be a common tendency to avoid the personification or hypostatization of social groups so frequent in earlier sociology, and to interpret the apparent unity of social aggregates in terms of highly complex sets of social relationships. All these writers devote a great deal of attention to the analysis and classification of social relationships and

¹ Feb. 1933.

² *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*, Ed. Alfred Vierkant, Ferdinand Enke, Verlag, Stuttgart, 1931; A. Vierkant, *Gesellschaftslehre*, 2nd Edition, 1928; F. Tönnies, *Einführung in die Soziologie*, 1931; L. von Wiese, *Allgemeine Soziologie*; R. Thurnwald (Editor), *Soziologie von Heute*; H. Freyer, *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*, 1930.

³ R. M. MacIver, *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, New York, 1931; Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*; *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*.

the schemes which have emerged have much in common and may be regarded as in some instances complementary.¹

Yet despite these efforts at co-ordination there remains a fundamental difference of opinion regarding the objects and methods of sociological inquiry, which still divides sociologists broadly into two schools. One school is above all anxious to avoid the charge so often made against sociology that it is a maid-of-all-work, either bringing together the "throw-outs" of other social sciences, or pretending to an encyclopædic completeness really beyond the reach of the working scientist and unlikely to yield to the established methods of exact inquiry. It therefore wishes to make sociology into a specialism and to define exactly the particular point of view from which it approaches social life. The other school still takes the synoptic or synthetic view of sociology and maintains that with the aid of the special social sciences and of history it will prove possible to arrive at a *vue d'ensemble* of social life and social development.

(A) Sociology as a specialism. In Germany this attitude goes back to Simmel, who based his conception of sociology upon a distinction drawn by him between the form and the content of social relationships. He maintained that the business of the sociologist was to disentangle and reduce to system the types of relationship exemplified in social life considered in abstraction from the terms which they relate. Thus such relations as leadership and obedience, subordination and superordination, competition and division of functions can be traced in all societies, and might therefore be studied simply as relations. Simmel himself applied this method of analysis to very few relations, and in somewhat unsystematic fashion. His general influence upon German sociology appears to have been profound, and what has come to be described as "Formal Sociology" is even asserted by some authorities as the dominant trend in contemporary thought. Its general point of view may be indicated, perhaps, by saying that in defining sociology it wishes to put the category of relation (*Beziehung*) in place of the category of object (*Gegenstand*). Thus, for example, it seeks to define social groups in terms of complex relationships and processes and to avoid the hypostatizing of these entities which has given so much trouble

¹ Cf. the following articles in the *Handwörterbuch*: Geiger, "Gesellschaft"; Sombart "Grundformen des menschlichen Zusammenlebens"; Vierkandt, "Gruppe"; von Wiese, "Beziehungslehre"; Tönnies, "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft."

to sociology and social philosophy. This general point of view is illustrated in the work of von Wiese, who considers the theory of social relations to constitute the whole of *allgemeine* sociology, of Vierkandt, who, as we shall see, combines it with the method of phenomenological analysis elaborated by Husserl, and of Max Weber, who gives a great deal of attention to the analysis of social relationships and social behaviour, though he uses this analysis in a wider attempt at a more synthetic sociology. It will be well to look at some of these important contributions in some detail.

(i) Vierkandt's position is lucidly expounded in several important articles in the *Handwörterbuch* and especially in his treatise on *Gesellschaftslehre* (second edition, 1928). He is, above all, anxious to free sociology from the charge of vagueness, indefiniteness and all-comprehensiveness (*Uferlosigkeit*), and argues that it should be confined to the study of the *forms* of social organization and of culture. Sociology is concerned, in his view, with the analysis of such relationships as those of leadership, obedience, punishment, community, struggle, power and the like. In dealing with historical entities, such as French society of the eighteenth century, or the Chinese family, our primary interest is to exemplify types of community or the exercise of power, but the sociologist must not attempt to deal with the actual concrete events or their detailed description, matters which fall to the historian. Similarly, in dealing with culture what interests the sociologist is the mechanism of persistence and change of cultural elements, the degree to which they are tied to particular groups, and the like, but he cannot pretend to study the actual content of culture, or to formulate laws such as Comte's law of the three states, which involves reference to the specific content of culture at different periods. Similarly he would regard an attempt like that made by Max Weber to work out the relation between religious and economic development not as sociology, but as a combination of the history of religion with economic history.

The method followed by Vierkandt is described as phenomenological. This term, which in English is highly ambiguous and misleading, is borrowed from the school of Husserl and, as used by the latter, appears to mean a method of examining mental functions by direct inspection or intuition of acts of consciousness as directed upon objects. All such acts are "of" something. In the phenomenological analysis the consciousness and the object are bracketed together. It is a study of the consciousness-of-objects. In ordinary

experience and in natural science we concentrate on the object. In psychology we concentrate on the subjective act. In phenomenology we are concerned with the objective reference in so far as it is immanent in the act, and we seek to disentangle the root types of mental functioning or ultimate modes of objective reference. The method claims to be capable of reaching perfect certainty on the ground that it is based on direct apprehension of what is within our consciousness and to be independent of empirical matter of fact. It can be applied to any field of experience and will disclose the *a priori* forms or essences "possible" in that field. Such applications have been attempted by Scheler to ethics and by Kaufmann to law. Vierkandt explains that by the phenomenological method he understands a procedure with the following characteristics. Firstly, it is an attempt to arrive at the ultimate or irreducible forms of social life or experience, such as submission, or contagion of feeling, or suggestion. Secondly, these ultimate forms are arrived at by direct inspection of a single example (actual or imaginary). Consequently and thirdly, the procedure is not one of inductive generalization. Thus for example we can see that respect differs from fear by the inspection of a single experience, and it is also evident that the experience of respect is specific and irreducible. Vierkandt urges that this procedure differs completely from the method of introspection in psychology and the insight thus attained is free from the errors to which introspection is liable (*Jahrbuch*, II, p. 78). Among the irreducible categories or social forms that Vierkandt distinguishes may be mentioned self-regard intimately interwoven with the need for recognition by others and their approval, the tendency of submission to and admiration of honoured persons, the attitudes of shyness, embarrassment and shame, love and hate, the widening of the self and its extension beyond one's own person, contagion of feeling, the experience of other persons as the "thou," the act of communication and understanding as an indissoluble unity, the experience of community as a specific inner bond of reciprocal responsiveness in varying degrees of intimacy or closeness, the feeling of "belonging" to a group, the notion of struggle, the attitudes of approval and disapproval, the experience of obligation. Nearly half of Vierkandt's major treatise is devoted to what purports to be a phenomenological analysis of these experiences, and is intended to supply the basis for the account which is then given of the real nature of social relationship, conceived as an

inward bond, and a classification of the types of community to which it gives rise.

While undoubtedly suggestive in details, Vierkandt's analysis of the social attitudes and impulses does not differ in method from the confessedly psychological discussions of McDougall and it seldom shows the fullness and richness of experience that we find, say, in the psychological work of Shand. In any event I can see no justification for the view that his conclusions have any greater claim to finality than those reached by psychologists, and in many instances, as it appears to me, he would have been greatly helped by the distinctions which have been drawn by recent psychologists in dealing with the conational life, especially the distinction between instincts, emotions and sentiments. While he may be right in regarding the attitudes he describes as specific it may nevertheless turn out that their specificity is due to a particular combination of elements which may also be found as members of other combinations. Thus, for example, respect may be clearly distinguishable in consciousness from other attitudes, but it may permit of analysis by the methods followed by Shand, who traces in it the operation of fear, approval, sympathy and confidence. Similarly I doubt whether his derivation of the desire for power from the desire for distinction and joy in activity can claim phenomenological certainty. The appeal to direct intuition unchecked by psychological methods seems to me to be beset with great danger and to open the way to very arbitrary theorizing.

(ii) A more ambitious attempt at a "Formal" sociology has been made by von Wiese¹ in what he describes as "*Beziehungslehre*." The object of theoretical sociology is, according to him, the whole tissue of relationships between human beings which it seeks to order and systematize. The fundamental concepts that he employs are those of social process, social relation and social structure. The most general forms of social processes are those which either bring individuals together or draw them apart, processes, that is, of approach or withdrawal, association or dissociation: "*Die Beziehungslehre kennt nur die Bewegungen zur Vereinigung oder zur Flucht; tertium in sociologia non datur.*" Whatever the specific content of the relationships arising through social processes they none

¹ Cf. *Allgemeine Soziologie* and article on "Beziehungslehre" in the *Handwörterbuch*. An elaborate Americanized version of von Wiese's views by Professor Howard Becker has recently appeared with the title: *Systematic Sociology* (New York and London, 1932).

the less are either associative or dissociative in tendency. No other social relationships equal these two in range of application. Everything that happens in the dealings of men with one another either binds or loosens. Social processes are thus occurrences resulting in a change in the "distance" between human beings. It will be seen that the really fundamental category is that of social process. The social relation is conceived as the result of social processes, as something brought about through the activity of approach or withdrawal. The terms relation and process are not, however, used very consistently, nor does von Wiese make it quite clear what he understands by the properties or characteristics of social processes as compared with the relations arising through them. Be this as it may, the two important properties of social process are in his view their "direction," i.e. whether towards or away from, and the degree of association or dissociation (*Richtung und Abstandsgrad*). Von Wiese explains that social distance is, of course, not to be equated with spatial distance, though he insists that it is not to be estimated in terms of psychology but by outward behaviour or action. This enables him to meet the objection that has been raised against the notion of social distance on the ground that in dealing with the relations between human beings the distance from A to B is not necessarily equal to the distance between B and A. From the point of view of the outward observer, von Wiese thinks, there is only one distance, for instance, when he notes that two friends no longer greet each other, though psychologically the attitude of A to B may be quite different from that of B to A in this case. His procedure in the classification of social relations is thus "behaviouristic"; the inward aspects of the relationships are relegated to psychology. Social structures are defined as "a number of social relationships so interwoven that they come to be regarded as unities"; in short they are systems of relationships having relative permanence and distinguishable from other such systems. The business of theoretical sociology is to provide: (1) an analysis and classification of social processes; (2) an analysis of social structure in terms of their constituent social processes and a classification of the social structures. The analysis of social processes consists in breaking them up into the "personal attitude" (*Haltung*) and the situation. The *Haltung* is interpreted behaviouristically, that is, in terms of outwardly observable behaviour. These two factors permit of further analysis. The *Haltung* is the product of

the inborn equipment of the individual (*Ichheit* = I) and the experiences he has had (*Erfahrung* = E). The situation (= S) again consists of the physical environment (*Umwelt* = U) and the behaviour or *Haltung* of other individuals (= H'). Thus expressed in a formula the analysis of a social process is :

$$P = H \times S, \text{ or, more fully,} \\ P = I \times E \times U \times (I \times E)'.$$

This is only another way of stating what I suppose few will dispute, that a social process is the result of an interaction between the individual's native aptitudes as moulded by his history and the outer environment, physical and social. As the variables hidden in the formula are highly complex and numerically indefinite, and we are given no method whereby they may be ascertained or measured, the formula cannot be said to be very helpful.

In his classification of the social processes von Wiese distinguishes firstly the fundamental process of association (*A* processes), and of dissociation (*B* processes), and mixed associative and dissociative processes (*M* processes). These he subdivides into principal processes and sub-processes. The *A* processes include approach, adaptation, equalization and unification; the *B* include competition, opposition and conflict, the basis of division being the degree of approach or withdrawal. Under each head various sub-processes are enumerated, but it is difficult to see on what common principle of division. These are all processes of the first order. He also describes processes of the second order, that is processes which presuppose a social structure or which result from interaction between social structures. These again are either integrating or differentiating, and may be illustrated by inequality, domination, stratification, selection, estrangement; examples of the integrating processes of the second order are sub- and superordination, socialization, uniformization, liberation. On the basis of these concepts an elaborate table of human relationships has been compiled by von Wiese and his pupils. Social structures are classified on the basis of the closeness with which they serve to tie (or separate) individuals. He thus obtains crowds, groups and what he calls abstract collectivities. These differ from each other in the directness of the influence which the mass exercises upon the individual. The abstract collectivities include such entities as the

State, the Church, the social class, the economic order and the cultural order such as the arts and the sciences. They are oddly named abstract. The intention is to stress the fact that they are not tied to any particular individual and are thus impersonal. They are not to be thought of as substantive. They are complex interweavings of social processes, and the study of them should aim at revealing the symbols and standards employed by them, the behaviour of the individuals and the groups inside them, and the processes which go to their making.

Such, in very rough outline, is von Wiese's scheme. Its value as an instrument of investigation has hardly yet been tested. The descriptions given by the members of this school of actual social processes, though frequently illuminating, do not stand in any intrinsic relation to the methods and distinctions elaborated by them, and are in general too slight to provide a criterion of their usefulness. The fundamental terms, such as distance, are somewhat vaguely defined, and though there is a great parade of formulæ, no real units of measurement or even of qualitative comparison have yet been worked out. This vagueness applies also to the analysis of the factors involved in behaviour whether genetic or environmental. Nevertheless as outlining a programme of investigation the scheme is impressive, and the formal classification of relationships must in one way or another constitute a part of theoretical sociology.

(B) Broader views of sociology. We may take the work of Max Weber, which is generally regarded as the most important German contribution to recent sociology, as illustrating the transition to a more concrete and historically minded conception of sociology. Max Weber belongs in a certain sense to the "Formal" school. He has worked out a detailed scheme of social relationships beginning with the notion of social behaviour, and leading up to the most complex forms of social structure. But these formal definitions have evidently arisen out of his actual treatment of historical fact and they are used by him in a comprehensive study of social development, of which he seeks to determine the principal trends. Here it is, of course, not possible to follow up his account of economic and religious development, and I will confine myself to a brief statement of the essentials of his method. The business of sociology is to understand or interpret social behaviour. The method of interpretation is through the notion of ideal types, accompanied by

empirical or inductive verification. We have then to ask what is meant by "social behaviour," "understanding" and "ideal type" in this context.

Social behaviour is defined as action which in the intention of the agent has reference to the behaviour of others and is determined in its course by that behaviour. Thus, for example, the acceptance of money is a social act because the recipient expects that an indefinite number of others will in the future be ready to accept it in exchange. On the other hand, an act initiated by the expectation regarding the behaviour of material objects is not in this sense social. Further, only such contacts between individuals are social which rest upon an intentional reference to others. For instance, a collision between two cyclists is in itself merely a natural phenomenon, but their efforts to avoid each other, or the language they use after the event is true social behaviour. There must be a "*sinnhafte Orientierung des eigenen an dem fremden Handeln*." Like all human action social behaviour is determined in four typical ways: (1) *Zweckrational* or purposefully, i.e. when the expected behaviour of others is used as a means for one's own deliberately formed purposes; (2) *Wertrational* or in accordance with standards of value or through conscious belief in standards assigning intrinsic value to certain types of behaviour; (3) *Affektiv* or emotionally, when the agent acts as a result of an affective attitude to others, e.g. revenge or devotion; (4) *Traditionell* or through established habit. There is a social relationship whenever behaviour is determined by conscious and mutual reference to the expected behaviour of the individuals concerned. (The mutuality does not imply that the *same* action or attitude is mutually expected but merely that some form of response is anticipated by all the parties.) There is a social relationship whenever there is a chance or probability that social behaviour of a given type will occur. By the aid of these definitions, Max Weber also defines for his purposes such entities as the State or the Church or Marriage. They are complexes of social relationships and define the probability that socially oriented behaviour of a certain type has taken place, is taking place, or will take place. In this way he avoids turning these entities into substances. Thus, for example, a state ceases to exist when there is no longer the chance or probability that certain definable types of social behaviour will occur. On the same lines Max Weber gives useful and illuminating definitions of such things as social ordinances, usages,

fashion, law and custom, always, that is, in terms of the probability of certain types of social behaviour.

What now is meant by the "understanding" or interpretation of social behaviour? The definition of social behaviour as we have seen contains reference to the intention of the agent (*von dem Handelnden gemeinten Sinn*). We are said to understand the behaviour if we can grasp this *Sinn* or intention. This is clearest in the case of rational utterances, as when we are told that $2 \times 2 = 4$, or when we understand a conclusion in a syllogism. Similarly we can understand errors in arithmetic on the basis of our own similar errors. In other cases we can only "understand" by sympathetic intuition (*empfindend nachvollziehend*). In either case the understanding is either of the present intention, as when we understand any scientific communication, or see that a person is angry from his outward expression, or it may go further back by reference to a wider context of motives, as when we understand an arithmetical proposition communicated to us, in the sense of knowing the reason why the calculation is made just then, or interpret a person's anger by referring it to jealousy or injured vanity. In all cases the interpretation may refer to (i) a particular event, (ii) a general or average mode of behaviour, or (iii) an ideal type, that is to say, a mode of behaviour arrived at by deliberate abstraction, as, for example, when we inquire what a course of behaviour would be if it were determined only by conscious purpose unaffected by emotion or other sources of deviation. In dealing with mass behaviour it is this last procedure by the use of ideal types that is most important. We try to ascertain what would happen, if the course of behaviour were determined rationally, and then interpret the deviations actually found as due to emotional or other irrational factors. In this sense *verstehende* sociology is rationalistic. It uses the purposive as an ideal type, but it does not assume that actual behaviour is rational. On the contrary it realizes that in the majority of cases behaviour runs its course in "*dumpe Halbbewusstheit oder Unbewusstheit seines gemeinten Sinns*." The interpretations thus arrived at remain, however, only hypothetical, owing to the following difficulties. There are repressed motives which are not easily accessible to the agent himself. Secondly, outward acts may in fact be differently motivated, and, thirdly, there are frequently conflicting motives, the relative intensity of which can only be inferred from the final choice. It follows that verification is required, and this

must aim at showing that the interpretation is (i) "*sinnhaft adequat*," that is to say, intelligible in terms of normal habits of thought and feeling, and (ii) *kausal adequat*, that is to say, that the sequence is in accordance with probability, or that (on the ground of experience) there is a chance of its always happening in that way. Sociological laws are, then, empirically established probabilities, or statistical generalizations of the course of social behaviour of which an interpretation can be given in terms of typical motives and intentions. Sociological method is a combination of inductive or statistical generalization with "*verstehende*" interpretation by the aid of an ideal type of behaviour, that is, one assumed to be rationally or purposively determined. The method is thus not psychological, though it would seem that a *verstehende* psychology would be helpful in accounting for the deviations from rational behaviour actually observable (p. 9). The relation between history and sociology is formulated by Weber thus: History is concerned with the causal analysis of individual, culturally important actions, structures or personalities. Sociology, on the other hand, operates with typical constructs and searches for general rules. In this view he was to some extent influenced by Rickert, but, as the latter explains in the dedication of his work, Weber cannot be fitted into any category or school. He was at once a great historian and a systematist and in both directions he opened new paths.¹

To the historically minded sociologists in Germany belongs also Alfred Weber, who has put forward important suggestions towards what has come to be known as *Kultursoziologie*.² His conception of sociological method is based upon a distinction he draws between social process, civilization and culture. The social process consists in the successive appearance of typical social structures which seems to follow a definite order and can be traced, though naturally with individual variations, among the different peoples of the world. By the process of civilization he understands essentially the growth of knowledge and the technical command over the forces of nature. This is a coherent growth following a regular order, transferable from people to people, valid for all humanity, a process of discovery bound by the laws of causality. The process of culture, on the other hand, follows no necessary order. It is not

¹ For an interesting study of Max Weber's views in the light of Husserl's logic, cf. Alfred Schütz, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, Julius Springer, Vienna, 1932, and Tomoo Otaka, *Grundlegung der Lehre vom sozialen Verband*, Julius Springer, Vienna, 1932.

² See article in the *Handwörterbuch*.

unilinear or cumulative, but occurs sporadically in a series of "protuberant-like" outbreaks, revealing no necessary order or connection, except, of course, so far as the technical methods of expression are concerned. Culture can only be dealt with historically; that is, each case must be studied in its individual character, and it does not lend itself to the generalizing methods of science. The business of sociology is to study these three processes in relation to each other. The older evolutionary point of view was, in Alfred Weber's opinion, wrong in that it over-emphasized the civilizatory process. It therefore saw uniformities in development, and misconceived the nature of culture, which does not follow any definite order of growth. On the other hand, such a system as that of Spengler is doubly open to the objection that, firstly, it does not realize that the process of civilization is unitary and not tied to any one cultural area and, secondly, the cultures of different peoples are not in any true sense homologous, each being unique, and, therefore, there can be no morphology of culture as Spengler imagines. In the light of these distinctions Weber has planned an investigation of the cultures of ancient Egypt and Babylonia¹ which affords a good illustration of the way in which he handles sociological problems. It remains to be seen how far the method can be generalized.

Professor MacIver's Sociological System

MacIver has much in common with the German sociologists, though his method is much more concrete and in closer touch with empirical observation and comparative study. Sociology is, in his view, the study of social relationships, that is relationships based on mutual awareness and the recognition of a common life. The object of such study is the "understanding" of social events, and by understanding is meant very much what Max Weber means by it, namely the discovery of motivation in relation to the complex and interconnected factors in the social setting or situation. But unlike Max Weber he lays no stress on the device of the ideal type, and he is readier than Max Weber to appeal to psychology. He adopts for his purpose a classification of human drives based on the distinction between attitudes, interests and motivations. By attitude he means a quality or state of consciousness involving a tendency to act in a characteristic way on appropriate stimulation.

¹ See *Archiv f. Soz. Wiss. und Soz. Pol.*, p. 55.

Examples are friendliness, domination, submission. He divides attitudes into those that imply a sense of inferiority in the subject towards the object of the attitude, those which imply a sense of superiority, and those which do not necessarily imply a difference of plane or status. Examples are fear or envy ; disdain or patronage ; distrust or competitiveness. Each class is subdivided according as the attitude is associative, restrictive or dissociative in tendency. Attitudes are modes of consciousness. Interests are defined as objects of consciousness. They are "any object or kind of object which seriously enlists our attention." Attitude and interest are correlative. Thus, for example, an interest in health or recreation implies an attitude of attraction towards these objects. The distinction is not very clear to me. The difference between mode and object of consciousness appears to apply to interests just as much as to attitudes. For interest as ordinarily used refers to an abiding mood guiding and sustaining appropriate responses, and in such moods we can distinguish between the psychic state and the objects upon which it is directed. The third term "motivation" is not very clearly defined. It is described as "the effective valuations which inspire our conduct, which subtly change our attitudes and interests" (p. 50), but no further analysis is given of its nature or its relation to the interests and attitudes. I find it more helpful in dealing with problems of human motivation to use the distinctions made by English psychologists, more particularly Mr. Shand, between instinct, emotion and sentiment. Interests are really abiding moods within the organization of a sentiment or sentiments. Attitudes again are potential reactions or dispositions within sentiments or emotional systems, established or incipient, and valuations are judgments of approval and disapproval intimately connected with the emotions of joy, admiration, wonder, satisfaction. On this view of mental dispositions MacIver's lists would have to be very considerably modified, especially in order to avoid confusion between emotions and sentiments. The notion of sentiment is of especial importance in social psychology on the ground that with its aid we can do better justice to the subtle interplay of emotions and dispositions and the extremely wide range of feelings and desires which come to be variously connected with the objects of our interests. On the other hand, the classification of mental dispositions into associative, restrictive and dissociative is novel and helpful, at any rate in a preliminary analysis, as is also the grouping on the

basis of whether the dispositions imply a difference of level or status.¹

These psychological preliminaries are used by MacIver in his analysis of social structure. There are, he thinks, three broadly distinctive modes of grouping ; communities, that is to say circles of people sharing a whole set of interests and not merely this or that particular interest ; looser configurations such as social classes, which have no formal organizations but arise out of common attitudes and in response to common interests ; and formal associations which are established for definite ends. The first two reveal more directly social attitudes, while the latter are more closely related to interests and can be defined functionally. The distinction between association and community is one which MacIver has made familiar to English sociologists in his earlier works. In one form or another it has been widely used by German writers, since it was formulated by Tönnies in his early work on *Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft*. Indeed all the recent writers in Germany devote a great deal of attention to this distinction and have made it the basis of their classifications of social groupings.

On the basis of this threefold grouping MacIver deals in rapid survey first with community and quasi-communal groups such as social classes, with the family as on the border line between community and association, and finally with associations. These he classifies in terms of the kind of interests they serve and their durability. Interests, or rather objects of interest, differ according as they are instruments to the satisfaction of other interests, or are intrinsically valuable. The latter or primary interests include social intercourse, health and recreation, sex and reproduction, religion, æsthetic appreciation and science and philosophy, and give rise to numerous associations. The former are described as secondary, and include economic, political and technological interests, and they also give rise to associations serving them. Intermediate interests are both instrumental and intrinsic, or in MacIver's words utilitarian and cultural, for example educational interests and associations. The distinctions are reminiscent of those used by Tönnies and Alfred Weber and they are clearly useful in a preliminary classification. It is to be noted, however, that there is a danger in such classification of forgetting that social groupings are historical entities which undergo great changes both from the point

¹ Cf. the classifications suggested by Wiese and Plenge.

of view of the interests they serve and the clarity with which they are differentiated. Thus, for example, it is clear that the distinction between economic and political interests is differently drawn at different times and among different peoples, and they cannot be laid down once for all. In some of MacIver's detailed discussions, for instance, of the State, it is not always clear whether he is giving an analysis of the actual functions of the association or whether he is asking what such functions *ought* to be. Another difficulty is due to the interweaving and overlap of interests in actual life, and the tendency for means and ends to pass into each other. The dominant interest may give us an initial clue to the nature of an association, but it will not take us very far in the interpretation of its actual working.

From the account of social structure MacIver passes to the regulative principles of social life and to the problem of social change. Unlike many recent American writers he finds the concept of evolution of value in sociology. He traces briefly the various grades of the differentiation and diversification of interests which constitute the historical process. Evolution consists in a movement from a state in which the various interests are fused, to one of differentiated communal institutions, and later to one of ever-increasing differentiation and multiplication of distinct associations. Like Tönnies he asserts there has been a movement from community to association. He also works out in his own way the distinction between culture and civilization which we have seen to be the core of Alfred Weber's sociological work. In dealing with social causation he stresses the interdependence of inner and outer factors. Briefly his method is to study the way in which the universal desires of mankind are given varying valuation under particular conditions. Changes in valuation have to be brought into relation with changes in the efficiency with which the means needed for their realization are rendered available. Social analysis consists in disentangling the complex of desires, motivations and interests in relation to the complex of means, opportunities and hindrances governing social responses. The study of concomitances and sequences and the use of correlations are only a preliminary step in the tracing of causes. We only achieve interpretation when we have discovered the nature of the adjustment between the inner and outer factors involved in the phenomenon. In his subtle and interesting analysis of this adjustment, MacIver has succeeded in avoiding the one-

sidedness alike of those who interpret social change as merely a reaction to environmental changes and of those who view human history as the expression of capacities inherent in human nature. The book is distinguished for its unity of design and for the great skill with which empirical and theoretical elements are interwoven. If it does not quite fulfil the promise held out in the preface to provide a complete system of sociology, it must yet rank high among recent contributions towards a synoptic sociology.

I will now try to bring together the main points regarding the nature of sociology which have suggested themselves to me as a result of my brief survey of contemporary work. First, in regard to the scope of sociology we have noted the cleavage that still exists between those who wish to make sociology into a specialism dealing with the forms of social relationships, and those who consider that the business of sociology is to give an account of the whole growth and development of societies, and especially of the interrelations between the various aspects of social life. To me there seems no necessary conflict between these two conceptions of sociology, and there is ample room for both. It must indeed be urged that they are necessarily related, and that the study of forms of relationships must itself take account of the historical or temporal character of social life. For (i) if by the forms of social life be meant the types of associations, institutions, such as forms of the family, of property or political organization, I doubt whether they can be regarded profitably as identical and timeless entities. Their form is affected by the varying social life within which they are embedded. A category like common ownership, for instance, does not really mean the same thing in different economic systems. (ii) If by the forms of social life be meant the fundamental types of the psychical bond, similar considerations apply. Vierkandt, who has worked out this conception most fully, himself stresses the historical and plastic character of the human mind, but he does not seem to realize the implications of this admission for his method. If human nature is not constant, but receives varying content in the course of historical evolution, how can we be sure that what appears to us an irreducible element in human nature is not in fact, a complex product of mental evolution? Can phenomenological analysis ever enable us to conclude, as Vierkandt repeatedly does, that certain types of experience are inborn, specific elements in human nature? It seems to me that the analysis of types of experience must be supplemented by a study

of the tendencies of the emotions and sentiments as reflected in behaviour, and this means that the method cannot be exclusively formal.

I turn next to the relation between psychology and sociology. Here the prevalent tendency (with the exception of MacIver) is to keep the two disciplines distinct. But closer examination shows, I think, that in this endeavour none of the writers have been successful. Von Wiese's treatment professes to confine itself to outward behaviour, but in analysing any social process, he has to take into account the inborn psychical equipment as modified by the environment, though he confines himself to the "four wishes" which he borrows from the American sociologists. Vierkandt calls his analysis phenomenological, but as we have seen, this is hard to distinguish from what other people call psychology. Max Weber's use of the concept of ideal types frees him from the necessity of psychological analysis in a preliminary investigation. But in dealing with any actual situation, the deviations from rational behaviour become important, and admittedly they cannot be accounted for save by a psychological analysis of the irrational elements in the mental life. Indeed Max Weber himself admits the importance of psychology of the type he calls "*verstehende*." For certain purposes we may ignore the fine distinctions drawn by psychologists in dealing with human behaviour. We may with Max Weber regard that behaviour as "intelligible" which is in accordance with normal habits of thought and feeling. But these "normal" habits will, in fact, be made up of a large number of variable forms and there is always room for further detailed analysis. Particularly in the study of social change the individual variations are of great importance, since it appears to be the case that vast changes are brought about by the accumulation of small variations. A study of the forms of institutions must, it seems to me, benefit from psychology. Thus, for example, in examining monogamy as a form of marriage, it is surely highly relevant to take into account changes in the intensity of the desire for offspring, in the general attitude to women, in the refinement of the sentiment of love, in the prestige which formerly attached to large families. These factors are all interwoven with changes in economic structure, and these in turn depend in part upon psychological forces. We cannot assume at the outset that the psychological factors are unimportant relatively to the rest.

On the historical and evolutionary side of sociology recent work

has brought out certain important distinctions. Alfred Weber and MacIver stress the distinction between culture and civilization and argue that the order of growth appears to be radically different in the two spheres. But only the merest beginning has been made in the study of their mutual relations and interactions, though valuable suggestions in this direction are made by Alfred Weber. With regard to the process of civilization itself an important distinction is drawn by Thurnwald between those processes that are cumulative and irreversible, for instance, technical discovery, and those that of necessity alternate between a number of limited possibilities, for instance, the forms of marriage, or systems of kinship. There is urgent need for study of the interrelations between the various aspects of social development. In particular the study of the relation between the mentality of social groups and the social structure has hitherto been conducted in too general terms to be at all decisive. The broad correlation, for example, that Hobhouse seeks to establish between the growth of mind and society is based upon a classification of the stages of mental and social evolution which in its own way is illuminating, but which needs to be supplemented by more detailed comparative studies of a less ambitious kind. MacIver's discussion on this point seems to me to be even more general and vague than Hobhouse's. Max Weber's work on the relation between religious systems and economic development is of great importance in this connection and the growth of a *Wissenssoziologie*¹ may prove helpful. A profitable line of inquiry, and one for which there seems to be abundance of material, is afforded by the relation between law and morals—a comparative study of which ought to throw light upon the influence of mental factors upon the growth of institutions.

¹ Cf. Mannheim's article in the *Handwörterbuch*.

CHAPTER SIX

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITIES ¹

AN examination of the courses of study now followed in the universities shows that the teaching of the social sciences is almost completely divorced from the teaching of social philosophy. The bulk of the students reading economics, anthropology, history, law, international relations obtain no systematic training in philosophical analysis, and they are encouraged, no doubt in the interests of objectivity and detachment, to regard their disciplines as ethically neutral. Politics is perhaps an exception. Though it consists mainly of a factual study of methods of governmental administration it deals also with the theory of political obligation and with the ends or aims of government. Yet even in the case of political science it is true, I think, that the majority of students are rarely given the preliminary training in ethical analysis necessary for any effective synthesis of these two aspects of their studies. Where, as in the Modern Greats, philosophy is associated with economics, politics, and history, there is likewise no clear evidence that any genuine correlation is achieved.

As a preparation for the effective handling of social problems, both from the point of view of theory and practice, the schemes of study now prevalent seem open to grave objection. The problems of deepest interest to layman and student alike are just those in which questions of value and questions of fact are closely interwoven, and to see them in their proper relationship is a matter of the most vital importance to the social inquirer. In political discussion it is not uncommon for questions of right and wrong to be overborne by confident assertions as to facts which themselves turn out to rest on little more than prejudices. It is no doubt equally the case that sociologists have often been influenced in estimating the trend of events not so much by the evidence before them as by their pre-conceived theories of the direction in which events ought to move. It is therefore essential that questions of fact and questions of value shall be clearly distinguished. The training at present provided

¹ A paper read to Section L of the British Association, 6 September, 1937.

in the universities is not, however, well calculated to achieve this object. For while students are given careful instruction in marshalling and correlating factual data they have no parallel experience in weighing values or in disentangling the value elements in complex social situations. The result is that they hover between scepticism and dogmatism. They either conclude that moral judgments do not permit of rational analysis but are matters of taste or feeling about which there can be no argument, or else they accept uncritically the now fashionable dogma that value judgments merely express the needs of the dominant sections within any given community. In moments of crisis, that is to say at times of profound conflict of loyalties, the moral assumptions underlying conduct are put to the test and the lack of systematic reflection becomes painfully evident in the tangle of contradictions then brought to light.

Social philosophy has two functions to fulfil, both of special relevance and urgency at the present time. The first, which may be described as the logical or epistemological, is concerned with the presuppositions or assumptions underlying common sense and scientific thought about social phenomena, and with the nature and validity of the methods employed in investigating them. It is true that in the past controversy as to methods of investigation has sometimes blocked the path of investigation, and sociological treatises in particular have often been accused with some justice of spending so much time on questions of the logic of their inquiry that the inquiry itself is never undertaken. It is further true that philosophy can no more prescribe the methods to be employed by the social sciences than it can prescribe the methods to be employed by the physical sciences. But philosophy can, and it seems urgently necessary just now that it should, attempt to provide a critical apparatus for scrutinizing and evaluating the methods and assumptions made by the social sciences, and particularly the more fundamental conceptions from which a synthesis of the social sciences might proceed. I will give some examples in illustration of this need.

In the last century the conception of evolution was part of the climate of opinion. It was a constitutive principle of thought, and all problems were naturally approached within the framework of evolutionary theory. Gradually a reaction set in. In part this was due to the failure of the ambitious efforts made by earlier sociologists like Spencer to build up schemes of evolution covering

the whole range of human activities. In part the reaction was of the nature of a protest, which had its parallel among the biologists, against excessive preoccupation with problems of origin or genesis, and expressed the desire for a direct study of existing societies. But above all it was due to a decline of faith in the notion of progress with which evolutionary sociology was associated, a decline of faith brought about by the eclipse of humanitarian ethics and the triumph of the opposite principle of forcible self-assertion in its various forms. The position now is very curious. People are sceptical of the possibility of establishing any general laws of social change, yet cannot reconcile themselves to the view that in history there is no plot, rhythm, or pattern, but only a series of emergencies, the play of the contingent and unforeseen. In the form of the materialist interpretation of history the notion of development, so far from being dead, is exerting a wide and growing influence. The biological form of the theory survives in racial theories of civilization and in the widely held view that in history the struggle for existence is the decisive force. Very few writers can avoid using the conception of levels or stages of civilization, though the criteria for comparing different peoples or periods are rarely stated explicitly. The question thus remains whether the notion of evolution or development is valid as applied to societies, whether it is used in the same sense when applied to different spheres of human activity, say economic and political institutions, religion, art, and morals, and how it is related to the conception of progress with which, despite much discussion, it is still frequently confused. A philosophical analysis of the conceptions of social change which in fact are employed, whether deliberately or otherwise, in the different social sciences would greatly help in clarifying the present highly confusing state of affairs.

Another problem calling for philosophical reflection relates to the part played by the human will in social change. There was a time when the possibility of any social science was disputed on the ground that the freedom or indeterminateness of the will made the notion of regularity or law inapplicable to human affairs. Now the tendency is rather to doubt the efficacy of the human will on the ground that the social process is determined by massive causes which operate independently of the will of individuals. Apart from the support given to this view in some forms of historical materialism, it underlies much recent popular thought. It is implicit, for ex-

ample, in the statement frequently to be met with that war is "inevitable," despite the fact that no one wants it. The fatalistic attitude is encouraged by the enormous complexity of the factors shaping collective action which does not appear to be the result of any individual will, nor of a common will, but rather of a complicated network of wills linked in a manner not willed by anyone. From the fact that the interactions between wills are not controlled by any one will the conclusion is drawn that will does not count at all. Or else, paradoxically, refuge is sought in the unique will of a "leader" credited with the power of solving by sheer self-assertion all the problems which had baffled the collective wisdom of the community. I am not suggesting for a moment that the problem of the nature of public opinion or of collective volition can be solved by philosophy alone. On the contrary, these are matters largely for sociology and social psychology. But philosophy can throw light on the validity of the notion of end or purpose in its application to the historical process, and on the problem whether the laws or generalizations of the social sciences assert relations independent of the human will, or consist rather of statements of the various ways in which human wills act in relation to each other under assignable conditions. While the laws themselves have to be established by empirical investigation, the philosopher can do much to guard against confusions likely to arise out of misunderstandings regarding the logical character of the laws and the relations between necessity, freedom, and law.

One further illustration may be given of the need for philosophical analysis suggested by the present position of the social sciences. There has been a great deal of criticism lately of the use of the abstract or deductive method in economics. This criticism seems to me on the whole to be misdirected. There can be no question of the legitimacy of the method in its own domain or of the importance of pushing it as far as it will go. The really important question is rather as to the relation between purely deductive studies and the more concrete or inductive handling of economic data. Here there appear to be real divergencies of view which urgently require elucidation. There are some who regard the laws of economics as analytic propositions bringing out the implications of certain fundamental conceptions: for example, of what is involved in the notion of scales of preference in relation to goods limited in supply. Induction is then not considered as having a verifica-

tory function : the business of empirical studies is rather to reveal the fields within which theories otherwise established may be applied, or perhaps to suggest new or residual problems. Other economists regard economic laws as hypothetical generalizations to be verified by appeal to the facts, and induction and deduction are then regarded as integral parts of one set of logical operations. My experience of students suggests that they are bewildered by this divergence of views, and that they are seldom able to bring together the results of economic theory and of empirical observation. Whether a particular method is useful or not cannot be determined by abstract speculation but only by experiment in actual investigation. Yet some grasp of the logical aspects of the methods employed would be helpful to the student in his present bewilderment.

So far I have referred only to the critical or logical side of social philosophy, but the more positive side, namely that concerned with the problem of values, is now of even greater importance. The social sciences have recently prided themselves on their ethical neutrality, and they insist that they are concerned not with things as they ought to be but as they are. There can be no doubt that much confusion has been caused by a failure to observe this distinction, and in so far as the present attitude of the social sciences is intended to guard against this confusion there is clearly much to be said for it. Yet I am not sure that the grounds of the distinction have been accurately stated or that the ethical neutrality is observed in practice. In the case of economics it has been made to rest on the distinction between means and ends ; economics is said to be concerned solely with means, while the problem of ends is left to ethics. This is clearly untenable. Ethics cannot ignore means and economics cannot ignore ends, since the efficiency of means cannot be ascertained without reference to the ends they serve, and the compatibility or coherence of the various ends depends in part on the compatibility and coherence of the means. The true distinction seems rather to be that economics deals with ends hypothetically. It answers the question : if the end were so and so, what must be done in order to attain it ? Ethics, on the other hand, is concerned with the more radical question as to what ends ought to be chosen. If confusion is to be avoided the two questions must be clearly distinguished. In the criticism of a particular form of economic organization, for example of capitalism, it is important to be clear whether we are dealing with the question whether capitalism is

efficient or inefficient in attaining its objects, or whether we are questioning the desirability or value of these objects. But while it is important to distinguish the questions it is no less important to ask them both, and I would venture to say that it is the moral issues involved which at present are most urgently in need of clarification.

From this point of view a second ground which is often given for the separation of ethics from social science is even more open to objection. It has been argued that economics must eschew all problems involving value judgments on the ground that these are not open to investigation by scientific methods. I suggest that this argument begs a serious philosophical question, and that so far from being ethically neutral commits itself without proper inquiry to a particular form of ethical theory, namely the theory that moral judgments express nothing but personal feelings. If, as is presumably the case, the reference is to teleological ethics, it is easy to see that the ends of behaviour cannot be ascertained by simple inspection. To determine the ends of social policy or the purposes of social institutions is an even more complicated matter, and whatever may be our view of the nature of ultimate valuations, there is much to be done that calls for careful and methodical investigation in bringing these ends to light in relation to the means available for their realization. The distinction between means and ends is itself far from clear, and in many cases (e.g. the desire for power) it is certainly not easy to tell by simple inspection whether we desire a thing for its intrinsic value or as a means for something else. I am not maintaining that these are matters for the economist, or that the distinction between means and ends taken as given is not serviceable enough for his purposes. But he goes beyond his province in suggesting that the ends of social and economic institutions do not permit of rational discussion, or that in dealing with differences of view regarding them we are reduced to assertion and counter-assertion. Leaving aside the questions of means, three different questions arise in connection with social institutions: what ends do they in fact serve, what ends are they intended to serve, and what ends ought they to serve? He would be a bold person who were to claim that these questions can be adequately dealt with without painstaking and methodical inquiry in relation, say, to the various forms of the family, of property, of war, or of the criminal law. It is clear that in a great many cases our moral judgments of particular institutions would be transformed, if we had fuller

knowledge of the ends actually attained in relation to the ends they are intended to attain. The moral judgment itself is far from simple, and I can see no ground for assuming that it is not susceptible of investigation by rational methods, whether such investigation be called scientific or not. I agree that economics and sociology in general should be kept distinct from ethics, but would urge that they should also be brought into definite relation. Confusion is likely to arise if their distinctness is not recognized, but also if they never meet at all. The effective handling of social problems involves a synthesis, but not a fusion, of social science and social philosophy. If this be so, then the present organization of teaching in the universities is sadly out of balance.

The need for closer co-operation with social philosophy is even clearer in connection with the teaching of political science and especially of international relations. In politics attention is largely concentrated on the institutional side. The ethical aspects are generally introduced through courses on what is called the history of political ideas. As I have already indicated, the students seldom have the necessary preliminary training in the analysis of ethical concepts which is essential if the facts of governmental organization are to be effectively correlated and interpreted in the light of the ends which governments subserve or ought to subserve. I doubt, for example, whether they are equipped with the critical apparatus needed for dealing with such questions as the relation between the good of the nation and the good of its constituent members, or of the relation between loyalty and conformity, or of the legitimacy and limits of the political use of force. In the teaching of international relations ethics plays, so far as I am aware, a very small part. Yet nothing is more striking in the history of international relations than the appeal made to the notion of right and justice. Since the relation between actual law and the theory of justice is not critically examined, the student not unnaturally concludes that all talk of justice is mere rationalization, a concession to the strange desire that man seems to have to justify or explain himself to himself and to others. Philosophy goes by default, with the result that the student is least equipped to tackle with detachment and method just those problems which have the strongest emotional appeal, and in relation to which the fiercest contests are likely to be waged.

The neglect of philosophy is clearly not due entirely to the hard-headedness of the social scientists. It is due at least as much to

the fact that with few exceptions philosophers have not recently devoted much attention to social problems, and, in particular, to the fact that the teaching of ethics has not been brought into relation with present needs. The student of ethics is given an account of the various ethical systems, but except in the case of utilitarianism the bearing of these systems on social and political problems is not made clear to him, nor is he enabled to derive from them any criteria for evaluating particular social institutions or for comparing different societies with one another. Thus the students of philosophy have seldom any detailed knowledge of social facts or even of the actual working of moral codes ; while the students of social science are given no training in ethical analysis. It is clear that in these circumstances the synthesis of social studies which is so urgently needed is not likely to be attained, and that great changes will have to be made in the teaching of both social science and social philosophy if the universities are to make the contribution they ought to make towards the rational ordering of society.

PART TWO

CHAPTER SEVEN

NATIONAL CHARACTER ¹

I. THE PROBLEM AND ITS DIFFICULTIES

IN popular thought and in serious historical and political studies the existence of national characteristics and even of national character, in the sense of coherent group of traits exhibiting some measure of permanence and continuity, is undoubtedly frequently taken for granted. An American statesman in speaking recently of the trend of the war predicted a German defeat by internal collapse, because as he said "the Germans will not take it." The novelist Conrad, when asked in 1914 what England would do, felt confident in asserting that if England did come into the war then, no matter who might want to make peace at the end of six months at the cost of right and justice, England would keep on fighting for years and, if necessary, alone. In both these instances it is clear that to Germany and England is attributed sufficient continuity of character to justify prediction of their probable behaviour in given circumstances. On the other hand, when we turn to the attempts that have been made to subject national characteristics to scientific analysis the results are generally so indefinite as to raise a doubt whether the characteristics in question exist at all. It is therefore of importance at the outset to bring out the difficulties which such studies of necessity encounter.

There is, to begin with, the obvious difficulty of avoiding personal bias in observation and interpretation. The greater part of the books on the subject are *livres de circonstance*, written under the influence of particular political situations and with a view to future policy. The numerous accounts of English national character written by Germans since the beginning of the nineteenth century may be cited in illustration.² The earlier writers saw in the slow and organic growth of England and its sturdy independence a model

¹ Inaugural address to the Social Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society delivered at Nottingham, 17 April, 1941.

² An interesting discussion of these accounts will be found in (1), Introduction, pp. 35-51.

for Germany's struggle and reconstruction. Later and under the influence of the new racial theories stress was laid on the ruling qualities of the Germanic peoples, and England is depicted as the noblest people of Germanic race. Later still, with the emergence of the theory of *Realpolitik*, there is a strong tendency to depict English character as essentially materialistic, as persistently striving for power and profit and hiding its selfish sentiments under a cloak of ethical and religious humanitarianism. This tendency was naturally encouraged during the war of 1914-18 and is clearly seen even in writers who claim, not without reason, to be capable of viewing the problem with some coolness and fairmindedness. Thus Levin Schucking seeks to show that hypocrisy is deeply rooted in English character. It is not, he thinks, to be explained as a defence mechanism against a too stringent Puritanism, because the trait is most marked in the non-Puritan sections of the English public and can be traced back to the pre-Puritan period (2). The best-known work on England written after the war of 1914-18, while praising the sanity, virility and spiritual balance of the English, is yet at bottom dominated by the belief that the ruling quality of the English mind is the lust for power and that this constitutes a great danger to the world, unless it is checked and controlled by the resistance of something like an equal opponent (3), p. 506). English and French writers in dealing with the psychology of peoples other than their own show, I think, greater powers of detachment, a keener awareness of the difficulties of entering sympathetically into the minds of others, and a greater readiness to make allowance for national and personal prejudices. To give one example, Fouillée's work (4) on the psychology of peoples is generously conceived and executed, inspired by the belief that the qualities of a people are as a rule more deeply hidden than its vices and absurdities, and that the lesson of comparative psychology is to inculcate at once justice and sympathy. His study of the character of the Germans, in particular, is extraordinarily fair-minded, though he cannot altogether avoid being disturbed by their growing militarism and chauvinism. A survey of the works dealing with national characteristics suggests, I think, that the errors due to bias can be to a large extent corrected by a comparison of the views that writers of different nations have of other nations than their own, while occasionally the picture they paint of other nations may also serve to reveal something of the mentality of their own. In this branch of

social science as in others impartiality is very much a matter of degree, and in a measure the personal equation can be allowed for by paying attention to the historical conditions likely to affect the results of the inquiry.

Another set of difficulties arise from the great complexity of national groups and the fact that they differ widely in inner unity and homogeneity. There appears to be no generally accepted definition of nation, but for the present purpose we may say that a nation is a group of people, inhabiting or associated with a given territory, who regard themselves as a unity and have the will to give expression to that unity in political independence or at least in a measure of cultural autonomy. It is obvious that this definition would cover groups differing widely from one another in inner cohesion and complexity of structure. We cannot assume that all peoples who call themselves nations have a distinctive character, still less that this character is natural or native or equally diffused in all portions of the people.¹ A differential or comparative psychology of nations would have to establish a serviceable classification of types of nationhood. Such a classification would have to take into account (a) the type of political unity, e.g. whether federal or centralized, (b) degree of social differentiation and type of class structure, attention being given in particular to the emergence of the middle classes, (c) degree of cultural homogeneity, with special reference to language and religion, (d) age or rather stage of maturity or growth.

Politically complex nations often have sub-nations within them, as is, for example, the case in Great Britain, and the question arises whether there is a national character common to them all. Again, in most European countries there are important local differences both of temperament and character. The Picardian differs from the Gascon, the Norman from the Savoyard, and we cannot be sure that behind these divergencies there is an underlying identity of character.² The age of the nation or its degree of maturation

¹ Cf. Nietzsche's remark : " That which is at present called a nation in Europe, and is really rather a *res facta* than *nata* (indeed, sometimes confusingly similar to a *res facta et picta*) is in every case something evolving, young, easily displaced " ((5), p. 208).

² An interesting attempt is made by Halbwachs, *Les causes du suicide* (6), to calculate the " dispersion " of suicides in the various regions of several European countries. He shows that in this respect there is greater uniformity in England than in other countries, the tendency to suicide being more evenly distributed in the counties of England than in the departments and provinces of France, Italy and Germany.

becomes especially important in comparative studies. The traits attributed by Tacitus to the Germanic tribes have often been regarded as specifically German ; but according to modern ethnologists these traits are common to many primitive peoples. There may be differences also in speed or rate of maturation, and it has been argued, for example, that the German people has matured very slowly and that it is only in recent times that its own nature has been able to express itself over against the numerous foreign influences to which it has been for long subjected (cf. (7), p. 39). The degree of social differentiation is especially important in dealing with the non-industrial peoples. Most of the characteristics attributed to the Poles, for example, appear to refer only to the Polish nobility, while of the bulk of the population we know little or nothing. In the more differentiated peoples it is perhaps an open question whether class characteristics are not at least as important as the national characteristics, and it is arguable that in some cases members of the upper classes have more in common with their opposite numbers in other nations than with the lower classes in their own. It is clear that a comparative differential psychology would have to take into account these considerations. Meanwhile, attention is most usefully confined to nations of long standing and in comparative studies to peoples of similar levels of cultural development. It must be confessed that most studies of national characteristics have so far been very general in nature and have hardly even begun to deal with the problems suggested by the above considerations.

There is still another sort of difficulty which arises out of the lack of a generally accepted theory of the structure of individual character. Fouillée's work is based on the old theory of the temperaments. Thus he regards the Spaniard as *bilieux-nerveux*, the German as *flegmatique*, the Frenchman as *sanguin-nerveux*, while he also finds important differences in sympathy, strength of will and in intelligence ((4), pp. 144, 254, 456). McDougall bases his account on assumed differences in the intensity of the basic instincts, e.g. gregariousness, assertiveness, submissiveness, and in temperamental traits like the tendency to introversion or extroversion (8, 9). Others work with the concept of types as when Madariaga regards the Englishman as the "man of action," the Frenchman as the "man of thought," and the Spaniard as the "man of passion" (10). Whatever the starting-point of the inquiry, the problem is compli-

cated further by our ignorance of the relative importance played by hereditary and environmental factors in the formation of character. Temperament is often regarded as the innate element in character and, in so far as national characteristics are held to be constant, this constancy is attributed to the persistence of temperamental traits. But there seems to be little agreement as to what is to be included under temperament, and the study of its hereditary basis appears to be still in its infancy. Again, it seems to me very doubtful whether differences in behaviour among different peoples can be safely attributed to differences in instinctive endowment. The French are held to be more sociable than the Germans, and this is explained by McDougall, for example, as based on a difference in the intensity of the gregarious instinct. But it may well be that the difference is rather in the way gregariousness or sociality expresses itself in the two nations. The French meet to talk, to exchange ideas ; the Germans to drink, to make music, to go on excursions. Further, those who are not satisfied with enumerating single traits of different peoples and wish to show how these traits unite to form distinctive characters conceived as systems must find the problem of the relative importance of hereditary endowment and environmental influences still more difficult, since very little appears to be known with regard to the genetic basis of the organizing principles of character and personality. In view of all these uncertainties in the theory of individual character, it is not surprising that the psychology of peoples has found no secure foundation and that the bulk of it consists of divination rather than observation, intuitive impressions rather than scientific analysis and interpretation. Despite all these difficulties and obscurities it seems to me to be a mistake to dismiss the whole theory of national character as an "illusion" (11). The dangers arising out of bias and the intrusion of value judgements are not peculiar to this branch of study but beset all social studies in varying degree and can be to a great extent watched and guarded against. The difficulties of comparative study can only be removed gradually as our knowledge of the different nations grows and is supplemented by more detailed study of the character of groups within the nations. The problem of the genetic elements in national character has been, as we shall see later, much obscured by the assumption that national characteristics are racially determined. This has led to much futile argument. In all probability it would be much better to defer discussion of

the part played by genetic factors until a better technique of record and observation has been developed and the relations between individual and social psychology have come to be more clearly defined.

II. THE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL CHARACTER

I propose now to inquire what exactly is understood by national character. Strictly speaking, I suppose, only persons can be said to have character and, if we follow Stout in saying that "Character exists only in so far as unity and continuity of conscious life exists and manifests itself in systematic consistency of conduct" (12), p. 653), then nations cannot be said to possess character. Nevertheless, nations like other groups behave in distinctive ways and if their behaviour shows some unity and continuity we may perhaps speak of a group character without committing ourselves to any theory of a group mind or group personality. In practice there seem to be two senses in which the term is used. It may, first, be used to indicate differences in the distribution of certain traits or perhaps of types in different groups, as when we say that the Germans are more docile than the English or that the French are on the whole more articulate than the English, or that the Irish temperamentally dislike regimentation. This could perhaps be called common character, and it is clear that a scientific study of it would involve a statistical examination of the frequency with which traits are distributed in different groups. But, secondly, group character is also used to indicate the behaviour patterns of the group as a whole, that is the nature of its organization as embodied in its institutions, its collective achievements and its public policy. It is then assumed that the institutions in the long run depend upon the character of the component individuals as shaped by their interactions. Clearly there is a very subtle and complex relation between institutions and the character of the individuals sustaining them, since on the one hand men make their institutions but, on the other, the institutions make the men. Hence it seems misleading to say, for example, with Madariaga that it is not English education which explains the Englishman, but the Englishman English education, or that the Reformation and the Roman Catholic Church are not to be considered as causes but as effects of national character. The relation is one of reciprocal interaction rather than of causality. The situation is complicated by the fact that institutions may not

reflect the character of all the members but perhaps only of powerful sections, and that, once formed, they tend by unconscious processes to select the type that suits them. In this way many qualities in a population may remain dormant or repressed until a change of circumstances brings them into play, while again the reaction against a type that has become unduly dominant may sometimes be an important cause of change. It is thus possible for great and revolutionary changes to take place in the institutions of a nation without a parallel change in the underlying qualities of the mass of the nation. It follows that at any one moment of time we cannot safely infer the character of a people from its institutions or public policy, and that for this purpose it is necessary to know the history of the institutions and the portions of the people that have been dominant in shaping them. A great deal of what foreign writers have to say about English character is based on their impression of public school mentality. But the public school tradition dates only from the middle of the nineteenth century and few of the "Prep" schools which are an integral part of the system date further back than 1870. In dealing with the psychological basis of religion in England the class structure of the country becomes of great importance, since it is generally agreed that, on the whole, Anglicanism has been the religion of the gentry and of the villages, while Nonconformity is more characteristic of the middle classes and the towns. The range of variation in character has to be taken into account. Most continental observers find English character homogeneous throughout the different classes and they attribute this to the lesser rigidity of the class structure of England as compared with, say, that of Germany. But this is hardly more than a subjective impression and more accurate methods of observation and record would no doubt reveal both local and class differences. The transition from the institutions of a people to its underlying character thus raises many difficult problems.

Similar difficulties arise when the literature, the science and philosophy of a people are taken as a basis for the psychology of peoples. Fouillée thought (4), p. 547) that a nation expresses itself above all in its *élite*, its representative men: "If you leave out of consideration the *élite* of France there is no more France; France is reduced to the level of those peoples who have no history." "There is no national poet of any great nation," it has been said, "who is so completely representative of his own people as Shake-

speare is representative of the English," and it has even been argued that his acceptance by the world is due not so much to the greatness of his genius as to its English quality ((13), Ch. VI). On the other hand, of Dürer and Bach a German writer has said that they are representative rather of Protestantism than of Germany (14). It is difficult to see how at the present stage of our knowledge such problems can be resolved. In any case, the study of national traits as revealed in its "representative" men must be supplemented by a study of the mentality of the people at large, especially as revealed in proverbs, folk lore and especially in wit and humour.¹ There is here clearly an enormous field of study.

The bulk of the more popular works on the psychology of peoples is concerned with national character in the first of the two senses distinguished above, namely the wide prevalence of certain traits in the group. They abound in rough generalizations and often exaggerate both the permanence of the characteristics and their wide diffusion. The English have been described since Froissart as "taking their pleasures sadly" and their gravity has been contrasted with the gaiety of the French. But already Emerson noted that their "brows were no sadder than their neighbours of northern climates," and as compared with Americans he thought them cheerful and contented. The experience of the war of 1914-18 belied the traditional opinions about the psychology of peoples. Clémenceau remarks: "The Englishman was noted for his calm, but English soldiers tended to be more hysterical than others, the Americans were supposed to be so quick and they were so slow. The French were supposed to be gay and they were solemn" (quoted in (11), p. 39). The Chinese are reputed to be impassive and reserved in the expression of their emotions, and even a careful anthropologist like the late Professor Seligman felt justified in describing them as introvert. He found, however, on closer inquiry that what he took to be an inborn trait of the Chinese was rather a mode of behaviour set up as a standard for the governing and literary classes and never adopted by more than a small proportion of the population ((16), p. 86). So again the tradition of the Austrian as charming, easygoing and kindly was shaken by the brutalities committed after the triumph of the Nazis. Examples could easily be multiplied of similarly crude generalizations and

¹ Cf. Baldwin's remark: "Understand English humour, and you have gone a long way to understanding the Englishman" ((15), p. 22).

especially of the danger of predicting the future behaviour of peoples on the basis of what is supposed to be their permanent and even innate character. Yet even when allowance is made for local and class differences and for the effects of changing circumstances there is often some truth in the generalizations reached by careful observers, and it would, I think, be a mistake to deny the existence of national traits in the case of nations of long standing merely on the ground that so far they have not lent themselves to exact analysis or quantitative measurement. Better results may be expected when more is known of the genetics of character and when a more reliable technique has been elaborated for observing and recording group differences in behaviour.

The indirect method of studying national characteristics by an analysis of the psychological basis of the collective achievements of peoples has undoubtedly proved more fruitful than the direct method based on the observation of individual behaviour. As an example I want to consider briefly some of the views that have been put forward regarding the character of the English and the Germans. With regard to two qualities of the English mentality there is universal consensus among observers both English and foreign, namely, its empiricism and individualism. Apart from the contributions made by English thinkers to empiricism regarded as a philosophical theory, the empirical habit of mind is seen in all spheres of English life. English law and English politics are based on the empirical method of dealing with particular problems as and when they arise. There is a disinclination to formulate general principles and piecemeal enactments are preferred. Even when, as has frequently been the case, legislation is undertaken after special inquiry, the inquiry is deliberately limited in scope and little attention is given to the requirements of general theory or systematic connection.¹

English international policy is especially characterized by its tentative, piecemeal method. It avoids legal rigidity and has no faith in general solution or long-range planning. An acute French observer has seen in this trait one of the standing difficulties of Franco-British collaboration. In contrast with the habit of the English diplomatists to confine themselves to the immediate and particular, the French mind reaches out for the general and has a longing for clear-cut and logically consistent solutions. That there

¹ For numerous illustrations compare especially Boutmy (17), Ch. IV.

is a certain consistency in British foreign policy over long periods of time is due in the main to the geographical and economic situation of Britain and certainly not to the existence of deep-laid plans pursued year in and year out with Machiavellian cunning. If the British Empire was not exactly built up in a fit of absence of mind neither was it the result of a deliberate policy carefully planned beforehand and applied methodically by successive governments. The early French colonial acquisitions were also fortuitous and occasional and not the results of conscious planning. But this cannot be said of the colonial policy of the Republic which appears to have been due to a political plan carefully studied and applied with persistence in the face of great difficulties (cf. (18) and (19), p. 25). German colonial policy was, of course, still more consciously and deliberately planned, with frank recognition of its economic nature and with the open support of financial and commercial interests. In internal policy the same characteristics of the English mind can easily be traced. The principles of democracy have never been clearly formulated and deliberately applied. The issues fought over have been particular changes in which only the historian can discern a steady tendency. The history of the Church of England also shows a quality essentially connected with empiricism, namely a dislike of pushing principles to their logical conclusions in face of the complexities of life. The dislike of the English for rigid principles and their distrust of abstractions is sometimes attributed by continental writers to a lack or weakness in the power of generalized thought. This seems absurd in view of the contribution of the English to science and philosophy. But it is true that in dealing with the practical problems of life the English mind prefers to proceed tentatively, by trial and error, and in this it appears to me to show a better and sounder sense of method than those who put their trust in dialectics.¹

The second quality of the English mind, its individualism, can also be readily traced in the various spheres of the national life. It can be seen in the spirit of the English law which is a law of the liberty of the individual subject, in the strength of local government and resistance to centralization, in the stress laid by

¹ Cf. the remarks of T. S. Eliot ((20), p. 352) : "The admission of inconsistencies, sometimes ridiculed as indifference to logic and coherence, of which the English mind is often accused, may be largely the admission of inconsistencies inherent in life itself and of the impossibility of overcoming them by the imposition of a uniformity greater than life will bear." Cf. also rather flattering account given by Madariaga ((10), p. 63).

Puritanism on the autonomy of the individual and in a very widespread and deeply rooted impatience of compulsion and restraint. Continental writers, while stressing the individualistic tendencies of English institutions, have nevertheless also urged that this individualism has its limitations. Both Madariaga and Dibelius think that the tendency of English education and especially of the Public Schools and the Universities has been to standardize behaviour and to repress the types that threaten to diverge from the norm. A recent writer, very friendly to England, has said that as compared with pre-Hitler Germany "the English type in all classes lacks a certain touch of individualization" (21). I suspect, however, that these writers are impressed rather too much by a certain conventionality in the behaviour of some of the educated classes in England, which on closer analysis proves to be perfectly compatible with a plentiful variety and even eccentricity of character.

The individualism of the English is closely associated with a capacity for spontaneous organization, and indeed a great deal that is distinctive in English society rests on the power of combining an intense individualism with practical understanding of the needs of others. That these qualities are not peculiar to any particular social class in England can be seen from the enormous number of voluntary societies in England and, in particular, from the history of the trade unions, the co-operative movement and the Friendly Societies. I think Madariaga has laid his finger on a very important point when he stresses as a remarkable and typically English phenomenon which he calls "collaboration in opposition" (10), p. 22) and which he shows to be as important in the field of politics as in sport. With these qualities are associated also the capacity for collective deliberation, the toleration of divergent views and the considerateness shown to opponents, which are characteristic of so much of the social life of England. Social discipline is proved not to be incompatible with a respect for individual peculiarities and with freedom to criticize accepted and sanctioned views. The prestige of the law, for example, is not shaken in the least by the perpetual stream of satirical criticism directed against it. A French observer has said: "There is no country where the judges, i.e. the persons whose duty it is to administer the law, criticize it with more irony, or ridicule it with more humour, and that from the Bench, in the presence of the litigants" (17), p. 177). Equally illuminating is a comparison of the habits of debate or public

discussion in England and other countries. I doubt whether any country excels England in the fundamental decency of public discussion, the urbanity and moderation which is shown to opponents and the care which is taken to keep out "personalities" or imputation of bad motives to those from whom one happens to differ.¹ It remains to be added that these qualities which I have stressed as exhibited in the public life of England are not independent but closely interwoven. The empirical habit of mind harmonizes well with the attitude of tolerance and respect for other persons which is implicit in individualism. It is in the fusion of these qualities with the tendency to spontaneous association which gives distinctive character to English institutions.

Strangely enough, individualism is a quality which authorities both German and non-German have taken to be deeply rooted in the German character. A distinguished student of comparative religion, Otto Pfeiderer, finds in the history of German Protestantism ample proof of an extreme individualism, of a tendency of the personality to isolate itself at once from the outer world and the community and to seek in its own being the connection with the divine (22). The older descriptions of social life in Germany give a picture of people highly individual in their taste, unconventional, deliberately odd in their behaviour, blunt and rather brusque in their personal relations, stiff and reserved. In their political life this individualism is seen in a strong tendency to particularism and discord and an incapacity for wider unions except when they come under the influence of dominant leaders. Every German, said Bismarck, would rather have his own king. Their parliamentary history proves, as a recent commentator has pointed out, that every German would also like to have his own party. Their lack of political capacity seems to be the trait that has struck most observers. The individualism of the Germans thus differs from that of the English in not being accompanied or balanced

¹ Of German debates Müller-Freienfels writes: "In hardly any other country of the world do political opponents so regard each other as moral scoundrels as in Germany, hardly anywhere else is political opposition so saturated with hatred as among ourselves. . . . Just as two German scholars who differ in their opinion regarding the value of the *Nibelungen* manuscripts invariably despise one another morally, so it is in the field of politics" (7), p. 144). "In France," says Madariaga (10), p. 158), "a debate is a battle and arguments are loaded. Every pair of eyes looks like the two barrels of a double-barrelled machine-gun turning at high speed, throwing ideas at the enemy with the utmost alacrity. Arguments, innuendoes, accusations, insults are hurled through the air like projectiles."

by the capacity for spontaneous organization but requiring evidently organization based rather on some form of subordination.

Another quality generally ascribed to the Germans is strength of will. This is seen in economic life in their industry and in scientific work in the persistent "*laboriositas*" already noted by Leibniz. There seem, however, to be certain characteristics of their thought and feeling which colour alike their will and their individualism. On the cognitive side the German mind seems often lacking in concreteness. Though the German works with abstractions, these do not seem to be reached by analysis of sense experience but rather by a sweep of imagination or fantasy. A German writer has characterized this tendency in the words: "*Die Eigenheit der deutschen Abstraktheit ist Begriffsphantastik*" (7), p. 88). Their intellect is not inspired by a search for order and clarity. Their interest in system again is often not rooted in the need for order, not the product of a drive to classify and understand, but rather of an imaginative longing for grandiose architectural schemes. Hence an *esprit large et trouble* which with a certain profundity and comprehensiveness often combines a tendency to vagueness and obscurity. On the side of feeling the German writers speak of a depth and inner warmth (*Innigkeit, Wärme, Tiefe*), but they also point to a vagueness and indefiniteness which the non-German describes as sentimentality. This combination of cognitive and affective vagueness shapes the nature of the will which, though thorough and realistic in many ways, is also liable to be moved by vague and highly abstract ends. What the German calls his idealism, says Müller-Freienfels, is a devotion to fanciful abstractions. It is rooted in feeling and fantasy and tends to evade and even resist rational control or definition. No doubt this can be said also of other peoples, but it does seem to be true that Germans are more apt to be moved by large but vague ends, that their will, like their thought, is lacking in the sense of proportion or measure which is found in the English and the French.¹

This account of the German as highly individualist and as led by vague and fanciful ideals, an account which has the authority not only of German writers but also of foreign observers, has of

¹ Cf. Nietzsche's remark: "As everything loves its symbol, so the German loves the clouds and all that is obscure, evolving, crepuscular, damp and shrouded; it seems to him that everything uncertain, undeveloped and growing is 'deep'" (5), p. 198). Contrast Chateaubriand (23): "Le ténébreux, l'embroussaillé, le vapoureux, le pénible me sont abominables."

course to be brought into relation with another side of German life, with which at first it seems to stand in glaring contradiction. What of what is called German militarism, German docility, German thoroughness and attention to detail and method? Müller-Freienfels solves this problem by resorting to the mechanism of compensation and over-compensation. Afraid of the anarchy which his deep-rooted individualism would produce, the German is ready to accept the leadership of a strong personality; fearful of the conflicts which his powerful but indefinite strivings must generate, he has recourse to minute regulation and prescription of every detail of group life; aware of the dangers of his speculative fancy, he insists on exact method and painstaking investigation; to keep his feelings in check he cultivates hardness and reserve. These are all compensations, it is claimed, developed by the Germans in the course of a century-long struggle with their own nature, especially under the discipline inculcated under Prussian influence. The process of compensation on this view of the matter is largely unconscious and is by the Germans themselves regarded not as based on reasoned calculation of consequences but as irrational or suprarational. Hence what other people call militarism is not thought of as such by the Germans and what strikes others as slavish submissiveness is by them thought to be willing acceptance of constraint.

Müller-Freienfels appears to think that the traits of docility, thoroughness and discipline are secondary and not primary features of German character. It has, however, to be remembered that the notion of compensation is easy to invoke but hard to verify, and in any case, if the compensation is genuine it is likely to be deeply rooted in unconscious need, and consequently to be an integral element of character. Other writers give a different and perhaps more plausible account of the duality of the German character. Lacking in the power of spontaneous organization, which in the case of the English provides a balance to the forces of individualism, the Germans have only been able to achieve such unity as they have by authoritarian discipline. Realizing this need for regimentation they have consciously and unconsciously divided their lives into separate zones, a private zone of freedom and independence and a public zone of deliberate acceptance of constraint. Writing in 1893 Professor Richard M. Meyer tells us: "The German frequently sadly disregarded political liberty, because

he knew his liberty of thought to be safe from attack" ((14), p. 241). Dr. A. Loewe tells us in a recent work that "up to the present the German Philistine, even when most impressed by political authority, has always managed to maintain his personality in his own eyes. By a private interpretation of the universe he tried to give to the most banal life the consecration of supra-temporal freedom" ((21), p. 25). Now that the Totalitarian regime has invaded even the personal zone of life it remains to be seen whether the individualist tendencies will have sufficient strength to assert themselves. It is clear that, for whatever reasons, the need for authority is deeply rooted in German life and that the relationship of inferior and superior pervades all spheres of activity. A prolonged period of education in other forms of organization will therefore be necessary before Germans are led to abandon the forms of order resting on authority and hierarchical subordination.¹ The view is often advanced that towards the end of the last century and the beginning of this century the Germans underwent a radical change of character which turned them from a nation of thinkers and dreamers into a nation of cool and hard realists. It seems more probable that with certain changes of aims the fundamental characteristics have remained unaltered. Especially noteworthy is the persistence of vague and cloudy aspirations and the admiration for the demonic, the heroic and the like. German *Realpolitik* and *Machtpolitik* are in many ways realistic and pursue perfectly definite and concrete aims, but equally the appeal which they make is essentially romantic. The same combination of definite aims with appeal to myth and fantasy is to be observed in much of the propaganda of the Nazis.

III. THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL CHARACTER

Having given some examples of the character of nations as reflected in their collective life, I propose now to say something on the factors which contribute to its formation. This question has undoubtedly been greatly obscured by being entangled with the problem of race differences. I have discussed the relation between nation and race elsewhere (24, 25, 26), and here I desire to draw attention to some of the more important points.

(a) The mental characteristics of the racial elements which

¹ This at any rate was the view of many German writers before the advent of Nazism. Cf. Müller-Freienfels ((7), p. 159).

have entered into the composition of the European elements are entirely unknown, and to explain national traits by reference to them is to explain the obscure by the more obscure. It is to be noticed that in recent anthropological work it has been found necessary to break up the three principal units, Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean, into numerous sub-divisions. Thus, for example, v. Eickstedt has three subdivisions of the Nordic (27), Coon four types (28). The Alpine and Mediterranean groups are not in any sense unitary entities. The psychological descriptions that are given of these racial groups still lump them together, but it seems extremely unlikely that what is said of the mentality of any of these large aggregates can really apply to all its constituent groups.

(b) The theory that the existing distribution of racial traits is to be explained in terms of hypothetical pure races supposed to have intermingled in various proportions is coming to be abandoned by modern anthropologists.¹ If such pure races ever existed we certainly know nothing of their mental characters. The descriptions we have of the habits of Gauls and Teutons cannot be taken as descriptions of Alpines and Nordics, since by all accounts they were racially composite and the part played by race in the determination of *their* mental characters is just as complicated and insoluble as the part played by race in the formation of the character of the French and the Germans.

(c) There is a difficulty of a more general kind. It is the habit of those who explain national character in terms of race to refer highly complex institutions to specific innate tendencies. McDougall (8), p. 223, for example, explains the prevalence of a centralized system of government in France mainly by the supposed intensity of the gregarious instinct in the Mediterranean and Alpine races. But from gregariousness to centralized government is surely a far cry. The evidence of all those who know the French character intimately is to suggest that the attitude of the French to the state is not that which would be expected from a spontaneous play of the social tendencies. Madariaga describes the state in France as something mechanical rather than organic. M. Paul Gaultier stresses the fundamental individualism of the French, their lack of discipline and social cohesion, and he even speaks of an instinctive opposition to the state ((30), p. 156). It is clear that if social institutions are to be referred to under-

¹ Cf. especially Morant (29).

lying psychological causes, use will have to be made of much more complex constellations than the instincts, and it seems highly probable that from very similar instinctive equipment very different forms of social grouping may arise.

(d) Any theory of national character must of course be able to account not only for the relatively permanent traits, but also for the changes that undoubtedly occur. On the racial hypothesis such changes are to be explained as due to various forms of racial changes brought about by emigration, immigration, conquest and social selection inside communities. An examination of the problems thus raised would require a lengthy treatise, but it may be worth while to give some brief illustration of the fundamental issues. As an example of explanation in terms of racial change due to war and immigration I may quote McDougall's assertion that the decline of the Greeks from the heights reached by them in the time of Pericles reflected a change in their mental qualities due to racial substitution brought about by wars, the slave trade and later by successive invasions of Slavs from the north. He goes so far as to commit himself to the statement that the modern Greek people is "descended largely from Slav invaders and largely from the numerous and prolific slave population of the great age of Greece, but hardly at all from the men who made the greatness of that age" (8), p. 249). Such explanations seem to suffer from two main defects, namely, the lack of adequate anthropological evidence and a failure to attend to negative instances. In the case of the Greeks it is to be remarked that McDougall's categorical assertions are not borne out by recent anthropological studies. Statements about the physical character of "the Greeks" in general are of little value. If comparison is to be made with the Greeks of antiquity, care must be obviously taken that the reference is to the inhabitants of the same localities. It appears from recent investigations that when this is done the continuity of living Greeks with their ancestors of the ancient world is more striking than the opposite. Professor Coon (28), p. 604) tells us that "If one refers to the inhabitants of Attica during the sixth century, or to the Spartans of Leonidas, then the changes in these localities have probably not been nearly as great as that between the Germans of Tacitus and the living South Germans." The explanation of cultural changes in terms of racial substitution thus rests in this case at any rate on slender foundations. Even more

serious is the failure of such explanations to take into account negative instances, i.e. instances of significant cultural changes not accompanied by known racial changes. A case in point is that of the Romans. The periods of vigour from the fourth to the last century B.C., and the later brilliance of the Italians during the period from the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries A.D., have frequently been ascribed to the infusion of fresh blood. This explanation, however, fails completely to account for the later decline in the sixteenth century and the revival in the nineteenth century.¹ In the case of the Risorgimento the explanation is to be found in political factors connected with the re-establishment of contacts with Western civilization resulting from the temporary incorporation into the Napoleonic empire. But, if so, may not the earlier successes also have been largely shaped by social and political factors?

The problem of the effects of race mixture presents great difficulties. It has been claimed on biological grounds that the blending of allied races results in an increase of constitutional vigour and in a greater variety and variability of innate qualities. This may well be true, but the importance of these changes for cultural change is not forthwith to be assumed. We have to distinguish between the effects of race mixture on the genetic constitution of the resulting blend of peoples, and the effects of cultural stimulus and variability. The forces at work cannot be clearly isolated, yet the numerous cases of important cultural changes due to culture contact unaccompanied by race mixture on a big scale should make us hesitate to stress the purely genetic changes. No one, for example, would question the enormous influence exerted upon the political structure of England by the Norman Conquest, yet the invasion did not in any way modify the physical type of the English ((32), p. 82). Similarly, while the cultural effect of the Roman conquest on France was of decisive importance, the racial effect was negligible ((33), p. 157). An examination of the results of the contacts between European and non-European peoples is even more illuminating, since it at once becomes clear that the cultural effects are out of all proportion to the degree of racial admixture. It seems therefore highly probable that even in those cases where culture contact is accompanied by racial amalgamation the purely genetic effects of the mixture are not so important for

¹ Cf. the detailed examination of the facts by Prof. Toynbee ((31), pp. 16 *seq.*).

the formation of national characteristics as the sociological effects of the stimulus due to contact with fresh elements of culture.

There remains the problem of the effects of social selection. By this is meant the influence exerted upon the genetic constitution of a people by the action of social forces. Thus for example long-continued differences in fertility between social groups may, if the groups differ in genetic qualities, result in a change in the character of the people as a whole due to the increasing recruitment of its population from the more fertile groups. Elaborate investigations have been conducted on these lines by the Anthropo-sociologists (Ammon (34), de Lapouge (35) and others). They claim to have shown among other things that Europe has undergone a process of "denordicization" (*Entnordung*). This is supposed to have occurred through military selection (the Nordics being fighters and therefore tending to be killed off); through religious persecution (e.g. the emigration of Protestants); through urban selection (the Nordics being restless and enterprising and therefore attracted to the towns where they fail to reproduce themselves). I do not propose to discuss this particular view here. The evidence is considered by many competent authorities as insufficient to justify the formulation of general laws. It seems that there really has occurred an increase in brachycephaly, but the causes of this increase are disputed and some regard it as at least in part an environmental effect analogous to and accompanying the parallel increase in stature ((33), p. 278, (28), pp. 10-11). In any case so far no one has succeeded in establishing any definite relation between broad-headedness and any mental quality, and the psychological effects of the increase in broad-headedness remains a matter of speculation. Another case frequently cited in this connection is that of Spain, whose decline is attributed to negative selection resulting on the one hand from religious persecution, which killed off or drove out of the country individuals of independent mind and will, and, on the other, from the excessive multiplication of monastic orders which made celibates of large numbers of people presumably of superior ability. This argument suggested by Galton ((36), p. 344) was elaborated more fully by Fouillée ((4), pp. 158 seq.). The biological effects of clerical celibacy must be a matter of doubt, since many of the priests were only celibates in name and since there is no proof that the majority of the priests differed from the rest of the population in innate independence or ability.

Fouillée himself doubts whether the biological effects of celibacy, even if combined with the graver influence of the persecutions and expulsions, could have been such as to produce a really vital change in the quality of the population. He lays greater stress on the wars of Charles V and particularly the American conquests which drained Spain of men endowed with energy and the spirit of enterprise, and he explains that to these biological factors must be added economic and moral causes which he discusses at length. Apart from these rather speculative arguments there is a certain amount of direct evidence of the selective action of immigration. It has been shown for example that the Poles who came to the United States during the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century differed in height, pigmentation and head-form from their own relatives who remained at home ((28, p. 8), and that they did not represent a cross-section of the entire Polish population. It does not follow, of course, that this selective immigration seriously altered the innate constitution of the Poles who remained in Poland.

It has also been alleged that the wholesale emigration from Ireland and Sweden to America has permanently affected the genetic constitution of these countries, but, so far as I know, there is no direct evidence of this change. The effects of urban selection have been studied in many countries since the question was raised by the Anthro-po-sociologists, without however any stress on the racial aspect of the process.¹ Though none of these investigations are conclusive, it is highly probable that over long periods of time social forces may act selectively on the genetic constitution of a people, and conversely the genetic constitution may in turn influence the forms of social life. Yet even a little reflection is sufficient to show that the processes involved in social change differ radically from those involved in racial change and that vast changes can be brought about in society without parallel change in the inherited constitution.² To begin with what is acquired by one generation can be transmitted to the next without resort to the genetic mechanism of inheritance. This makes possible cumulative change on a vast scale. Further, there is not the same need for continuity as in genetic transmission, since even ideas which have been forgotten may again be revived after a long interval of time

¹ Cf. Coon (28), p. 8, for references.

² This was clearly pointed out by Huxley (37).

and exercise renewed influence. Furthermore, co-operative division of labour renders it possible for societies to achieve results amounting to specific changes without any change whatever in the genetic constitution of the component members. For these and many other reasons racial change and social change appear to differ radically in their nature, and it is not to be expected that they should follow parallel courses.

These considerations have an important bearing on the problem of social selection. A sort of selection is operative in society which has nothing to do with the substitution of one genetic type for another. This may be shown by a few examples. It has been argued by Pirenne (38) that each of the phases in the growth of capitalism in Western Europe was initiated by "new men" who made their way by exceptional audacity and vigour. Is there any reason to believe that these men were "mutations" suddenly called into being by the circumstances of the time? It is surely far more likely that these qualities were always present in the population and that sections of it which hitherto were denied opportunity were able to seize it by a change in the social conditions affecting commerce. Similarly present-day Germany is ruled by a group of people of distinctive mentality, but they are hardly likely to be a fresh biological product. In different circumstances quite a different group may attain predominance and thus present to the world quite a different aspect of the German character. In short, the selection exercised by social forces need not operate by way of biological elimination or substitution. It operates rather by encouraging or inhibiting the expression of certain qualities and by determining their direction or mode of manifestation. A totalitarian regime may drive individuals of a certain endowment out of the country, and this may have some effect on the biological constitution of the stock. But in the main the hereditary qualities of peoples may well remain constant while changing circumstances bring different sides of the underlying character into play or give dominance to different elements of the population at different times. The process of adaptation is thus social rather than racial and, if the term "selection" is to be used at all in this context, it must be given a meaning very different from that which it has in biology.

In summing up these arguments we must, I think, distinguish between genetic qualities in general and those which are claimed

to be racial traits. Since at present very little is known of the mental characteristics of races, we can obviously make very little use of them in accounting for national characteristics. But this is not to say that genetic qualities do not count. Unless we are prepared to deny the inheritance of mental characteristics we must regard it as highly probable that just as there are individual differences there are also group differences and that these play their part in shaping the collective life of groups. The difficulty is to determine exactly what their rôle is. The inherited constitution must in some sense put a limit to what can be achieved by social organization. If the latter puts too high a demand on the character of individuals, it will not work, and, if a movement is forced by enthusiasts on a reluctant mass, it may come up against ineluctable predispositions which will in the end defeat it. Yet here again it must be remembered that the range of human potentialities is extraordinarily wide and that upon the same hereditary elements very different social structures may be built. There seems no warrant for assuming any such differences between national groups as would amount to an inherited incapacity of anyone for the arts and institutions achieved by another. We cannot infer from the incapacity hitherto displayed by any people to run democratic institutions that they must for ever remain so incapable. If, then, there is an inherited element in the character of nations of long standing they nevertheless retain considerable powers of adaptation and the limits of these powers cannot be determined with any accuracy from their previous history.

In view of the above considerations it would seem that the differences in the character of the European peoples are not in the main to be traced to variations in innate tendencies, but rather to variations in the ways in which these are expressed, balanced and directed. Even in referring to highly complex qualities of character like "individualism," "empiricism," "collaboration in opposition," we cannot say that these qualities are either present or absent in a given people. There is, for example, a French individualism, an English individualism, and a German individualism. So again different peoples may successfully work the same institutions—but with a difference. To account for these differences we have to look to historical and social conditions and only in the last resort should we appeal to genetic variations. If for example we seek to ascertain the conditions which have given a

definite 'tinge' to the behaviour of British diplomacy, we have no need to appeal to unverifiable genetic factors. Far more illuminating is the attempt made by such writers as Bardoux (39) and Kantorowicz (1) to analyse the historical conditions in which that behaviour has taken shape, e.g. the geographical conditions which have given to British diplomacy a certain constancy of aim, the peculiarities of the English class structure which has put the conduct of foreign affairs in the hands of a class with special codes of behaviour, the feeling of security and confidence generated by the absence of the fear of war and fear of revolution which has formed the background of continental diplomacy. So again the peculiarities of the political individualism of the English are not traced with any probability to the supposed inborn qualities of the Saxon peasant. They are surely connected rather with the special conditions which prevented the growth of a centralized administration and encouraged the growth of local government, and of a legal system serving to protect the liberties of the individual.¹ In a certain sense no doubt the institutions of a people express in the long run the character of the people, but equally the character is formed by the institutions. The congruence of the different aspects of a nation's life in particular depends on the unity and continuity of its historical development. It has been remarked, for example, that in this respect there is a profound difference between England and Germany. In England there is a certain homogeneity of texture in the various manifestations of the national life, while in Germany religion, government and philosophy seem rather to diverge in their development. The explanation is surely that in England the early attainment of political unity facilitated the interaction of the various elements of the national life, while in Germany the conditions favoured the perpetuation not only of marked local variations but of more rigid distinctions between professions and social classes.²

I will now try to sum up briefly the general conclusions which emerge from the above survey. First, the study of national char-

¹ In a recent work (40), Profs. Buckland and McNair show the remarkable similarities that exist between the practical rules of the Roman Law and the Common Law, despite the difference in the fundamental conceptions on which the two systems rest. They attribute the similarity to a certain resemblance in the habits, the morale, the *Anschauungen* of the two nations and the difference in the conceptions to a difference in racial origin. It is difficult to see how such an hypothesis could ever be put to the test.

² Cf. E. Barker (41), p. 235, and Dibelius (3), p. 154.

acter is to be approached not through an investigation of individual differences in behaviour, but of the qualities manifested in the collective life of nations, their traditions and public policy. Secondly, the object of this study is to discover whether these manifestations of the collective life reveal the existence of relatively permanent and stable traits and dispositions and how far these form congruent systems. Thirdly, such studies as have so far been made indicate that although ultimately national character must be linked with the genetic qualities of the stock, these are highly plastic and susceptible of wide variation in their actual expression. Hence the national character is not something given once and for all, but something always in the making, moulding and being moulded by the circumstances in which nations find themselves.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

GERMAN VIEWS OF GERMAN MENTALITY ¹

THE Germans, Nietzsche tells us, escape definition, and in this are the despair of the French. He adds that it is one of their characteristics that they are for ever asking what is German? The explanation suggested is that this is due to the great diversity and rich complexity of the German mind. Since there is hardly a writer on the psychology of peoples who does not claim that his own nation is more complex and varied than any other, it may be doubted whether the explanation hits the mark. It is perhaps nearer the truth to say that the excessive preoccupation with the question, what constitutes a German, is a sign of inward doubt and betrays an anxiety to bring about a unity which as yet does not exist.

In this discussion we are not concerned so much with what the Germans are or are coming to be as with what the Germans themselves think of their mental make-up. It is important at the outset to explain what is implied in the term mind or mentality as applied to a group like a people or nation. Every group is constituted of minds in a network of relations. Within this web of relations certain psychological characters may be discerned, for example, certain habits of thought, certain ways of behaviour and modes of feeling widely diffused among the members, affecting the mutual relations of the members and also the relations between the group as a whole and the outside world. The sum of these prevalent modes of action, thought and feeling constitutes the group mentality. It is not a mind, in the sense in which this term is used when applied to an organism possessed of a unitary centre of consciousness, but rather a mental condition widely dominating thought and action. If this view be adopted, it would follow that the comparative study of the mentality of nations might be approached in two ways. Firstly the attempt might be made to ascertain differences in the distribution of traits or perhaps of types of personality or temperament in different populations, as when it is said, for example, that Germans are more docile than the English or that the Irish are temperamentally averse from regimentation. Secondly, the mentality of groups might be studied by observing the behaviour patterns of the group as a whole,

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that is, the nature of its organization as embodied in its institutions, its collective achievements in art, science and religion, its public policy. Clearly the two approaches are interconnected. Already Kant (1) noted that the German love of titles and carefully graded hierarchical distinctions might perhaps be due to the forms of government favoured by the German peoples, but, on the other hand, these forms of government themselves might be the result of certain inborn tendencies or inclinations (*dem natürlichen Hange der Deutschen*). We come up here against a difficulty inherent in the whole inquiry, namely the difficulty of disentangling what is to be ascribed to innate equipment and what to the way in which the innate propensities are shaped by historical circumstances. If German life is characterized by a certain lack of stability and cohesion, as so many German writers maintain, is this to be ascribed to inborn traits of temperament or character or to the peculiar situation of the German people? Is the *furor teutonicus* rooted in inborn constitution or is it historically conditioned? Clearly there must be an intimate relation between the collective achievements of a people and the character of its components. The institutions of a people must reflect the character of the individuals composing it, but this in turn is moulded by the institutions. Men make their institutions but also the institutions make the men. Perhaps, however, the relation thus indicated does not affect all segments of social life in the same degree, so that changes in some of the forms of social life may leave the deeper layers of individual character relatively unaffected.

Leaving these and other difficulties unresolved, as I think we must in the present stage of the psychology of peoples, I turn now to what German writers have to say of the mentality of their people. On the intellectual side German as well as foreign commentators stress the tendency of the German mind to think in abstractions. V. Clausewitz (2) writing in 1807, ascribes this tendency to the desire of the Germans to follow up a decision once made with great steadiness and not to be satisfied with the superficial confirmation of ideas provided by observation of facts. The German becomes abstract because he wishes to dig deeply and to exhaust the subject under investigation. He notes that this tendency has its dangers especially in dealing with the problems of political life. Here the farther one gets away from the realities of experience the greater is the liability to error and confusion. Here profundity is apt to lead

to one-sidedness. Such one-sidedness he thinks is really characteristic of the German in dealing with practical or political problems. Hence the multiplicity of systems of thought moving within a very narrow circle and limiting truth from above. It is this which leads not only philosophers but also lesser folk to endless mutual criticism and distrust, with the result that no common stock of beliefs is built up and no one has any confidence in others or in the nation as a whole.

The connection here adumbrated between the abstract nature of German thought and certain qualities of character is developed in other ways by other German writers. Thus Müller-Freienfels (3) thinks that by its innate constitution the German mind is inclined to turn away from concrete facts and to set itself vague and indefinite ends. The German does not seek confirmation for his ideas in the world of perceptual fact ; the world of ideas seems to him to constitute a higher reality. The abstractions used by the German are not derived from an exact analysis of sensory experience but are due rather to a sweep of imagination or fantasy. In this it differs from the French form of abstract thinking which is always controlled by "*bon sens*." This lack of concreteness and the indulgence in fanciful abstractions Müller-Freienfels ascribes to the fact that the Germans are less controlled and regulated by rational norms than other peoples. The German lacks the sense of measure or proportion of the Greeks, the feeling for reality of the English or the socially moulded "*sens commun*" of the French. He is guided by inner or subjective norms rather than by the trans-subjective norms which peoples of a steadier social tradition have elaborated. This means that he can occasionally rise to great heights and explore the deeper layers of thought. But it also has its dangers especially in the field of social and political thought. Here there is a strange combination of vagueness and obscurity with profundity and comprehensiveness and a predilection for grandiose systems.

A rather more favourable account of the relations between the rational and non-rational elements in German thought is given by Pfleiderer ((4), p. 367) who approaches the problem from the point of view of religious experience. The German's reflection, he says, "is not so much that of abstract formal reason as of the *whole man* ; his feelings, his moral qualities, his æsthetic intuitions, take part in it by putting questions to him, directing him in his course, and setting bounds to his conclusions." A similar view, somewhat

obscurely expressed, is that of Hegel (5) who attributes to the Germans the sense of natural totality (*die Empfindung der natürlichen Totalität*) which he calls *Gemüth*. This he says is an undeveloped, indeterminate striving for general satisfaction, not directed at any particular aim but rather concerned with the entire condition of the soul.

In the realm of feeling German writers lay stress on what they call depth, inwardness, inner warmth, indefinite but intense yearning or longing (*Innerlichkeit, Innigkeit, Wärme, Tiefe, Fernweh, Sehnsucht*). The feelings of the Germans, they say, are less lively and aroused with greater difficulty than those of other peoples (*mehr Glut als Flamme*), but are not lacking in intensity. The indefiniteness which characterizes German thought is also said to mark their feelings. They frequently use the word *Stimmung* in this context, a word difficult to translate, but which seems to convey a mood in which many feelings are fused, and in which the ideational components need not be very clear ((3), p. 82). As to the quality of the feelings German writers note the tendency to depressive, uneasy, morose moods which stands in contrast with the "*gaieté*" of the French or the vigorous optimism of the American ((6), Ch. IX, (3), p. 83)). Some writers even speak of a profound pessimism and defeatism as characterizing German mentality throughout its history, though this is occasionally submerged in a blare of bombast and self-stimulation.

The temperament of the German is usually depicted as slow and heavy, phlegmatic. Schopenhauer (1851) says :

The true national character of the Germans is ponderousness or heaviness (*Schwerfälligkeit*). This is seen in their gait, in everything they do, their language, speech and thought, especially in their style of writing, in the pleasure they take in long, ponderous, complicated periods, in which the memory has a heavy task, till at last the understanding grasps the sense and solves the riddle (7).

With this slow tempo are perhaps connected the thoroughness or *Gründlichkeit* usually claimed for Germans, the steadiness or persistence, the "*vis durans*" already noted by Tacitus, and the "*laboriositas*" which is seen in all spheres of German life and which Leibnitz regarded as the distinctive characteristic of the Germans.

Of the more general qualities of personality, the one on which perhaps the greatest stress is laid is what the German writers call individualism or subjectivism. By this appears to be meant the

power of the individual to make himself independent of the outer world, to concentrate on the inner life of emotion and imagination and in its extreme form to become entirely absorbed in his own existence and to follow his own peculiar opinions and inclinations, regardless of rules and regulations. It may seem odd to us, now that we bear so much of German docility and submissiveness, to be reminded of the claim to subjectivity or individualism, generally interpreted as involving a spirit of independence verging on anarchy or at least repudiation of authority imposed from without. But there can be no question that until the end of the nineteenth century it is the quality of individualism thus understood, that at once attracted and troubled German observers of their national life. The Reformation of the sixteenth century was interpreted as an expression of the principle of the autonomy of the personality, and it was pointed out that during the later progress of the movement, the obverse side of this virtue came to view, namely a one-sided individualism, an aversion from any subordination of individuals to a common whole. "To this defect," says Pfeleiderer, "can be traced the political weakness of the Germans . . . and the ecclesiastical weakness of the German Protestants, split up as they were into sects and creeds, in contrast to the close unity of the Roman theocracy ((4), p. 36). The theme is repeated by innumerable writers, and as a recent example, I will cite a passage from Müller-Freienfels :

In politics German individualism appears in the form of particularism. Apart from the few glorious periods in which great leaders managed to attract an enthusiastic following, German history is a painful tragicomedy of egoism and disunion. The first act is presented to us by the Roman historians : for it was only through discord that the German tribes were overcome. The whole Middle Age, indeed the whole history of the old empire, is full of a like discordance shown now by the princes, now by the estates, now by other groups. In more recent times parliaments have become the home for the odd and the singular. Naturally there are and must be conflicts between parties in every country, but in Germany these take on a peculiar colouring. The German brings the whole of his emotional make-up into politics and instead of being guided by definite purposes he indulges in fanciful ideas and moods, without considering the needs of the whole community. The Englishman is first an Englishman and then a party man ; the German is first a party man, and the whole is subordinated to the part. Hence he sees in political opposition not merely a difference of opinion but moral perversity. Every difference of conviction is regarded as a personal matter. In

hardly any country in the world do political opponents regard each other as moral scoundrels, hardly anywhere else is political opposition so saturated with hatred. . . . In this emotional individualism, not regulated by purposes nor by the needs of social adjustment, is to be found the ground for the "unpolitical" nature of the Germans for which they have so often been blamed ((3), pp. 143-4).

The historian Kurt Breysig ((8), p. 268), striking a more favourable note, says :

Certainly at present, the stereotyped and almost mechanical conformity of the French, the more natural, mature conformity of the English and the dull, herd-like conformity of the Russians, form a distinct circle about Germany, as the country dedicated to the individual . . . at least among all those whose character and work determine the contour of German life . . . The endeavour to make out of the meditative and reflective, self-willed and self-absorbed German, drilled to the "goose-step," the recruit for a mental army, is foreign to our nature.

Sombart, who quotes this passage with approval, adds that what Breysig says is true not only of the eminent but also of the broad masses of the people. The German does not readily accept external compulsion. He does indeed demand regulation and order, but these must be freely accepted and self-imposed ((6), Ch. 11).

It will be seen that under the term individualism are brought together a number of traits or qualities such as a tendency to turn inwards, a desire for independence, for freedom from external constraint, distinctiveness in self-expression passing into self-will and self-absorption. The accounts which German writers give of this quality betray a lack of assurance. The professors protest too much. Occasionally among the older writers who are anxious to encourage the development of the German spirit, individualism is preached as an ideal and not asserted as a fact. Germans are exhorted to be "true to themselves," not to be so ready to imitate others and to over-value everything that is foreign (9). More recent writers are evidently concerned to dispel the impression which German life makes upon foreign observers of excessive submissiveness, longing for rules and regulations, docility verging on servility. Some say that this longing for regulation, so far from being incompatible with the qualities of individualism, is necessitated by them. The German, the author of *Rembrandt als Erzieher* tells us, feels the need for rules just because he is by nature lawless ; *Vielleicht neigt der Deutsche so sehr zur Regel, weil sein Charakter von Haus aus ein regelloser ist* ((9),

p. 10). A modern version of this theory, making use of the psycho-analytic notion of "compensation" is given by Müller-Freienfels. According to him the features in German life which strike the foreign observer, namely militarism, method and minute regulation, are not an immediate or direct expression of German character but an over-compensation, the result of an age-long struggle with his own nature, which often leads the German to behave in a way which is the very opposite of his true self. This, he thinks, is the source of his lack of unity, the reason why the German is so dissatisfied with himself, why he is for ever worrying about his own nature, why he tries one course of action after another to allay his restlessness, and why at last he seeks refuge in submission to authority. The German solves his problem, it is maintained, by freely accepting constraint and the philosophers help him in this by their doctrine that freedom consists in deliberate acceptance of constraint. If this fails to carry conviction to the outside observer, the answer is that the process is not intended to be taken as rational. It is a supra-rational reconciliation of opposites, a procedure which Germans like to regard as congenial to the German mind and indeed as inherent in its nature.

Other writers, more candid, do not pretend to say that the Germans live in political freedom. But, they say, Germans find their freedom in the inner life, in the full play of thought and imagination. The German, says Professor Richard Meyer, disregards political liberty, "because he knew his liberty of thought to be safe from attack" ((10), p. 241). Whether this division of life into separate zones could be sustained under modern conditions may well be doubted, but the claim that the private zone can remain free despite the minute regulation accepted in the public zone no doubt affords many Germans a convenient way of escaping from a situation which in their hearts they must feel to be humiliating. Certainly the energy devoted to proving that the authority which Germans obey is self-imposed and that freedom consists in the deliberate acceptance of constraint points to the persistence of an uneasy feeling that all is not well in the best of all possible countries.

The lack of inner assurance is indeed a quality which German writers have long complained of as characteristic of the German people. The older writers speak of *Masslosigkeit*, a lack of the sense of proportion or measure.

This lack of measure [says the literary historian Scherer] is the curse of our intellectual life. We rise very high in order to sink back to greater depths. We are like the Teuton who having lost all he had in a game of dice stakes his liberty and, losing this also, permits himself to be sold into slavery . . . so great, says Tacitus, who cites this trait, is the German obstinacy in evil things. They call this *Treue* (11).

Writing in 1917, E. Krieck, who later became a leading Nazi philosopher, says :

The German lacks the gift of measure or proportion. His world has only one centre of gravity, his own self, which his impulses drive in all directions. There is a lack of inner equilibrium, of every power that gives measure and form. To this mental endowment the German owes his strength and his weakness ; a wealth and even excess of energy and spirit and a lack of firm and plastic form ((12), p. 15).

Eugen Diesel speaks of a lack of inner poise and security. It is a peculiarity of the German, he says, to be readily moved to hope and enthusiasm, to be easily flattered and equally easily insulted, characteristics which do not indicate any great inner stability. While Germans are patient in their work and in submitting to orders, they show little patience in dealing with their fellow-men or the trials of circumstance. The inner insecurity is covered by a professional veneer of self-assurance.¹

The lack of inner stability is in part also reflected in the love of rank and outward distinctions which peoples with a more firm tradition do not need to emphasize. The absence of inner poise, Diesel adds, "has prevented the nation from pursuing a steady course of development through the centuries. It has led it to give up too lightly movements that seemed to promise well and to plunge with feverish enthusiasm into every sort of new craze" ((13), p. 151). Richard v. Kuhlmann, who thinks Diesel's strictures somewhat severe, nevertheless concedes that the Germans lack balance and calm, so "that a foolish brusqueness too often alternates with excessive affability, thus arousing the impression of a want of inner assurance, and therewith a suspicion of untrustworthiness." He attributes this lack of poise to historical conditions, particularly the heterogeneity of the elements of which the nation is composed, the absence of a steady and continuous tradition making possible a

¹ With this may be compared Bismarck's remarks : The German nation is a race of non-commissioned officers. Everyone is eager to get the stripes. On an average everyone in public life has only that degree of self-reliance which corresponds to his official hall-mark, to the conditions of his official life and to his orders. Exceptions to this are praiseworthy but rare.

conscious, clear and confident method of life. He urges that continuity of historical experience can hardly be said to exist in Germany. "The individual epochs are sharply severed from each other, without intermediary stages or transitions, like ice blocks in a broken floe. . . . Every generation that emerges after these great cleavages begins an entirely new life ; the threads of common feeling with the previous epoch are very thin" ((14), pp. 174-5).

The descriptions of the German character that I have so far discussed are based on observation and interpretation of everyday behaviour. They can hardly claim to be more than rough empirical generalizations. More exact study would have to allow for local or regional differences and attempts would have to be made to estimate the pervasiveness and permanence of the traits of character or temperament in question. The submissive type may be more common in old Prussia than in Bavaria ; the hypercritical, phlegmatic and reflective person more frequent on the Frisian waterfront than in the cheerful Moselle valley, and so forth.¹ Yet even when allowance has been made for regional, class and temporal differences, widely held generalizations, such as I have quoted above, may retain their value at least as a starting-point for further inquiry.

A far more promising approach to the study of German character is to be found in the analysis of the structure of German society and the changes which it has undergone. It is to be assumed that the structure and the forces which make for its changes reflect the character of the people while at the same time shaping it. For the national character, there is a good reason for believing, is not something fixed and unalterable, but always in the making, moulding and being moulded by historical circumstances, and this applies to the Germans as to other nations. From this point of view we may try to see what German writers have to tell us of the main characteristics of German society. The following points, I think, are widely emphasized. Firstly, there is the fact that the unification of Germany has only been recently achieved, that the elements out of which it was composed were themselves without a firm tradition, and that the unification was imposed at a pace far outstripping the pace of inner development. The comparatively late growth of Germany, its "youthfulness" or immaturity has affected not only its political but also its cultural development. It has been a tragedy for Germany, says Müller-Freienfels, that before it had time to

¹ For a very interesting study of regional differences cf. Georg Grupp (15).

develop a culture of its own it had been subjected successively to the influence of foreign cultures. Both as individuals and as a people, he thinks, the Germans mature very slowly. This is seen politically in the tardy manner in which it becomes democratized and in the persistence of non-rational elements in their thought. This slow growth is due, in his opinion, not merely to historical circumstances but to an inner insecurity bound up with the inherently slower tempo of the German mind. Whether this particular explanation be accepted or not, the facts are not in dispute. The influence of Rome and of Christianity reached Germany much later than, say, France, and what is even more important, the south-west was affected much earlier and more deeply than the north-east. Later there came the influences from the romanized peoples of the south-west. It is only towards the end of the seventeenth century that the Germans begin to be conscious of themselves as some sort of unity. In 1767 Lessing is very doubtful whether the Germans are a nation, either politically or as regards moral character. One might almost say, he says, that the German character consists in having no character ! (16).¹

The late growth of the German nation is connected with another feature of German life which German writers call particularism, the tendency to break up into small units and for these units to persist and to resist absorption into a larger whole. Many writers trace this tendency to a deeply rooted and inborn propensity akin to what has been described above as individualism. But in the main the explanation is to be sought in geographical and historical conditions. The disruptive forces can be traced back to the earliest days. The German emperors who dissipated their energies in the struggle with the Papacy and in the pursuit of an empire outside Germany were never able to control their unruly vassals, and the measures which they took in this direction only resulted in the multiplication of petty despotisms. The relations between the crown, the feudal nobility and the people were for various reasons here different from those which prevailed either in France or England. The people were never strong enough to induce the crown to seek their support in the struggle with the feudal nobility. With the triumph of the territorial princes in the late Middle Ages

¹ Oddly enough, a similar assertion is made by Hume of the English : " The English, of any people in the world, have the least of a national character : unless this very singularity may pass for such " (17), p. 252).

the bourgeoisie lost whatever power they had retained in the cities. "There began," says Fritz Rörig, "those fateful centuries in which the stratum of the population which in the Middle Ages had achieved such splendour—the bourgeois-merchant upper stratum of the cities—was deprived of political experience and was made politically impotent" (18). Religious strife added to the forces making for disruption. According to Schnabel (19), the Reich contained even at the end of the eighteenth century 1,789 independent powers. The significance of this fragmentation is that it made a movement of liberation difficult and kept the people in a state of political impotence and apathy. While in France the nobility had been weakened by the crown and the crown itself was exposed to attack by nationwide forces, in Germany the crown was weak, there was no bourgeoisie sufficiently strong to counter-balance the dynastic ambitions of the feudal princes and the people was broken up into too many fragments to offer effective resistance. When unity came it was relatively external in character, imposed by force and not in keeping with the inner development of the people.

When Bismarck coined his famous phrase that Germany needed only to be put on to the saddle and she would ride, behind his words there was a true and uncomfortable feeling that the continuity of history had been broken. The German people had been placed in the saddle, and it had always dreamt of riding, but it had not reached that saddle by its own strength and resolution. Many stages of development had been passed over, and much time would be needed to make good the deficiency ((14), p. 172.)

Connected with the features of social structure here briefly indicated is another feature which is also stressed by German observers. This is what they call *Ständische Zerrissenheit* or the tendency of German society to be torn asunder by sharp class divisions. "Nowhere," says Müller-Freienfels, "are nobles and bourgeoisie so *scharff geschieden*; nowhere is the whole of culture so caste-ridden."¹ This again is rooted in historical conditions. Reference was made above to the special form which the relations between the feudal nobility, the kings and the people took in Germany. Here the gap that separated the nobles from the people was wider than it ever was in England or in France. In the bourgeoisie the system of education that grew out of the Reformation resulted in the creation of an aristocracy of education sharply

¹ (17), p. 40.

separated from the mass of the uneducated. Owing to this separation, Schnabel tells us that the bourgeoisie tended to become isolated and narrow. "To this is due the lack of moral courage which it shows despite a certain outward manliness and zeal of enterprise, the attitude of submissiveness and mistrust of all above them and the rigid shutting out of all below them."¹ Of the greatest importance in this connection is, of course, the influence exerted on the social structure of Germany by the triumph of Prussia. Its effect was to militarize and bureaucratize the whole of society. In the Prussian army the ancient relationship of land-owner and peasant was carried over into the relation between officer and soldier—a mixture of tribal loyalty and autocratic authority. This spirit persisted even when the officers began to be recruited from the bourgeoisie and increasingly pervaded also the sphere of civil life, which throughout came to be dominated by the relationship of inferior to superior.

When these features of the social structure are taken into consideration the characteristics attributed to Germans by themselves and by outside observers become intelligible. Their docility and submissiveness cease to be so surprising when it is remembered that for many generations Germans were accustomed to the rule of feudal lords, who exacted tribal loyalty from their subjects, but were themselves uncontrolled by a higher authority, that the bourgeoisie have for various causes been deprived of political experience and that the fragmentation of German society hindered the growth of a collective popular will. The lack of balance or poise again is no doubt connected with the absence of a steady or continuous tradition, and the fact that neither culturally nor politically can Germany be said to have achieved any unity. The south-west with a more ancient culture has not been brought into harmony with the north-east. The capital has no ancient tradition nor deep roots in the life of the people. The aristocracy has never managed to adjust itself to the other social strata and so has contributed little towards the creation of a unified social system.² This lack of social and cultural unity generates tensions which may to some extent account for the internal distraction and disharmony that German writers attribute to the German mind.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

² For a very interesting discussion of these cultural divisions see Nadler (20) and Curtius (21).

There is yet another set of circumstances which must be noted in dealing with the mentality of the German in recent times. These are connected with the fact that the changes which have occurred in German society came largely from without and were imposed at a rate for which the people were psychologically unprepared. The triumph of Prussia turned Germany in a very short time into a world-power, and this coming after centuries of obscurity and strife, generated a mood of romantic intoxication, a belief that there was no limit to what Germany could achieve by the sheer exercise of its power. The astonishing rise of military and political power coincided with an equally rapid expansion in the sphere of industry and commerce. The cities grew by leaps and bounds. Urbanization of the population proceeded rapidly. While in 1871 only 4.8 per cent of the population lived in large towns, this rose to 30.2 per cent in the present century. The spirit of nationalism and the spirit of industrialism were here fused. Germany turned itself into a sort of "America in uniform" (22), drunk with political power, but lacking in all the elements making for moderation and stability. A *parvenu* mentality was produced, showing itself in strident boastfulness and display, but at bottom unsure of itself, fearful and resentful. Those who believe in the continuity of German character through the ages see in these phenomena yet another example of the "*Masslosigkeit*," the lack of measure or proportion of the German. Müller-Freienfels even finds in the changes which occurred in German mentality in this century an illustration of over-compensation, the erection of a merely external façade behind which the more fundamental character of the German remains. The "*Realpolitik*" and the "*Machtpolitik*" embody on this view the old romantic and vaguely imaginative element of the German mind, the brusqueness and arrogance, the cold efficiency are mere masks hiding the old "*Masslosigkeit*" and metaphysic. It is difficult to see how views of this sort are to be tested. The facts perhaps are more easily explained when it is remembered that the Germans who were unified largely against their will and industrialized and urbanized with too great rapidity were trying to play a rôle for which they were not prepared by their history and did not have the wisdom or restraint to allow themselves the time needed for the people to adjust itself to the new situation.

Bearing these considerations in mind, it becomes very doubtful whether we can speak with any accuracy of "a" German mentality

or "a" German national character. Such terms imply a unity and continuity in the social structure which cannot in this case be asserted with any confidence. It must be remembered that we know very little of the mentality of tribal Germany. The evidence derived from the Roman writers will not impress anyone familiar with anthropological literature. The traits they depict can be paralleled from the descriptions given by anthropologists of many peoples at a similar level of development. Much, for example, is made of the ancient German love of freedom. But this is based mainly on the fact that the powers of their chiefs were limited and that decisions on important matters rested with an assembly of freemen. But there is nothing very unusual in this in the societies of the simpler peoples. There are innumerable cases of peoples whose chiefs owe their power to their personal qualities and their authority to their persuasive gifts and prestige. No one would think of ascribing to them a special love of freedom. The later social structure of the German peoples was shaped by the peculiar form which feudalism took in German countries and especially by the relations between crown, nobles and people which were here different from those that prevailed in other European countries. As we have seen, particularist tendencies were thus encouraged with the result that the feudal nobility was able to hold in check both the kings or emperors and the emergent middle classes. Culturally the different regions came under the influence of Western civilization at very different times. Everywhere the people were "*entpolitisiert*," deprived of the opportunity of exercising political power. The separation of the zones of life of which German writers make so much encouraged this "*Entpolitisierung*." People became accustomed to the idea that political freedom did not matter so long as they had what was called "spiritual" freedom. They did not realize that this separation is in the long run illusory and that those whose outward life is shaped by others lose the capacity of ordering even their inward lives for themselves. Yet for a time this separation of the zones of life really did work at least in Southern and Western Germany. Here under enlightened princes in the period between 1650 and 1870 thinkers and poets could live in detachment from political life and freely satisfy their spiritual needs. The triumph of Prussia made this separation very unreal and regimentation penetrated all zones of life. The statements so frequently made by German writers that the obedience is really freedom and

their submission to rule is self-imposed can only be understood as the effect of cumulative suggestion. Those whose beliefs are fashioned habitually by suggestion from without become at last incapable of realizing that their thoughts are not their own. The docility of the Germans is perhaps not, as a recent writer has suggested, a myth. But neither is it a mystery. It becomes intelligible in the light of the history of the German peoples and is especially linked with the conditions under which the Prussian army and bureaucracy grew up and the causes which made it possible for this spirit gradually to pervade the whole of German life. The influence of the Lutheran tradition must not be forgotten in this connection. The stress laid by Lutheranism on faith, on the inward life, tended to break up the unity of thought and deed and thus to discourage the effort to translate thought into action. In teaching that matters of conscience were affairs of the inner will it accustomed men to accept calmly whatever befell them and to regard obedience and acquiescence as ordained by God. The Lutheran preachers often came from families accustomed to obedience and many of the bureaucracy too came from clerical homes.¹ A good deal of light on the mentality of middle class Germans can be obtained from an analysis of the social origins of the *Beamtentum* and especially of the habits and training of the schoolmasters. The middle classes in Germany have no continuous liberal tradition. They become of importance with the development of industry and commerce in recent times. But the circumstance of their growth did not make for effective or united political action. The upper levels made common cause with the landed nobility and this gave rise to what many German writers have called the "feudalization" of the bourgeoisie. For the rest, it would seem, the middle classes tended to concentrate attention exclusively on economic and industrial aims. In this the State aided them without, however, eliciting from them any active interest in politics or developing in them a sense of political responsibility. Political power was in fact concentrated in the hands of the Prussian nobility in association with the big industrialists and financiers. The working classes, despite the increasing weight of their votes, were prevented by various constitutional devices from exercising effective political power. There was, to the outside observer at any rate, a curious unreality in the situation. In 1912 four million electors voted for the Social Demo-

¹ Cf. Schnabel, *ibid.*, II, 306.

cratic party, a party whose programme was strictly revolutionary. It is extremely unlikely that there really existed in Germany at that time such a large number of people seriously bent on a radical reconstruction of the economic system by revolutionary methods. The probability is that under the banner of Marxism the Social Democrats were able to bring together discontented people of all sorts. The determinist elements in Marxist theory, the view that socialism must inevitably be realized as a result of the inner development of the capitalist system made it possible for the socialists to preach a doctrine of revolution as an event bound to come about in the fullness of time but which it would be dangerous and even absurd to attempt before that time had come. In the meantime people were to be patient and hopeful, prepare for the revolution to come rather than seek to bring it about immediately (23). Here too there was a separation of thought and deed which we have seen exemplified in other spheres of German life, but again the separation was rooted in the historical conditions and is hardly to be explained by invoking a permanent lack of realism and tendency to abstraction as characteristic of the German mind as such. It remains, however, that in Germany the distance between social theory and practice is perhaps greater than in other European countries and that theorizing provides a method of escape from realities more frequently in Germany than elsewhere. Fichte had no difficulty in persuading himself that the Germans were the only nation fit to realize the ideal of a republican constitution (24). The theory of the State as an organic growth was stressed by German thinkers in relations to Prussia, a state which no one could maintain was the natural expression of the soul of a people. So again the theory of the *Volk* as a racial unity is applied in Germany to a people whose racial heterogeneity is patent and whose cultural unity is as yet in the making. No wonder Nietzsche was impelled to chastise what he called the "idealistic self-deception and colour-blindness that the Germans love and almost worship as a virtue."

The contrast drawn by many German writers between German thought and the thought of Western civilization is in part an illustration of the same tendency. It serves to counterbalance by an uneasy assurance of uniqueness and distinctiveness, the views of other German writers who stress the imitative side of the German mind and its readiness to absorb and assimilate everything that comes from without. The contrast is sometimes drawn in the most

exaggerated manner. I will cite an example from a work written by Sombart during the last war, entitled *Helden und Händler* :

German thought and feeling expresses itself in the first place in the complete rejection of everything which even approaches English or West-European thought or feeling. With complete repulsion, with deepest disgust, the German spirit rises against the ideas of the eighteenth century which were of English origin. German thinkers have at all times rejected all forms of utilitarianism and eudaimonism. The German "heroic" concept lays emphasis on duty ; it looks on the State not as a contrivance for happiness but as an organism, a spiritual whole. Its growth does not consist in mere expansion for commercial purposes. It does not stand in dead equilibrium with other states. The struggle between states is a true expression of their vitality. The contrast between shopkeepers and heroes resolves itself into the contrast between Kraemer and Krieger between whom we have to choose (25).

In this form the contrast between German and Western thought need not be taken seriously ; the account given of both is ludicrously distorted by the passions engendered by war. But it is interesting to note that even a serious thinker like Troeltsch (26) finds some meaning in the contrast, though he does try to show that the two systems of thought are not as mutually exclusive as they appear to be at first sight. Western social theory is supposed to uphold the view of society as consisting of atomic individuals equal to one another, and brought together purposively for the sake of utility. The law of reason in the form of natural law is supposed to be binding on all and the final ideal is that of a union of all human beings in a rationally organized community of mankind. The German theory in the form which it has taken since the Romantic movement teaches on the contrary that societies are super-personal, spiritual forces and that humanity is a hierarchy of qualitatively different national Minds, developing their powers through struggle and "lifted above the world of utility and material welfare." Troeltsch shows how this romantic idealism was combined with a stern realism during the Bismarckian period, with the result that the notion of a wealth of unique national minds contributing their share to the collective achievements of mankind turns into a feeling of contempt for the idea of universal humanity, supra-rational morality results in moral scepticism and the movement towards German unity takes on the form of a strident imperialism.

Henceforth the political thought of Germany is marked by a curious dualism, which cannot but impress every foreign observer. Look at

one of its sides and you will see an abundance of remnants of Romanticism and lofty idealism : look at the other, and you will see a realism which goes to the verge of cynicism and of utter indifference to all ideals and all morality ; but what you will see above all is an inclination to make an astonishing combination of the two elements—in a word to brutalize romance and to romanticize cynicism.

Troeltsch himself bids German thought return to the doctrine of the autonomy of personality, which was inherent in the teaching of the Romantic movement but which later tended to be neglected. He finds value also in the theory of the Rights of Man and protests against that interpretation of the organic theory of the State which pays insufficient attention to the relations between states. In short he wants to restore a " new contact with the thought of Western Europe at a number of points at which there was once a large measure of agreement between it and our own classico-romantic age (1770-1800)."

It will be seen that the contrast between Western thought and German thought, in so far as it is real, only relates to one strain in German thought, namely that which Troeltsch himself calls the " later transformations and political perversions of the spirit of Romanticism." There can be no question, however, that this strain has been increasingly dominant in Germany since 1870, and its kinship with National Socialism is plain. As a set of ideas it has very little unity or coherence. The glorification of the non-rational, for example, is by no means wholehearted. It bears all the marks of an underlying fear of the power of reason and is an unconscious tribute to its power. The rejection of natural law again is far from being consistently carried through. A study of the literature relating to the philosophy of international law will show that German writers can make use of this notion quite cheerfully when they have to defend the rights of Germany against other nations (27). Even the concept of race is so elastically used as to deprive it of any consistent meaning. What is far more important than the theorizing is the mood of morbid romanticism which openly glorifies violence and inculcates harshness and cruelty as ends desirable in themselves. Croce has shown (28) that this mood, which he designates " activism," gained ground everywhere in Europe and outside towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. The recrudescence of violence, the rejection of humanitarian ideals was by no means confined to Germany. It is, however,

characteristic of the German tradition that in conformity with their stress on race they claim activism too as specially "German," and it is undoubtedly the case that it is in Germany that "activism" has received its most powerful and terrible expression. The particular form which it has taken in Germany requires explanation, of course. But it would be falling into the error of the racialists to seek this explanation in the ethnic constitution of the Germans.

This very summary account of a very large subject suggests certain tentative conclusions. We have seen that statements about German mentality are broadly of two kinds. They are based either on observation of the behaviour of individual Germans and then they assert that a certain kind of behaviour is found widely among Germans. Or they are inferences from the collective behaviour of Germans as represented in their public policy, their philosophy, science or social institutions. The first type of statements being rough, empirical generalizations are obviously subject to important qualifications. When we are told that Germans are heavy or phlegmatic, thorough and industrious, capable of warm feelings but slow in response, and the like, allowance has of course to be made for regional differences and these may be so great as rather to shake our confidence in the generalizations. Nevertheless, some of the generalizations I have quoted above are attested by so many observers for a sufficiently long period of time that they may be taken to hit something fairly widespread and constant in German behaviour. Assertions regarding more complex constellations of qualities such as are expressed by words like "individualism," "tendencies to romanticism," lack of poise or inner security, are based on observation both of individual and collective behaviour and require careful analysis in relation to changes in the social structure and social conditions. The tendency, for example, towards excessive abstraction which is noted in the German handling of the *Geisteswissenschaften* may be connected with the fact that so many German social thinkers live a life remote from the realities of life and are cut off from direct political experience. As already List noted: He who cannot find his way about the world launches into a world of speculation. Their aversion to the more "positivist" side of social investigation may also be connected with the fact that many German social thinkers and philosophers came from clerical families and though not themselves adherents of the faith of their

fatners have retained something of the religious outlook which inclines them to lay stress on feeling or other non-rational elements in experience. Hence the emphasis on "spirit," "totality," and the like. Too much must not be made of this line of approach. In any case it would be a mistake to lump all the German work on the social sciences together and to stigmatize them all as suffering from excessive abstraction. One has only to think of philosophers like Lotze, sociologists like Max Weber, historians like Troeltsch, to see how absurd this would be.

The term individualism as ascribed to the Germans is as we have seen very ambiguous. In so far as it connotes a tendency to turn inwards, it is fair perhaps to regard it as underlying certain phases of religion in Germany. In so far as it connotes the desire for freedom and independence and self-expression, it seems to me to be very doubtful whether the Germans can be said to be endowed with it in greater measure than other peoples. The tendency to particularism with which this is said to be connected is not due so much to the positive desire for self-expression as to the failure of the unifying forces which elsewhere in Europe led to an earlier creation of larger units. There is thus no problem of reconciling this trait with the allegedly opposite quality of docility. That quality too is, as we have seen, rooted in the historical conditions of the German peoples. The lack of poise and inner security is intelligible if we remember, firstly, the lack of a steady social tradition and, secondly, the fact that Germany has been subjected to drastic changes from without and that these have been brought about at a rate not conducive to stability or inward security. The brutality and glorification of violence which strike the foreign observers and which the German writers frequently boast of themselves, are connected with the special conditions of the rise of Prussia, the Prussianization of the rest of Germany, and the general conditions which brought about the recrudescence of violence and the weakening of humanitarian sentiment not only in Germany but in the rest of the world towards the end of the nineteenth century. Many of the assertions which the Germans make regarding their own mentality are not statements of fact but of ideals. They like to persuade themselves that they are what they would like to be. This applies clearly to their claims to uniqueness, unity and continuity of racial character. In this respect they show a capacity for self-intoxication and self-deception truly remarkable. Perhaps the really important question

about the Germans is not so much what they think of themselves as why they think so much of and about themselves.

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CHAPTER NINE

THE CAUSES OF WAR ¹

I WANT in this paper to discuss some of the more important and widely held theories of the nature and causes of war. Three views stand out, I think, fairly clearly in recent discussions. The first, which we may call the Socialist view, regards war as the outcome generally of economic factors and interprets modern wars as a necessary element in a *particular stage* of economic development, namely, imperialism. The second view, which is held mainly by Liberal and free-trade economists, denies that there is any necessary connection between capitalism and war and asserts, on the contrary, that whatever may have been the case in the past, they are now incompatible. On this view war is an atavism, a survival of tendencies rooted in earlier social conditions and of dynastic conceptions of the State impregnated with the ideas of power and glory. Sir Norman Angell, who on the whole shares this view, lays particular stress on the anarchical condition of international political relations, the absence of adequate international institutions, and the persistence of false beliefs and unreal abstractions or illusions which makes rational control difficult, and induces men to approve policies which they would probably condemn if they realized vividly the consequences to which they are likely to lead. The third view is most clearly represented in psycho-analytic writings. According to this the fundamental, as distinguished from the precipitating, causes of war are to be found in the inherent aggressiveness of human nature and the failure of the repressive mechanisms whereby these aggressive tendencies are normally checked or held in balance. This being so, no changes in political, educational, or economic institutions will go to the root of the trouble, until efforts are made to eliminate the unconscious tensions and to dry up the sources of anxiety and hate.

The Socialist view is based primarily on a theory of imperialism rather than of war. In essentials it was stated very clearly by J. A. Hobson in his now classical work on *Imperialism* (1902). He distinguishes between colonialism and imperialism. The former

¹ Written in 1938 and published April 1939.

consists in the migration of part of a nation to vacant or sparsely populated foreign lands, when the emigrants carry with them the full citizenship of their native land, or else establish institutions in conformity with those of the country of their origin and under her final control. Imperialism consists in the occupation of new territories by comparatively small numbers of white men who exercise political and economic sway over large masses of population who are regarded as incapable of exercising self-government either in politics or industry. He shows that imperialism thus understood owes its driving force to the pressure of capitalist industry for markets, primarily for investment but secondarily also for surplus products of home industry. "Over-production in the sense of an excessive manufacturing plant, and surplus capital which cannot find sound investment within the country, force Great Britain, Germany, Holland, France to place larger and larger portions of their economic resources outside the area of their present political domain and then stimulate a policy of political expansion so as to take in the new areas."¹ The root of the trouble Hobson finds in the mal-distribution of consuming power which prevents the absorption of commodities and capital within the country. The demand for new markets is not a "necessary" outcome of industrial development, but of mal-distribution of consuming power, and would disappear under a more equitable diffusion of the gains of improved technique and organization.

The part played by "non-economic" factors is not denied. Patriotism, adventure, military enterprise, political ambition, and even philanthropy exercise an important influence on imperial expansion. All that is claimed is that finance manipulates the energies thus generated and gives them definite direction. The emergence of competing imperialisms has been the main cause of the vast armaments which are draining the resources of most European countries. The result of this imperialist policy is not only war but militarism, i.e. a constant preparedness for war on an ever-increasing scale, the fostering of the belief that there is a real conflict of interests between different peoples and, consequently, the constant danger of war.

It is part of this theory that there is no inherent or necessary conflict between peoples or nations. Nationalism in the sense of the ideal to foster and develop whatever is specific to a particular

¹ *Imperialism*, p. 85.

ethnic group is no bar to internationalism. It is aggressive imperialism which has converted the nationalism of the earlier nineteenth century which was a cohesive, pacific, inclusive force into an exclusive, hostile force. The policy of protectionism, the scramble for markets, spheres of interest or of influence, the use of diplomatic machinery to secure concessions and leases, easily passing into a policy of forcible annexation, has been bad business for the nation. It has led and leads to vast expenditure on armaments, costly wars and the constant fear of war, and has arrested and still arrests international political and social reform. Its driving force is not national but sectional interest. By this is not meant that these interested groups deliberately seek wars and expansion for selfish motives which they hide under high-sounding moral phrases. "There is no enthusiasm in hypocrisy, and even bare-faced greed furnishes no adequate stimulus to a long policy." The process is psychologically more subtle. The men who inspire the policies of imperialism have first to deceive themselves if they are to deceive others. Nor do they cynically use the nobler drives of patriotism and humanitarianism for their own selfish interests. Rather do they attach themselves to any strong feeling likely to be of service, until self-sacrifice is made to cover domination and patriotism cloaks the lust of power.

The Neo-Marxists' position closely resembles that reached by Hobson, except that it does not appeal to the theory of under-consumption, and that, as is to be expected, it is fitted by them into the framework of a more general and far-reaching theory of the break-down of capitalism. Imperialism becomes a necessary and inevitable stage in the history of capitalism, that namely in which "the domination of monopoly and finance capital has taken shape, in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance, in which the division of the world by the international trusts has begun, and in which the partition of all the territory of the earth by the greatest capitalist countries has been completed."¹ Imperialism is moreover "parasitic or decaying capitalism." States come to live ever more on capital exports, and thus are driven along the path of military expansion. No doubt it is theoretically possible to imagine a kind of ultra-imperialism, or what Hobson called inter-imperialism, in which financiers would extend their organization across national barriers and substitute profitable co-

¹ Lenin, *Imperialism*, p. 81.

operation for economic conflict. No doubt, too, even the workers might be induced to support this kind of imperialism by the bribe of high wages. But the development towards world monopoly is proceeding so unevenly and is accompanied by such an intensification of the antagonisms between rival imperialisms, that before the goal is reached, capitalism will have decayed as a result of its inner contradictions.¹

This is not the place for a discussion of the whole Marxist theory of the evolution and downfall of capitalism. I must confine myself to the alleged connection between imperialist capitalism and war, and to a brief review of the criticisms which have been adduced against the theory of such a connection.

As to imperialism and war the empirical facts speak loud. The major causes of friction in the recent history of international relations were closely connected with imperialist rivalries. The Fashoda crisis which nearly led to a war between France and England in 1898 arose out of rivalry over the control of the Sudan. The "Moroccan crises" of 1905 and 1911, which nearly embroiled all Europe in war, arose directly out of the clash of the new trading and colonial interests of Germany with those of France and Great Britain, and it is generally agreed that the settlement left ill-feeling behind it which was to find expression in later quarrels. However complex the causes which led to the Boer War, no one doubts the important part played by financial interests. The occasion of the occupation of Egypt in 1882 was the danger to the foreign bondholders, though it is now generally agreed that there was the additional motive of protecting the Canal which it was believed necessitated the control of Egypt. The Russo-Japanese War arose out of the struggle for Korea and Manchuria, and the intrigues of timber merchants were certainly an integral part of the expansionist policy of the Russians. The recent seizure by Japan of a large section of China again is an instance of the influence of economic factors on militant imperialism.

This general theory of a necessary connection between the policy of territorial expansion and the pressure of surplus capital for opportunities abroad has been attacked on various grounds which must be now briefly considered.

(a) Even in what is apparently the clearest case of such a connection, namely, British Imperialism, Professor William L. Langer

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 113, and Preface to Bucharin, *Imperialism and World Economy*.

has argued that the export of capital had already reached high proportions by 1875 and that such export was not connected with the notion of political or territorial expansion. The boom in colonial annexations set in later (1884-1900). This, however, merely shows that the export of capital can occur without necessitating territorial expansion, and this no one is concerned to deny. Professor Langer himself points out that the breakdown of the monopolistic position of England, through the embarkation of other countries on the course of empire, generated the conviction that political control was necessary for safeguarding markets and that therefore the whole imperialist movement was probably at bottom "as much economic as anything else."¹

(b) Of greater importance is the argument that some cases of modern imperialism do not fit in with the hypothesis of the rôle of investment-seeking capital as the source of expansionism. Tsarist Russia it has been argued, for example, had no surplus capital in any reasonable sense of the term, yet it was one of the greatest expansionist Powers in modern times. The causes here have to be sought in political ambition, dynastic megalomania, military lust for conquest. In so far as the capitalists were used in the process, they were rather a tool than an initiating cause.

As an argument against the general proposition that all expansion is due to surplus capital seeking opportunities for investment this case would be conclusive. But I doubt whether anyone would want to defend this proposition. It is clear that there was a great deal of military expansion long before the days of financial capital. Russia's earlier expansion clearly had nothing to do with surplus capital but was the work rather of restless frontiersmen seeking new lands for settlement, and in this sense belongs to colonialism rather than to imperialism, and of ambitious Tsars seeking warm-water outlets, windows to the West and so forth. During the nineteenth century, however, Russia was infected with an imperialism akin to that of Western Europeans, and in that later expansionism capitalist interests played their part even though the capital had to be borrowed from the French financiers.

Italian imperialism is another case which does not fit in very readily with a theory which lays exclusive stress on capital export as the determinant of expansion. For clearly Italy was poor in capital and it is doubtful how far the conquests paid. The total

¹ *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, I, p. 95.

commerce with Libya in 1921 was only 201,630,575 lire, less than the annual deficit paid directly by Italy in the colonial budget.¹ It would seem that here the quest for national prestige and glory was the effective drive. Yet it must be remembered that though the conquest does not benefit the nation as a whole, the Banca di Roma and the Banca d'Italia may have made considerable profits and that there may have operated the illusion that such conquests pay, due to the impression that Britain and others were enriched by them. There is a sort of circle in the influences thus exerted. The example of England no doubt incited other nations, while "the scramble for colonies among the continental nations has had the good effect at least of determining the English not to be left behind in the race for empire."² Empire gives prestige and prestige is sought in empire.

French Imperialism, it may further be noted, does not lend itself very readily to the Neo-Marxist explanations, since trade with the colonies was not very extensive and investments in foreign countries were of far greater importance than investments in the colonies. To meet this objection it has been argued³ that in this case there is still a connection, though an indirect one, between colonial policy and the needs of financial capital. For a strong State is necessary to make foreign investments secure, and, with a stationary population, France is unable to build up an army of sufficient strength without the help of her colonies. This explanation is not likely to be found convincing by any but the faithful.

(c) A more radical attack has been made on the theory associating war in modern times with financial capital by Professor E. Staley,⁴ and to this work great importance is attached by some Liberal economists. His method is to subject a number of historical instances, e.g. the Frânco-Italian clash over Tunis, the Turko-Italian clash over Tripoli, the penetration of the Yalu by Russia before the Russo-Japanese War, the tension between England and Russia in Persia, the Japanese operations in Manchuria, to a detailed examination, and he argues that in all these instances financial penetration has been used by governments as a tool for "political" purposes rather than the other way about, and that frictions have arisen rather out of political causes than out of

¹ Moon, Parker T., *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York, 1926), p. 223.

² Egerton, H. E., *A Short History of British Colonial Policy* (London, 1897), p. 6.

³ Cf. Sternberg, F., *Der Imperialismus* (Berlin, 1926).

⁴ *War and the Private Investor*.

“purely economic” causes. On the other hand, the instances in which investors have directly brought major Powers into serious political friction are, he thinks, comparatively rare (Samoa and perhaps the Boer War). Immediate economic conflicts can and often are settled by compromise so long as political complications do not arise. Frictions arising out of investments become dangerous only when they have been pushed from the start for political reasons, and, on the other hand, investments do not receive strong political backing where they are not the tools of national policy or run counter to national policy.

While the argument is interesting, the method employed does not seem to me calculated to provide an adequate measure of the rôle of finance in imperialism and war. The fact that in many instances financial operations are encouraged by governments as means of penetration does not dispose of the theory of economic causation. We have still to ascertain the nature of the “political” factors which inspire governmental action, and these might very soon lead back to economic factors. The root of the matter is that the “economic” and the “political” cannot be separated in the way implied by Professor Staley’s argument. Consider the statement that the friction over the Baghdad railway was probably in the main political. This seems to be based on the fact that during the controversy there were several occasions when a compromise could have been attained by peaceful negotiation among the financiers involved. But how estimate the forces which led the diplomatists to intervene? From the British point of view the Baghdad railway was regarded as a menace to the Suez Canal and to India if the trunk line reached to the Persian Gulf. Can this fear be intelligibly described as purely “political?” The French feared the loss of their predominance in Syria. In the German attitude again it is quite impossible to separate the element of pure business from broader imperialistic designs. Political influences were used by them quite deliberately to further economic designs. In the Russian attitude economic interests were also at work, though here the aim eventually to dominate Constantinople and the Balkans also had deeper non-economic roots. It remains to be added that Professor Staley is only concerned with the view that there is a direct and immediate connection between economic frictions and political conflicts, for which he thinks the inductive evidence affords no proof. But he disclaims any “attack upon the economic inter-

pretation of history in its broader form. It may still be true that the larger political purposes in the service of which private investments become most dangerous—expansionism, the strategy of power, etc.—are themselves the product of forces best described as ‘economic.’”¹ It seems to me that often without an obvious and immediate economic motive the sense of antagonism and injustice may be rooted in economic policy, and while it may be true that national ambitions are not directly proportionate to the economic rivalries involved, yet the dangerous situations are those in which economic policies have become associated with the collective authority of national governments. Further, in interpreting this association, the question whether it is initiated by governments or by business interests is not, it seems to me, of decisive importance.

This review of the objections that have been raised against the economic interpretation of imperialist expansion suggests, I think, that though this theory has not been fundamentally shaken, it is greatly in need of further clarification. There are evidently many different types of expansion, and it is difficult to determine with precision the part that is played in each by the complex motives of power and prestige, adventure and pugnacity, and the desire to secure preferential or exclusive markets. Yet it may well be the case that despite its complex and multiple origins, imperialism has tended, in proportion as the areas suitable for colonization have been occupied, to become a fight for external markets and spheres of economic influence, and that the support which is given to this movement by the powerful machinery of national states nourishes jealousies, suspicions, and hostilities generating militarism and eventually war.

The Liberal economists to whose views I now turn do not deny that an important source of friction between nations is to be found in the increasing intervention by governments in economic affairs. But this intermingling of the political and the economic factors, they would say, is not inherent in “capitalism as such,” but is on the contrary a perversion of it.

Perhaps the most elaborate argument on these lines is that presented by Schumpeter in his *Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen*.² His chief contention is that there is no necessary connection between capitalism and imperialism. On the contrary the true interests of

¹ Cf. *War and the Private Investor*, p. xvi.

² Cf. *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Bd. 46.

capitalism lie in the direction of free competitive enterprise and unrestricted free trade. The mentality of the business man, he argues, somewhat after the manner of Herbert Spencer, is not that of the warrior. His energies are absorbed in the competitive struggle, and do not require the outlet which in pre-capitalist times could be found in war and conquest. We find in fact that it is just in the country where modern capitalism first developed that there also grew up a strong movement for peace, and that countries which are least burdened with pre-capitalist mentality like the U.S.A. are the least imperialistically-minded. Under free trade there would, he argues, be no real conflict of interest either between different nations or between corresponding classes of different nations. Since protectionism is not an essential characteristic of capitalism—witness England—it is clear, he maintains, that the drive towards aggressive expansion is not a necessary product of capitalism. Yet Schumpeter does not deny the essential thesis of the Socialists which emphasizes the part played in imperialism by monopolistic trusts and cartels. But he argues that these can only flourish under a system of tariffs. Protectionism, however, is not a necessary outcome of competitive capitalism, but a survival of former political conditions, and would disappear as soon as the majority began to understand their real economic interests. Imperialism is thus an atavism, a proof of the ancient truth that the living are ruled by the dead.

I do not find these arguments at all convincing. Schumpeter seems to think in terms of abstractions, capitalism as such, warrior mentality, industrial mentality, which are with difficulty applicable to the complex historical realities. The appeal to atavism and survivals is again a dangerous tool in sociology. There is clearly something very much wrong with a theory which can interpret the terrific imperial expansion of modern times as a mere carry-over of ancient habits. No doubt if people acted rationally in their economic pursuits they would see that free trade and peace were in the true interests of all. But to identify capitalism as such with a rational economic system is surely the height of abstraction. As a working concern capitalism is no freer from illusions than any other system. Historically, what has to be explained is the association of nationalism with protectionism and with the belief, no doubt mainly illusory, that the extension of territory in defenceless or semi-defenceless regions redounds to national glory and economic

advantage. From the socialist angle what needs further analysis is the association of national selfishness and sectional or class selfishness within the nation to which already Cobden and Bright drew attention. Whether national sentiment is itself rooted in economic conditions is a problem which so far as I know has not been fully investigated as yet. But there can be no question that the linking of this sentiment with protectionism and expansionism, which is characteristic of the modern period, is due mainly to economic factors, and it is this which makes the efforts of the liberal economists to separate the political and the economic from one another wholly unreal. The present phase of economic nationalism affords a good illustration of this difficulty of separating the political and the economic. No doubt the tendency to autarchy is attributable partly to national pride, partly to the desire for self-sufficiency in time of war. You can call these motives political. But no one will deny that at least as important has been the greatly accelerated productivity due to improved technique which has affected both the advanced and the backward countries. The result has been a clamour for protection against foreign imports together with an increased pressure on governments for assistance in securing an expansion of the export trade, by means of embargoes and subsidies and by loans to needy nations often applied to armaments and other extravagances and not to purposes of genuine development.¹ The pressure comes from merchants and financiers and the bellicosity inherent in this procedure must therefore be ascribed to economic at least as much as to political motives.

Perhaps the divergence between the two types of theory I have been considering hitherto may be best brought out in the following way. The Socialists insist that the aggressive elements in nationalism are essentially connected with the present economic system. This permits the selfish motives of classes or sections within each nation consciously or unconsciously to utilize the energies of national sentiments in bolstering up protectionist policies within and expansionist policies without. They would therefore seek the remedy primarily in a reorganization of the economic system aiming at equality and the elimination of the profit motive. Under such a system, if widely adopted by states, international economic difficulties would not disappear so long as there remained great differences in the level of equipment and the standard of life among

¹ Cf. J. A. Hobson, *Democracy*, p. 125.

different peoples, but they would be likely to be handled with less bitterness and there would be a greater chance of genuine international co-operation, and of the establishment of efficient international organs of government. The Liberal economists on the other hand regard the aggressive element in nationalism as in the main a survival of earlier dynastic militarism. The remedy they suggest is chiefly political. Exclusive state-sovereignty must be abandoned and an international federal authority established which would regulate relations between states. The removal of trade barriers and other restrictions would reduce friction and encourage friendly relations.

The "Political" solution is presented in the sharpest form in the writings of Sir Norman Angell. We know, he argues, from history that wherever a group of sovereign states has combined into a federation for mutual defence war has ceased. Differences of nationality as such do not lead to war : war arises out of nationality when it is associated with the claim to independent sovereignty, that is to the right to be judge in one's own cause and to defend it by preponderant power. Similarly, economic rivalries do not as such lead to war ; indeed, the economic conflict would not arise but for political separateness. The essential thing is therefore to abolish the international anarchy by the establishment of a federal authority which would pool all power and so keep the peace. All that such an authority needs to do is to federalize defence. The Socialist argument he dismisses as based on conditions which no longer hold. So far from war being an essential element in capitalism, it is utterly ruinous to it. The capitalist system is indeed threatened with destruction if war is allowed to continue. The advantages to the investor of imperial relations over the non-imperial are certainly not sufficient to justify him in running the risk of war ; capital so far from necessarily following the flag can and does disregard it. Again, " the problem of capitalism is now not the shortage of raw material which has to be 'politically' captured by wars that dislocate fatally the whole economic and financial system ; but to adjust production and consumption : for which peace is indispensable." From the capitalist point of view no victory could under present conditions bring gains commensurate with its cost in monetary, financial, and economic dislocation.

Why then do not people realize these truths, and why is the world again drifting to war ? Why, again, do arguments based on

the need of the "have-not" states for raw materials and fresh markets still retain their force with large numbers of people? How is it, moreover, that millions of men were ready in the last war, and are apparently again now ready, to fight for everything which is so palpably contrary to their economic interests? How, in short, are the delusions which Angell has exposed maintained?

The answer that Angell gives is mainly psychological in character. In the first place, there is sheer intellectual failure due to ignorance, personification of abstractions, and failure of imagination. In this way people quite readily accept or tacitly approve policies which, if properly analyzed, would be seen to be self-defeating and self-contradictory. Thus, during the Versailles conference a great many people certainly wanted a peace which would make further war impossible. But at the same time they clamoured for the annexation of new territory, the weakening of the enemies' trade, the retention by their own people of preponderant power, all policies conducive to war. Here it is plain that people did not see the relation between the policy they advocated and the end which they desired to attain or else they did not know how to choose between two mutually exclusive alternatives. Similarly, "the nationalist does not primarily want war; he wants independence and sovereignty for his nation and then domination of others as the only way to make it 'secure,' and fails to see that such a policy must produce war."¹

But secondly, as a result of this intellectual failure, the passions get a chance to express themselves in a manner often glaringly out of keeping with self-interest.

We say commonly of the Versailles treaty making that we could not see the plain facts because we were so angry. It would be truer to say that we were angry because we could not see the plainest fact, e.g. the Germany we desired to punish was not a "person," but an aggregation of little children going to school, old women picking up sticks in the wood, tired artisans, Socialists, Junkers, Catholics, Protestants. . . .²

The relation between reason and emotion is in fact reciprocal: reason may be obscured by the emotions, but these themselves may arise because of misconceptions and especially the tendency to personify abstractions. From the practical point of view it is important to realize that a change in beliefs and valuations does alter the direction of the impulses and emotions. In this particular

¹ *Preface to Peace*, p. 234.

² *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War*, p. 479.

case the relevant emotions are those connected with certain ideas and beliefs which constitute political nationalism, the ideas of independence and sovereignty. These ideas tend to give full play to the impulses of self-assertion, domination, and coercion, which in turn obscure our powers of judgment and defeat, not only our sense of justice, but even our motives of self-interest. Conscious economic motives play in Angell's view only a minor part in the struggle between nations. Yet he believes that if only people realized certain economic elementary truths affecting the relations between peoples, the passions of patriotism could be checked or at least redirected and civilized.¹

There are several doubts which are raised by this line of argument despite its sincerity and persuasiveness. In the first place, does not Angell himself fall a victim to the delusion which he has done so much to expose, the delusion due to the personification of national entities? Wars probably do not pay the nation as a whole, but is it so clear that they do not pay certain sections of the nation? Similarly, protectionist policies do not benefit the nation as a whole, but that does not make these policies less attractive to the particular interests directly concerned. These sectional interests do not directly aim at war and they may even be convinced that the risks of war are now too great from a purely business point of view, but they use the power of the State to secure fresh markets, spheres of influence, etc., and in a competitive world they thus create the conditions which will result in war. It is even arguable that as the backward countries are themselves transformed into surplus-producing countries the competition for markets and fresh opportunities for investment will become keener and the political situation more dangerous.

Secondly, it is, I think, true that the motives directly appealed to in war propaganda are rarely those of direct economic gain, and that economic nationalism and imperialism do not owe their strength to calculated self-interest so much as to obscure notions of prestige and power. The strength of these motives is illustrated by the fact that the demand for equality of armaments with the allies had a greater influence on German opinion than the appeal to economic motives, sharpened though they were by grave distress. Yet I do not think that Sir Norman Angell realizes clearly enough how interwoven these motives have become under modern economic

¹ Cf. *Preface to Peace*, p. 238.

and political conditions. Economic development, including expansion abroad, has itself come to be recognized as essential to a nation's prestige and power, while these in turn are utilized to further economic development. It has to be remembered further that peoples fight not only for expansion but generally in their own view for security, and this word is soon made to cover not only the desire to keep what one has but to make doubly sure by getting more. Nor does Sir Norman Angell pay sufficient attention to the fact that aggressive nationalism has frequently been used in the past as a tool for dulling internal discontent, not only political but economic. Whether or not we accept the view that Fascism is essentially a defence of capitalism against the feared reorganization of society by Socialists, we must agree that its flamboyant nationalism has not only political but also economic roots. On the whole, therefore, while agreeing with Sir Norman Angell in the stress he lays on the need for putting an end to political anarchy by the establishment of an international federal authority, it seems to me clear, especially in the light of recent experience, that such an authority will only be really successful if at the same time measures are taken to eliminate the deeper economic causes of war and militarism.

The psycho-analytic theory of the origins of war to which I now turn differs from both theories so far discussed in seeking to go behind social and economic structure to what are supposed to be the deeper underlying causes in the human mind. I will try to present this view in what appears to me its strongest form without attempting to follow in detail the various expositions that have been given of it by psycho-analytic writers. It is necessary to make clear at the outset that they are not concerned with the immediate or precipitating causes of particular wars which may vary infinitely. They are concerned rather with the predisposing factors, with the mental conditions, which make war possible and which shape its behaviour once it breaks out. They are struck with the readiness with which large masses of men respond to the call of war, the credulity and hysterical intolerance characteristic of war mentality. They point to the fact that even the experience of the disastrous consequences of the last war has not served to eradicate the tendencies to war, and that peoples are again drifting to war in a manner obviously against their self-interest. They point further to the enormous strength of the hate motive and the readiness with which people now respond to it everywhere. Their essential thesis is that

this cannot be accounted for in terms of response to the immediate stimuli provided by the actual situation, but that underlying this mentality are deeper unconscious tensions, hidden frustrations, fears, and anxieties. They believe that there are in the human mind primitive tendencies to destruction and aggression. War, however, is not due to the direct resurgence of these primitive tendencies, but rather to a faulty balancing of the repressive and repressed elements in the mind. In times of stress these repressed tendencies are projected or displaced on to an enemy. We are afraid of ourselves and in our terror turn against others. We should not be so ready to be stimulated to anger and hate against the stranger, if we were not in a state of unconscious tension, nor would the mood of irrational credulity be produced so readily if there were not predisposing conditions to hate. There must be in us, so it is argued, a reservoir of unexploded aggression, the result of accumulated repression, anxiety, and frustration. Against this anxiety hate and hostility provide an inward protection. The roots of the anxiety ultimately are found in the faulty repression of the two fundamental groups of impulses of love and aggression, and the only radical way of dealing with the problem is therefore to devise methods for eliminating the influences making for sadism and masochism, especially in the infant environment.

This is obviously not the place for a detailed examination of the psycho-analytic theory of human instincts. By Freud the aggressive tendencies have been identified or linked with the hypothetical death instincts, the reality of which is, however, disputed by many psycho-analysts. Further, psycho-analysts are not agreed as to the question whether the aggressive or destructive tendencies are to be regarded as primary or as secondary responses to interference or thwarting. Personally, I am not convinced that there is in man an inner need to destroy or hurt as there is a need to love or eat and drink. I am inclined to regard aggression as a form of self-assertion intensified under conditions of obstruction or the fear of obstruction, or loss of independence, and in other instances, of enhanced self-feeling and the enjoyment of mastery and power. In any event, as there is plenty of thwarting or baulking of primary dispositions, there is bound to be plenty of aggression, and, consequently, repression of aggression, and everything that psycho-analysts can suggest towards a more enlightened upbringing of children must be welcomed.

I thus recognize the value of the contribution that psycho-analysis has made and can make in the future towards the understanding of the causes of war. Nevertheless, several difficulties present themselves which I will briefly refer to.

In the first place, even if we grant that there are hidden or unconscious sources of aggression and hostility, the fact remains that some groups live in friendly relations with one another while others do not, and that in many instances, group hostility, so far from being spontaneous, has to be generated by persistent propaganda. Surely the differentiating factors cannot be regarded as merely secondary, but must form an integral part of any satisfactory explanation of the phenomena. From this point of view the distinction drawn between the precipitating and the more fundamental causes of war seems to be drawn in a superficial manner. No doubt the particular incidents which immediately precede a war may be relatively unimportant, but it is a serious error in method to exclude all the non-psychological factors from among the fundamental causes ; and unless the relation between the mental factors and the social and economic background be studied in detail, the psycho-analytic theory must remain far too general to throw any light on the highly complex and variable relations between groups.

In the second place, it seems to me that in their eagerness to disclose the unconscious elements in war mentality, the psychoanalysts are apt to neglect factors lying nearer the surface which yet may have vital significance. Consider the stress they lay on the unconscious anxieties due to deep repression. This has led them to neglect the more obvious sources of frustration due to modern industrial conditions, the worry, monotony, lack of security, dominating the lives of large masses of working people. Are there not here enough sources of anxiety and fear to account in large measure for the readiness to seek an escape in war and for the ease with which people yield to the blandishments of orators offering a speedy change in the conditions of their lives ? Consider again the apathy or indifference of many sections of the middle or upper classes and their unwillingness to make adequate preparation against war in peace time. Is not this political apathy an expression of the deep fear to undertake a radical examination of the economic and political structure which might be subversive of the existing order ; and having failed to take thought in peace time, is it surprising that they fall a ready prey to panicky propaganda in times of stress ?

Finally, the psycho-analytic attitude is clearly too individualistic and pays insufficient attention to the effect of institutions upon the actual behaviour of people. Consider such a simple case as the institution of forming queues. In its absence people jostle and fight, but the very same people are orderly and peaceful and amazingly patient as soon as the habit is formed. Changes in the economic and political institutions do bring about important changes in the actual behaviour of individuals without anything like the radical transformation of mind and character contemplated by the psycho-analysts. What is important in the psychology of war regarded from a sociological point of view is the association of aggression with other drives, such as economic motives and the desire for power. This combination is favoured by existing economic and political systems with their glorification of national prestige and the worship of wealth, a combination which might be broken up by a change in these institutions. No doubt these institutions again have their psychological side, but they are not to be understood in terms of psychology alone. From the practical point of view, I doubt, for example, whether any radical change in the educational system can be brought about without raising questions of economic and political reform. In short, the institutional and psychological approach are complementary and the possibilities of both must be explored if a rational solution of the problem of war is to be reached.

I have tried to bring out the extreme complexity of the causes leading to war and the difficulty of isolating any one set of factors which can be described as *the* cause of wars. I may perhaps bring together the main trends of my argument by setting out the principal factors which interwoven with one another appear to me to be responsible for modern wars. It is useful to distinguish between the fundamental predisposing conditions and the immediate or inciting conditions and I will mention chiefly the former.

First there are imperialist rivalries due to differences in economic and political power between different nations and particularly to the existence of relatively undeveloped parts of the world offering opportunities for expansion and exploitation. This tendency to expansion is encouraged by the capitalist form of economic organization which necessitates the search for new markets and thus generates animosities which tend to express themselves in political conflicts. Whether these imperialistic rivalries would disappear

under a Socialist organization may be doubted. It must be remembered that under a Socialist regime the linking up of the political with the economic is carried to its extreme point, since all foreign trade is politically controlled. In the case of those countries which have or believe themselves to have an insufficient supply of raw materials in their own domain or which have developed their production beyond what is necessary for internal consumption, occasions of friction might well arise quite as difficult to resolve as those which exist between capitalist states. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the profit motive once eliminated there might be a greater chance than there is now of an amicable solution of the problems of raw materials, immigration, and export.

Secondly, I should put the fear that nations have of each other due to a large extent to the resentment left behind by former wars and the treaties of peace which concluded them.

Thirdly, the existence of armaments which heighten this fear and keep it alive.

Fourthly, and as a consequence in part of the foregoing, the unwillingness of nations to give up their right of self-defence and the resulting absence of any effective international organization for dealing with disturbances of equilibrium.

Fifthly, the psychological factors making for anxiety, fear, and hate, partly the result of economic and political factors, and partly having their roots deeper in the forces discussed by the psychoanalysts.

Sixthly, another factor is to be found in the nature of public opinion in complex societies. It is sometimes held that there is now a general will for peace, but a general will is just what there is not. Here, as in so many other phases of public life, what is will is not general and what is general is not will. The truth is that the mass of people do not feel either individually responsible or competent to deal with the complex issues that arise, and realizing that they cannot control policy they leave events to take their course. Hence it frequently happens that statesmen having blundered into catastrophe console themselves with the reflection that owing to public opinion they could not have acted otherwise, while it is quite likely that had they given a lead public opinion might well have welcomed a generous and peaceful policy. Thus as Lowes Dickinson has said: "Governments do not lead and nations do not follow. There is a general slithering into the pit, into

which, nevertheless, everybody would say they do not wish to fall.”¹

The discussion of the origins of war and the conditions of peace abounds in overdrawn antitheses. Thus the political is contrasted with and even separated from the economic and, what is even stranger, both are contrasted with the psychological. In fact the causation is extremely complex and the attempt to control the factors involved frequently results in vicious circles. You cannot get a reorganization of the economic life within a country without raising international problems, and international troubles cannot be got rid of without raising problems of internal organization. You will never get peace until you get Socialism, say some. To which the reply is made : You will never get Socialism until you get peace. You must first re-educate mankind, it is maintained, and the political and economic reconstruction will follow. You must first revolutionize society and human nature will be transformed in consequence, say others in return. The essence of the matter is the recognition that the circles *are* vicious and that to break them a simultaneous and concerted attack at different points is necessary.

¹ *War*, p. 111.

CHAPTER TEN

ANTI-SEMITISM ¹

THE term "anti-Semitism" seems to have been used first by a German writer alleged to be of Jewish origin, Wilhelm Marr, in 1879 in a brochure entitled *Der Sieg des Judentums über das Germanentum*. It is clear from this pamphlet, as well as from the writings of the circle formed at that time, the Antisemiten Liga, that the word was intended to describe a movement directed not so much against the Jewish religion as against the race, nationality, and culture of the Jews, depicted as an Oriental group of Semites, sunk in materialism and seeking to dominate the world and especially the world of *Germanentum*. In the sense of an antagonism between "Semites" and "Aryans," anti-Semitism is thus a recent phenomenon and not applicable to hatred of the Jews in former epochs. The hatred itself is, however, very ancient. There are indeed writers who think that the anti-Jewish feelings in the ancient, mediæval, and modern periods differ radically in their nature. But, in view of the fact that we can recognize in all periods an intermingling of the same elements, though in different proportions, religious antagonism, hatred of the stranger, national rivalry, economic competition, the resemblances are probably greater than the differences, and there is thus sufficient unity of character in anti-Jewish movements of different periods and areas to justify comparative study.

Is the attitude of hostility to Jews to be interpreted as a special case of phenomena familiar in the relations between groups? Is the treatment of the Jews simply one instance of the relation of minorities to dominant majorities? Is it just a case of the intolerance of strangers, or of competitive struggle between groups? These are the questions which a broad survey of the facts suggests.

In approaching these questions it is necessary to make certain distinctions. We must distinguish first between the attitude of dislike for the Jews and the reasons which are given for it. The latter are of astonishing variety, ranging from the charges of predatory business habits, meanness, and aggressive pushfulness made by the man in the street to the elaborate racial theories of the

¹ Paper read to the British Psychological Society, July 1943.

academic anti-Semites. We must also, I think, distinguish different degrees of intensity of the feeling of hostility which may almost amount to a difference of kind. There is the mild dislike felt by many who have no personal experience of Jews at all and who have simply absorbed the attitudes prevalent in their circle. There is the paranoiac or paranoid hatred felt by others which is rationalized by theories of Jewish world power and influence and which the outside observer must regard as pathological in character.

The milder forms of anti-Semitism exhibit the characteristics which we are wont to group as prejudices. By this I do not mean to assert that the beliefs concerning Jews which are entertained by those who dislike them necessarily contain no grain of truth, but rather that these beliefs are of the nature of prejudgments, *Vorurteile*. Qualities are attributed to Jews not on the basis of direct experience, but rather because they are the qualities which the name Jew suggests, which one expects to find in Jews. The structure of the judgments on which these beliefs are founded is easy to disentangle. They are based on (i) *generalization* or the attribution to Jews in general of offensive qualities in fact noted in a few ; (ii) *specification* or the labelling of certain qualities as specifically Jewish which are in fact common among many other people, e.g. vulgarity, pushfulness ; (iii) *omission* or the tendency to overlook desirable qualities in the Jew, to regard them as exceptional when they cannot be ignored or at least to refuse to regard them as "typical" when they have at least as much claim to be considered typical as the unfavourable qualities ; (iv) *discrimination* or the tendency to condemn certain acts when committed by Jews which perhaps would not be noted or would be condoned when committed by others, e.g. when similar acts are condemned as sharp practice in the one case but regarded as a clever trick in the other, or when Jewish capital is depicted as destructive and Aryan capital as creative. There is finally (v) *calumny*, e.g. when Jews are charged with offences of which they are completely innocent, as in the various blood libels or the more modern stories of schemes of world domination.

With the mass of judgments thus built up are interwoven many others designed to make them more coherent and systematic. This again takes place in accordance with well-known psychological tendencies. There is in many people a desire to be able to claim rational grounds for their beliefs, especially when their cherished convictions meet with reasoned opposition. In this way beliefs

which may have very little rational ground are supplemented by other beliefs formed *ad hoc* and constitute with them a system extremely difficult to shake. Familiar example of this process can be given from the history of religious beliefs, where we often find that beliefs accepted on authority tend to be justified by further beliefs in the infallibility and complete reliability of the authorities.

The mass of beliefs concerning the supposed characteristics of the Jews is often accepted by Jews themselves. Jewish writers have drawn attention to this phenomenon and have spoken of Jewish anti-Semitism and even of "self-hatred." These terms are applied, not only to those who have left their people and turned into its bitter enemies, but to many others who consciously or unconsciously share the repugnance which non-Jews feel to Jews, or who, out of love for their people are anxious to rid their people of the faults ascribed to them and who adopt in their criticisms many of the unwarranted generalizations about Jews current in the environment in which they have been brought up. The tendency towards the disparagement of one's own group is common in oppressed minorities. This is especially so in the case of the "marginal" members, i.e. people who have come under the influence of other groups than the group in which they originate but are still deeply though often unconsciously attached to that group. In such cases the individual tends to adopt the hostility which he finds in his environment and uses it as a means for attaining liberation from his inner conflict (1).

I have so far spoken of a mass of beliefs or judgments which have gathered round the name of the Jew and have indicated their logical structure. It is clear, however, that this body of beliefs would neither have persisted nor had any effective influence on behaviour if it were not linked with emotional drives due to underlying tension and conflict. The hostility to Jews is clearly a form of group rivalry. A vulgar *nouveau riche* Jew is not despised merely as an individual but as representative of Jews in general. Economic rivalry between Jews and non-Jews would cause no more bitterness than normal business competition between individuals if the Jew were not regarded as a "stranger." The fundamental problem is therefore why the Jew has remained a "stranger" even in countries where he has been settled for a thousand years. This raises the further question, What sort of a group the Jews are? That they are not a race in any precise sense of the word is now generally admitted. Whether they are a nation or not depends to a large

extent on the way we define "nation." I doubt whether a term that is applied to peoples of such differing social structure as, say, Belgium, Switzerland, Britain, the United States of America, is very useful in defining an entity whose status is so disputed as that of the Jews. The problem of Jewish nationhood becomes practically important only when discussing the desirability or possibility of giving the Jews independent political status in a country of their own. But whether they are a nation or not, the Jews are certainly a body of people who feel bound to one another, to whatever historical factors this bond of union may be due. There are some who think that in ancient times the Jews were a nation, though even then the source of their unity was primarily religious in character, that with the dispersion the sense of nationality was lost, while that of religious unity remained ; that modern Jewish nationalism is not the latest expression of an inner development, but the product of modern conditions. Modern Jewish nationalism is on this view European nationalism applied to the Jews, inspired and sustained by anti-Semitism, in itself, in its modern form, a product of nationalism (2). Opposed to this view is the theory best represented by the well-known Hebrew writer Ahad Ha-am (3). He maintains that religion is only one of the ways in which the Jewish will to live has expressed itself. The Jews did not survive because of their religion ; in order that they might survive, their religion developed in a certain way. It moved from polytheism to monotheism after the dispersion because there was need for a belief in a universal God ruling over all the nations. The stress which later Judaism laid on inner life and the rules which sought to regulate all spheres of the outer life became necessary to prevent the disintegration of the Jewish community. The theory that the Jews have a special mission to teach the peoples among whom they are dispersed the principles of ethical monotheism provided a convenient formula to those Jews who had adopted the culture of other peoples but could not quite rid themselves of their ancient attachment to their own people. The modern nationalist revival is on this view due to the realization that the emancipation of the Jews secured in modern times had not in fact solved the Jewish problem. In short, the Jewish will to live is deeper than any of its particular manifestations. The theory is given a biological flavour which raises doubts. It is difficult to believe that the attachment to a socially conditioned group like a people can be due to a specific instinct,

genetically transmitted. But apart from this point, not, I think essential to the theory, there is more to be said for it than for the opposed view which regards the Jews as nothing but a religious community. There can be no doubt that it is through religion that the Jews have survived as an entity, but the bond that held them together was always more than a religious bond, whether it was of the kind to constitute them a "nation" or not. In the dispersion the Jews were certainly not political nationalists. They did not aim at establishing a separate political unit or even self-contained colonial settlements. They felt that they were bound to continue as a group within other political units and not themselves a political unit. The term "nation" does not perhaps adequately describe the historical unity of the Jewish people, but neither does the term "religious community." They are an ethnic group with a structure which resembles in some respects the structure of other ethnic minorities, but with peculiarities which give them a character of their own.

To understand the nature of these peculiarities it would be necessary to survey the whole field of Jewish history, but there are a number of points which stand out fairly clearly. In the first place the dispersal of the Jews is world-wide. They are to be found as minorities small or large in all parts of the world, but nowhere have they a centre which can be called their own. Since there is a bond of union between the Jews of different countries, though this is not as effective in practice as their enemies suppose, the Jews of any one country, even though they be regarded as nationals of that country, are regarded also as members of a wider group—the Jewish people. In the second place, throughout the greater part of their history, whatever may be the case now or in the future, the Jews were not willing to lose their identity as a people. The driving power in this connection was undoubtedly religion. It is fashionable now to explain all social phenomena in economic terms, but economic forces alone would long ago have broken up the unity of the Jewish people. After the collapse of Rome and during the period of the formation of the European peoples, there was nothing from the economic point of view to prevent the Jews from taking part in the general process of development and being absorbed in the social structures that were emerging. The root of Jewish isolation was the Jewish religion. In the ancient world the Jews stood for an imageless, non-mythological religion which was unintelligible and mysterious

to the pagan peoples around them. In the Christian era they aroused the bitter hatred of the Christians, who could not understand their obstinate refusal to accept Christianity and who resented their arrogant belief in the superiority of Judaism. The strength of the Jewish faith was such that none of the forces making for assimilation were able to shake it. Whatever the explanation, it is an historical fact that the Jews were at no time moved to accept, in any numbers, the religion of the peoples among whom they lived, however ready they were to accept other elements of alien cultures. The distinctiveness and intensity of their faith strengthened the feeling of unity among the Jews, and they came to regard themselves and were regarded by others not merely as a religious community but as a people, a people moreover that "dwells apart" and does not "belong" to the peoples among whom it is dispersed. Jewish history thus presents the unusual phenomenon of a people living within other peoples and yet retaining its identity. Migration, dispersal, infiltration, conquest, are common enough, but it is rare for the incoming group to survive as a distinct entity. It is difficult to account for this save by the strength of the faith in the Jewish religion as distinct and different from every other religion, a faith strengthened by persecution, upheld by a powerful religio-legal discipline, and producing or strengthening a bond of union which survives even among those over whom religion has lost its hold. Until the end of the eighteenth century the bulk of the Jews lived everywhere a life of their own, segregated in various degrees from the surrounding peoples by restrictive laws imposed from without and by the need for cohesion and solidarity felt within. The ghetto, it has well been said, was the land of a people without a land. Though the Jews had been Europeans since Roman times, they were everywhere regarded as strangers and wanderers, hated and despised, deprived of the legal rights which they had earlier enjoyed as Roman citizens, dependent on the whims of rapacious "protectors." Economic rivalry drove them out from most occupations save those despised or not desired by others. The feudal authorities drove them from the land and the burghers from trades and handicrafts. Thus the normal incorporation of the Jew within the community was made impossible. The image of the Jew as a parasite, living on the productive work of others, ever pushing himself into spheres to which he had no right, was created and added to the causes of hatred implanted by religious fanaticism. The suspicion of the

stranger, economic rivalry, and religious fanaticism combined to form a fertile soil for other antagonisms and to provide an outlet for hate and aggression originating in causes not in themselves connected with Jews. It is a well-established generalization that in all countries where Jews have lived in any numbers there is a tendency for them to be blamed for any troubles that may arise. The isolation of the Jew was deepened by persecution and restrictive laws of various kinds, and, thus deepened, generated further antagonisms. The arguments between those who maintain that the hatred of the Jews is due to their obstinate refusal to assimilate with the peoples among whom they live and those who maintain that the hatred is the cause of Jewish particularism are very unreal. Isolation may have been originally due to inner needs, but discrimination tends to produce further defensive isolation, and this, in turn, encourages further discrimination.

Next in importance and closely connected with the wide range of the Jewish dispersion and the persistence of the will to survive as a people despite the dispersion is the character of Jewish migration. This is a subject that has never been adequately explored. The difference in cultural level between the country of origin and the country of settlement is of the greatest significance, and a thorough study would be of great value for the light it might throw on problems of culture contact in general. Here only a few points can be referred to. The Jewish immigrant brings with him differences in manners, speech, and so forth, and so keeps alive the notion of Jewish distinctiveness. The fact that migration may occur in recurrent waves produces a feeling of distance between the long-settled Jews and those of recent origin and at the same time hinders absorption. It is to be noted that in countries not subjected to waves of immigration, for example in Italy, the assimilation of the Jews proceeded apace. The economic factor is of great importance in this connection. The immigrant is often accused of lowering the standard of life of the native worker. On the other hand, if he is ambitious and establishes himself in higher positions, he arouses jealousy and is regarded as a vulgar climber. Often he is a vulgar climber, and, in any case, he brings with him new ways of life and is apt to upset existing class alignments. Group prejudice is then complicated by class prejudice.

The situation is often further complicated by the presence of other minorities. Of the conflicts thus arising there are several

varieties. Illustrations may be found even in the world of antiquity. Thus in Alexandria hatred of the Jews, to whom on the whole the Romans were friendly, was instigated by the Greeks, who worked out a pattern, later to be repeated with greater elaborateness, based on a combination of economic rivalry and religious antagonism. In the modern world the relations are of course far more complex. Only a few instances can here be given. In Czarist Russia the Jews lived on the whole in areas which though under the political domination of the Russians were not Russian in culture, e.g. Poland, Lithuania, White Russia. From the point of view of the possibilities of assimilation, the situation presented great difficulties. The attempt made now and again to Russify the Jews was bound to fail in view of the fact that the normal environment in which great masses of Jews lived was not Russian. On the other hand, the culture of the other subject populations was not such as to attract the Jews, and in fact appears to have exercised very little influence on them. In the Austrian Empire the situation varied from case to case. In the German parts of Austria and also Hungary, the culture of the politically dominant group was the same as the culture of the masses of the people, and this facilitated Jewish absorption and assimilation. In other parts of Austria the Jews were torn between their attachment to German culture and the demands of the social environment which was not German. The Jews thus frequently found themselves between the hammer and the anvil. If they sided with the politically dominant power, they were blamed by the oppressed peoples. If they sided with the latter, they were accused of encouraging revolution. Thus both cultural and political factors were frequently unfavourable to the assimilation of the Jews (4).

The distribution of occupations among Jews has, as is well known, certain peculiarities and is generally different from that which prevails among the peoples in whose midst they live. To see in the peculiarities of occupational structure a primary cause of anti-Jewish feeling seems to me to be unreasonable. This feeling already existed at a time when the occupational structure of the Jews differed little, if at all, from that of other peoples, and the hatred showed itself in fact in the persistent efforts to prevent the Jew from engaging in the productive occupations. There is good reason for the view that Jews, like other struggling minorities, have often been compelled to choose occupations neglected or despised by others or to invent new ones (5). The abnormalities

of economic structure are thus an effect rather than a cause of anti-Semitism. Yet once produced, they hinder the normalization of Jewish social life and thus serve to foster anti-Semitic feelings (6).

In estimating the effect of the emancipation of the Jews which in West and Central Europe was attained by the middle of the eighteenth century, it is important to bear in mind the following points. Firstly, emancipation began in countries like France and England, where the number of Jews was small and the feeling against them was based on old memories rather than conflicts rooted in contemporary social conditions. Even so, it is maintained by many that anti-Semitism lingered among the masses, ready to be aroused in moments of national excitement. Secondly, in the areas where there were large Jewish populations, emancipation came much later and very frequently through external influence or intervention (Rumania, Congress of Berlin 1887; Algiers, Law of Crémieux; Minorities Treaties of 1919, etc.). With the exception of Soviet Russia, the Jews of Eastern and South-eastern Europe owe their civic rights to foreign intervention, and emancipation took a form other than it would have done had it arisen from within. It should be remembered that in these areas the problem of Jewish-Gentile relations is far more complex than in Western Europe, owing to the large numbers involved and the difficulties arising out of the growing industrialization and urbanization and the emergence of a non-Jewish middle class. The solution of the Jewish problem in these areas cannot be obtained merely by the granting of legal rights, but depends on general economic reconstruction designed to normalize Jewish relations and remove the economic sources of antagonism.

If we now bring together the points briefly discussed above, we may say that the primary source of anti-Jewish feeling is to be found in the conditions which led to the Jews being regarded as strangers, living in the midst of other peoples but not of them. Historically the determining factor was the uncompromising distinctiveness of Jewish monotheism. With the religious tensions thus generated there were soon associated other sources of group antagonism. Being regarded as strangers, the entry of the Jews into the economic life of other peoples was regarded as an unwarranted intrusion and economic competition assumed a character totally different from that between members of the same group. Persecution deepened his isolation and discrimination produced an economic structure

which sharpened the sense of his peculiarity and distinctiveness. The isolation of the Jew began to be broken down with the emancipation about one hundred and fifty years ago, but this was achieved only in the areas where the number of Jews was small (except for the U.S.A.). In the areas of great Jewish density the Jews continued to live in communities of their own ; the granting of civil rights is recent and in many instances was secured from above by governmental act and under the pressure of external influence. The waves of migration from these areas of great density kept alive the sense of the strangeness of the Jew even in the West and maintained the sense of community among the Jews in the world. His ubiquity and defencelessness made him a convenient object of aggression, and his situation was further complicated by the presence of other minorities themselves in conflict with the dominant authorities, the Jews in general never being strong enough to act as a united and self-contained group.

In dealing with more recent forms of anti-Semitism three further points have to be noted. These are the growth of nationalism ; the emergence of new middle classes in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, as a result of increasing urbanization and industrialization and the growth of official and governmental bureaucracies ; and the deliberate use of anti-Semitism as a political weapon. For earlier periods, during which the nation-states were still in process of formation, a Jewish historian has put forward the hypothesis that there was a definite correlation between anti-Semitism and type of ethnic grouping. He tries to show that the position of the Jews has been most favourable in areas in which several ethnic groups were included, none being a dominant majority ; least favourable in ethnically homogeneous states ; and varying between the two extremes in states which included only part of a nationality. He thinks that up to the seventeenth century this law was operative practically without exception (7). Whatever may be thought of this interesting generalization, there can be no question that the revival of anti-Semitism in recent times is closely connected with the intensification of nationalist feeling. In Germany the revival of anti-Jewish feeling dates from the movement towards unification. In France anti-Semitism was fostered by the Integral Nationalists after her defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. In the empires of mixed nationalities the nationalists used the Jew as a buffer and scapegoat. The rise of new nationalities after the War of 1914-18

was nearly in all cases accompanied by anti-Semitic manifestations. On the other hand, in pre-war Britain and in America, where national antagonisms remained in the background, anti-Semitism found but little support. It is possible that the recent rise of anti-Semitism in the United States is connected with the emergence of a stronger sentiment of American nationality. Soviet Russia has shown great tolerance of national minorities, but whether this will continue when the vast conglomeration of ethnic groups of the U.S.S.R. has been welded into greater unity has been called in question.

Connected with the nationalist movements in Eastern Europe has been the rise of a native middle class. The growth of industry, the needs of the newly formed governments, the increasing urbanization have brought into being a new middle class apt to be resentful of the Jews who hitherto had fulfilled the rôle associated with the middle classes. Nearly everywhere in East and South-East Europe there grew up strong movements designed to oust the Jews from government employment and the professions and even to eliminate them from trade and industry. Strengthened by the German example, the view was gaining ground that the Jews must be driven from public and economic life, though the difficulties in which Jews found themselves had already reached an acute stage before the growth of National Socialism (8).

Finally, reference must be made to the deliberate use of anti-Semitism as a political weapon. The part played by anti-Semitism in Nazi and Fascist propaganda is familiar, but the fact that Jews provide a convenient and defenceless object on which discontent can be focussed has long been known and utilized. The model is provided in the movement founded by Adolph Stöcker in 1878 and his Austrian counterparts. Stöcker first addressed himself to the workers, but getting a poor response he turned to the middle classes, and the party originally named the *Christlich Soziale Arbeiter Partei* was renamed the *Christlich Soziale Partei*. Christian principles were said to be endangered by liberal, democratic Judaism. Jews were attacked as being at once the mainspring of capitalism and revolutionary Socialism, a line of attack which has since become very common. The Germans have found many imitators. Anti-Semitism, Bebel said, is the socialism of blockheads; it is also the anti-socialism of blockheads. The anti-Semites of Czarist Russia were already greatly influenced by German writers. Dubnow (9)

has shown by an analysis of the relevant documents that the anti-Jewish agitation in Russia in the eighties was modelled on what was happening in Germany, and there is clear evidence to show that the Czarist government became more anti-Semitic as the revolutionary movement grew (10). The fact that the Jews can be so readily used as a scapegoat suggests the widespread existence of latent anti-Semitism among the masses. But this is not at all clearly established. Anti-Jewish risings are in general deliberately planned and organized and are in no sense "spontaneous."

The factors making for anti-Semitism can be generally paralleled from the history of the relations between other groups. But in the case of the Jews they appear in what is perhaps a unique combination, and they are intensified by the peculiarities of the Jewish position. Especially important in this connection is the antiquity of the hostility towards Jews and the traditions which have gathered round it, and which are transmitted as a matter of course from generation to generation. Add the wide dispersal of the Jews, the migrations which they have been forced to make, involving continual disturbance of cultural standards and class alignments, the abnormalities of Jewish economic structure, themselves the product of anti-Semitism of the past, and the difficulties of adjustment in areas undergoing rapid economic change and liable to serious economic crises. Add furthermore the numerous factors making for the intensification of national feeling in modern times apt to lead to the view that all minorities are disruptive elements, and the phenomena of anti-Semitism will be seen in clearer light. It is important to bear in mind that in different areas or times different factors or combinations of factors may be at work, although certain common features recur with depressing regularity.

I want now to refer briefly to some recent theories of the causes of anti-Semitism. They fall broadly into two classes—those that appeal mainly to economic factors and those that rely chiefly on psychological explanations. The former is found mainly in Marxist or other socialist writings. They argue that anti-Semitism is a device of the capitalists to divert attention from the class struggle or a last desperate effort of the middle classes to escape the destruction with which they are threatened. Theories of this sort unquestionably find a great deal of support in historical fact, but as a general explanation they are subject to important qualifications. The Jew is apt to suffer not only in periods when proletarian

revolutions are threatened, but whenever there is serious tension of any kind. This is particularly true of periods of national excitement, as during wars. The resurgence of anti-Semitism in recent times is closely related to the intensification of national feeling, and its explanation is therefore to be sought in the causes which have led to that intensification. It is to be noted further that anti-Semitic movements are not confined to periods of acute economic distress among the masses. Witness German "scientific" anti-Semitism or the movement which sprang up in France in connection with the Dreyfus affair. Finally, anti-Semitism cuts across class divisions. The struggle is often between members of the same class, workers against workers, merchants against merchants, members of the professions against members of the professions. It is a struggle between ethnic groups rather than between social classes.

The psychological theories tend on the whole to make use of the concepts of psycho-pathology. Already in 1882 a Jewish writer in a well-known work entitled *Auto-Emancipation* put forward the view that anti-Semitism is an inherited phobia (11). This, he thinks, was developed in early times when the Jew—a landless stranger, without any roots anywhere, a wanderer among the nations—struck the imagination of the masses as a creature uncanny and dæmonic. This phobia has been, according to him, transmitted by heredity and has come to be part of the mental constitution of the non-Jew. As will be observed, the theory rests on doubtful genetics, since according to present-day theories of heredity it is difficult to see how such a fear could be genetically transmitted. More modern theories are mostly applications of psycho-analysis (12). According to these theories, the more obvious motives of group antagonism are not sufficient to account for the observable facts, and deeper causes of hostility must be involved, having their roots in primitive unconscious tendencies. These deeper roots are traced to the aggressive tendencies. These indeed find some outlet within the group, and according to Freudian theory also in the formation of the moral conscience, but are most readily released when directed against members of an alien and potentially hostile "out-group." In relation to the members of his own group, the individual has perforce to repress his aggressive tendencies or to overcome them by identification or sublimation. The repression, however, is never complete, and the resulting conflicts are dealt with by a diversion of the hate impulses to an

out-group. For various psychological and sociological reasons the Jew, it is argued, is a particularly apt target for displaced aggression, and for the same reasons rationalizations are easily provided and widely accepted. The theory deserves close study. To substantiate it, it would be necessary to show that there is some correspondence between the degree of repression of aggressive tendencies within the "in-group" and the occurrence of anti-Jewish outbursts. This has so far not been seriously attempted.

A striking theory has recently been put forward by Freud (13) and, in a different form, independently, by Maurice Samuel (14). The essence of this theory is that the hatred of the Jew is at bottom a concealed hatred of Christianity.

We must not forget [says Freud] that all the peoples who now excel in the practice of anti-Semitism became Christian only in relatively recent times, sometimes forced to it by bloody compulsion. One might say that they are "badly christened"; under the thin veneer of Christianity they have remained what their ancestors were, barbarically polytheistic. They have not yet overcome the grudge against the new religion which was forced on them, and they have projected it on to the source from which Christianity came to them. The facts that the Gospels tell a story which is enacted among Jews, and in truth treats only of Jews, facilitated such a projection. The hatred for Judaism is at bottom hatred for Christianity, and it is not surprising that in the German National-Socialist revolution this close connection of the two monotheistic religions finds such clear expression in the hostile treatment of both.

Maurice Samuel, who develops his argument with a good deal of force, lays particular stress on what he calls the "obsessional" character of many forms of anti-Semitism, the wild exaggeration of Jewish numbers, Jewish financial and political power, Jewish unity of purpose, and the ease with which currency is given to these exaggerations. He thinks that the hostility to Jews differs in character from the hostility and intolerance shown towards any other people, that it stands in no functional relation to the part actually played by Jews in economic and social life, that there is no sort of proportion between the so-called causes of anti-Semitism and the effects. Samuel's own explanation is that the horror of the Jew, the obsession of his ubiquity, subtlety, and persistence in crime is really a concealed attack on a set of ideas which in fact has the power to move the minds of men everywhere, the belief, namely, in universal love and an attempt to replace it by the principle of force

as the regulator of human relations. Anti-Semitism is, in short, an attack on Judæo-Christian morality.

It is of Christ that the Nazi-Fascists are afraid ; it is in *his* omnipotence that they believe ; it is *him* that they are determined madly to obliterate. But the names of Christ and Christianity are too overwhelming, and the habit of submission to them too deeply ingrained after centuries and centuries of teaching. Therefore they must make their assault on those who were responsible for the birth and spread of Christianity. They must spit on the Jews as the Christ-killers because they long to spit on the Jews as the Christ-givers.

It is true, I think, that anti-Semitism in its recent manifestations is part of a more general attack on universalist and humanitarian ethics, and it is clear that the attacks on the Jews have been used to provide training in ruthlessness and violence. But the theories in the form briefly outlined above raise many doubts. To begin with, the "obsessional" or perhaps more correctly the paranoiac character of many varieties of anti-Jewish behaviour need not be in any way connected with qualities actually possessed by Jews or with sets of beliefs of which Jews have become the symbol. They may be based on experiences which intrinsically have nothing to do with Jews, but which merely seize on Jews as convenient centres of hatred. When a paranoiac accuses judges of corruption, lawyers of being in the pay of his enemies, and imagines a conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining justice, the root of the trouble does not lie in the nature of the lawyers and the judges or the moral theories underlying legal justice. In short, in so far as anti-Semitism really exhibits paranoiac traits, the explanation would have to begin by an examination of the mental history of the individuals in question, and it is not very likely that one and the same set of causes would be operative in all cases. Secondly, I very much doubt whether the principles of universal morality have ever been so firmly rooted in the Western peoples that an attack on them could only be made in deeply disguised form. It has not proved difficult in practice to reconcile Christian ethical principles with war, intolerance, and violent persecution, and it is odd that at a time when Christianity is openly attacked, as it is by the Nazis, the attack on the ethics of love should have to be carefully concealed under the guise of an attack on Jews. Samuel himself notes that the Russian Communists, who, in his view, also repudiate the doctrine of "non-force," have been able to condemn anti-Semitism just because,

having openly rejected Christianity, they did not need the disguise of Jew-hatred. But if this is the right explanation, it is not clear why the Nazis needed anti-Semitism. Thirdly, it must be remembered that anti-Semitism is not confined to Christian countries. It existed in Arabic Spain and exists now in Moslem countries, not to speak of its manifestations in the Græco-Roman world. Finally, during the mediæval period the persecution of the Jews often ceased with their conversion to Christianity, and it would require great subtlety to interpret such persecution as a concealed attack on "true" Christianity. It is, of course, possible that recent anti-Semitism is something radically different from ancient or mediæval anti-Semitism, but this, I think, has not been conclusively shown.

The psycho-analytic writers have rightly drawn attention to the part played by frustration and anxiety in generating hatred. Wherever there is widespread anxiety and a sense of insecurity and, in particular, a sense of injustice, the Jew is apt to furnish a convenient target for aggression. The causes making for such a widespread anxiety are largely social in character, the result of particular social and economic conditions. But in so far as they involve unconscious factors, psycho-analysis may help in throwing light on their nature, especially on the more intense forms of anti-Semitic reaction which are out of all proportion to the real character of the Jews and the part they actually play in social life. The milder forms of what may be called latent anti-Semitism appear to be traceable largely to traditionally transmitted antipathies. These can be roused to life in times of economic difficulty or intensification of national feeling, and occasionally still by a revival of religious fanaticism. The occurrence of anti-Semitic outbursts is a symptom of social disorganization. From this point of view anti-Semitism is thus a problem, not only or even mainly for the Jews, but also for the peoples among whom they live.

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PART III

CHAPTER ELEVEN

STAMMLER'S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW ¹

“**W**HOEVER,” says Stammler, “would be a philosopher of the law must first breathe the dust of legal archives.” I have not breathed this dust, and I therefore cannot deal with Stammler’s legal philosophy as a lawyer. I propose to confine myself instead to its philosophical aspects, and this, I venture to say, is legitimate procedure, since in essentials what Stammler has sought to do is to provide a philosophical analysis of law in terms of the Kantian system or method.

Stammler has given several elaborate expositions of his theories, notably in the following works: *Wirtschaft und Recht* (1906), *Die Ledre von dem Richtigen Rechte* (1902), *Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft* (1911), *Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie* (1922). It is obviously impossible in a short paper to do justice to so rich and complex a system as Stammler’s. I must content myself with a brief account of the essential elements in his theory and an estimate of the value of his contribution to the philosophy of law.

Stammler distinguishes between what he calls technical legal science and theoretical legal science. The former is concerned with the elucidation of any given legal system, the connection between its parts, the application of general principles to particular cases and so forth. Theoretical legal science, on the other hand, is concerned with law as a set of rules formulating the means to fundamental human purposes, and it has to inquire into the real value of the means employed and to discover the basis and justification of actual law. Both technical and theoretical legal science deal with law as it is, but while the former is content to bring out the meaning of given rules, the latter goes further and relates them to more fundamental principles, or if possible, to one ultimate principle.

The method to be followed in the theoretical study of law is in essentials the same as that followed by Kant in his *Critiques*. It

¹ A lecture given at the London School of Economics in the Lent Term 1932.

may be called the "critical" method. Its nature may be best understood by contrast with the historical or psychological method. Thus, for example, in dealing with knowledge, we may study it genetically, that is inquire into the way in which certain beliefs have come about in the course of time, or we may inquire into the elements of which beliefs are made up, the conditions of their occurrence in the individual mind. The critical method is not concerned with either of these problems. It is concerned rather with the question as to what must be presupposed if there is to be any knowledge at all, and it seeks to arrive at these presuppositions by an inquiry into the "formal" elements of knowledge, that is to say, those elements of knowledge which are found universally and which do not vary with its matter or content.

It is by following this method that Kant "deduces" the forms of sense, that is space and time, and the categories of the understanding, such as substance and causality, quality and quantity. It is by an analogous method that Kant inquires into the fundamental principles that are implied in the particular moral judgments that we make, and he shows that they rest upon the assumption that there is a law which is in its nature binding or obligatory irrespective of our likes and dislikes, and that this law is universal—a principle formulated, it will be remembered, in the famous formulæ of the Categorical Imperative. The task that Stammler has set himself is in essentials the same as that of Kant. He seeks, namely, to disentangle the pure forms of law, that is the necessary and universal elements which are found in all legal propositions irrespective of their particular content or matter. He seeks to ascertain what law is as such and how it is distinguished from other species of social regulation. Further, just as Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* distinguishes between the categories of the understanding and the ideas of reason, so Stammler distinguishes between the concept of law and the idea of justice. The concept of law sums up the forms of law, that is to say, as we shall see, the different ways in which means are related to ends in social volition. The idea of Justice provides us with a criterion of *just* law. It lays down an ideal of a completed harmony of human striving to which law approximates and in the light of which it may be criticized. He claims that his difference from Kant consists just in this, that Kant did not employ in his ethical inquiries and in his philosophy of law this idea of a completed harmony, and contented himself with the

categorical imperative. I shall inquire later whether Stammler does in fact go beyond Kant in this. Meanwhile it is important to show that Stammler's inquiry consists in essentials of two parts. One is concerned with the concept of law, that is the deduction of the forms of law. The other deals with the Idea of Justice or the ideal in the light of which we can determine what is not merely law but *right law* (*richtiges Recht*).

(a) *The Concept of Law*. There are, Stammler thinks, two ways in which order is introduced into the contents of consciousness, namely, perception and will. The former seizes the impressions of sense and arranges them into objects; the latter sets itself an object as something not present in perception, but to be attained in the future.

The connection between perception and will is to be found in the temporal relations between objects, the relations of permanence, co-existence and order in time. The present may be the necessary outcome of a preceding cause, or it may be regarded as a means for a future end. Things may be regarded either causally or teleologically. In willing we are concerned with the latter, that is with the ways in which means are related to ends. By end is meant an object to be attained: by means a cause to be chosen which will bring about the end. Now law is a species of volition. When we make a legal claim we want something. When we formulate a legal principle we do not assert a fact of experience but rather an end or purpose to be fulfilled. By saying that law is a species of will we do not mean that it is created by will, or that it is its product, but that it *is* will, that is one way in which will appears. How, then, does law differ from other non-legal forms of will? To answer this question certain distinctions are necessary. In the first place will may relate to the ordering of means and ends within a single personality. This Stammler calls isolated or separate volition (*Getrenntes Wollen*) and it constitutes the sphere of morals. It is to be distinguished from the binding will (*Verbindendes Wollen*), which implies a social relationship, that is the use by one will of the purposive acts of another as a means to ends of his own. Society may in fact be defined as a group of wills which function as ends and means to each other. Society also means co-operative effort in the attainment of common ends, that is ends of identical content. But this is a derivative notion and implies the existence of society in the first sense, since without social regulation there can be no unity

of aim. Law is a species of binding will. It is concerned with the outward acts of men in a social relationship. It may be noted in passing that the term "binding" or *Verbindendes* is ambiguous. It may mean "uniting or linking or bringing into relationship," and it may mean "obliging." It is the first sense of the word that is to be stressed in this connection. The notion of obligation remains to be considered. If law is a species of external regulation, yet not all external regulation is law. Here a second distinction is necessary. A regulation may claim to be its own authority and to impose an obligation upon all those who come within its sphere of application, whether they like it or not. On the other hand, there are regulations which bind individuals but only to the extent to which they consent to be bound by them. Here is the basis for the distinction between conventional and legal rules. Note that the distinction is not based upon psychological or historical fact. It is not that law in fact is accepted as authoritative while conventional rules are in a measure optional. It is rather a question of what law and convention are in their nature or what they claim to be as such.

Within the regulations that are both binding and claiming to be their own authority, we must further distinguish between the arbitrary will, that is to say a decision arrived at from case to case on no underlying principle and subject to the whim or caprice of the commanding authority, and the constant and inviolable will, applicable to particular cases as they occur irrespective of subjective likes and dislikes. Law claims to be in its nature inviolable. We may now bring together Stammler's final definitions: Law is a species of will, other regarding, self-authoritative (or autonomous) and inviolable (*dass unverletzbar selbstherrlich verbindende Wollen*).

(b) *The Idea of Justice*. I will not here follow Stammler's further elaboration of his definition of law and his effort to deduce from it a list of fundamental legal categories, and will proceed at once to the second part of his inquiry which is concerned with the criteria of just law. The problem here is to find a principle to guide us in the ordering of human volition. Not every volition is right merely because it occurs. What constitutes rightness? What is the ground of a volition in virtue of which it may be said to be right or justified? In answering this question Stammler follows a procedure which at first sight reminds one of Kant. He shows that there are two ways in which valid ground may be given for an act.

(1) A certain means may be shown to be necessary for the attainment of a particular aim or end. The object then has value in relation to the particular desire. If the end is desired the means must also be desired. But both end and means may have only "subjective" value. It may be remembered that this is what Kant calls the hypothetical imperative.

(2) But, secondly, the ground of an act may claim universal validity. Here Stammler claims to improve on Kant. Kant thought that in contrast with the hypothetical imperative which merely says : if you want this, do that, the categorical imperative says : do this without any regard to any particular end to which you may or may not be inclined. It prescribes a form of action universally binding. Hence it will be remembered the first formula of the categorical imperative : so act that you may at the same time will that the maxim of your action shall become a universal law. In Stammler's view this is insufficient. There is needed in addition what he calls the Idea of Justice, that is something in the realm of will analogous to Kant's Ideas of Reason in the realm of speculative thought. It is the idea of a complete harmony of all striving or endeavour. Such a harmony is not, of course, an object of experience. It is rather a limiting notion or ideal to which the will must endeavour to approximate, a task which can never be completed but which yet must ever be undertaken afresh. It bids us ever to subordinate the particular to the universal and to regard all definite aims in their relation to the possible completed harmony of all ends whatever. It will be seen that this ideal is entirely formal. It does not of itself suggest or motivate any particular line of behaviour. It is rather a way of dealing with lines of behaviour whatever their source. In this Ideal of Right Stammler finds the fundamental principle which is to regulate all volition whether moral or legal. The distinction between these, as we have seen, is found in the distinction between the *getrennte* and *verbindende Wollen*. Morality is concerned with the inner life, with purity of intention, with the will as an expression of the inward personality. Law is concerned with the external relations of men, with the wills of men in so far as they bind each other. The Idea of Justice can be applied to both species of volition. In the case of morality it leads to the notion that Stammler calls the Pure Will. By this he means a will free from the urgency of particular desires, capable of regarding all such desires in the light of the unconditioned and the whole.

From this notion of the Pure Will there follow in his view the following general principles of morality :

- (i) The principle of truthfulness : Do not seek to escape from yourself ; seek to harmonize the conditioned with the unconditioned.
- (ii) The principle of perfection : Do not let any particular aim dominate your will.

Subordinate the conditioned to the unconditioned.

In the sphere of law the Idea of Justice gives rise to the notion of the pure community. Here we are concerned with acts of will which are directed to others, in which individuals use each other as means and ends. A community has a pure will when its regulations are inspired not by subjective desires but by principles of universal validity, that is to say which, when they conform to the Ideal of a complete harmony. From this there follow the fundamental principles of *Right Law*.

1. Principles of Respect.

- (a) No act of will should be subjected to the arbitrary control of another.
- (b) No juristic claim is valid save on condition that the person to whom it applies may remain his own neighbour (i.e. and end in himself).

2. Principles of Co-operation.

- (a) No member of a legally bound community may be arbitrarily excluded from it.
- (b) No legal right may be exclusive save in so far as the person excluded may still remain his own neighbour.

The general purport of these principles seems to be that the social ideal justifies the binding will, but only on condition that while being bound all individuals may yet remain ends in themselves. This is, of course, also Kant's view, as Stammler himself notes (*Rechtsphilosophie*, p. 199, 4) but he adds that Kant uses the formula only in connection with the relation between the individual and the State, and he complains that Kant makes no further use of it in his *Rechtslehre*. I shall return later to the question whether Stammler really takes us further than Kant. Meanwhile in order to complete my exposition of this part of Stammler's theory, it is necessary to refer to his discussion of the basis of legal obligation, of the relation between law and the State, and of international law. He objects to the view that the basis of obedience is moral. But

this is largely a matter of words. For Stammler the moral is confined to inward motives and it cannot have anything to do with problems of outward legal compulsion. But ultimately the basis of morality as well as of right legal regulation is to be found in the fundamental principles derived from the Idea of Justice. To ask the question whether right law is obligatory seems unmeaning, since obligatoriness is involved in its definition. On the other hand, whether any particular law is binding is an important question. But this kind of question, as belonging to the detailed discussion of particular legal systems, is not raised by Stammler, and in general, he leaves us rather in the dark as to how he conceives actual law to be related to right law.

Law in Stammler's view is not derived from the State. The latter is in fact only one type of legal order and therefore presupposes the notion of law in general. Law, on the other hand, can be defined and contrasted with other forms of social regulation, such as the conventional and the arbitrary, or with moral rules, without bringing in the notion of the State. The latter notion in short does not belong to the pure forms of law and is conditioned by particular circumstances. The relations between states are subject to law. But world law is not to be conceived as a world morality. It is true law and is concerned not with inward motives, but with external or social regulations. World law is not *Völkerrecht* which in practice is concerned only with European civilization. *Weltrecht* is not incompatible with the existence of sovereign states. Such states may be regarded as true subjects of law, i.e. entities recognized as ends in themselves. International law does not create new law over-riding other existing law. Rather does it seek to bring about changes in the content of the existing national legal orders. The obligations of international law do not depend upon the existence of a league of states. Here as elsewhere it is the Idea of Justice or right that ought to inspire the law and not the merely subjective desires of particular states.

Such in rough outline is Stammler's Philosophy of Law. I propose now to deal briefly with the more important criticisms that have been put forward against his views.

A great deal of what has been written in opposition to Stammler appears to be due to a misunderstanding of his real position. It has been urged, for example, by Kantorowitz, Kaufmann and others that Stammler's fundamental principles do not afford a basis

for the derivation or deduction of particular rules, that they are empty, sterile or merely "formal." Seeing that it is their formal character that Stammler is most anxious to stress, it is clear there must be something wrong about the criticism. In fact Stammler clearly explains that his principles are not to be regarded as themselves legal principles, or fundamental *Verfassungsartikel* to be used as major premises under which particular rules are to be subsumed. They are rather standards or criteria in the light of which particular rules, which they do not themselves produce but which must be conditioned by experience, are to be judged. Given any particular legal rule, we may ask whether it possesses the formal structure that it ought to possess if it is to conform to the standards of law as such.

A second objection that has been urged against Stammler is that he commits a grave error of method when he seeks to derive a norm or standard of values from a mere analysis of the pure forms or categories implied in legal or juristic propositions. "The relation between value and actuality is not the same as that between form and content. In bringing down norms to the level of categories, Stammler obscures the real nature of law" (Kaufmann, pp. 14-15).¹ But this is far from convincing. To begin with, the analysis of judgments or propositions asserting values with the object of disentangling their pure forms or categories is not intended to supply us with an account of the nature of value itself. Ethical or juristic propositions have forms like other propositions, but no account of their forms could be given if the propositions were not there to begin with. Secondly, and this is the more important point, Stammler really tries to do two things. The first is to determine the nature of law by what may be called a categorical analysis, and to compare it with other forms of social regulations such as the conventional or the arbitrary and with morals. This analysis applies to good and bad law alike. The problem of the rightness of law is attacked by the aid of Stammler's theory of the Social Ideal. This as an idea of reason is to be clearly distinguished from the categories of law. Nor is it fair to accuse him with Kaufmann of hypostatizing this idea and of regarding it as an agent which brings about or is a guarantee of progress. This is precisely what Stammler does not do. He insists that the idea of reason is not creative, and that in dealing with progress we must clearly distinguish between the problem of the nature of progress, and the question whether

¹ *Kritik der neukantische Rechtsphilosophie.*

progress has in fact occurred, and while he is prepared to supply the requisite definition he leaves the question of fact, so far as scientific proof is concerned, open (*Rechtsphilosophie*, pp. 366-7).

The really crucial part of Stammler's theory, as it seems to me, is his discussion of the Idea of Justice. His principles both of morality and of law are really expansions of this idea. They take for granted that by means of it we can determine what can be objectively justified in human volition, and what must be regarded as merely arbitrary or subjective. Has Stammler really gone, as he claims, beyond Kant in elaborating this idea of reason, or do his criteria after all remain essentially the same as those suggested by Kant in the various forms of the categorical imperative, and if so, are they not exposed to the same difficulties as those which have been repeatedly urged by critics of Kant? The most general expression for the Idea of Right is that it is the thought of a complete harmony of endeavour. It is not the totality of the forms or categories, but rather the whole of experience actual and possible as a unity. This totality can never be grasped as an object of experience. It sets thought or will a task, namely, to bring any finite volition or experience into harmony with the unity of all thinkable volition. Can this extremely vague notion really help us in dealing with particular volitions? By this I do not mean to ask whether from it can be deduced any particular rules of action? To expect the latter would be completely to misunderstand the proper function of the Idea. But it is important to show that it can be used as a criterion in the light of which we could judge particular rules or acts of will. A careful study of Stammler's work shows, I think, that though he claims to have gone beyond Kant in this very matter he does not in fact use the idea of reason in the sense of a complete harmony, but appeals to the criteria employed by Kant, viz. formal universality, exclusion of particular aims or ends and the notion of individuals as ends in themselves. Thus the "Pure Will" is the will guided by universal law or the law of justice. The "Pure Community" is a community in which "everyone makes the objects of others his own as soon as they permit of an objective justification" (*WR*, pp. 581 and 600), or a community in which "the members are reciprocally ends and means." Now an examination of Kantian ethics and jurisprudence shows that there is much of value in these criteria. It is important in dealing with proposed acts to ask whether they would stand the test of being universalized, or whether

they involve the use of others merely as a means. At the same time it is now generally recognized that these criteria do not take us very far. Whether a line of action can be rightly universalized cannot be decided without an appeal to some other principle than the categorical imperative, and whether the use of a person as a means is incompatible with his being also used as an end in any given case or cases cannot be decided without further knowledge of the potentialities of human nature and of the effects of given acts upon those potentialities. But Stammler, like Kant, interprets the universal law as excluding all particular ends. This seems to me to defeat the effort, in itself of the greatest importance, to work out the implications of the idea of rationality in relation to human conduct. Rational conduct, whatever else it may be, is purposive conduct. This indeed is insisted on by Stammler, who regards the whole problem of social life as concerned with the right ordering of means in relation to ends. His idea of a complete harmony is surely that of a totality of all ends reduced to some form of unity. It must therefore include all ends in so far as they can be harmonized. The real problem is thus to find the conditions of harmony. But this Stammler does not attempt to discuss. Had he done so, it seems to me, he would have found that the general principles regulating social life must include not only those principles of a purely logical order such as those which insist on relevance, comprehensiveness and consistency, but also principles which define the place of specific purposes in relation to the wider good which in harmony they constitute. In short the task of legal philosophy would seem to be not to rest content with the idea of justice as a remote idea of reason, but to endeavour to give it concrete form by defining the proximate conditions of the harmonious realization of human purposes.

To a large extent the difficulty arises from the extremely vague use of the term "subjective" and "objective" in describing ends or purposes. Let us consider this a little more in detail. By subjective may be meant :

(i) Forming part of a subject's mental activity. In this sense all desires are subjective. What is desired, that is the object of desire, need not, so far as purely formal argument is concerned, be a part of the mind desiring, or of any mind, though of course states of mind *may be* also objects desired.

(ii) Dependent upon some peculiarity of an individual desiring and variable as between different individuals.

(iii) Dependent upon a momentary or temporary state of the subject desiring in contrast with his permanent or enduring needs.

(iv) Apparent as contrasted with real desire. This contrast partly overlaps with (ii) and (iii). But it also includes cases where desire is stimulated by a mistaken view of the nature of the object desired. In such cases the desire may cease when the true nature of the object is known.

(v) By subjective is also sometimes meant, though very confusedly, the arbitrary or ungrounded. But a choice may be ungrounded either because it is based upon a mistaken view of the object, or of the needs of the subject, or because it does not take into consideration other relevant needs.

By contrast an "objective" treatment of ends is a rational or well-grounded treatment of them, that is one based upon an accurate apprehension of the intrinsic nature of the ends and of their relevant relation to other ends and means in a systematic whole of life. Bearing these points in mind it seems that the objective treatment of ends would involve the following :

(i) To ascertain the intrinsic nature of ends and to clear them from irrelevancies.

(ii) To discover which of them are constant in the sense of being necessary for the enduring satisfaction of the individual and which more variable or permitting of substitution, replacement or sublimation.

(iii) To show which are common to all individuals and which depend upon individual peculiarity. This would involve also a consideration of the justification of the differential treatment of individuals.

(iv) To study ends in relation to each other, that is to inquire whether ends tend to form systems or not, whether they permit of being satisfied in harmony or whether there are ends the satisfaction of which is incompatible with the requirements of systematic organization.

(v) To consider ends in relation to the means necessary for their attainment and, in particular, to clear up the confusions arising from the mixing up of ends and means, instrumental goods and intrinsic goods.

(vi) In all these considerations to bear in mind, not the individual in isolation, but the requirements of social life.

It will be seen that an objective treatment of ends in this sense

does not require us to eliminate all particular ends. On the contrary, it is a certain way of considering particular ends. The function of reason in relation to the ends of impulse and desire is not purely formal, nor is it confined to the consideration of the relations between them and the means which are required for their realization. Reason defines and clarifies, connects and systematizes the ends of endeavour, and in doing so transforms their very nature. To prove the rationality of ends it is necessary to show that they stand the test of critical scrutiny, that they are well grounded in the sense that a reason can be given for them by reference to their intrinsic value and their relation to other ends. The chief defect of Stammler's theory and of that of other neo-Kantians seems to be that they are based on too abstract a view of reason, a view which makes it impossible ever to bring the particular aims of action into relation with the universal and which, while doing lip service to a remote idea of reason, leaves actual law and actual morals at the mercy of a rough empiricism and the blind forces of tradition.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE CONCEPTS OF JURIDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC LAW ¹

IT is usual to distinguish between scientific laws and juridical laws by saying that the former are propositions asserting a regularity or uniformity in the character or relation of certain classes of facts or events, while the latter are commands backed by sanctions or penalties to do or refrain from doing certain acts. But this clearly will not carry us very far. For, from one point of view, commands may also be treated as facts or events exhibiting uniformity or regularity of character or relation and juridical laws may be interpreted as statements of the way in which people are regularly expected to behave in defined circumstances in a given society, and departure from which is followed regularly by certain stated consequences. The point sometimes made that scientific laws cannot, while juridical laws can, be violated, is in this context irrelevant. The expectation by society subsists even when a particular person disobeys the law, and the punishment follows regularly on detection in accordance with the conditions laid down in the law. If the law breaker is not detected, then the law does not come into play, but this does not mean that the law itself is in any way affected by the violation. If it be urged that juridical law is uncertain and indefinite in its application to particular cases two answers may be made. In the first place, laws are usually clearly enough stated in regard to certain defined relations. The difficulties arise from the fact that in concrete situations different and opposed relations may be involved and this raises problems analogous to those which we meet in applying physical laws to the explanation of particular or concrete facts. In the second place, recourse may be had to the notion of probability, and laws may be defined as by Max Weber, as statements of the chances that in a given society defined forms of behaviour will be followed by sanctions of a particular kind. So regarded juridical laws would thus be a species of sociological or psychological laws and fall within the class of natural laws. It is true that they would differ in range or generality, juridical laws being valid only for certain communities at

¹ March 1939.

certain times. But this is not very important, since properly stated, juridical laws would define the conditions under which they claim validity and they would be universal within those limits.

The relation between juridical and moral laws and scientific laws can be seen in a clearer light only when the nature of the obligation implicit in the former is considered. So long as authority on the part of the law-making power is considered merely as a social power endowed with the means of obtaining obedience, and so long as the obligation to obey is interpreted in terms of psychical constraint experienced by the individual in relation to that authority, we are not outside the realm of fact, and juridical laws can be treated as statements of relations analogous to those we find in the social and the natural sciences. Something of this kind is attempted by the so-called positivist view of law. It is, I think, also implicit in Bergson's treatment of obligation in the sphere of what he calls the "closed morality." Obligation, he says, is "the pressure which the elements of society exert upon one another in order to maintain the form of the whole." He will not have it that obligation is in any sense rational. Rather is it the form which the pressure of social instincts takes in beings capable of reflection and therefore in a measure of acting freely, and he asserts categorically that from this point of view obligation loses its specific character and may be linked with the most general phenomena of the life of organisms.¹ If a view of this kind be adopted, I do not see how any radical distinction can be drawn between scientific laws and juridical (or moral) laws. The most that we could do would be to distinguish between primary laws asserting functional relations between the parts of society, or between social needs and social acts, and practical rules designed to render possible the application of the primary laws to the varying situations of social life. This is, in fact, what is attempted by many positivists. To give but one example, Scelle,² a disciple of Duguit, distinguishes between *droit objectif* which consists of causal laws determining the life and growth of societies, and

¹ Cf. *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, p. 23. A somewhat similar view of obligation is held by Prof. Alexander. "Ought is but a new sort of reality made creatively out of the natural impulses by the introduction among them of another natural impulse which dominates, regulates and harmonizes them. . . . Ought is but the arrangement or order established among them by another natural passion and obligation is but the relation of any single element to the whole system" (*Beauty and other Forms of Value*, p. 251).

² Cf. *Précis de droit des gens*.

positive law which, he says, is the transposition of these causal laws on to the normative plane through the agencies of custom, legislation or convention. These norms of positive law would appear to be nothing more than practical rules akin to those of the applied sciences, and like them they may be valid or invalid according as they do or do not correctly interpret the causal laws or are technically adequate or inadequate in carrying them out into practical effect. On such a view legal rules must be assimilated to those of biology and sociology. It is only if we refuse to regard the notion of obligation as definable in terms of certain emotions felt by the agent or subject judging or of sanctions designed to secure the enforcement of rules of conduct, and if we insist that the notion of ought or right is essentially different from all notions representing physical or psychical facts, that the distinction between juridical and moral rules on the one hand and scientific laws on the other can be given a definite meaning. We can then say that juridical rules are in the realm of what ought to be while scientific laws are concerned with the realm of fact. This, of course, does not mean that all legal rules are moral rules, or that at any time there is a precise correspondence between moral and legal requirements. It means rather that whatever may be the conditions which determine the actual history of legal rules, the obligation to obey them is in the last resort moral in character, and that to justify any commands or imperatives it is not sufficient to refer to the psychological or sociological conditions which bring it about that individuals feel constrained to obey them. The question whether there is a real distinction between juridical and scientific laws thus seems to me to turn on the question whether or not obligation is taken to be a category *sui generis* or whether it permits of analysis in terms of psychological or sociological fact.

Without for the moment pursuing this latter question further I wish now to show that there is a certain parallelism between the conceptions that have been formed of juridical and of scientific laws. To do this I propose to avail myself of the account given by Professor Whitehead of the history of the doctrines concerning the laws of nature. He distinguishes four main doctrines: the doctrine of law as immanent, the doctrine of law as imposed, the doctrine of law as an observed order of succession, and the doctrine of law as a conventional interpretation. It appears to me that the problem that have arisen in connection with these conceptions of scientific

law are closely akin to those that also arise in connection with the conceptions that have been formed of juridical law, and a brief survey of these parallel problems may be useful in elucidating the relations between the two forms of law.

First then with regard to law as immanent. This involves, as Whitehead explains, the notion that things are inter-dependent in such a way that when we know the nature of things we also know their relations to each other. Some "partial identity in the various characters of natural things issues in some partial identity of pattern in the mutual relations of those things." The laws of nature formulate these identities of pattern in the mutual relations. The doctrine involves the theory of internal relations, that is the character of things is regarded as the outcome of their interconnections and the interconnections as the outcome of their characters. If this theory is combined with an evolutionary view of nature the laws may be regarded as also evolving in the sense that the character of the things and their mutual relations change in the course of evolution.¹

In its application to societies a theory of this kind would involve a view of social relations which would give due weight both to the individuals constituting society and to the whole formed by their membership of it. In actual fact the theories based on this conception have rarely maintained this balance, and the social whole has frequently been interpreted as something other than its inter-related members. To all forms of the "organic" theory of society the notion of law as immanent is, however, congenial. Thus the Historical School of Jurisprudence regards law as emanating from the *Volksgeist* and as evolving with it. The theory is worked out in different ways. The older historical school as represented by Savigny stresses the nation as the source of law, and the theory is then used in a defence of the organic view of legal change as against the "revolutionary" doctrine of natural rights. The Hegelian branch of the school, on the other hand, stresses the State as the representative of the *Volksgeist*. Modern National Socialism is a return to the older view. It affirms the spiritual reality of the *Volk*, of which the State is a mere instrument. A more balanced view is seen in the work of Gierke. "Individuals and the community," he says, "exist for one another in the measure in which they exist for themselves and the principles of unity and variety mutually

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 142-4.

support one another as elements equally necessary and equally real."¹ This leads him to protest alike against the centralization of the State and the atomization of the people. Between the State and the individuals he interposes numerous associational groups each with a real personality of its own. Yet the State has sovereignty over all, and it rightly exercises through law control over the inner life of all groups. Law for Gierke is, moreover, grounded in reason and its essence is not will or command. It is based upon widely prevalent convictions emanating from the life of groups. "Law," he says, "is not a common conviction that a thing shall be, but a common conviction that it is." I take it that by this is meant that the essence of law does not consist in its being enforced but rather in the conviction that enforcement is right, and this is true even if it happens that there is no power strong enough to enforce it in fact.² The theory of the nature of obligation adopted by this school would seem to be on the whole that in obeying the law individuals really obey themselves, since law is the expression of the will of society and this will is immanent in all its members.

It is interesting to note that in the German Romantic movement this theory takes on a strongly nationalist and anti-rationalist tinge. The super-personal whole is not humanity in its entirety but the nation. The ideal for mankind was not that of a union of fundamentally equal human beings in a rationally organized community but that of a plurality of distinctive national minds, a hierarchy of qualitatively different cultures, which cannot be brought under a universal Natural Law. In each community or *Volk* law is the expression of the national spirit, but curiously enough this ascription of a sort of divinity to the state and to law did not involve any fusion of morality and legality. Troeltsch has shown clearly that on the contrary law and morals were sharply separated, morality becoming a matter entirely of the inner self, and law something particular and positive confined to externals.³ In present-day National Socialist writings, it may be noted, law and morals are regarded as alike expressions of the national spirit and the claim is made that the gulf between the two has been bridged. But

¹ *Genossenschaftsrecht*, vol. II, p. 906.

² Cf. Appendix II to Prof. Barker's translation of Gierke's *Natural Law and the Theory of Society*, vol. I, p. 225. An illuminating discussion of Gierke's theory is to be found in G. Gurvitch, *L'Idée du droit social*.

³ Cf. *The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity*, published as an Appendix to Prof. Barker's translation of Gierke, pp. 212-13.

there is an insistence on the uniqueness and separateness of distinct national minds and a denial of any universal juridic or moral law, which have affinities with the earlier movement. We may well doubt whether this dual morality can be sustained, and we may safely predict that a conception which denies the morality of the State in its external relations will in the end lead not to a genuine fusion of law and morals but to a legalization and externalization of morals in internal relations. Evidence of this is abundantly available already in the rigid control of the individual penetrating all spheres of life and the tendency to cancel and absorb all personality in the interests of the mystical unity of the *Volk*.

The "organic" theory of society and the theory of law as immanent need not, of course, necessarily take the form they have taken in much German social philosophy. It need assert nothing more than that individuals are interdependent in such a way that their character is shaped by their interconnections and the interconnections the outcome of their characters. We have seen that this is the view implicit in Gierke's theory, and it is certainly the view of thinkers like Green and in another form of Hobhouse, both of whom desire to lay equal stress on the features of personality and sociality in human relations. Nor is it necessary to accept the doctrine of the uniqueness of national minds.

The doctrine of imposed law rests, as Whitehead shows, on the theory of external relations. The ultimate constituents of nature are regarded as not inherently connected with one another but as each understandable independently of the rest. The relation into which they enter are imposed upon them from without, and these imposed behaviour patterns are the laws of nature. The laws cannot be discovered from a study of the relata, nor can the nature of the relata be discovered from the laws of their relations. Historically this type of doctrine is linked with Deism. Law is here a command of God which Nature obeys. Whitehead shows that this was how the problem presented itself to Newton who stated definitely that the principles underlying the correlated behaviour of the bodies forming the solar system made obvious the necessity of a God imposing law. This is also Cartesian doctrine on the whole, though there are lines of thought in Descartes qualifying in a measure the conception of God as transcendent.¹ In Whitehead's judgment.

¹ Cf. "By Nature in general I understand nothing else than either God himself or the co-ordination ordained by God of all created things" (*Sixth Meditation*).

the whole. Cartesian apparatus of Deism, substantial materialism, and imposed law, in conjunction with the reduction of physical relations to the notion of correlated motions with mere spatio-temporal character, constitutes the simplified notion of nature with which Galileo, Descartes and Newton finally launched modern science on its triumphant career.¹

In its social applications it will be readily seen that this conception of nature as a system of self-dependent elements externally related to one another is likely to constitute a suitable background for individualism. This association can easily be illustrated. In the ancient world the moral individualism of Epicurus was based on the atomism of Democritus. In the English empiricists ethical and political individualism is associated with an atomistic view both of physics and psychology. Here the social relations between individuals are purely external. They are ways of providing more efficiently what individuals desire before they enter into these relations. The individualist theory of law is in accord with this underlying atomism. For some of the sophists law was an instrument for the benefit of self-centred individuals. Others start with the notion of individuals as inherently good and then a contrast is drawn between a law of nature which expresses this goodness and conventional law which is "the tyrant of mankind and often compels us to do many things which are against nature."² In modern thought individualist theories of law have been based either on utilitarianism or on the theory of the social contract linked with the doctrine of natural rights supposed to inhere in individuals as such. In the former case the fundamental principles of law are regarded as concerned with the conditions securing mutual non-interference, the reparation of wrong done and the fulfilment of contracts voluntarily undertaken. The function of law is thus restricted to preserving the individual within his own sphere. The contract theory, on the other hand, has been sometimes interpreted to justify thoroughgoing absolutism. It is to be observed further that the theory of Natural Rights though fundamentally individualistic may occasionally ally itself with "organic" theories of society. This happened, for example, in the "natural" social theories of the Middle Ages.³

How far the Deistic hypothesis is required as a basis for the individualist notion of law is an interesting problem. The theory

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 145.

² Cf. Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

³ Hippias in Plato's *Protagoras*.

of Natural Rights has, of course, frequently been given a theological interpretation and Natural Law has been identified with or regarded as closely related to divine law. It is worth noting that Professor Taylor has recently argued that in Hobbes's treatment of natural law a certain kind of theism is necessary to make the theory work, and that we must take seriously Hobbes's assertion that natural law is the command of God and to be obeyed *because* it is God's command.¹ It has also to be remembered that on its more positive side, that is in so far as it stresses the supreme value of the individual, modern individualism has strong religious roots.²

The doctrine of law as a description of observed sequences is associated with Positivism, a movement which has been growing in influence since the first half of the nineteenth century. As enunciated by Comte it renounced as metaphysical any inquiry into the ultimate nature of things, and confines science to the study of the relations of succession and resemblance between phenomena. In its ethical and juridical applications Comte himself used the conception of the Law of Nature as an illustration of the metaphysical stage of thought, and this attitude has remained characteristic of Positivist theories of law ever since his time. But while Comte subordinated all law to ethics, the essence of modern positivist theory is the refusal to go outside the legal system for any criteria of the validity of law and the rejection as legally irrelevant of any ethical principles whether of the law of nature or of a rational morality or of revealed religion. This does not mean, of course, that positivist thinkers may not in their private capacity accept any of these principles. It is clear that many of them do.³ What is important for them is that no such principles should be allowed to invade the legal domain and that legal studies shall confine themselves to legal facts. It is held either that ethical principles cannot

¹ *Philosophy*, (Oct., 1938), p. 418.

² Cf. especially Lindsay, *Individualism*, Encyc. Social Sciences. Cf. also Roosevelt in a recent speech, "Religion, by teaching man his relationship to God, gives the individual a sense of his own dignity and teaches him to respect himself by respecting his neighbour." Message to Congress, 4 January, 1939.

³ "L'on peut être profondément convaincu de la valeur transcendante des préceptes qui découlent de cette source suprême (Dieu), et cependant on n'en demeurera pas moins obligé de reconnaître que, dans l'ordre des réalités sociales, il ne peut exister de droit proprement dit antérieurement à la loi de l'État. La haute et souveraine valeur de ces préceptes ne suffit pas à leur imprimer le caractère de règles de droit effectives." Carré de Malberg. Quoted in *Positivisme philosophique, juridique et sociologique* by Marcel Waline, *Mélanges R. Carré de Malberg*, p. 533.

be scientifically established, whether or not they are acceptable on other grounds, or else, if they fall within the domain of science at all, they must be regarded as a species of social facts and investigated by psychological and sociological methods. In neither case can they form the foundation of law. Further, if the positivist interpretation of ethical rules is accepted, an interesting sociological problem arises of the relations between the different varieties of social norms, legal, moral and conventional. From this point of view it is useful to distinguish between sociological positivism and juridic positivism. The latter restricts itself to positive law proper, to norms for which legal authority can be given ; the former takes a broader view and considers also the relations of juridic norms to other social facts. Here I shall confine myself to illustrating some of the trends in this movement and shall use for this purpose the work of Duguit and of Kelsen.

Duguit himself refuses to be classed as a positivist and uses instead the term realism or objectivism to describe his views ; but these illustrate clearly enough some of the tendencies I have grouped under the heading of positivism. Social norms formulate the conditions of social equilibrium ; they prohibit acts or abstentions which endanger this equilibrium. Such social norms receive juridical character not from the State but from society. In other words a social norm has juridical character when there is a widespread feeling that its violation should call forth a more or less organized reaction. Duguit thinks of norms on the analogy of the laws of biology :

The law of an organism is not called a norm because we cannot assert that the cells of which it is composed are conscious ; the law of a social group is called a norm because its individual members act from motives of which they are conscious. Apart from this there is no difference between the two kinds of law, and if one admits that biological laws are founded on the facts of organic life there is no reason for refusing to admit that social norms are founded on the facts of social life.¹

It is true that the latter are teleological (*loi de but*) while the former are causal laws (*loi de cause*). But this difference is not fundamental and merely means that human beings are capable of becoming aware of the conditions of their lives and of accepting these as ends. Law so conceived is *droit objectif*. From this may be distinguished constructive or technical juridical rules which are

¹ *Traité de droit constitutionnel*, 2nd edition, I, p. 12.

designed to ensure respect for and application of the rules of the *droit objectif*. When we ask what makes the norms obligatory the answer is that to say that a norm is legally obligatory means that at a given moment and within a given society the mass of men think in accordance with their ideas of justice that the norm is necessary for the maintenance of social interdependence and that whatever conscious or organized force exists within the group will be used to suppress its violation. Is the ought here reduced to social fact? This seems doubtful so long as the "sense of justice" which is here invoked is not further analysed.

A similar ambiguity attaches to the notion of social solidarity or interdependence which is central to the whole of Duguit's system. In one sense all societies which manage to cohere somehow are based on the interdependence of their members. But if the term is used in an ethically neutral sense, societies resting on free co-operation must be regarded as on the same level as societies relying on domination, and as Duguit makes no attempt to show that the latter are biologically less sound than the former, his hostility to all forms of domination can only have purely subjective grounds. How is the transition effected from the solidarity of fact to the solidarity regarded as desirable? In the end Duguit comes back to the sense of justice which he appears to reduce to two elements, a sense of proportion and a desire for equality.¹ He will not have it that this involves any appeal to what is just in itself. Nevertheless his argument goes beyond what can be deduced from the bare necessities of social life and sets up a standard in the light of which the actual conditions of life are evaluated.²

Kelsen's positivism is of another brand. Unlike Duguit he makes it clear that juridical rules do not assert connections of fact (*Sein*) but of obligation (*Sollen*), and that these forms of assertion are not reducible to each other. When the law says whoever steals shall be punished this does not mean that if an act of theft is committed it will inevitably be followed by an act of punishment, but that it *shall* be, that is that it ought to be so followed. This law has the universality of a law of physics in the sense that it admits of no exceptions, since the obligation subsists even though the thief is not discovered or otherwise escapes punishment. If by juridical

¹ *Traité de droit constitutionnel*, 2nd edition, I, p. 54.

² On Duguit's theories reference may be made to G. Gurvitch, *L'Idée du droit social* and to G. Davy, *Éléments de Sociologie :—Sociologie Politique*.

positivism is meant "the reduction of right to fact" (Marcel Waline) then Kelsen is not a positivist. He is a positivist, however, in the sense that he refuses to go beyond law for any justification of law and he expressly states that this refusal is grounded in a relativist theory of knowledge.¹ When we ask what precisely juridical obligation consists in the answer is not so clear. A certain connection with fact there must be. For a legal order to be positive it is necessary that it should correspond up to a point with the actual behaviour of people. There must, of course, be the possibility of acting against the law, for if in fact there never was any deviation from the law, the latter would lose its normative character and would be merely a description of what actually happens. On the other hand, the tension between the legally obligatory and actual behaviour must not exceed a certain maximum of intensity, since a society in which the law was in fact never obeyed could hardly be said to constitute a legal order. In short, the fundamental principle of law must be in a certain harmony with what the masses of men can accept as actually governing their behaviour. In such circumstances, it appears, might is transformed into right.²

What is the nature of this transformation? On this I cannot find any light in Kelsen's writings. The theory of the fundamental norm certainly does not supply the answer. This theory asserts that the obligation which attaches to a particular law is grounded in the obligation to a legal rule of a higher order and ultimately to a *Grundnorm* beyond which the jurist cannot go. This fundamental norm does not generate law, nor is it itself a rule of law. In this respect it resembles the Kantian principles of the understanding. These are not empirical principles but rather the presupposition of all experience. In the same way the fundamental norm is what makes the actual legal rules that we find in a given society intelligible but it does not itself give rise to these legal rules. It is what must be assumed as the presupposition or basis of the system, and in that sense, of course, its choice is not arbitrary or conventional. Its validity can therefore be no greater than the validity of the system of rules which it binds together. This Kelsen expresses by saying that it claims only hypothetical validity. If the fundamental norm is once accepted as binding then the rest of the system is

¹ "Positivismus und (erkenntnistheoretischer) Relativismus gehören ebenso zusammen, wie Naturrechtslehre und (metaphysischer) Absolutismus." *Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus*, p. 14.

² *Phil. Grundlagen*, p. 65.

binding also. But the legal system is self-contained. It follows that in dealing with any particular legal rule we need not and ought not to introduce any factors such as moral principles to account for its obligatory character. The legal and the moral systems are independent and neither must intrude in the sphere of the other. For the acceptance of the initial norm no legal reason can be given, nor any other reason so far as one can see save historical fact.¹ If this be so it is difficult to see how the transformation of might into law of which Kelsen speaks is ever effected. From the mere fact that people on the whole conform to law and thus implicitly accept the fundamental norm no theory of obligation can be deduced. For obligation is as Kelsen explicitly asserts not merely factual acceptance or even psychical constraint to accept. The reference back of all obligation or *Sollen* to the fundamental norm, the justification of which is metalegal, implies, I think, an admission that the category of *Sollen* is not in the last resort a legal category at all. Either then its foundation is to be sought in historical or political fact, and in that case the fundamental distinction between *Sein* and *Sollen* cannot be maintained and right is reduced to fact, or its basis is moral, and in that case there would be no reason for the severance of morals and law on which Kelsen insists. Closer examination shows that Kelsen does not get rid of ethics. Indeed, it would appear that the motive for the severance of law and ethics is itself moral. Kelsen is impressed by the fact that the theory of natural rights for example has been used frequently to justify the *status quo* and that competing classes or groups struggling for power always claim to be acting in the interests of justice or the common good. For this reason it would, in his view, be much better for law to renounce any claims to be based on any principles of justice and to claim only hypothetical validity. It may be doubted whether this *versagungsvolle Sichbeschränken* is either justified by the facts of legal history or by philosophical requirements. The fact that self-interest has to take on a moral guise is itself an indication of the belief in the practical efficacy of morality, and it is hardly likely that the appeal to morals always works for ill and never for good. In any case it seems to me clear that the remedy is not to

¹ The actual content of the legal order seems indeed according to Kelsen to be the embodiment of a compromise reached in the struggle for power by competing groups. These succeed in concealing the true nature of the struggle by pretending to act in the name of justice and the common good. Cf. *Phil. Grundlagen*, p. 68.

be sought in adjuring moral criticism or in the glorification of "political indifference." Such indifference is in the end illusory, and if seriously insisted on must lead not to a transformation of right into might but of might into right and to deprive the notion of obligation of any meaning other than that of psychological acceptance or constraint.¹

This is not the place for a detailed critical review of juridical positivism. I hope, however, that it will have emerged even from my brief account that the attempt to reduce right to fact and the attempt to establish a rigid separation between law and ethics, which appear to be the two main forms which positivism has so far taken, both meet with insuperable difficulties. The chief difficulty arises from the assumption that statements involving norms are not "scientific," and therefore cannot figure in a positive science of law. Hence the attempt is made to reduce norms to facts. This attempt has failed so far and sooner or later positivists are compelled to introduce categories which, on their assumptions, have no place within their systems. But whether the positivist method, the essence of which appears to consist in rejecting all principles which cannot be brought to the test of experience, really requires its upholders to dismiss all value judgments as mere metaphysics, seems very open to question. Kelsen, as we have seen, does not make the mistake of confusing fact and norm. His method is really that followed by Kant and it is to be remembered that in this there is nothing inconsistent with positivism. Kant starts from moral experience as a fact and seeks to deduce the principles implicit in this experience. Kelsen thinks that in dealing with the problems of the practical reason Kant was not faithful to his own method and thus failed to provide the "relativism" which is needed for a positivist theory of law.² But it is difficult to see why the method consistently employed must necessarily lead to relativism. On the contrary, an analysis of the implications of actual moral experience in different areas and periods may well lead to the discovery of universal principles. In any case, whether this be so or not cannot be asserted *a priori* before the possibilities of the transcendental method have been more fully explored. Here then, as in so many other instances, the positivists are not so free from metaphysical assumptions as they seem to imagine themselves to be.

¹ Cf. Prof. H. Lauterpacht, *Kelsen's Theory of Law. Modern Theories of Law*, Ch. VII.

² *Phil. Grundlagen*, p. 76.

To the theory of scientific law as conventional interpretation I do not find any exact analogue in the philosophy of juridical law. Reference must, however, be made to a group of theories which do not figure in Whitehead's classification of the theories of law. The pragmatist conception of law may perhaps best be put in Professor Dewey's words : Laws are

formulæ for the prediction of the probability of an observable occurrence. They are designations of relations sufficiently stable to allow of the occurrence of forecasts of individualised situations—for every observed phenomenon is individual—within limits of specified probability, not a probability of error but a probability of actual occurrence.¹

Laws are on this view instruments for determining the "meaning" of individual objects. They are a way of "transacting business effectively with concrete existences, a mode of regulation of our relations with them." Dewey himself shows elsewhere how this conception can be applied to juridical laws. Instead of regarding these as fixed principles governing particular cases, they are to be treated rather as guides for estimating the specific consequences that are likely to follow from handling a particular situation in this way or that.²

This view appears to be closely related to Professor Roscoe Pound's conception of law as a form of social engineering.³ In another form this conception also inspires the "realist" movement in American jurisprudence. Though the writers belonging to this movement hardly form a school, they have this in common that they all stress the notion of legal rules as "generalized predictions of what the courts will do"; and they all insist that every part of law must be evaluated in terms of its effects and that a sustained effort should be made to ascertain as scientifically as possible what these effects are.⁴ The whole trend is thus away from the conception of laws as furnishing rigid and immutable rules to the conception of laws as instrumental hypotheses needing to be continually tested by the way they work out in application to concrete situations. The analogy with the pragmatist conception of scientific laws is thus very close.

¹ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 198.

² Cf. the essay on Nature and Reason in Law in *Philosophy and Civilization*, p. 172.

³ Cf. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*, Ch. II.

⁴ Cf. esp. Karl N. Llewellyn, "Some realism about realism," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. XLIV, No. 8.

Summing up the whole of this discussion we may say that the following relations probably hold between conceptions of scientific and juridical laws :

(i) Those who start with an atomic conception of nature, of things externally related to each other are likely to form an "individualist" conception of the social order and to conceive of law as imposed or externally related to individuals. On the other hand, those who stress the interdependence of things are likely to form an "organic" conception of society and to think of juridic law as immanent in society.

(ii) The pragmatic theory of science is likely to be reflected in an "instrumental" view of juridical laws.

(iii) The "positivist" view of science is likely to be reflected in a positivist view of ethics and law. This may result either in the reduction of ethical and legal norms to psychological or sociological laws or at least in the sharp separation of ethics and law. In either case ethical categories tend to be regarded as irrelevant to law.

(iv) The fundamental problem throughout is as to the relation between legal and moral obligation. This turns upon the answer to be given to the question whether there is a radical distinction between statements of fact and statements of obligation.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE FUNCTION OF REASON IN MORALS ¹

BEFORE considering the place of reason in morals, I propose to deal briefly with the more general question of the nature of the distinction commonly drawn between rational and irrational conduct. It is widely agreed that the distinctive mark of rational behaviour is purpose. In other words, reasonable action is action for which a ground or reason can be given by reference to an end more or less consciously aimed at. Here it is important to bear in mind the distinction between immanent and external ends. The purpose which is the ground of an action need not consist in the production of a result distinct from the acts through which it is attained. The acts may be their own end and have value to the agent whether they issue in any further result or not. This is the case not only in play but in the exercise of any faculty, practical or cognitive, which may be enjoyed for its own sake. Even where an external end-product is achieved, it does not always follow that the acts through which it is achieved are to be regarded merely as means to that end, since there may be direct satisfaction in the successful expression of energy and skill. What is essential to purpose is the awareness of the relations of the constituents of an act to each other and to the whole, including the causal relations of means and end where these can be distinguished. The acts are subjectively reasonable in so far as the agent is determined to action by his knowledge of the relationships in question, while clearly they may be objectively unreasonable as judged in the light of better-informed opinion.

Purposive behaviour is usually contrasted with acts due to unconscious urges and with impulsive acts, on the ground that in both these types of action, though the behaviour may in fact be adapted to achieve certain results, it is not shaped or directed by an awareness of the relationships involved. But this statement requires careful qualification. In the first place, when purposive is contrasted with impulsive action it is not to be inferred that purpose involves the elimination of impulse. The word "impulse" appears

¹ Read at a meeting of the Aristotelian Society, June 1939.

to be ambiguously used in psychology. It is used on the one hand for what is sometimes called "bare" impulse in which action is inspired by a drive denuded of any anticipation of the end. It is used, on the other hand, for the propelling element common to all forms of action and all levels of conation. In this latter sense purposive action is a highly developed form of impulsive action, namely that in which the end of the impulse has emerged into consciousness and there is awareness of the relations of the constituents of the act to each other and to the whole. Purposive action, in other words, does not require us to stand apart from biological needs or inherited instincts, but may consist rather in the conscious fulfilment of these needs or instincts. In the second place, the consciousness of the end which is the essence of purpose may vary greatly in clarity and articulateness, and to that extent, in degree of rationality. In long trains of action we can often detect a persistent purpose, which may never have been clearly formulated, and which may even undergo considerable change in the course of its realization, but yet provide some unity of direction throughout. In artistic or intellectual work the idea of the completed whole may not be present at the outset but nevertheless guide and sustain the entire process. There is, in fact, as comparative psychology has made abundantly clear, a whole series of levels of conation ranging from the kind of effort inspired by a vague disturbance of equilibrium seeking relief to that in which there is an elaborate system of ends consciously apprehended and deliberately controlled ; and it is very difficult to say at what precise degree of awareness of the relationships we can correctly speak of purpose.

The consciousness of the end and of the relations of the constituents of the act is, of course, only the minimum involved in rational action. It is necessary also to know the nature of the external and internal forces available for the attainment of the end, and it is only through such knowledge that the plasticity and variability of behaviour can be secured which marks off rational action from the relatively blind and fixed responses characteristic of the lower forms of behaviour. Furthermore, consciousness of the ends makes possible comparison between them and their evaluation in terms of a larger organization or system of ends. Rational action is especially distinguished by its width of range and the power of selecting what is relevant. None of this is possible without the power of delaying action and without a certain detachment or

capacity to resist the urgency of immediate desire or emotion. Hence, also, the importance for rational action of the power of taking an "impersonal" view, that is at least the power of distinguishing the character of an act from the person who does or suffers from it, and of bringing it under some general rule. We should say, I suppose, that a rational person is one who habitually shows such powers of detachment and who is able to bring to bear on a particular situation a knowledge of general rules which he has laid down for himself on the basis of his experience and insight. In practice, of course, the rules are accepted largely by the individual from the society around him, without necessarily inquiring into their validity. Thus in regard to general rules reason requires, firstly, that they should be applied consistently and without bias, that is without the agent being carried away by irrelevant emotion. Secondly, reason requires that they should permit of justification in the light of the best available knowledge. Thirdly, reason is required in helping us against the fanatical application of rules without due consideration of their limitations and of the need of correcting them as our insight grows or circumstances change. The passion for the letter of the law may be as blind as any other passion and a narrow consistency be therefore profoundly irrational. Reason may also recognize the value of spontaneity, and the adjustment of the claims of this value to the needs of control is clearly one of its most difficult tasks. Finally, reason involves the attempt to secure consistency among the rules themselves and their systematization into a coherent whole. It seems to be the rationalist assumption in the sphere of practice that every impulse has, so to say, *pro tanto* a claim to be heard, and that the reasonable method of dealing with the various claims is to bring them clearly into consciousness and to relate them to one another in the light of the broadest range of relevant experience.

Two further points require elucidation at this stage, namely, the nature and source of the control exercised by the agent over his impulses and desires, and the relation between the ends of rational choice and the more primitive needs and impulses. As to the first point, I take the view that the will, which is the agency of control, is not a separate source of energy but consists of an organization of the conational elements in our nature. This organization is effected through the building up of sentiments, and, as Mr. Shand has shown, these contain within themselves desires that grow more

abstract and general with experience and come by their comprehensiveness to represent the self more adequately. The organization is, however, incomplete and the conceptions by which it is guided are only in part articulate. Hence the continued struggle and imperfect self-control attained. With regard to the second point, it seems to me highly important not to make the error of supposing that the ends of life are simply given by our biological inheritance and that in them reason plays no part. This is not the place for a review of the fierce controversies that have raged round the concept of instinct. My impression is that the view which regards the instincts, conceived as specific innate responses, as the prime movers, has not stood the test of criticism, and that the ultimate drives are to be found in much more general needs of the organism, which are only partly served by the instincts, and may have objects and methods not specifically defined by heredity. Again, the impulses, emotions and sentiments, though they may have a certain independence, are not separate forces but rather differentiations of the underlying unity of personality. It seems to me fantastic to suppose that even the conscious wants of an individual adequately express his real needs or potentialities and that reason has no function to fulfil in relation to them. So far from the ends of life being merely given to the individual he may spend the greater part of his life in finding out what he wants and is capable of. From this point of view the chief function of reason is to ascertain, define and criticize the ends of life.

When ends are complementary or at least compatible no difficulty arises, except in relation to the means available for their realization. The possibilities open in the case of conflict between impulses seem to be the repression of one of the impulses, the persistence of both in a state of conflict or the redirection of the impulses to objects which are desired and are mutually consistent. Since reason aims at the fullest life it seeks to get rid of conflict, and repression is held to be justifiable only as a last resort and for the sake of a greater fulfilment. Force here as elsewhere is the abandonment of rationality, and experience shows that repression is apt to take its revenge on the personality by generating anxiety or by driving the repressed impulses to seek an outlet inconsistent with the abiding peace of the mind.

In the case of conflict with other individuals it seems to be taken as a minimum requirement of reason that the claims of the others

shall be considered and not just ignored or overridden. Further, in dealing with such claims, it is the mark of reasonable conduct to avoid coercion and to seek to attain agreement by reasoned argument. It has been maintained by some philosophers that what influences the individual in such cases is not his reason but his social impulses, and no doubt if a man has not the power of sympathy, of entering in imagination into the situation of others and feeling with them, he will not, unless compelled, trouble to consider their claims. But here as in other connections it is a mistake to separate impulse from reason too sharply. Mere sociality may be unenlightened and of little help in the adjustment of disputes. The social impulse like other impulses may operate at different cognitive levels and in the higher phases it becomes conscious of its object and may be guided by elaborate conceptions of well-being. Reason then enters into its very nature and transforms it. The problem remains as to what constitutes a reasonable settlement of a dispute, given the will to avoid force and to "listen to reason." Professor Alexander¹ will have it that what is reasonable does not exist in advance of a decision, but is simply what all come to desire after they have listened to one another's claims. But in that case, all agreements would be equally reasonable, and there would be no sense in distinguishing between a wise agreement and a foolish one. The implication of Alexander's view is that desires themselves cannot be either reasonable or unreasonable. But this seems to overlook the doctrine of levels of conation to which attention was drawn above. I should maintain that desires may be enlightened or unenlightened according as they are informed by a knowledge of the nature of the objects to which they are directed and by their relations to other desires. Alexander admits that people in making their claims may take into consideration the consequences in the way of happiness or unhappiness that may follow from the adoption of any proposed course, but thinks that the primary determinants are just the desires of the parties concerned. I find it difficult to see how these can be separated from the consideration of consequences and cannot believe that all solutions are equally reasonable provided that they are accepted by all concerned.

There remains the notion of impartiality which by universal consent is regarded as an essential element in rational behaviour. It seems to me that this is based on the idea that every action has

¹ *Beauty and other Forms of Value*, p. 244.

a ground and consequently every difference in action should be grounded in a relevant difference in the ground. The difficulty is of course to determine what differences are relevant ; yet the principle of impartiality is of great importance in excluding arbitrariness and throwing the burden of proof on those who wish to treat *prima facie* similar cases differently.

I conclude then that the function of reason in conduct is to clarify and define the ends of endeavour and to relate them to one another, to disclose the nature of the forces, internal and external, necessary for their realization, to insist on the widest consideration of all the claims that are relevant and the greatest impartiality in dealing with them, and, in cases of conflict whether within the individual or between individuals, to avoid the use of repression or force and to seek rather to evoke willing acceptance. Desires or preferences so informed or guided would be rational desires or preferences.

We come now to the problem of moral goodness. Can desires which meet the requirements of rationality just described be said also to meet the requirements of morality? It will have been noticed that some of the principles that I have taken to be implicit in the distinction drawn between reasonable and unreasonable conduct have a strong resemblance to the principles treated by philosophers under the heading of justice.¹ This applies, for example, to the principles of impartiality and to the principle of relevant differences which insists that any difference in the treatment or valuation of similar claims stands in need of justification. Now I do not think, as some have held, that these principles are trivial, and I believe that they are inherent alike in the notion of justice and in the commonsense estimate of reasonable behaviour. But it seems to me also clear that they do not take us very far in dealing with the complexities of the moral life. That we should be impartial in the application of general rules is an important principle, but it does not help us in deciding what kind of rules we should adopt for our guidance ; that differences in the treatment of claims requires justification is negatively important as excluding arbitrariness, but offers in itself no criterion of relevance ; that no claims shall be ignored or overridden is a principle far from negligible, but gives no guidance in the qualitative estimate of the claims. In short, the principles of justice being concerned with problems of distribution require to be related closely to the goods to be distri-

¹ Cf. specially Sidgwick's analysis in the *The Methods of Ethics*.

buted and cannot be applied, so to say, mechanically. We are thus forced to face the question whether the ends or purposes which inspire action can be rationally valued. It is tempting to seek an explanation of rational valuation in terms of rational desire, and to say that that has value which we should still desire after mature reflection on the nature and implications of the object desired. But I doubt whether in the end this amounts to more than saying that what is rationally desirable consists of what ought to be desired, and as we have seen what ought to be desired cannot be determined by reference solely to the formal principles of justice. We are thus thrown back to the fundamental problem of ethics as to the nature of the good and the obligatory.

My impression on reviewing recent discussions of this problem is that the efforts to deduce these two notions from one another have not been successful, and it appears to me that they are to be taken not as separate forms of moral experience which have to be brought into relation with one another, but rather as two aspects of the same reality. The notion of moral goodness is, if I may use a term of modern psychology, ambivalent; in it constraint and appeal are interwoven. Those who stress the notion of the obligatory as the fundamental category in ethics have to admit a certain relation between it and desire. They hold that there is in man a desire to do what is right as such. But this desire, as it seems to me, must be a generalized desire, built up as a result of our experience in dealing with particular duties and, therefore, with some reference to the content of the particular duties. I should say, accordingly that what is felt as obligatory is felt at the same time as a fulfilment of our nature, as something to which we can respond more or less willingly. These two elements are always interwoven but may be present in different proportions in different individuals or, within the same individual, in reference to different forms of conduct. In some cases the element of appeal is so strong that the constraint vanishes to a minimum, while in other cases an act may appeal to us as noble or sublime and yet, being of the kind which is beyond our capacity to emulate, not give rise to a feeling of obligation. In some, no doubt, the element of respect for the rule simply because it is the rule may be dominant, but even in such cases there can hardly be complete absence of any reference to the content of the rule and its desirability. It is this ambivalent character of moral goodness, the fact, namely, that the acts which are morally good

express the nature of the individual and at the same time point to an ideal going beyond him, that is at the root of the difficulty which we encounter when we try to interpret good in terms of desire, or seek to deduce the obligatory from the good or the good from the obligatory. We cannot, I think, account for the facts of moral experience without realizing that there is implicit in it a reference to something desirable yet not necessarily desired, something which makes demands on us, and which we cannot attain without tension and struggle, but which none the less is also a fulfilment of our nature. To define and clarify this ideal is the main function of reason in morals.

It will be useful at this stage to refer briefly to the functions assigned to reason by those who have worked out psychological and sociological theories of ethics. Westermarck, for example, is far from minimizing the part that has been played by reflective thought in the growth of morals. As is well known moral judgments are, in his view, ultimately based on the retributive emotions of resentment and gratitude, made disinterested through sympathy and generalized through social agencies. Reflection may, however, modify the play of these emotions in various ways. In the first place, since the higher emotions are stimulated by a cognition of objects, a change in our knowledge of the nature of the object may result in a change in the emotion. In this way, for instance, our indignation with a person who tells an untruth may die away when we discover that he acted from the benevolent motive of saving life. Secondly, acts may come to have qualities assigned to them as a result of superstitious beliefs, as happens in the case of many taboos, which may be dissipated when the superstitions have been cleared away. In other cases, again, our aversions to many forms of behaviour may be due not so much to the fact that they are perceived to be the causes of pain, as to the fact that they are disliked by persons for whom we have a regard and with whose dislike or resentment we therefore sympathize. Furthermore, growing reflection may affect our emotions by giving us a more vivid insight into the mental state of others, as may have happened in the change which has come about in the treatment of animals. In short, the function of reason is to direct emotions to their proper objects and to divert them from other objects by revealing their character more clearly. This, it will be seen, is no unimportant service to render. But it seems to me doubtful whether in ascribing

this service to reason Westermarck is not giving to reason powers of authoritative criticism inconsistent with the main lines of his doctrine. There is a certain ambiguity in the statement that by reflection we come to see that certain acts are not "the proper objects of moral censure or blame." By "proper" is sometimes meant "the biologically primary or original," as when it is said that resentment is properly felt against anything that is the cause of pain. But at other times "proper" is given a meaning analogous to the ethical use of the term "fitting," as when we are told that we ought not properly to condemn anything which does no harm. As a matter of psychological fact the aversions which are indirectly attached to objects as a result of social suggestion, or superstitious belief or respect for authority are as "proper" as the primary resentments, and all we can do psychologically is to study the conditions under which these aversions arise or can be controlled. It would seem then that moral reflection is after all capable of doing more than ascertaining the actual tendencies to approval or disapproval found in given societies and of criticizing them in the light of a conception of what is deserving of approval or disapproval.

Similar reflections are suggested by the views of Mr. Russell who, in his recent writings, has given brief expositions of a psychological theory of ethics.¹ His approach is far more individualist than that of Westermarck. For while the latter regards moral judgments as expressions not of the emotions of particular individuals but of the tendencies of acts to call forth emotions in a given group or society of individuals, Russell seems to regard moral judgments as affirmations of a personal wish or desire, qualified by the further desire that others should have the same desire. Ethics, is in fact, an art whose aim is to universalize desires, that is to persuade the individual to accept the desires of the group and, conversely, it may be an attempt by the individual to cause the group to accept his desires. This is possible, Mr. Russell thinks, because human desires are in fact less selfish on the whole than many moralists imagine. I do not propose to discuss this theory in detail but only to draw attention to its bearings on the rôle Mr. Russell assigns to reason.

With regard to desires Russell thinks that they can be neither rational nor irrational, in other words, it is impossible to give any reason for desiring or not desiring anything. Yet reason is of the greatest importance in the sphere of conduct. For, we are told,

¹ Cf. especially *Religion and Science*, Ch. IX.

reason helps us to take into consideration all our relevant desires and not merely that which happens at the moment to be strongest and that it thus enables us to realize our desires "on the whole."¹ Further, in dealing with others reason enjoins impartiality, requires us to use persuasion rather than force and in persuasion to use only arguments which we believe to be valid.² I cannot see how reason can do any of these things save in so far as impartiality and the use of persuasion and intellectual integrity can be shown to be efficient means in the service of ends that Mr. Russell desires to achieve. In so far as they are desired for their own sake reason can have nothing to do with them, and I am not aware that their superior efficiency as means has been safely established. Elsewhere, in discussing Fascism, Mr. Russell appears to include the preference of force to argument, of power to happiness, of propaganda to scientific impartiality in the sphere of ends, in relation to which the distinction between the rational and the irrational does not apply, and he suggests that the irrationality of Fascism consists rather in the fact that it cannot achieve what its supporters desire. If so, all that intelligence can do in dealing with the divergence of view between Fascists and their opponents is to reveal the inefficiency of the methods employed by the former, while the more formidable task of harmonizing their desires would have to be left to the art of rousing feelings, in other words to propaganda. It may be remarked that in dealing with particular ethical problems in his various writings on social philosophy Mr. Russell's own methods of persuasion are undoubtedly based on an appeal to reason. In his discussion of sexual morality, for example,³ he says "that whatever sexual ethic may ultimately be accepted must be free from superstition and must have recognizable and demonstrable grounds in its favour," and he proceeds to formulate principles from which such an ethic could be derived and in regard to which, he thinks, there is a wide measure of agreement. It is hard to reconcile this with the sharp separation of desire and reason, feeling and thought which his argument elsewhere implies, and to believe that we can ever attain to a "sane and balanced view of our relations to our neighbours and to the world" if the fundamental values lie outside the scope of reason.

Exponents of National Socialism very commonly describe their

¹ *Sceptical Essays*, p. 53

² *In Praise of Idleness*, p. 36.

³ *Marriage and Morals*, p. 24.

own views as anti-rationalist, but it is not very easy to find out what **their** diatribes against reason really amount to. I have consulted for this purpose the work of Ernst Krieck¹ whose exposition is I believe regarded as authoritative. The function of reason, it appears, is to serve impulse, to make it conscious, purposeful. It is the power of reason which enables man to raise himself above the level of merely animal life and helps the individual to come to himself, to distinguish himself from his community and to rise above it (*sich aus Gemeinschaftsleben zu lösen und darüber zu erheben*).² The value of the individual is not denied. It is true that the individual is linked essentially to his community, and his development is governed by the law of the whole of which he is a member. But whilst it is clear that *Ohne Gliedschaft keine Persönlichkeit* it is also clear that *Ohne Persönlichkeit keine Gliedschaft*.³ It is even asserted that the highest grade of morality is attained when self-fulfilment is at the same time fulfilment of the whole, and that no one can fulfil the law of the whole if he does not also at the same time fulfil his own personality. Furthermore, the fundamental moral principle is enunciated in terms not very different from the Kantian Categorical Imperative. It asserts that individuals must never be used merely as means, that members of a community must recognize their fundamental equality and that the relations between them must be based on mutuality of service.

In all this there is clearly nothing that could not easily be paralleled from the writings of other schools of thought. What is peculiar is the denial that ethical principles have universal validity. A distinction is drawn between purposes (*Zwecke*), i.e., means—end relationships, which apparently may be rational and the same for all men, independently of race, and values or norms (*Werte*) which are rooted in the race and are above reason. Moral principles which formulate these values are tied to the race and only binding within it. The Kantian principle that humanity should be treated as an end and never as a means merely should therefore be amended by the substitution of the word community for that of humanity. Elsewhere in the work the racial determination of knowledge is

¹ *Völkisch-Politische Anthropologie*, 3 Bde., Leipzig, 1937.

² Vol. 2, p. 14.

³ Cf. T. H. Green's remark: "Without society no persons, without persons no society."

asserted not only of values but of all thought. It is, Krieck holds, not true, as the rationalist philosophers assert that "man as such, that is independently of race, people and history, is endowed with a faculty of reason capable of attaining universally valid knowledge and of establishing everywhere similar social orders. . . . There is no truth which is the same for a German, a Chinese, a Jew or a Negro." This denial of universal truth applies even to the realm of natural science and mathematics. The birth of a particular truth is just the emergence into consciousness of the specific will to live of a particular race, and the claim to validity has meaning only within a community derived from the same race and subjected to the same historical conditions. The theory of knowledge adopted by Krieck is thus a form of vitalistic intuitionism, based on the view that impulse and will are more fundamental than thought, and that all knowledge is socially and racially determined. This racial determination affects knowledge not only in the sense that the historical conditions under which knowledge is built up are shaped by the race, but even more fundamentally in the sense that the ultimate presuppositions of thought are rooted in the sense of values of the race. Validity is the claim for acceptance that the creative minds of the race make for their discoveries upon members of their own community, a claim grounded in the belief that these discoveries express a common principle of life and a common sense of values.

I do not propose to discuss the theory of the racial determination of knowledge and valuation, because in my judgment, the notion of race is used so ambiguously in this context that I find it difficult to take it seriously. But I should like to say something about the theory of the social determination of morals which is very widely held and by no means only by National Socialist or Fascist writers. It may be found in the most coherent form in the writings of Durkheim, though even there rather as a programme for research than a fully elaborated system.¹ The chief merit of this programme is its insistence on the importance of a wide study of moral facts. Durkheim shows clearly how little we know not only of the historical causes but also of the teleological grounds of actual moral codes and of social institutions, and he is convinced that no real progress can be achieved in moral theory until careful analysis has been made of the rich material to be found in law, popular sayings

¹ Cf. *Sociologie et Philosophie*, Ch. II, Determination du fait moral, and *L'Éducation morale*.

and proverbs and the vast range of uncoded custom. It cannot be the function of the philosopher to invent ideals out of his inner consciousness. All that he can do is to discover the structure or organization of the mass of judgments which he finds in more or less unorganized form in tradition and current opinion and to study them in relation to social conditions. His view closely resembles that recently expounded by J. L. Stocks and, like the latter, Durkheim only admits such criticism or correction of actual beliefs as will naturally emerge in the course of a systematic attempt to ascertain the facts.¹

Durkheim thinks that an investigation of the facts of the moral life shows that the predicate moral is never attached to acts which have for their object the interest of the individual or even his perfection conceived in an egoistic sense. He argues further that since I as an individual have not as such moral value, neither can other individuals who are similar to me. If an act which merely serves my personality is amoral, there seems no reason why acts which serve the personality of others should come to have moral character. He thus reaches the startling conclusion that moral acts must be supra-individual, that is having for their object a group qualitatively different from the personality of the individuals composing it. The essence of morality is attachment to a group.

This conclusion appears to me to be reached dialectically and not by means of the elaborate examination of the details of the moral life which is insisted on at the outset. I doubt whether his conclusion that moral character is never ascribed to self-regarding acts is borne out by the facts, and I should have thought that sociological study shows that a great deal of morality goes beyond the group. Furthermore, it does not seem to me at all clear that the facts of the moral life imply a conception of society qualitatively different from the personalities which compose it, and it is hard to believe that inter-individual devotion has no value ascribed to it except in so far as it contributes indirectly to the value of the super-individual group or society.

Still greater difficulties arise when we come to consider the obligations which attachment to a group imposes on its members. In Durkheim's view moral rules not only have society for their object, but they also emanate from society, and it is owing to the

¹ Cf. Can Philosophy determine what is ethically or socially valuable? *Arist. Soc. Supp.*, vol. XV.

fact that society is at once immanent in the individual and superior to him, that they present themselves to him as at once obligatory and good. Is then every thing that society at any time requires from the individual morally binding? This conservative conclusion is definitely repudiated by Durkheim. The individual has not indeed the right of pitting his personal preferences against the will of society. But a scientific study of moral facts may enable us to criticize commonly accepted views and may even justify rebellion against the existing moral order. The opinion current in a society may not represent society as it really is and may be a survival of conditions which have long since passed away. Further, scientific study may reveal the existence of moral tendencies not obvious to superficial inspection and help in making them explicit and precise. In this way he thinks Socrates expressed more faithfully than his judges the morality which suited the society of his time. In other cases again the science of moral facts may help to recall to mind moral principles which in troubled times may be temporarily neglected or suppressed. This has happened, for instance, in reference to the notion of individual rights; the task of moral science is to show that the principle underlying them is inherent in the structure of European society and to deny it is to do injury to its deepest interests. In these ways science can go beyond the beliefs prevalent in a given society. Its business is to clarify opinion, to compare and systematize divergencies of opinion and above all to relate them to social conditions. "*C'est l'état de la société et non l'état de l'opinion qu'il faut atteindre.*" More than that science cannot do.

While admitting the strength of this position, I think that the history of morality shows that moral insight is not tied to actual social conditions or tendencies, but may go beyond them. Durkheim's own work provides examples. Perhaps the clearest is his treatment of the ethics of international relations. Since morality consists in attachment to a group our duties are towards the highest groups so far constituted and these have not as yet exceeded the boundaries of the nation-state. Humanity is not an organized group, but an *être de raison*, an abstraction under which we bring together the sum of tribes, nations and states which constitute mankind. There cannot be any duties to this vague entity. But since this conclusion is repugnant to him Durkheim argues, in this respect agreeing with some of the Hegelians, the solution is to be found in a more rigorous interpretation of the duties of patriotism.

If states abandoned the pursuit of material aggrandisement and took for their end the realization of justice and the relief of suffering within their own domains all rivalry between them would disappear and nationalism and cosmopolitanism be reconciled.¹ It is clear to me that this solution of the problem is not reached by an examination of the direction in which states are actually moving and are likely to continue to move, but is based rather on a universalist ethic which is recognized as binding whether it will in fact be accepted by states or not. In short, if social philosophy must begin by taking actually held moral judgments as its data, its critical handling of the data may lead to the enunciation of principles which do not depend for their validity upon actual or future acceptance by society.

It is important to note that the objectivity of moral values is not denied by sociological theories of ethics but is given a special interpretation. Thus Alexander, for whom morality consists in the adjustment of the wills of individuals under the impetus of the social impulses, thinks that the objectivity of moral judgments consists "in the compulsion exercised by consentient minds upon the individual mind."² This, I should have thought, would give those societies which have succeeded most in *Gleichschaltung* a claim to greater objectivity than those which allow divergence of judgment. It would seem that we should have to distinguish between different kinds of consentience, and if only that kind of consentience bestows objectivity which is based on reasoned argument, the final test is reason and not consent. Alexander also admits that the wise prophet may be he who opposes the will of society. It is difficult to believe that his views can claim no objectivity until they are accepted. Durkheim in another way also thinks that the objectivity of moral judgments consists in their "impersonal" character, but I think he tends too readily to identify the impersonal with the collective and he fails to provide us with any criteria for evaluating the claims of different collectivities.

A more drastic attitude to objectivity is taken by some psychological theories of ethics, such as that of Mr. Russell already referred to above. It is argued that moral judgments express personal desires and preferences, and in regard to these there can be no question of truth and error. I have already pointed out that in my

¹ Cf. *L'Éducation morale*, p. 87.

² Cf. The objectivity of value, *Travaux du IX Congrès international de Philosophie*, 1937, p. 27.

view the notion that desires can be neither rational nor irrational is based on an unjustifiable severance of impulse and thought. Here I wish to add that if the psychological theory is to be sustained it will be necessary to undertake a far more systematic study of the variations in moral judgments than psychologists have so far attempted. In a great many cases the differences that divide individuals arise rather from differences as to facts than as to their valuation. In Mr. Russell's view there is now, for example, wide agreement with regard to the principles to which a rational ordering of the relations between the sexes should have regard. The differences relate, he thinks, rather to the consequences in the way of policy that are to be drawn from the principles. Elsewhere he asserts more generally that if men did not disagree about matters of fact, the disagreements which might survive would almost certainly be found capable of amicable adjustment. If so, the main argument for the "subjectivity" of values, namely, the lack of agreement regarding them, would lose much of its force. In my view it is unlikely that differences in value judgments would disappear with the removal of disagreement about matters of fact, but the systematic study of the variations of attitude seems to me to be of the greatest importance to any one who wishes to defend a psychological theory of ethics.

The above brief survey of some sociological and psychological theories of ethics shows, I think, that they generally find themselves compelled, consciously or unconsciously, to reintroduce categories of value which at first they pretend to discard. When sociologists set up society as the source and criterion of values it is not any actual but an ideal society to which they appeal. When psychologists derive moral judgments from emotions they are soon compelled to abandon the clear-cut distinction between emotion and thought with which they start. Though the inconsistencies of these theories do not necessarily disprove them, since they might conceivably be worked out more coherently, they do raise the doubt whether the desire to reduce all judgments of value to judgments of fact has any sound philosophical justification. That all assertions must be tested in the light of experience is no doubt sound doctrine, but what ground is there for limiting experience *a priori* to what is called fact? The vitality of moral experience is suggestive of some solid foundation and requires impartial and autonomous investigation.

I will now try to formulate briefly what I take to be the main

functions of reason in the field of morals. In the first place, sociological study shows that moral codes are the result of a medley of forces, psychological and social in which rational reflection has played a variable and frequently indecisive rôle. It is by no means an easy matter to elicit with any precision the values involved in, say, the rules regulating the relations between the sexes, or the institution of property or the limits of the rightful use of compulsion. It is clear that in a great many cases our moral judgments of particular institutions would be transformed if we had a fuller knowledge of the ends they actually attain in relation to the ends they are intended to attain. Here is a task which requires the co-operation of social philosophy and sociology.

In the second place, in dealing with moral judgments themselves, it is very important to distinguish between what may be called their factual components and ethical components proper. Frequently, value judgments are based on the objective compatibility or incompatibility of the ends to which they refer. We may take as an example Lotze's explanation of the rules prohibiting sexual relations or marriage between near kin. These, he says, do not rest on "any non-demonstrable 'command of nature' but on a correct moral insight which condemns the admixture of different moral relations, each of which can only unfold its peculiar beauty and worth when it does so purely for its own sake."¹ This is clearly partly a question of psychological fact, since empirical investigation is required to ascertain in what degree the healthy development of sex love is likely to be interfered with by admixture of other forms of affection. In many instances the clarification of the facts is an essential preliminary to the clarification of the values involved, and sometimes failure to explore the facts creates a false impression of underlying differences in ethical principle which might be dissipated by adequate analysis. When one person says that race mixture is a good thing, and another that it is a bad thing, we are entitled to ask whether the factual components of these judgments have been adequately grasped. The following points at least would have to be established: (i) that the qualities of the pure races in question are ascertainable; (ii) that in the results of race mixture it is possible to distinguish between what is due to genetic factors and what to environmental ones, since in so far as the effects are due to social factors they might permit of control

¹ Cf. *Outlines of Practical Philosophy*, p. 71.

without interfering with race mixture as such ; (iii) that the effects of racial isolation are known and can be compared with effects of contact and mixture, again distinguishing between social and genetic effects. It is arguable that when these questions of fact have been answered the differences in the value judgments might not perhaps completely disappear, but they would not loom so large in the minds of the disputants. In any case unless the factual and ethical components are clearly distinguished there is no chance of resolving disagreement, or even of discovering the nature and sources of disagreement.

In the third place, reason has an important function to fulfil in regard to the element of obligation or authority in morals. It is clear that as a matter of psychology the feeling of compulsion and of what may appear to be completely disinterested constraint can come to be attached to almost any acts whatever their intrinsic nature. It is therefore necessary to be able to distinguish between the feeling of obligation which is due to habit or suggestion and the "objective" or rational constraint which arises from a clear grasp of the moral nature of the act. In other words, the function of reason in this connection is to reduce the element of external compulsion, or, in psycho-analytic terminology, to make the ego increasingly independent of the super-ego. Until this is achieved moral intuitions, however self-evident, may nevertheless be very deceptive.

Finally, the rôle of reason may be indicated perhaps by comparing it with that of intuition. In a sense all knowledge is intuitive, being a deliverance of the mind on looking at or intuiting. But when reason is contrasted with intuition I take it that the point is partly at least that for reason no particular intuition can claim finality, but is held subject to correction by further insight and by being brought into relation with other intuitions. From this point of view a rational ethic would be opposed to all those forms of ethical theory which hold that the moral life is governed by distinct and unrelated, intuitively apprehended, principles. That the principles of inter-connection in ethics have actually been discovered, I do not believe, but it seems to be a postulate of rationalist methodology to seek for them.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE INDIVIDUALIST BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MORALS ¹

I

IN a world in which international law is widely disregarded and defied and elementary human rights are denied to millions, it may seem futile to talk of the moral relations between peoples. Political "realists," surveying the field, will tell us that ethical ideals are merely the "ideology" of the strong who make use of them in order to hide from others and perhaps from themselves the motives by which they are in fact inspired. Or, varying the argument, they will tell us that justice is the necessity of the weak, who, however, repudiate its claims as soon as they are powerful enough to defy them with impunity.

In whatever form the argument is put it involves the admission that the idea of justice, or perhaps more clearly the sense of injustice, is a powerful force in human affairs. It is sometimes said that National Socialist or Fascist theories reject all appeals to ethics. The disconcerting thing is rather that they speak in the name of ethics. The National Socialist theorists even go to the length of claiming that they have bridged the gulf between law and morals and that their law alone is "*richtiges Recht*." Hitler's speeches from the beginning contained constant appeals to justice. The Versailles agreement was repudiated on the ground that it had been obtained under duress and that only those contracts are "holy" which are entered into freely by equals.² The Locarno Pact was broken on the ground that its partners had not stood by its terms. The repudiation of reason so common in Nazi writings is by no means wholehearted. The New Order in Europe, Hitler tells us, would rest on "*Vernunft und Logik, Verständnis und gegenseitige Rücksichtnahme*." Competent observers have testified that the strength of the Nazi propaganda, at least in the early period of the movement, lay in the skill with which it managed to keep alive and to intensify the resentment felt by the people against the injustice supposed to have

¹ Presidential Address read before the Aristotelian Society on 27 March, 1942

² Rede in Essen, 27 March, 1936.

been inflicted on them by their conquerors. Witness the frequent use made in their propaganda of the "war guilt" clauses, the jailure of the Allies to disarm, the alleged determination to keep the German people in a state of inferiority and the like. This kind of propaganda was intended, it will be noted, not only for external but for internal consumption, and shows clearly the faith of its authors in the dynamic value of the sense of injustice.

It seems clear that in popular morality the distinction between what is just and unjust, fair and unfair, right and wrong, is held to be applicable to the behaviour of states to each other. Some philosophers have, however, denied this or, at least they have questioned whether these distinctions are applicable in the same sense to the relations between states as between individuals. Bosanquet has argued, for example, that states in their relations to one another have no common standards to guide them analogous to the framework of social and legal obligations which help the individual within a state to discern his duty at any moment of difficulty.

A state cannot tell whether it is being less than just, or merely just, or kind and generous. For it every case is under altering conditions and new, and it is sole judge in its own cause. A state may think that it is behaving with superhuman generosity, while its antagonist may think it is behaving like a bandit. There is no complete or detailed scheme and scale of conduct and sentiment to operate as a norm of feeling and judgment.¹

I do not propose to pursue this matter here in detail. Bosanquet himself realizes that he has rather over-stated his case. He notes that in peace time at any rate and over a great part of their conduct the course of states, like that of the individual, "may be considered as plainly marked."² Yet in times of crisis, he thinks, problems may arise involving a whole philosophy of life as well as the prediction of the future history of the world. It seems that in such a case there is no recognized moral order to guide the conscience of statesmen, and each state will then have to fight for the defence of the "best thing it knows." Now that statesmen may have to make important decisions on matters on which they have inadequate knowledge whether in respect of the facts involved or the relevant ethical principles is clear enough, and such cases are by

¹ *Patriotism in the Perfect State. The International Crisis in its Ethical and Psychological Aspects*, 1915, p. 138.

² *Arist. Proceedings*, 1916-17, p. 45.

no means confined to problems of international adjustment, but arise equally in the internal problems of a state. The problem of importance seems to be what the function of the moral philosopher is in these circumstances. It is clear, firstly, that if there really are distinct moral worlds between which there is no bridge it is urgently necessary to define exactly the differences that divide them and to indicate clearly the boundaries of these "worlds." Are the moral ideas of the French in relation to international affairs radically different from those of the British? Did the War of 1914-18 really involve, as Bosanquet suggests, conflicting philosophies of history? If, as the German writers now maintain, all values are rooted in the race, what races are sufficiently akin to permit of common values? Is it true, as is often alleged, that what divides peoples now is that some assign supreme value to the individual human being, while others claim supremacy for the values of the community?¹ The Nazi theorists, so far as I can gather, do not speak with one voice on this matter. Formally they do not deny the value of individual personality. They do indeed start with the *Volk* as an organic whole, and the individual, they urge, can only achieve free development through life in the community. But such freedom is essential for the growth of the community and is accordingly required not only in his own interests, but also in the interest of the community.²

The divergence, it would seem, does not really lie in the views regarding the value of the individual, but in the difference in the methods by which the development of the individual is to be furthered. In the Nazi view only the leader can tell the individual where his "true" freedom lies.³ I do not raise these questions

¹ Cf. Prof. Julian Huxley, *Evolution*, p. 578: "To-day we are experiencing the struggle between two opposed ideals—that of the subordination of the individual to his community, and that of his intrinsic superiority."

Sir Walter Langdon Brown in a Presidential Address to the British Hygiene Social Council, declared: The present issue is clear-cut. Do individuals exist for the State or the State for individuals? It is quite possible to win the war and yet lose on that issue. Quoted in *Nature*, 31 October, 1942.

² Cf. Otto Dietrich, *Die Philosophischen Grundlagen des Nationalsozialismus*, p. 29.

³ So, according to Hegel, the state is "the actuality of concrete freedom," and it is in the state that individuals are said to achieve their complete development. The trouble begins when we ask by what methods this is attained. In actual fact, we are told, individuals are dominated by selfish interests. Only the monarch can "absorb all particularity." The "people" does not know what it wants, and its action would be "elemental, irrational, barbarous and frightful" (*Philosophy of Rights*, Trans. T. M. Knox, paragraphs 260, 261, 279, 301, 303).

with any intention of trying to solve them but merely in order to urge that those philosophers who base their ethical theories on the *Sittlichkeit* of particular communities ought to give a great deal more attention than they do to the analysis of the moral opinions prevailing in the different "moral worlds," and to ascertaining the nature and extent of the differences that divide them.

But, if the first duty of the philosopher is to collate and classify the moral judgments that he finds in more or less unorganized form, in tradition, in law and in current moral opinion, his second is to inquire into their coherence and consistency, to disentangle their hidden assumptions, and, in the light of this inquiry to enunciate principles which presumably would go beyond the beliefs and judgments with which he starts. Such a method applied to the field of international relations would involve a detailed study of the opinions actually held regarding what is fair and unfair, just or unjust in the way in which states behave to one another and of the changes which such opinions have undergone in the course of time. This, of course, would be a very big undertaking. What I propose to do here is to follow up certain changes which can, I think, be discerned in the history of international law, on the assumption that these changes reflect in part, at any rate, changes in moral outlook. I shall try to show that the principles underlying international law correspond pretty closely to what in the sphere of private morality is summed up by the term "individualism," and that there has been a certain lag in applying the criticisms which in the course of the nineteenth century were directed against the principles of individualism, in so far as they bear on the relations between the individuals inside the state, to the problem of the relations between states.

II

The theory of international law has been for the most part based, so far as I can ascertain, either on the conception of a law of nature and natural rights or on a kind of utilitarianism, and in both cases it has a strongly individualist flavour. According to the latter view the sole principle of modern international law, in so far as this is conceived to be determined on rational grounds, is the principle that the function of law is to ensure mutual non-interference, to see that contracts freely entered into are fulfilled, and that reparation is made for wrong done. The reasons given for this limitation

of the function of international law are analogous to those which are given for a similar limitation in the case of the internal law of states, but are held to be more obvious. In view of the difficulty experienced in preventing nations from doing mischief to each other it would be futile to attempt the much harder task of compelling states to work for a common good or to render each other positive services. The active promotion of common interests should accordingly be left to voluntary combination, until the reign of peace among independent nations is established. Even the prevention of aggression and the securing of reparation for wrong done, which are the chief functions of government within the State, are in the case of international law handicapped by the absence of an effective international authority, from which it is concluded that individual states retain the right of self-protection and even of securing reparation. The full implications of the individualist position thus briefly summarized were worked out by Sidgwick with his customary thoroughness and fairness in his *Elements of Politics*, and there can hardly be any doubt that the realities of international law were, at least when Sidgwick was writing, in close correspondence with the account there given.

I propose now to inquire how far the criticism directed by liberal thinkers against the individualist position in so far as it concerned the internal life of the State may throw light on the analogous problem concerning the external relations of states. This criticism seized mainly on two points¹ in the individualist argument, namely its handling of the right of property and the freedom of contract. On the individualist theory the principle of mutual non-interference was applied not only to secure the protection of the person but also of his property. The ethical justification of private property was the individual's right to the produce of his labour, where at least such labour would not be expended by the individual if he could not be sure of the exclusive enjoyment of its results. This right, however, was subject to the limitation that the appropriation by the individual involved no encroachment on the opportunities of others to productive labour. It became clear even within the camp of the individualists that this condition could not be fulfilled when, as was the case with land, there was only a limited supply. The problem of balancing conflicting

¹ Cf. T. H. Green, *Liberal Legislation and the Freedom of Contracts*; L. T. Hobhouse *Liberalism*, and *The Elements of Social Justice*.

claims then arose which led individualists in many cases well on the way towards the opposed camp of the socialists, or at least towards admitting a much greater amount of social control of property than was originally thought compatible with the strict principles of individualism. The argument can be and was in fact easily extended to other cases of monopoly and led to very radical revision and reconstruction of liberal policy.

The analysis of the notion of freedom of contract worked in a similar direction. In the individualist view the principle of freedom of contract applied only to contracts made freely, i.e. without coercion or the exercise of "undue influence." Liberal criticism pointed out that here freedom implies substantial equality between the parties and that there was no such equality, for example, in the case of a factory owner who employed children or even in the case of a bargain between an employer and the unorganized adult workers. It was necessary therefore to control contracts with the object of preventing those who have power from abusing it by forcing others less powerful to enter into contracts which they would not accept if they were in fact equal in power. This was only very slowly recognized and it is only recently that legislation has avowedly undertaken the task of controlling the conditions of work and the remuneration of workers. In this way it was realized that effective liberty implies a large measure of social control even on the individualist principle that coercion by the State should be limited to the prevention of coercion by individuals. It was further realized that the principle of non-coercion applies to the community as well as to individuals, and that, therefore, in cases where individual recalcitrance or non-conformity amounts to the coercion of the entire community by the individual, the community has the right to exercise constraint against him.

Turning now to the applications of these arguments to the sphere of international relations, it must be noted to begin with that international law has not so far succeeded in fulfilling its primary function and the function of all law, namely that of preventing aggression, though it has succeeded in rendering many positive services in securing a great many forms of co-operation between states. From the beginning, however, international law did make a distinction between just and unjust war, though many authorities maintain that states never did in fact abandon the right to make war and never did recognize any legal restriction of this

right. Other authorities deny this and point to the fact that in practice states never confess to a war of aggression and always seek to justify their conduct by the plea that the other side had broken the law. Whether governments are sincere in such pleas or not, they know that their peoples have to be satisfied of the justice of their cause if they are to fight with enthusiasm. On this ground it is maintained that a legal restriction on the right of making war has existed in the customary law of states even before the covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris. It seems that lawyers in their desire to prove themselves men of the world, in close touch with the "realities" of life, have been so impressed by the failure of states to respect the law that they have shown an excessive timidity in the accounts they gave of what the law actually was.¹

Reverting now to the above discussion of the individualist position in regard to the right of property and freedom of contract I wish to follow the parallel development in the theory of international relations. The rights that a state has over its own territory do not, as I understand, come strictly under the category of the rights of property, yet the problems that arise in connection with territorial competence have some resemblance to those which have arisen in the case of property. It is easy to see that so far as the law is concerned, the actual practice of most states rests on the maxim *ex facto oritur jus*. The law gives legal recognition to the facts without inquiring too closely into the circumstances in which they had their origin. There is no doubt, however, that the theorists found the question of territorial rights based on conquest extremely embarrassing. Sidgwick, discussing the matter from the point of view of individualist theory, concludes that when the conquerors and the conquered are approximately equal in civilization expansion is not likely to benefit either party and that therefore it "seems to be, under ordinary circumstances, rightly disapproved of by the morality of modern civilized nations."² The case was different, he thought, when the conquered were markedly inferior in civilization to the conquerors. But even here he qualifies his approval by insisting that it applies only to cases in which the war that led to the conquest was justified by obstinate violation of international duty on the part

¹ Cf. L. J. Brierly, *Règles du droit de la paix*, Recueil des cours, Académie de droit international, 1936. Ch. IV.

² *Elements of Politics* 1891, p. 310.

of the conquered. How many cases of annexation by conquest would stand this test he does not inquire.

In Sidgwick's time the whole surface of the earth had already come under the juridical order of the several states and it did not seem probable that the question of territorial control would be seriously raised again on a large scale. This, however, has, as we know, happened. Germany, Italy and Japan have argued that the world had been unfairly partitioned to the great disadvantage of the powers that had arrived late on the scene. It is interesting to look at the theoretical basis of their challenge. Broadly they reject the individualist outlook and appeal to the social principle of a world community of states based on the principle of equality. The parts of the world, they say, which are indispensable to all peoples should belong to them in common. Accordingly the high seas, the Straits, the inter-oceanic canals, the great maritime stations should be the property of all peoples. Hence, for example, it was argued that the British should give up Gibraltar and the Suez Canal should come under an effective condominium. This is what the German writers understand by the freedom of the seas. Moreover, in dealing with undeveloped territories, preference should be given to peoples who as yet have no colonial possessions in proportion to their capacity for expansion and their power to develop the territories. Some German writers went further and demanded a repartition of the colonial domains already under control in accordance with the principle of proportionate equality.¹

It is clearly no answer to these arguments to say with Professor Redslob and others that legally they have no warrant, that the partition of the world rests on titles universally admitted by agreements tacit or express. For the demand was for a revision of the law, and the question is whether it is ethically justified.

It seems to me that what is gradually emerging from the vast amount of discussion that has been devoted to this question is a revision of the individualist approach to these matters, more radical than is attempted by the representatives of the so-called Have-Not powers. What is wanted is not a re-distribution of colonies, but rather the creation of some form of supra-national authority to control all non-self-governing territories and to supervise international monopolies, cartels and raw material schemes. The remedy does not consist in taking away power from some particular

¹ Cf. Redslob, *Histoire des Grands Principes du Droit des Gens*, p. 550.

state and giving it to others, but in socializing or de-nationalizing control over forces that are vital to all nations.¹

A similar need of transcending individualist principles comes to light if we consider the problems connected with the freedom of contract. Here, as we have seen, liberal criticism stressed the need of regulating the conditions under which contracts are made with the object of preventing unequal contracts being entered into under the stress of economic inequality. In the field of international relations the analogous problem is concerned with the validity of treaties made under duress after a conquest or otherwise between parties unequal in economic or political power. A great deal of discussion has been devoted to this subject. It is possible that treaties of the kind referred to are not properly to be regarded as coming under the category of voluntary contracts, but more candidly as legislative acts of another order imposed by an authority endowed with the necessary power. If so, it is clearly to be expected that when the balance of force is changed attempts will be made to change the state of affairs *de facto* and ultimately *de jure*. The ethical question then raised would be whether there is a right of repudiating by force a law imposed by force. But whether treaties be regarded as contracts or not it is clear that the difficulties arising from unequal power will not be removed until treaties come to be made under the ægis of an impartial authority administering justice on the basis of the relevant claims and irrespective of the differences in the power of the parties concerned. Here I cannot do better than to quote the words of Professor Brierly :

The sanctity of treaties will never be more than a cant phrase so long as the law is too weak to deny the validity of a treaty entered into under coercion, or to lay down canons of international public policy, comparable to those of municipal law, which shall be conditions of any treaty's validity *ab initio*. In part the ultimate solution can be found only in some quasi legislative action comparable to the legislative interferences which modify the obligations of private contracts within a state in the interests of the social order.²

Analogous considerations apply to the problems that arise in connection with treaties that have become, or are alleged to have

¹ Cf. especially Prof. E. Staley, *The Economic Organisation of Peace*, International Conciliation, No. 369.

² Cf. Brierly, *Law of Nations*, p. 208. On the whole question see further Scelle, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, Recueil, 1932-4, and Brierly, *Règles du droit de la paix*, Recueil, 1936.

become, oppressive under changed circumstances from those in which they were initiated. These have usually been discussed in terms of the doctrine of the *clausula rebus sic stantibus*. It is clear that this doctrine lends itself to abuse, since it can easily be employed to provide states with a legal excuse for tearing up treaties which they find inconvenient. In some of the recent German writings the doctrine is interpreted in such a way as to reduce the validity of treaties to a shadow. According to Graf Westarp, for example, each state remains "master of its contracts," and can renounce them when they have in its own view become incompatible with its right and duty of self-preservation. This is said to be a limitation "inherent in all state contracts," and, since there are no objective criteria for defining the limitation, the last decision must be left to war. Numerous writers join in this protest against making the principle, *pacta sunt servanda* "too absolute, on the plea that contracts are made for the welfare of peoples and not for their own sake."¹

This is not the place for a detailed study of these controversies. It seems clear, however (i) that it is a mistake to try to bring all the problems that arise in this connection under the doctrine of the *clausula*, since this would require the stretching of the notion of "implicit reservations" to a point which would endanger all contracts; (ii) that unilateral denunciation must be regarded as unjustifiable; (iii) that the moral issues which arise in hard cases are analogous to, though frequently more complex than, those which arise in the case of individuals in dealing with promises or undertakings whose fulfilment in changed circumstances is likely to produce greater evil than their abrogation; and finally (iv) that the situation will not be seriously eased until there is an international authority capable of prescribing the conditions of contracts *ab initio* and of revising them in an impartial manner when this is considered necessary in the interests of general public policy. Thus in the matter of contracts as in the case of territorial rights the theory of international law seems to be tardily following the line of criticism to which individualist views regarding the internal functions of law were subjected. Here too it is gradually being realized that freedom and equality are closely related and that effective freedom necessitates social control.

¹ Numerous citations will be found in Bristler, *Die Völkerrechtslehre des Nationalsozialismus*, 1938, pp. 154-6.

So far I have dealt with that form of the theory of international relations which is based on what perhaps may be called utilitarian individualism. Far more common has been the appeal to the law of nature and the conception of natural rights. Here, too, I wish to show that the tendency has been to interpret this conception in an extremely individualistic manner and that writers on international law are only very slowly becoming aware of the criticism that has been directed against this conception in its application to the relations of individuals inside the State and of the re-interpretation of the doctrine which has resulted from this criticism.

The general effect of this constructive criticism may perhaps be summed up thus.¹ (a) Rights are held to be claims which can be made by or on behalf of an individual or group to the conditions necessary for the good life, (b) Rights have correlative duties; a right is what is due to an individual, a duty is what is due from an individual, (c) Rights define social relations and cannot be said to inhere in individuals in a pre-social state or apart from social relations; (d) Owing to the complexity of relations no single right can be absolute. To determine what is right or due in a particular case involves a weighing of claims, and this necessitates reference to a general form of life, judged on the whole to be good. The system of rights and duties may be regarded as laying down the general conditions of this form of life, but they are not self-subsistent and they require restatement and modification as historical circumstances change. Legal rights and duties (as distinguished from moral) would define those conditions of the good life which require and permit of enforcement by the machinery of the law.²

If this conception of natural rights is to form the basis of international law, it would be necessary to ascertain what conditions are essential for a good life, whether for individuals or groups, and which of these both can be and ought to be enforced by international legal organs. Since communities differ widely in their level of life and in the views which they have of the general form of the good life, the rights and duties arrived at would have to be of the nature of a minimum requirement to be progressively revised as mutual understanding increases and the power of controlling the conditions

¹ Cf. especially, T. H. Green, *Principles of Political Obligation*; L. T. Hobhouse, *Elements of Social Justice*.

² This, of course, formulates an ethical ideal. In existing states particular legal rights may not be ethically defensible.

of life grows. Needless to say no such elaborate inquiry has ever been attempted, though I suppose the various efforts to define the rights of man anew which have been made recently may be tending in this direction. If there are rights of states these would define the conditions which are necessary for the good life of states as component parts of an international order. They would not inhere, any more than this is the case in reference to the rights of individuals, in each state apart from its social relations, or be conceived as existing in a pre-social "state of nature."

When we turn to the use that has been made of the notion of natural rights in the theory of international law we find, however, that the atomistic view which regards them as inhering in individuals as such, instead of defining the conditions of membership in a society, persists. This is particularly clear in many forms of the doctrine of the "fundamental rights of states" which is regarded as a corollary of the theory of natural rights. There is no agreement among the authorities as to the precise number or content of these rights. Generally five are assumed, namely, self-preservation, independence, equality, respect and intercourse. Oppenheim mentions the right of existence, self-preservation, equality, independence, territorial supremacy, holding and acquiring territory, intercourse, good name and reputation.¹ The fundamental rights are supposed to provide the moral basis of the international order and are taken to inhere in every state as such. From these rights deductions have been drawn which, if given effect, would seriously hinder the growth of an international order.

I can best bring this out by reference to some recent German views. Professor Bruns² argues that independence is of the essence of the State. This means that no state can claim hegemony over other states and that in this respect all states are equal. But, since no state can be said to be independent which does not possess the means of defending itself, the right to arm is a fundamental right and an essential presupposition of membership in the international order. From the right of equal independence is also deduced the right to a *Lebensraum*. Similarly Professor Carl Schmitt³ appeals to the doctrine of fundamental rights to justify Germany's right to arm herself. It will be seen that in these and similar arguments

¹ *International Law*, I, 217, 218.

² *Deutschlands Gleichberechtigung als Rechtsproblem*.

³ *Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht*.

the system of rights which should define the conditions of a common regulated life is construed in a manner which is bound to hinder the development of a community of states. Independence is interpreted as equivalent to freedom from regulation, and the right to arm, which might be conceded to individuals or groups as an unfortunate necessity in the absence of a communal order, is made the very basis of that order.

The abuse of the doctrine of fundamental rights does not, however, as it seems to me, justify us in rejecting this doctrine. There is surely a sense in which it might be of value, providing it be remembered that no single right is absolute and that the various rights must not be regarded as the elements out of which the common order is constructed but rather as defining the requirements of that order. Let us consider from this point of view the principles of independence and equality.

Clearly, on the view of natural rights here adumbrated, independence should not be interpreted as excluding interdependence. What it asserts is that no state has the right to claim superiority over any other state or to reduce it to dependence. This does not exclude the common submission of all states to an international authority or the acceptance by each state of limitations to its liberty imposed upon it by international law. Independence, in other words, defines the relation of the constituent members of the society of states to each other, while subordinating them to a legal order which binds them all alike.¹ Independence, in this sense, is a negative term excluding dependence on particular states, and throws no light on what a state may be entitled to do. The positive term, presumably, is freedom. But this again, it need hardly be asserted, does not mean absence of control, but the possession of a body of liberties, that is rights or powers to act defined by law.

The principle of equality in its application to states as to individuals does not assert equality of power or even equality of treatment. The essence of the matter is the exclusion of arbitrary inequality, the insistence that discriminatory treatment requires justification in the light of some relevant difference in the grounds on which the claims of the parties concerned are made. The difficulty is, of course, to determine what differences are relevant. It may not be obvious to some people, for example, that a difference in

¹ Cf. Prof. J. L. Brierly, *Recueil*, 1936, p. 25, and the "individual opinion" there quoted given by M. Anzilotti, with reference to a dispute between Germany and Austria.

colour is not relevant in considering the claim to political rights. It should further be noted that we are here considering equality as an ethical principle. The question how far it is in fact recognized by international law is a separate question, and if it is found that it does not do this, it does not follow that it ought not to, or that it is not worth while to inquire what, as an ideal, equality implies.

In the light of these considerations we may distinguish various senses of equality. There is to begin with (*a*) equality before the law. This means that the rights of any state, whatever these rights may be, are equally entitled to the protection of the law ; in other words, that the weakness of any state shall not prevent it from having its claims heard, or affect the decision. This is admitted in principle, but neither in relation to individuals or states is it in practice realized. It is obviously easier for a strong state to defy the law with impunity than for a weak one, and weak states will find it more prudent to forgo their claims rather than risk antagonizing their stronger neighbours. There is secondly (*b*) equality in the rights themselves. In the law as it is states are not equal in their rights. There are differences in rights resulting from differences in status, as is the case with the forms of " dependent " states, protectorates and the like. There are also differences due to the abandonment of certain rights or limitations of rights through the instrumentality of treaties. In relation to these differences, it is important to observe that they are not necessarily condemned by the principle of equality. There may be good reasons for them, that is the differences may be justified by relevant differences in the circumstances. What is important from the ethical point of view is that discrimination in rights shall not be grounded in differences of arbitrary power, and that there should be an international authority, capable of revising or invalidating treaties made under coercion, open or disguised, and of reviewing differences of status in an impartial manner. The recent relinquishment of the extra-territorial rights in China by Britain and the United States is a good example of the movement towards equality in this sense. There is thirdly (*c*) equality in the right of making law. If ever an effective international legislative authority comes into being, it would follow from this principle that all states should have the right to participate in law making. Oddly enough the principle of equality has been invoked to justify insistence on unanimity as against vote by majority. One would have thought that to give a single state the power of

coercing all the rest by standing out is a plain violation of equality. I suspect that what really lies behind insistence on unanimity or even of general consent is, firstly, the persistence of positivist views of international law which regard the validity of law as bound up with consent, and secondly the well grounded belief that in existing circumstances the chances of enforcing a law which has not been widely accepted are very small indeed. The root of the matter is, of course, that until the nations of the world come to have implicit faith in the fair-mindedness and impartiality of the law-making power they will not wish to consider themselves bound by a law or treaty to the making of which they were not a party. It remains to be added that the principle of equality does not carry with it the principle of "one state, one vote." It is generally agreed that size of population is an unsatisfactory basis. But there are various possibilities of securing proportionate equality exemplified in existing federal constitutions and it should not be beyond the wit of man to devise a system suitable for larger combinations of states. There is fourthly (*d*) equality as a principle of distributive justice. This is the sense of the principle which is only slowly coming to be accepted and which obviously presents the greatest difficulties. Here belong the problems connected with the so-called *Lebensraum*, of access to raw materials, of the occupation or administration of areas not yet under the control of particular governments, spheres of influence, protectorates and so forth. I have already referred to some of these problems in dealing with what I have called utilitarian individualism. But they have also been approached from the point of view of fundamental rights, especially the right of equality. The doctrine of the freedom of the seas, for example, has been held to imply not merely that the navigation of the oceans should be open to all peoples alike. It has been argued that the principle of equality demands not only open access, but also that no particular power should be in a position to bar access by control of maritime stations and points commanding the straits.¹ It will be noted that in this case the principle of equality is held to imply that control should be taken away from particular states and entrusted to a common authority. In the case of the right to colonies and protectorates, on the other hand, the principle is interpreted in a different way. Here a right of expansion is claimed which shall

¹ For references cf. Redslob, *op. cit.*, pp. 38 seq.

be in proportion to the capacities, attainments and needs of the colonizing powers. It is on the principle of relative or proportionate equality that the claims of the Germans, the Italians and the Japanese to territorial expansion have been based. In dealing with this claim in so far as it appeals to a fundamental right, just as in dealing with the similar claim based on utilitarian individualism, it is not a sufficient answer to say that it is not in harmony with established titles of possession or control, since what is in question is the moral validity of the titles. The answer is, I think, that the claim takes for granted the right of conquest and completely ignores the rights of the peoples in the conquered areas. Clearly, if a redistribution of power in colonial areas is to be attempted the question of the moral justification of the exercise of power in these areas should be re-examined. So far as I can see, there are two points to be considered. Firstly, the "advanced" peoples may claim the right to penetrate into those parts of the world which are only capable of being developed by their energy, capital and resourcefulness. Secondly, if such penetration be admitted it becomes necessary to protect the natives of those areas from exploitation by settlers and from being driven into accepting conditions detrimental to their well-being and future development. These grounds clearly do not justify any state in annexing territory or utilizing its resources for its exclusive requirements. The solution lies therefore not in any re-distribution of territorial rights, but in abandoning the whole notion of exclusive possession and entrusting such control as is necessary in the interests of the natives and of the whole of humanity to bodies acting under international control. What these bodies should be is a matter which may require different solutions in different areas, but in no case should they be regarded as owners of the areas in question or as having the rights of unlimited sovereignty over them. Here again therefore the principle of equality, freed from the individualistic associations of the notion of independent sovereignty and applied universally, proves to be of real value and importance as a guide to policy. Analogous considerations apply to the problem of access to raw materials. The Atlantic Charter commits its signatories to further the enjoyment by all states of access on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity. In all probability however, the granting of formal equality to states differing widely in their level of economic development will not be

sufficient. Some positive effort in the direction of rational distribution is needed to make equality real.¹

The view of fundamental rights here defended involves a re-interpretation of the notion of freedom as applied to states. In the case of the individual we have long come to recognize that liberty does not mean the right to do what he likes, but consists of his *liberties*, that is the rights or claims to those conditions which are necessary to his good life in society. Liberty is his sum of rights or assured powers. In the case of the state the notion of liberty has tended to be fused with that of unlimited sovereignty, that is the refusal to submit to any law not voluntarily agreed to and the right to make law without regard to the needs and claims of other countries. It is clear that in this sense liberty cannot be a right. To give positive content to the notion of liberty it is necessary to define the *liberties* of the State or to mark out the spheres of activity, within which the State should in the interests of humanity as a whole be given autonomy. The questions involved would require different answers in different historical circumstances. It is being gradually recognized, for example, that in future states ought not to have the right to change their economic legislation, e.g. to increase import barriers or alter the value of their currency, without regard to the effect of these changes on other states, and that at least they ought to agree to consult with all other states likely to be affected. Similarly, the regulation of migration should not be left to the unfettered will of each country, but should be entrusted to an international authority capable of taking into consideration the needs of would-be migrants, the absorption capacity of different areas, the effect of immigration on the standard of life of the receiving country and the methods of preventing a decline, the provision of alternative solution where migration is not desirable, and so forth. Here, as in other matters of economic control, the conditions of the modern world require the relinquishment by states of their claims to the exercise of sovereignty. Further, it is clear that if positive content is to be given to the notion of liberty in the sense of a body of rights and duties there must come into being an international authority with sufficient force to prevent their violation and to balance and adjust conflicting claims in a manner conducive to greater freedom on the whole. This obviously implies that the international authority must have

¹ On the whole question of the equality of states, cf. Arnold D. McNair, "Equality of States in International Law," *Michigan Law Review*, 1927, to which I am much indebted.

the power of initiating changes in the body of rights and duties and above all of making it impossible for any state to bring about any such changes by resorting to force.

The notion of freedom is closely connected with that of self-determination, though the latter is used to refer not to states already in being but rather in the process of coming into being. The right of any body of people to their own mode of government cannot, any more than any other single right, be absolute. The problem at bottom is what, in the interests of the common good, is the best unit of government, and it is quite possible that what is a good unit for some purposes is unsuitable for other purposes. The whole problem of national self-determination would be completely transformed, for example, if states abandoned the right of arming themselves and if their economic relations to one another were controlled by an international authority. The remaining spheres of activity could then be left to units, small or large, without much risk of tension or struggle. There is a tendency among recent writers to consider the small states as unsuited to modern conditions and even as "danger spots," hampering the movement of trade and a constant temptation to their stronger neighbours. It has to be remembered, however, that the autarkic policy of the smaller states was in most cases due to the need they felt of defending their national economies from the violent fluctuations originating in the economic pressure of the world markets traceable in the main to the economic policy of the Great Powers.¹ What is needed is the creation of conditions which will remove the drive towards economic self-sufficiency which has been so noticeable in states, small and large alike. This implies the recognition by all states of their obligations to a wider society and their willing submission to international control. In such circumstances there would be no reason for discriminating between small and large states and there would be no reason why the small states should not continue to exist. Much more serious difficulties arise in connection with the treatment of minorities. But these again are not difficulties peculiar to small states and perhaps they would not loom so large if the major causes threatening the security of peoples were removed.

The socialized conception of the rights of states here illustrated by reference to the rights of equality, independence and self-determination is undoubtedly implicit in a great deal of current discussion.

¹ Cf. J. B. Condliffe, *Reconstruction of World Trade*.

It can be traced in the numerous attempts now being made to draw up declarations of rights, in the changing attitude towards the problem of the administration of so-called backward areas, the recognition in many quarters that even the notion of "trusteeship" which has been appealed to in this connection, must be purged of the implication of overlordship and mastery which it carries with it. It is seen above all in the growing realization that the duties of states are not exhausted in the negative injunctions of non-aggression and non-aggrandizement but include also the positive duties of collaboration for a common good, with the object, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter, "of securing for all improved labour standards, economic adjustment and social security." These changes in attitude imply a radical abandonment of individualism in international affairs. Here, as in the case of individuals, rights define social relations and social functions. They cannot be ascertained without taking into consideration the needs of all affected, and in this sense they depend upon and serve to define the common good. It follows that we cannot construct a system of international morality and international law by beginning with a list of self-subsistent rights. The fundamental rights and duties can only be ascertained as a result of an inquiry into the needs of various groups and the relations arising out of these needs. Construed in this manner the doctrine of fundamental rights does not seem open to the objections which have been raised against it, though it must be admitted that in many current interpretations of it, it has tended to encourage an atomistic view of the bond between states, an over-emphasis of rights which states possess and a readiness to overlook or disregard the duties which they owe to each other.¹

III

Some recent writers have maintained that the notion of rights is not applicable to collective entities and that only individuals have rights.² This view is mainly a reaction against extreme forms of nationalism. In dealing with it, it is necessary to distinguish between the general question of the applicability of the notion of rights and duties to corporate entities and the special question of its applicability to such entities as nations. The first question raises the whole problem of the basis of rights. Rights are commonly

¹ Cf. J. L. Brierly, *Law of Nations*, pp. 39-41.

² Cf. H. E. Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, pp. 47, 273.

described as claims to the conditions necessary for the good life. This seems to imply that the good must be first known and the rights then shown to be conditions needed for its attainment. But even on the Utilitarian view of ethics it is doubtful whether justice can be equated with conduciveness to good. Sidgwick, at any rate, admitted, in discussing the possible ways of distributing a given quantum of happiness, that "we have to supplement the principle of seeking the greatest happiness on the whole by the principle of just or right distribution of that happiness."¹ As I see the matter, what is good on the whole cannot be determined without taking just distribution into account. What is good on the whole is a certain order or mode of life of individuals in their relations to one another. Rights are assignable to the elements of that order. These elements need not, as I see it, be individuals. They may well consist of individuals in certain relations who, in those relations, have something specific to contribute to the total life of society. In this way we may, for example, regard a certain type of family as entitled to the conditions necessary to it as a family, and in this sense the family has rights. Similarly with churches, local communities and nations. The community, as a whole, also has rights and its constituent elements owe it duties. The denial of rights to such entities as nations and the tendency to insist that everything must be referred back to individuals may appear at first sight as a healthy protest against excessive abstraction in social theory. But it may easily result in an unreal universalism and, I suspect, serve as a cloak for what may perhaps be called the cultural imperialism of the more powerful nations. It is the value of the smaller nationalities that is called in question, but hardly that of the great powers. There is clearly a need for a great variety of corporate bodies to mediate between the mass of individuals and the community of mankind. Such corporate bodies, as standing for a certain distinctive form of life, or as making possible the fulfilment of specific social functions, have rights and duties and in their fulfilment contribute to the common good. The difficulty, is, of course, to define these rights and duties, and, in particular, the problem of the best unit for purposes of government is extremely complex. There is, it may be noted, an analogous problem in the theory of international law. Here too, some writers, in their anxiety to refute the view that only states can be subjects of international law, have gone to the

¹ *Methods of Ethics*, Bk. IV, Ch. I.

other extreme of asserting that only individuals can be such subjects.¹ It remains to be added that the view which regards collective entities as capable of rights and duties, both in the legal and moral sense, does not entail the ascription to them of a mystical personality. In the long run, of course, legal and moral rules can be addressed only to individuals who alone are capable of willing and thinking. Nevertheless they may be addressed to them in their collective capacity, as representing a certain form of life or as fulfilling a certain social function on which the rights and the duties are founded.

From the point of view here put forward, the right of national self determination does not rest merely on the right of association which belongs to the members of the nation taken as individuals. It is based also on the claim that a specific order or mode of life is entitled to the conditions necessary for its realization. What conditions are so necessary is a question which has to be examined in each case. It does not follow, for example, that every cultural group has a right to be politically or economically self-governing. But this question as we have seen affects large and small states alike, and if the large states were willing to accept international control in the matter of armaments and of economic regulation, there would in all probability be considerable weakening of the pressure towards unity inside states. Cultural diversity would then be more easily tolerated and the problem of minorities would then, perhaps, be handled in a more amicable spirit.

To anyone whose eyes are fixed on the actual behaviour of states and peoples towards each other this may seem idle theorizing. All that is claimed here is that a study of opinion as reflected in discussions on international law and in other ways suggests that there is growing acceptance of the view that there can be no peace without justice among nations and that justice does not consist in mere non-interference, but involves positive efforts of collaboration for common ends. There are signs that in the external as in the internal relations of states, the individualist conception is slowly giving place towards more organic views of the nature of human relations.

¹ Cf. Brierly, *Recueil*, 1936, p. 47, for a discussion of this question.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE UNITY OF MANKIND ¹

THE subject upon which I have the honour to address you is one which lay at the very centre of Hobhouse's philosophical and sociological thought. His studies of the evolution of mind in the animal world and in human societies, and his theoretical analysis of the structure of knowledge, led him to the conception that the whole evolutionary process can be best understood as the effect of a purpose working itself out slowly under limiting conditions and gradually making itself their master. His life work was devoted to a study of development, and he reached the conclusion that the highest phase so far known was one in which the mind of humanity becomes conscious of the conditions of its own development and through this knowledge seeks to direct and control its own future. Though he never conceived of this process of development as automatic or of the harmony which was its goal as assured, the tone of his earlier writings was, on the whole, optimistic. He thought that the attainments of modern civilization, especially the control over natural forces made possible by the growth of the physical sciences and, on the side of ethics, the emergence of the conception of the unity of mankind and of the subordination of law, morals, and all social institutions to the needs of social harmony, supported his fundamental thesis that humanity had for the first time reached the stage of self-direction. The events of the war and still more of the peace which followed it shook, but did not shatter, his faith. The humanitarian spirit, he saw, was not yet strong enough or coherent enough to establish itself, and possibly its achievements represented a culminating point in civilization to be followed by a period of re-barbarization. Had he lived longer he would in all probability have undertaken a re-examination of his thesis in the light of the recent changes in thought and in contemporary social life. But it is clear that, despite moods of pessimism, he retained his original conception of human development as capable of, and as actually moving towards, rational self-direction. Even if the civilized order

¹ Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture delivered on 21 March, 1935 at the London School of Economics.

as we know it were to be shattered by violence, yet the distinctive contributions of modern thought, the ideas of humanity, freedom, and the conquest of nature would remain. Idcas, he thought, were less mortal than the embodiment they receive in particular institutions. They would survive and make possible a fresh, and perchance a more vigorous, start in the future.¹

Recent events would have put a very severe strain on Hobhouse's courageous faith and would have made him more doubtful of the power of the civilized order to survive. The increasing resort to violence, the dangers of world wars, the tendencies towards national isolation and autarchy, the glorification of race, the bitter attacks on the central ideas of humanitarian ethics, the ideas of personality, liberty, and equality, the adulation of the irrational, all run counter to the line of ethical development, and raise the question whether what Hobhouse took to be the culminating point in human evolution was not rather an episode, a temporary product of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from which little or nothing that is decisive can be inferred regarding the future. Are we indeed entitled to speak of humanity as a single entity capable of undergoing development as a whole? May it not be that world history is a series of partial developments which do not converge to a single point and which cannot be judged by common or identical criteria? Is not the lesson of history that of conflict, dispersion, indifference? What ground is there for the belief that behind the struggle and discord there is a principle making for co-operation and unity?

A full answer to these questions would require an investigation even more extensive than that to which Hobhouse devoted his life, and especially a more detailed study than he was able to make of civilizations other than the European. I can only deal with some few aspects of this vast problem and, deeply conscious of my limitations both in respect of capacity and knowledge, I should be happy if what I have to say is conceived in the spirit of Hobhouse's teaching and be considered not inappropriate to a lecture devoted to his memory.

It is very important at the outset to make clear precisely what is meant by the unity of mankind. We may, I think, distinguish the following different, though not independent, meanings of the term. By unity may be meant (i) uniformity or similarity of type or character. This implies that despite an obvious variety there is

¹ Cf. Introduction to revised edition of *Development and Purpose*, 1927.

an underlying resemblance in physical and mental structure between the groups of mankind, and that there is no warrant for assuming any such radical differences between them as would amount to an incapacity on the part of any one group of peoples to assimilate the cultural achievements of another, or to play its part in the general movement of civilization. This may be combined with the notion of unity in the sense of continuous descent from a common origin. (ii) Secondly, by unity we may mean interdependence and interconnection between the various civilizations or groupings of men. Such interconnection does not necessarily imply unity in the first sense. On the contrary co-operation may be of greater value between groups differing markedly in type or character. Interconnection obviously admits of variation in degree and amount, ranging from occasional contacts to continuous organic interrelations. (iii) Thirdly, by unity may be meant the process of unification, that is to say, the fact that in the course of history there has occurred and is occurring a growth of interconnection, an extension of the range of common organization. With this may be connected the inference that such unification will culminate in a world-wide order covering the whole of mankind. (iv) Fourthly, by the unity of mankind may be meant the view that social processes are subject to laws, which owing to the similarity of human nature may be shown to hold good in all civilizations. (v) Finally, we may mean that there is a fundamental unity of purpose in all mankind, not in the sense that all men are conscious of such identity of aim, but that a rational order is conceivable, defining a good common to all mankind, and that there is an element of rationality in all men giving ground for the belief that an effective common will may some day be secured directed to this common good. The first of these conceptions, that of uniformity of type or character, has recently been attacked as a result of the revival of the doctrine of fundamental race differences. In its other meanings the notion of unity is challenged principally in two directions. Firstly, there are those who doubt the possibility of establishing any general laws of social life and social evolution. Others insist on what may be called the relativity of history. According to them there is no such thing as a universal humanity, but distinct and qualitatively different civilizations, each going through its own process of development and having no common goal. This goes back to the German Romantic movement with its emphasis on the national mind or *Volksgeist*,

but receives its most extreme formulation in Spengler's philosophy of history.¹ Connected with this is a repudiation of the Stoic conception of a universal rational law binding all mankind, and an emphasis of the sociological relativity of all morals.

(i) *Race Differences.* The problem of the rôle of race in the history of humanity is so complex and its discussion has been obscured so much by political passions and prejudices that there is very little that can lay claim to scientific certainty. Here I can only outline certain provisional conclusions which seem to me to be reasonable in the light of the available evidence.

(a) As regards the problem of origins there is wide agreement among physical anthropologists that independent origination in more than one continent is unlikely. The general view is that man arose from a small group of anthropoids who had a relatively limited distribution, and it is further probable that the local races of primal man differed from each other slightly, but each had in common certain minor characters.² The main groups of mankind are considered to have arisen independently from these unspecialized stocks, and to have achieved more definite characterization in the course of their dispersal. The genealogical affinities of the principal groups now found are, however, much disputed, and many great authorities regard the attempt at genealogical classification as hopeless. Apart from certain characters which divide the great groups of mankind, such as hair-form, the differences between groups are not absolute. There is, that is to say, much overlap and the difference is one of frequency distribution. The departures from the supposed "type" may be due to mixture, but also to inherent variability and to the survival of traits from earlier undifferentiated stocks. This makes classification somewhat arbitrary and infinitely complicates the problem of tracing genetic affinities.

(b) The characteristics which have been used by anthropologists as racial criteria are physical attributes such as hair-form, pigmentation, certain facial traits such as nasal form, lip-form, the form of the head and stature and bodily proportions. Extremely little is known of physiological differences, but it is these which are important to the sociologist, as probably correlated with temperamental differences. As regards mental characters in general, it is probable

¹ "Mankind is a zoological expression or an empty word" (*The Decline of the West*, I, p. 12). "There is no such thing as a universal human ethic" (I, p. 471).

² Cf. Haddon, *The Races of Man*, p. 141.

on general grounds that there are racial differences at least in the frequency with which certain traits appear in different groups. But we know very little about these matters. The evidence is mainly "anecdotal" and biased.¹ Psychologists have begun to obtain estimates by means of mental tests, but so far no method has been devised for disentangling the genetic from the environmental factors. The verdict is "not proven." If, as is likely, there are inborn differences between the groups, they are unquestionably accentuated by environmental factors. Further, there is always much overlapping, and the individual differences within the groups are greater than the differences between the groups.

(c) The determination of the genetic elements in national, as distinguished from racial, character presents great difficulties. Theoretically, national character might be interpreted as due to the intermingling of different racial stocks, given a certain stability and permanence by relative isolation and inbreeding and the selective activity of the social environment. But we know little of the original mental characters of the component stocks. What the Roman writers, for example, have to tell us of the mental characters of the Gauls and the Germans, if it is to be taken seriously at all, is certainly of little use in arriving, say, at the mental constitution of the Alpine and Nordic races, and of still slighter value in arriving at a racial interpretation of the present German and French nations. Moreover, since traits segregate in inheritance and are transmitted independently, we must expect new combinations and there need be no close correlation between physical and psychical traits. Hence Professor Kossina may be perfectly right in saying that "Nordic souls may often be combined with un-Nordic bodies, and a decidedly un-Nordic soul may lurk in a perfectly good Nordic body."² If this is so, the explanation of existing national traits in terms of the supposed psychical characters of original racial components becomes a very hazardous venture. It must be pointed out further that the racial basis of nations has hitherto been discussed in much too

¹ Similar attributes are often differently characterized according to the bias of the author. Thus Aryan "*Wanderlust*" or "spirit of adventure" becomes "destructive nomadism" when applied to Semites or Mongolians; so the love of freedom may become the spirit of anarchy; fidelity abject or slavish submission; German national pride is French Gallic vanity; English perfidy is German *Realpolitik*; Semitic intolerance is Aryan firmness in self-expression. Cf. Hertz, art. "Rasse" in *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*.

² *Ursprung der Germanen*, p. 127.

general terms. None of the European nations date farther back than a thousand years, but while some may have achieved a certain stability and homogeneity of character, others are relatively recent, created by the exigencies of the balance of power. Even for the old-established nations we know singularly little how far the intermixture has gone, since we cannot estimate the amount of migration from locality to locality or the effectiveness of the barriers of class and religion in preventing intermarriage. In a country like France for example,

what racial bonds unite the Flamand of Hazebrouck to the Breton of Quimper or the Basque of Doniane or the Provençal of Nice? There is greater racial kinship between the French and Spanish Catalans than between a citizen of Arles-sur-Tech and a Lorrainian of Nancy. Even between Amiens and Chartres the differences strike the eye. What then is the French nation regarded from the point of view of race? ¹

The view sometimes put forward that nations are races in the making seems hardly applicable to any of the modern nations, and nationality and race remain quite distinct ideas. In any event there is no ground for holding that national groupings are permanent entities with ineradicable differences putting a limit to their powers of adaptation or cultural co-operation.

(d) In view of these complexities it is clear that we have not yet the material for a just estimate of the relations between race and culture. We may, however, be reasonably certain that racial purity and seclusion is not an agent of cultural development, and that most civilizations have been the product of more than one race. Indeed many anthropologists and historians have maintained with some plausibility that race mixture has played a decisive rôle in the advance of culture. By way of illustration it is held that the Sumerian and Egyptian civilizations rested upon an intermingling of Mediterranean and Alpine (or at least broad-headed) stocks; that the Greek civilization involved a fusion of Mediterranean, Alpine, and Nordic elements. It is worth noting that such a vigorous opponent of the racial hypothesis as the late J. M. Robertson regarded race mixture as an important cultural stimulus and relative homogeneity as a fundamental drawback conducive to stagnation. He thinks, for instance, that a study of the European Renaissance shows that the development occurred in virtue of access to the remains of Græco-Roman culture and to Saracen

¹ René Johannet, *Le Principe des Nationalités*, p. 381.

learning, and in proportion to the degree of admixture of physical type.¹ Similarly Professor Toynbee in his recent work speaks of a law to the effect "that the geneses of civilizations require contributions from more races than one."² The comment I should like to make on these views is that while the fruitfulness of culture contacts is beyond doubt, the part played by the purely genetic factors has not yet been disentangled. In many instances culture contact results in important changes where the purely ethnic effects are slight or nil. The effects of the contact between the European and other peoples, for example, are out of all proportion to the degree of racial admixture. It is thus perfectly possible that what is important is not the physical admixture, as such, but the cultural stimulus which comes with it. Upon the whole a study of the spread of culture strongly suggests that whatever differences in inborn traits there may be between racial groups we cannot attribute their distinctive contributions to the racial factor as such. It is certainly impossible to predict the future evolution of any racial group on the ground of its inherent capacities. The futility of such predictions on the basis of the fixity of racial types has been amply demonstrated by the attitude of Europeans to the "unchanging East." It is now being exemplified by the rapid evolution of the Negro races. They are revealing a capacity for development that would have seemed incredible to most people half a century ago.³

(ii) *Unity as Interdependence.* That the world is now an interdependent whole is almost a commonplace. The recent progress in transport and communication has facilitated contacts, co-operative and antagonistic, on a scale undreamt of in former ages. The development of industry has led to an interweaving and interlocking of interests which has broken down isolation and renders increasingly futile any attempts at autarchy or self-sufficiency. Politically the world is, it is true, not yet a single system, but all states are so inter-related that no change can occur in any of them without profound repercussions on the rest. It is being increasingly recognized that no solution of the political or economic problems within any one state is possible, without reference to world-problems and world unrest.⁴ This interdependence is, in the main, the achievement of

¹ *Evolution of States*, p. 340.

² *A Study of History*, vol. I, p. 240.

³ Cf. Westermann, *The African To-day*, p. 30.

⁴ "Peace is indivisible" rightly remarked the Russian minister in London in a recent speech; it cannot be kept in western Europe while it is broken in eastern Europe and Asia.

the last four centuries, and it is the expression of the ebullient energy of the European peoples. But it is by no means a new phenomenon. Recent archaeological work brings out the essential unity and continuity of the civilizations of the ancient East. In the fourth millennium B.C. the civilizations of Egypt, India, and Babylonia were in regular intercourse and had a common cultural basis. The links between these centres of civilization and the European barbarisms of prehistory are also more or less definitely established.¹ Cultural interaction is the lesson taught by the whole of history and prehistory. Mediterranean culture, itself an extremely composite product, influenced the whole of Europe and America. The Mohammedan civilization rested upon a fusion of Semitic and Hellenistic elements. The spread of Mohammedanism to India, the Malay Islands, and even to China, and the penetration of Buddhism into China and Japan are instances of the close interrelations of civilizations due to factors other than the welding power of European economic and political imperialism. Such interrelation appears always to have existed without, however, hindering the development or survival of highly individual types of culture. What is relatively new is the consciousness of this mutual dependence and the movements of deliberate encouragement or hostility to which it is now giving rise throughout the world.

(iii) *Unity as a Process of Unification.* This includes the increase in the size of political aggregates which may be observed in the course of history, the growth of interconnection between them, politically and economically, and what may perhaps be termed cultural assimilation or convergence in science, art, religion, and mode of life generally. The study of this vast process in its various aspects constitutes one of the most important divisions of general sociology, though systematic investigations on an adequate scale are still lacking. That there has occurred an increase of organization both in scale and intensity is, however, clear on even a cursory review of the evidence. The political units of the primitive peoples are generally small. In America and Oceania the numbers run from a few hundred to perhaps five or ten thousand, though occasionally loose confederations of larger dimensions came into being, as in the famous Iroquois League estimated at seventeen to twenty thousand. On the other hand, in Africa the range is very wide, and we find very small units subsisting side by side with large

¹ Cf. Gordon Childe, *The Most Ancient East*.

monarchies running into tens of thousands or even millions of subjects. The Aztec kings had authority over perhaps a quarter of a million people, and in ancient Peru much larger numbers were brought under central control. In general, in the primitive world the larger aggregates had little power of endurance, the binding forces of conqueror kings not being equal to the centrifugal tendencies of the component groups. Of the ancient Oriental empires only rough estimates can be given. That of Egypt is stated as between three and seven millions. The Persian Empire reached eighty millions, but it existed only for 250 years and then fell to pieces. These theocratic aggregations had little political or economic unity. They were mostly tribute-collecting, military aristocracies which did not succeed in welding into a whole the self-contained units within them, or in impressing upon their subjects a common and distinctive civilization. China, with its vast population of about 400 millions, has achieved a measure of unity in civilization, but politically it remained chaotic till the close of the last century, and it has not yet emerged from the chaos. The modern world exhibits a series of units steadily increasing in volume and density from the earlier territorial states of roughly a half to two millions, to the national states of two to fifty millions, and finally the empire-states with populations up to 500 millions.¹ Whether these modern empires will prove to have greater powers of endurance and cohesion than the ancient ones we cannot tell. The sentiment of nationalism which gave the European peoples their driving power is now becoming universal and is producing movements for independence which may break up the large empires, at any rate in so far as they still rest upon an authoritarian basis. On the whole the tendency to the formation of ever larger units seems well established, though, of course, a great many forms of decentralization within the larger units are theoretically conceivable and will no doubt be tried out.

Of at least equal importance to the increase which has occurred in the size of the political and economic units is the growth of interconnection between them. The majority of the states of the world to-day are members of an association of states (about 56 out of the 68 states are members of the League of Nations), and the economic interdependence of the world is too well known to need further elaboration here. The problem of cultural assimilation or con-

¹ Cf. G. Schmoller, *Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre*, II, pp. 762 seq.

vergence presents greater difficulties and hardly lends itself to rapid summarization. In the political sphere it is clear that the methods and ideas of the Western peoples are rapidly being adopted, no doubt with considerable modifications, to suit particular conditions throughout the world. It is to be noted that this process of assimilation does not necessarily make for unity in the sense of solidarity. For tendencies to autarchy and exaggerated nationalism are spreading as rapidly as the ideas of democracy and international co-operation. It is also extremely difficult to estimate the depth and genuineness of the process of assimilation. How much in common is there, for example, between Japanese parliamentarism on the one hand and say Chinese parliamentarism on the other, and European forms of popular government?

Economic assimilation is at first sight more obvious, but closer examination shows that the widespread ideas of the rapid Westernization of the world are somewhat exaggerated. Professor Tawney's recent survey of conditions in China shows, for example, that apart from half a dozen cities the industrial revolution has hardly more than begun. The estimated number of factory workers is not more than 2.5 millions, and apart from a few exceptional cities they form a small minority of the working population. Professor Tawney thinks it probable that, despite the present craze for imitation, capitalist industry will be moulded by the Chinese to suit their cultural requirements and that "it will be propagated in a Chinese version or not at all."¹ In extent of industrialization India is now probably half-way between Japan and China. According to the 1931 Census, 67.1 per cent. of the total occupied population are engaged on agriculture, pasture, fishing, and hunting, while only 10 per cent. are occupied in industries. Of these the majority are in small-scale industry, and it is estimated that less than 2.3 per cent. (about 3.5 millions) persons are in registered factories.² In Japan, on the other hand, industrialization has gone much farther, and about 55 per cent. of the population lives in towns of more than 5,000. In the Near East the process of Europeanization or Westernization appears to have followed everywhere much the same lines. Since the war efforts have everywhere been made to improve the means of communication, to encourage industrialization and intensive agriculture, to build up national financial institutions and to

¹ *Land and Labour in China*, pp. 128 seq.

² I am indebted for these figures to Dr. Vera Anstey.

resist economic domination by foreigners. The State is being secularized, and education on modern lines is replacing the older modes of instruction, though the separation of state and religion has not everywhere been so drastic as in Turkey.¹ No one can foretell how these drastic and revolutionary changes will affect Mohammedan civilization, or how it will ultimately react to the divergent influences of western Europe and Russia. The Westernization of economic and political institutions, it must be remembered, is everywhere qualified and countered by the spread of nationalism, which must tend to emphasize cultural peculiarities and for a time at least to erect barriers to further assimilation. On the other hand, the very universalization of nationalism may tend to reveal its inherent contradictions and to bring home to every people the urgent need for world-wide institutions and associations. If we leave the economic and political plane and turn to the cultural, the degree of assimilation is, of course, much more difficult to ascertain. It is certain that the great civilizations of the Far East, of Islam, and of India will not abandon their distinctive character ; but it is equally certain that closer links will be forged between them and the European civilizations, while it is not unreasonable to assume that a distinctive African civilization will emerge in close relation with the rest. Despite the fact that at present cultural assimilation has affected mainly matters of outward behaviour and the superficialities of life, it is not unlikely that there will be convergence in deeper matters also, though this must not be taken to imply the dominance of Western ideas and cultural patterns. But predictions are idle until we know a great deal more than we do at present of the laws governing the relations between economic factors and other elements of social life. Economic unification in the sense of interdependence and convergence is likely enough to be world-wide, but whether this will be accompanied by similar convergence in other spheres of human activity may well be doubted, and there is a great deal to be said for the view that the effectiveness of diffusion is in inverse ratio to the delicacy and subtlety of the elements transmitted.

(iv) *The Unity of Sociological Laws.* That social life is subject to law is, of course, a fundamental assumption of all social science. How far does this assumption imply a belief in the unity of mankind ? The answer to this question depends upon what we are to

¹ Cf. Hans Kohn, *Die Europäisierung des Orients*.

understand by social laws. If social laws state regularities of association or connection between different elements within given societies, or regularities in the changes which they undergo, then it would seem that we need assume no unity other than that of uniformity of mental structure and of similarity in social and physical conditions. But philosophers of history and sociologists have also sought to formulate laws of social evolution which, in the nature of the case, are applicable not so much to specific societies as to the whole of humanity. Thus when Herbert Spencer asserts that society is subject to the law of evolution, that is of differentiation and integration, he has in mind the "entire assemblage of societies,"¹ since it is clear that particular societies do not necessarily go through the series of changes enumerated by him. Similarly Hobhouse's conception of human development has reference to the whole of humanity, though he is perfectly well aware that the movement goes on in distinct though not unrelated centres, and that the unity which is achieved is a late product rather than an original datum.² Again, Professor Toynbee in his recent work, despite the emphasis he lays on the distinctness of the different civilizations he enumerates, yet in the end applies the notion of social development to the whole of humanity.³ It would obviously be impossible here to examine these very ambitious and comprehensive theories with the fullness which they deserve. I merely remark that, although they all utilize inductive and comparative data on a big scale, yet in the end they rest upon metaphysical views going far beyond sociology and history. Thus Spencer's account of social evolution is but one exemplification of the law of evolution which he felt justified in formulating for the whole of reality; Hobhouse postulates a Central Mind as an element in all reality making for order and harmony; Professor Toynbee appears to assume a Bergsonian *élan vital* which finds expression in the creation of civilizations and reaches out beyond the societies already formed. Here we have been concerned only with the trends of sociological facts, and these, so far as I can see, do not point with any certainty to a unitary principle which would enable us to pass from the partial and relatively external processes of unification, which have been occurring amidst much violence and conflict, to a deeper form of organic connections binding into a unity the whole of mankind. The unification hitherto achieved is

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, III, p. 598.

² *Social Development*, p. 315.

³ *A Study of History*, III, p. 390.

in itself no guarantec of further and more intimate interconnection. Indeed, as Freud and Bergson, approaching the subject from very different angles, have recently pointed out, the strength of the bonds which link the members of a group to each other seems to depend upon and to vary with hostility to other groups, and unity within has frequently been furthered by fear and hatred of the stranger without. May it not be then that what has been happening in human history is merely the substitution of struggle between large groups for that between small ones, and the replacement of the ethics of the tribe by the ethics of the nation?

(v) *Unity of Purpose.* In the long run the most important argument for the unity of mankind is not that unification has been proceeding and must continue, but that we can conceive of a good common to all mankind and therefore ought to work for it. The clarification of this conception and the recognition of the obligation which it imposes upon us may well turn out to be an important and perhaps decisive factor in converting what is at present an abstract idea into a living reality. It is a fundamental error to regard all social processes as occurring automatically or independently of the human will. The conflicts which devastate mankind are the result largely of a misdirection of will, due to ignorance, and the lack of co-ordinated guidance. They can only be overcome by bringing the methods of science to bear upon problems relating not only to the means but also the ends of life. We need to know above all whether the differences that divide men relate to ends or to means. Do individualists and socialists, for example, differ in their conception of the purpose of social life, or is theirs a quarrel about means and methods? Do class and national antagonisms imply an ineradicable divergence of view regarding ultimate values, or are they the result of a struggle for the means which each group finds necessary for the attainment of its ends? That no large group of men can hope to solve its own problems without paying attention to the rest of mankind is now plain fact. What is needed is a united effort by ethics and social science to define the relations of the various ends to each other and to the means which are available for their realization, and thus to give to the bare idea of a self-directing humanity that fullness of vivid and concrete detail without which it can make no appeal to the masses of men.

At this point we are met by a very widespread denial of the possibility of a rational ethics and scepticism of the power of reason

to influence social movements. The most insidious attack on the unity of mankind comes from those who insist on the relativity of all moral ideas and who deny the existence of universal principles binding on all men. The Protagorean maxim, "man is the measure of all things," appears in the form, "the group, the nation, the race is the measure of all things." Beyond the racial or national group there is no *Sittlichkeit*, no common standard of appeal, no general will, and the ethical differences between the groups admit of no rational or scientific adjustment. This position I consider to be fundamentally false, and to rest upon a misunderstanding of the variations which are actually found in the moral judgments of the different groups of mankind.

When such variations are carefully scrutinized they are seen to be traceable to differences in the general level of thought, to change in religious beliefs, to the varying complexity of social and political circumstances, to variations in the clarity with which the ends of life are apprehended, to the dominance of partial interests, and above all to confusions arising out of the difficulty of defining the relations between the collective good and its component parts. There is no reason for believing that the problems which thus arise do not permit of scientific investigations or of solution in terms of universal principles.

The view that reason is concerned with means only and not with ends is, I think, based upon a defective analysis of the relations between impulse, feeling, and reason. Reason penetrates into the ends themselves, brings them into clearer consciousness, defines and systematizes them, and in so doing transforms them. A scientific ethics would carry this process farther by trying to disentangle the assumptions upon which actual moral judgments rest and to discover the general principles in the light of which they can be criticized and systematized. The view sometimes put forward that moral judgments are a series of final and unrelated intuitions does not seem to be borne out by the history of either ethical theory or moral practice. Despite the aberrations and crudities of which the history of human conduct is full, I can see no ground for abandoning our faith in the rational ordering of life or for putting our trust either in blind impulses or mysterious intuitions.

But even if the theoretical possibility of a rational ethic be accepted, the question may still be raised of its actual influence in human affairs. Such doubts are in line with the widely current

distrust of reason and the emphasis on unconscious impulses and hidden drives, but they are never carried to their logical conclusion. If men are really dominated entirely by these unconscious elements in human nature, it is difficult to see why they seek to rationalize their behaviour, and why they have at least to think themselves in the right in order to act with energy and resolution. If it be urged with writers like Pareto that this *besoin de raisonner* is merely another inborn tendency with no claims to superiority over the rest, then all our efforts to subject human activities to scientific analysis must be declared illusory, including the theory that such efforts are illusory, and we might as well abandon the entire pursuit. But in fact there is no real ground for the view that human ideals are the one thing in our experience which cannot be submitted to rational tests, or the one element in our make-up which lacks all driving power. "Sophistication," as Hobhouse said, neatly varying an adage, "is the tribute which fallacy pays to reason," and the popularity which vague or merely plausible theories enjoy is evidence of the need for rational justification. No one in fact questions the influence of bad theories. It is only of the efficacy of good ones that people are sceptical.¹

It may be urged that what is wanted at present is not more knowledge or further discoveries in ethics, but a deeper realization of the principles already known. It is not for want of admirable doctrine, as Shelley has said, that men hate, and despise, and censure and deceive, and subjugate one another.² Nothing is in fact more striking in the history of morals than the distance or discrepancy between the ethical teachings of the spiritual religions and the moral principles which actually guide even enlightened men. "Not by hate is hate destroyed ; by love alone is hate destroyed," says the Buddha. "I would return good for good ; I would also return good for evil," says Lao Tse. "Resist not evil" is the doctrine of Christianity. We echo the essentials of this Buddhist-Tao-Christian teaching when we say that force is no remedy and sing the praises of liberty. Yet these formulæ sound unconvincing and at bottom we do not think them in harmony with cool common sense. This uneasy feeling of discrepancy is no doubt due in part to the strength of the self-assertive and aggressive elements in our nature to which I will return. But it is in part due to real difficulties and ambiguities in the doctrines referred to which permit of, and require, scientific

¹ Cf. *Social Development*, p. 203.

² *Defence of Poetry*.

analysis. The questions that are raised are in part questions of fact. Whether hatred ceases by love, whether forbearance is more effective than force, whether repression really resolves conflict, are problems not only of ethics but of moral psychology and sociology. To what extent freedom can be secured without compulsion, or how far it can be reconciled with order is a difficult problem of practical politics. The comparative failure of the doctrines of universal benevolence and of freedom is thus not to be ascribed entirely to the hard-heartedness of men or to the obtuseness of their imagination, but also to the one-sidedness of these doctrines and the real difficulties that are encountered, when the attempt is made to apply them to the complex problems of large societies.

The part played by the self-assertive and aggressive impulses in obstructing the unity of mankind has been discussed a great deal of late in connection with the problem of the origins of war. Three somewhat different views emerge. There are those who regard war as the outcome of economic factors and who insist that it is inherent in the existing forms of "capitalist" industry. There are others who deny that there is any necessary connection between capitalism and war and who maintain, on the contrary, that whatever may have been the case in the past they are now incompatible. On this view war is due to the atavistic survival of tendencies rooted in earlier social conditions and of dynastic conceptions of the State impregnated with the ideas of glory and power ; or, as Sir Norman Angell appears to hold, to the absence of adequate international institutions and the persistence of false beliefs and unreal abstractions or illusions, which makes rational control difficult and induces the masses of men to give their approval to lines of policy which they would probably condemn if they realized vividly the consequences to which such policy must necessarily lead. The third view is most clearly represented in psycho-analytic writings. According to this the fundamental, as distinguished from the precipitating, causes of war are to be found in the inherent aggressiveness of human nature and the failure of the repressive mechanisms whereby these aggressive tendencies are normally checked or held in balance. This being so, no improvement in the educational system and no changes in political or social institutions will go to the root of the trouble until efforts are made to eliminate the unconscious tensions and to dry up the sources of anxiety and hate. I cannot pretend to weigh up here the merits of these rival views, and must content myself

with a few brief remarks. In the first place, as far as the economic factors are concerned, the issue is confused by the vague use of terms like capitalism and socialism. It is quite possible that war is not necessarily inherent in "capitalism" as such, that is to say, as theoretically constructed by liberal economists, but that it is the outcome rather of the irrational elements which persist in it despite the teaching of the economists. It is further arguable that a great deal can be done to diminish the probability of war within the limits of the capitalist structure of society by getting rid of the "great illusion" which Sir Norman Angell has done so much to expose, and by the provision of international institutions for the adjustment of disputes and the removal of obstacles to free intercourse and the discouragement of the present dangerous tendencies to autarchy and economic isolation. On the other hand, it is by no means to be taken for granted that socialist nations will necessarily escape these illusions and these tendencies to isolation so long as the world consists of peoples at very different levels of industrial development and is harrassed by fears, overweening superiorities, and rankling inferiorities. Socialists and capitalists alike have to face the element of unreason in man and the real difficulties of choice in complex economic and political issues which frequently lead men to pursue policies which, though not directly aimed at war, eventually lead to it. In the second place, the strength of the psycho-analytic case lies in its insistence on the elements of unreason, on the deep-seated anxieties, frustrations, and hatreds which find an outlet in war. Otherwise, how account for the readiness with which men are persuaded of the utility of war and the comparative ease with which an atmosphere is engendered during a war favourable to credulity, vainglory, and hysterical intolerance. Nevertheless, the psycho-analytic attitude is perhaps too individualistic. It pays insufficient attention to the effect of institutions upon the actual behaviour of people. Institutions, no doubt, in the long run reflect the character of the individuals sustaining them. But it is at least equally true that they react upon that character, and what is perhaps more important is that in changing circumstances they select the particular types of character which suit them or evoke tendencies hitherto dormant. The Englishmen of the Restoration, if I may use an example given by Hobhouse in another connection, cannot have differed materially in their common nature from the Englishmen of the Commonwealth, but what was most repressed in 1655

was most triumphant in 1660. Similarly, it is not to be supposed that the character of the German people has altered with the advent of the present regime, but rather that different phases in that character or different types of individuals are in it allowed predominant expression. In this way vast changes are brought about in the actual behaviour of the people, of the greatest significance in matters of war and peace, which yet do not involve any such radical transformation of mind and character as is contemplated by the psychoanalysts. It is to be remembered further that what is important in the psychology of war is not aggressiveness as such, which might find many other outlets, but its combination with other drives such as economic motives and the desire for power. This combination is favoured by existing economic and political systems with their glorification of national prestige and the worship of wealth, and might be broken up by a change in these institutions. The psychological and the institutional methods are thus complementary, and the possibilities of both must be explored if a rational solution of the problem of war is to be reached. Great as are the obstacles to human unity and deep-seated as are the antagonisms between men, we can find no justification in sociology or psychology for an attitude of fatalistic pessimism. It is to be remembered that the notion of conscious self-direction is comparatively new. Even within the limits of the highly organized states it can hardly be claimed that the notion of a common good has yet attained sufficient rational coherence to make it an effective force in social life. The great states have not yet discovered how to utilize in the interests of social well-being the vast increase in power due to the growth of the natural sciences. In relation to international problems rational control is still in its elementary stages. "Humanity," says Hobhouse, "has been regarded as a being that lives and learns through the ages. As compared with an individual organism, its hitherto acquired power of assimilating the teaching of experience must be placed somewhere on the level of the sea anemone."¹ Yet is not the comparative recency of the notion of self-direction a ground of hope, and may we not conclude with Comte and Hobhouse that its emergence may constitute a turning-point in the history of humanity, beyond which progress may be expected to be both rapid and assured? The rate of unification has certainly been increasing enormously in the fields of economics and politics. What is needed

¹ Cf. *Social Development*, p. 336.

is a parallel growth in moral wisdom. To bring social development into closer accord with ethical development is the task of social science and of social ethics in our time. In the long run our faith in the unity of mankind must rest upon our faith in the unity of the human reason.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

MORAL PROGRESS¹

THE idea of progress which dominated all thought in the latter part of the nineteenth century began to be seriously questioned in the beginning of this century, and in the interval between the world wars there was a widespread impression that it was about to be relegated to the realm of exploded myths.² Professor Bury in an exhaustive historical study, published in 1920, still regarded it as occupying a commanding position, but predicted that it might in the end fall a victim to its own denial of finality and argued that its value as a doctrine was "only relative, corresponding to a not very advanced stage of civilization; just as Providence, in its day, was an idea of relative value, corresponding to a stage somewhat less advanced."³ Anthropologists, who had become sceptical of the value of evolutionary ideas in sociology, were even more critical of the notion of progressive evolution. "Neither morphologically nor dynamically," says Professor Lowie, "can social life be said to have progressed from a stage of savagery to a stage of enlightenment."⁴ The notion of a unitary mankind moving towards a common goal was particularly challenged by German writers, notably Spengler.⁵ From another angle, Pareto, while admitting an onward movement in economic production and in the arts and the sciences, argued that reason had so far proved impotent in dealing with problems of social and political organisation, and the humanitarian movement in particular was dismissed by him with bitter derision.⁶ Among the humanitarians themselves the gnawing doubt insinuated itself whether the movement for which they stood was not merely a temporary product of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and whether the main

¹ Being the Frazer Lecture delivered within the University of Glasgow on 18 April, 1944.

² "The Myth of Progress," by M. D. Eder in *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, vol. XII, Pt. I, 1932.

³ J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, 1920, p. 352.

⁴ R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, 1921, p. 427.

⁵ O. Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, 1919.

⁶ V. Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, 4 vols., 1935.

tendency of the modern mind was not moving in the opposite direction towards a supermoral or amoral age, indifferent to the claims of reason and humanity.¹ These doubts were intensified by the failures and disillusion of the post-war period and by the rise of Fascism and Nazism which pride themselves on the rejection of the ideas essential to the notion of progress, rational self-determination and a universal ethic binding on all mankind.

There are signs that the tide of sceptical criticism is now receding. Several factors have contributed to this reversal of views. To begin with, those who have been influenced by Marxist theories could not really abandon the notion of development. Although Marxist writers speak with contempt of bourgeois evolutionary sociology, they themselves teach that history is a dynamic process of change following immanent laws. The changes, no doubt, proceed by a series of revolutions, but these follow a regular rhythm and reflect the way in which mankind adapts itself to the outer environment. Marxists further share the optimistic attitude of the early believers in progress and look forward confidently to an age when the "true realm of freedom will blossom out of the realm of necessity in the fully developed Communist Society of the future."²

Another factor working in the same direction is the recent revival or restatement of what may be called the generalized theory of evolution. According to this view the antithesis drawn by T. H. Huxley³ between cosmic evolution and ethical evolution is to be rejected. Social evolution, of which the ethical is a part, is to be regarded rather as the last in a series of ascending levels of integration and differentiation. This theory takes many forms. It may be fitted into the framework of the philosophical theory of emergent evolution as by Lloyd Morgan.⁴ It may be combined with Marxist views as by Needham.⁵ It may be treated more strictly from the biological angle as by J. S. Huxley.⁶ But in all cases the essential point is that social evolution, including the evolution of morals is no longer regarded as outside nature but

¹ L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1915, p. 612.

² K. Marx, *Kapital*, III, p. 355.

³ T. H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, The Romanes Lecture, 1893.

⁴ C. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, 1923.

⁵ J. Needham, *Time the Refreshing River*, 1943.

⁶ J. S. Huxley, *Evolutionary Ethics*, The Romanes Lecture, 1943.

as falling within it. At a certain stage in the evolutionary order further evolution takes place, not as hitherto through selection of new variants, but through the formation of societies, and these develop a method of transmission by means of tradition which in the main replaces the method of genetic transmission through the mechanism of heredity. On this view mutual aid, the sense of justice, moral and legal codes replace at least in part the bare struggle for existence as agents in the process of evolution. In this way the notion of progress which had hitherto been regarded as extra-scientific is brought back to the field of science and scientific warrant is claimed for ethics.

Finally reference must be made to a change of mood, partly reflected in these scientific theories, but even more noticeable in popular thought, the result of a reaction against the mood of cynicism and disillusion characteristic of the period between the two wars. There is a widespread feeling that the troubles of our time are due in the main to a failure of moral wisdom to keep pace with the advance in technical science. Even in the period of disillusion the critics of moral ideals protested too much. Their very criticisms betrayed an underlying faith in the value and power of ideals. Even the Nazi glorification of the irrational is by no means whole-hearted. It bears all the marks of a hidden fear of the power of reason and is an unconscious tribute to that power. In any case the period of "debunking" seems to be over and there is evidence of a longing for a revival of faith and for a justification of the hope that mankind can in a measure shape its future in accordance with moral values. Those who have attacked the problem from a religious point of view may perhaps be sceptical of the all-sufficiency of human effort. But even they stress what they call the dynamic view of human history and the importance of human efforts being directed by a restored faith in ultimate values.

In these circumstances, it has seemed to me important to review the problem of progress afresh in the hope of obtaining a clearer definition of the issues involved. A few words must be said first on matters of terminology. The term evolution, in its application to social change, it is generally agreed, should be used in an ethically neutral sense. Those who have followed the analogy of organic evolution understand by social evolution a process by which out of a few relatively simple social structures a great variety

of increasingly complex forms has arisen.¹ Others, using the older and wider notion of development have been concerned rather to work out an interpretation of human history as a gradual unfolding of human potentialities. Hobhouse, in a very elaborate study² has suggested criteria for estimating the extent of social development, thus conceived. These criteria are not ethical in character but are such as might be used by a biologist when he distinguishes between higher and lower forms of life. They are scale or size of social organization, efficiency or the power of using natural forces as means to human ends, freedom or the release of spontaneous energy in all the component members of the group and mutuality or co-operation between the members of the group and between groups. All-round development would have to satisfy all these criteria. In fact, as Hobhouse shows, development in one direction has often conflicted with or defeated development in other directions, though taking the whole history of humanity there may have been a net gain.

The notion of progress, of course, arose independently of modern theories of evolution and from the outset had an ethical connotation. It involved, I think, the following elements. First, it meant a belief in the power of the human reason to shape the course of social change. The progress of mankind was not conceived to be an automatic process but rested on deliberate or consciously directed human effort. Second, it involved a belief in the unity of mankind, accompanied by the belief that the potentialities of man can only be fully attained by world-wide co-operation. Third, there was the belief in universalist ethics; the belief that is that there are universal moral principles binding upon and applicable to all men irrespective of racial or national grouping. Fourth, there was an assumption that there is nothing in human nature so intractable that it permits of no adjustment, nothing in the process of development which necessarily involves self-defeat.

It is easy to see that, in the above use of the terms, social evolution or development is not necessarily progressive. Increasing efficiency, for example, may be attained at the loss of freedom. Increase in the scale of organization may be obtained by methods which hinder further unification or in other ways contradict the

¹ A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, "On Social Structure," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. LXX, 1940.

² L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, 1924.

principles of universalist ethics. Progress, is in short that kind of social evolution which moves in the direction of human solidarity, guided by rational principles considered as common to and binding all mankind.

All progress, as distinguished from evolution or development, is in a sense moral progress, in other words, it is a movement towards a better state of affairs. We can, however, also speak of moral progress as meaning progress in morality. This seems to consist in the clarification of moral ideas, the removal of inconsistencies between moral rules, a clearer understanding of human needs and purposes, the enlargement of the area within which moral principles are applied and increasing approximation of behaviour to the demands of the moral code. It may also involve the discovery of fresh moral principles and the emergence of new rights and duties with changing circumstances. Like all social development, moral progress does not necessarily involve changes in the genetic make-up of man. It consists rather in the building up of a tradition which makes it possible for each generation to re-acquire, perhaps more easily, what has been achieved by former generations and, in turn, to prepare the ground for coming generations. Moral progress need not, of course, be continuous, nor proceed at a uniform rate and it does not involve denial of retrogression. Those who deny the reality of moral progress would probably maintain that moral ideals are constant, that the fundamental moral patterns remain the same, despite variations in form. The observable variations in content they would add, do not originate from moral sources, but arise from changes in human needs or the methods of satisfying them, which are brought about by changes in technology and perhaps by changes in social structure, and such changes are not necessarily for the better. More moderate opponents would perhaps say that the case for moral progress is unproven and that if a distinctively moral development has occurred, it cannot be disentangled from the general changes which human culture has undergone.

We may approach this problem by glancing briefly at what may be learnt from comparative ethics of the extent of variance and stability in moral codes. It may safely be said that comparative ethics knows of no pre-moral stage, that is of any societies where there are no rules, upheld by the general judgment of the people, distinguishing between what may or may not be done.

If there has been a development of morals, it has been a development within the field of morality and not a development of morals out of something else. When we look at the codes in detail we find that all known societies insist on some degree of internal peace and order and tend to give public approval to whatever acts contribute to the satisfaction of social needs and the preservation of the continuity of the group, and similarly to disapprove of whatever acts disturb social relations and social peace. Contrary to widespread views on this matter we find, amidst noteworthy divergencies, striking similarities between different codes, and it would be perfectly possible to classify the morals of the most primitive peoples by the aid of categories which have universal significance. For purposes of brief comparison we may take the classification of duties suggested by Sir David Ross in a recent work.¹ Analogues to the duties he enumerates can be found almost universally in the civilized and uncivilized world alike.

The duties discussed by Sir David Ross come under the headings of fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence and non-injury and self-improvement. The duties of fidelity, that is broadly of keeping promises and telling the truth are, as Westermarck has shown, widely recognized in primitive societies, though there are considerable variations in the intensity with which their violation is condemned and the usual limitation of the duties towards the members of one's own group. In the ancient civilizations respect for truth is inculcated in all the codes. The Egyptians barely distinguished truth from right. The Babylonian Incantation Tablets condemn dishonesty not only in deed but in intention. "Has he been honest with his mouth while false in heart? With his mouth was he full of yea and in his heart full of nay?"² Truthfulness and sincerity are first principles in Confucian ethics and in Zoroastrianism. According to the Talmud four shall not enter heaven, the scoffer, the liar, the hypocrite and the slanderer. "He who punished the generations of the Flood and the Tower of Babel will also punish him who does not keep his word. Let your yea and nay be both righteous. Do not speak with your mouth what you do not mean in your heart."³

¹ W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (1930).

² A Jeremias, Art. "Ethics and Morality" (Babylonian), *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 5, p. 446.

³ C. G. Montefiore and H. Loewe, *A Rabbinic Anthology*, p. 398.

The second class of duties of providing compensation for a wrongful act are universally recognized, though there are, of course, great variations in the interpretation of what is due to the injured party and in the way in which reparation proper is interwoven with punishment. The duties of gratitude for services rendered or benefits bestowed are also widely acknowledged. "To requite a benefit, to be grateful to him who bestows it is probably everywhere, at least in certain circumstances, regarded as a duty."¹ The fourth class of duties namely those concerned with distributive and corrective justice are most seriously affected by the emergence of class gradations within the group, and by the limitation of all duties to members of the group which characterizes the early moral codes. To give each man his due, *suum cuique tribuere*, is a formula for which wide assent may be claimed, but there are great differences in defining what is *suum*. In a society where caste exists it is just to treat a pariah as a pariah ; in feudal societies to give a man his due meant to give him what belongs to his status. In the middle of the nineteenth century it was not considered unjust that women and children should work sixteen hours a day in the factories for "suitable" wages. We have here an instance of the great divergence in the actual content of moral rules that may be hidden under a general formula.

The duties of beneficence and non-injury are universally recognized. They are partly covered by the duties towards the kindred, and since in early society the bonds of kinship extend further than they do in the higher civilizations, the range of the persons affected by familial duties is correspondingly extended. These are strengthened by duties of mutual aid among group members, as is abundantly shown by Westermarck's survey. All the higher religions inculcate charity as a duty. The duties of non-injury, *neminem laedere*, concern the life, bodily integrity, freedom, honour and property of others. Here again there are noteworthy similarities between different codes, amid considerable variation in answering the question who is to be included in *neminem* and what constitutes an injury. The duties to develop our faculties belong of course mainly to higher levels of moral evolution, but even these are anticipated in primitive morality in the notion of self-respect and proper pride in one's own gifts and capacities.

The great similarities that are found in what may be called

¹ E. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, vol. II, p. 155.

the elementary duties do not preclude great variations. These may fairly easily be traced to a number of sources, among the more important of which seem to be the following. There are to begin with changes in social relations or other circumstances which give a different character to what at first appear to be the same acts and therefore bring them within the scope of different rules. Moneylending, for example, had a different character from that which it has in an industrial age, at a time when there was little or no scope for the employment of money in ordinary business and when surplus incomes could be conceived as lying idle. In these circumstances it was not unreasonable to expect that a neighbour's temporary need should be met by lending without interest, full security for recovery being assured. In other cases changes in social circumstances may affect the way in which different conflicting duties are balanced against each other. Thus, for example, in circumstances of nomadic life, the duty of helping the weak or the old may have to be pitted against the duty of preserving the group, and the latter duty may be thought to override the former in stringency. Again the relative importance of particular duties may shift with a change in circumstances. The duty of charity ceases to loom large in an age when social and economic organization has reached the point when the abolition of poverty by organized effort has become possible. The giving of charity to individuals may then even come to be deprecated as likely to divert attention from the need of a radical reconstruction of the system of property. So again self-redress is condemned in societies which possess a system of public justice, but is regarded as normal in societies where there is no regular machinery for obtaining redress.

A second source of variation is found in the growth of knowledge regarding the nature of acts and the consequences likely to be produced by them. Many of the outstanding differences in moral attitudes are traceable to such changes in the knowledge of the real properties of acts. Here belong especially changes in religious and magical ideas. Thus, for example, the varying attitude to suicide has been influenced by the notion that it is a man's duty to submit to the will of God, by the belief that life is a penance which must not be shirked, by the belief that loyalty to one's superiors involved the duty of following them to the next world, by the belief that to act in defiance of God's will in the

moment of death is the more serious because the individual deprives himself of the opportunity of repentance. The severe condemnation of homosexual practices in Christian countries is, according to Westermarck, to be traced to the abhorrence felt for these acts by the ancient Hebrews on account of their association with idolatrous cults. A most striking example of the influence of religious beliefs on moral attitudes is to be found in the history of religious persecution. The moral judgment approving the persecution of heretics rested on the dogma of the guilt of error and the infectiousness of this guilt. Granted that those who entertain certain beliefs are not only guilty of a heinous crime but by infection are liable to cause the eternal damnation of others, there appeared to be no moral difficulty in concluding that the heretic should be put to death.¹ In this and analogous cases dogmatic theology may inculcate beliefs which then become the basis of moral judgments that otherwise would not be made, and that tend to disappear with loss of faith in the dogma.

A third source of variation closely connected with the second is to be found in the influence exercised on individuals by the people whom they regard as possessed of authority. The belief in an infallible authority, in particular, may induce men to approve of acts which otherwise they would regard with horror. That unbaptized infants were liable to endless and unmitigated torture in expiation of an ancestral crime was a doctrine accepted by men who in other ways were not lacking in moral feeling. As Lecky has shown those who accepted this doctrine did so because they believed it was taught by an infallible authority and that to stifle their moral feelings was a matter of duty and a commendable exercise of humility. In such cases there occurs a kind of dissociation or departmentalization of moral attitudes which makes it possible for a person in certain contexts to give his approval to acts which in others he would condemn as monstrous. It is arguable that in so far as the cruelties now perpetrated in totalitarian countries are widely approved, the approval may rest on this kind of isolation or dissociation and that there too it is made possible by reverence for an infallible authority.

A fourth factor is to be found in the variations of the range of sympathy. Sympathy, in the sense in which it is ethically important, involves the power of imaginative identification with

¹ W. E. H. Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. I, p. 98.

others, the power of entering in imagination into the situation of others, and to react to their feelings as though they were one's own. It is thus the basis of the attitude which makes us ready to do unto another as we would be done by. The strength of sympathy seems to depend on the strength of our social feelings, on the power of imagination and the absence of counteracting emotions. Perhaps the most important variable is imagination upon which depends our power to realize vividly the consequences of our actions on others. The failure to recognize that people belonging to another group, social class, race or nation, are men like ourselves makes possible a discriminatory morality, while the extension of the range of imaginative identification facilitates the universalization of morals or the extension of the area within which common principles are applied.

The variations so far considered are compatible with the assumption that the fundamental moral rules are constant. We have now to consider whether any lines of advance can be discerned. The best established trend is the extension of the range of persons to whom moral judgments are held to apply. As T. H. Green has pointed out, it is not so much the sense of our duty to a neighbour that has varied as the answer to the question who is my neighbour.¹ In primitive morality moral obligations are confined to members of the group and the group may be very small. As the group widens and contacts are established between groups the range of rights and duties extends, though in practice there always remains a distinction between the inner morality and the outer. The fact that morality is still largely group morality is seen in the survival of race discrimination, in the persistence of war and the precariousness of the rules supposed to control behaviour during war.

As far as moral teaching is concerned, the change from the attitude of primitive peoples to that which is found in all the higher religions is enormous. In *Leviticus* we are told "the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." "Love all men," say the Rabbis.² "Against the sage who calls the golden rule the most comprehensive precept of the Thora another quotes as still greater the opening verse of the fifth chapter of Genesis: this is the book of the origins of man

¹ T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 220.

² *Aboth*, I, 12.

which declares all men to have been created in the divine image and therefore to be equally entitled to human love.”¹ “It is worse to steal from a non-Jew than to steal from an Israelite, because of the profanation of the Name.”² Benevolence to all men is inculcated by the Chinese teachers. Buddhism enjoins universal love. The love of enemies is taught by Christianity. Analogous teaching is found in other religions. “Let us live happily, not hating those who hate us.” “Hatred does not cease by hatred but by love alone” is Buddhist teaching. “The virtue that deserves to be celebrated, the moral rule to be followed is to conquer one’s anger and even in enmity to remember that your enemy is a man, *meminisse hominis*” (Quintilian).³ Seneca urges us to return good for evil and tells us that the weapon which we should use against the wicked is obstinate kindness, *perpetua bonitas*.⁴ The Rabbis teach us that he who is not merciful and kind cannot be of the true seed of Israel, and that he who is reviled and does not revile, returning good for evil, is like the sun when he sets forth in his might.⁵

Universalism always has its limits in practice and in operative belief. “*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*,” was once Christian doctrine. The unity of mankind often means the unity of Christian mankind, and, indeed, each nation tends to regard itself as embodying the highest values of humanity. Nevertheless there is a persistent trend towards universalism; it cannot be denied that there has occurred an extension of the range of persons to whom common principles come to be applied with an increasing measure of impartiality.⁶

Westermarck has argued that this extension has been due to emotional factors, that is, to an extension of sympathy rather than to a refinement of moral insight. But this separation of feeling from thought seems unreal. Some feelings are only possible at a given level of rational development, and possibly some thoughts and beliefs only emerge under particular emotional conditions. A

¹ *Siphra to Leviticus*, XIX, 18.

² Montefiore and Loewe, *A Rabbinical Anthology*, p. 398.

³ *Quintiliani declamations*, IX, 17.

⁴ *De beneficiis*, VII, 31.

⁵ Sabbath, 88, B. Cf. Montefiore and Loewe, *Rabbinical Anthology*, 615.

⁶ Cf. B. Russell, *Power*, p. 260: “The principle of universal sympathy conquered first one province, then another. . . . I do not think that the return to a tribal or aristocratic ethic can be of long duration; the whole history of man since the time of Buddha points in the opposite direction.”

certain intensity of social feeling and a certain measure of imaginative identification may be requisite before it becomes possible to grasp the essential relations between men. The insight required is compounded of feeling and thought.

The influence of religion on universalism has been much discussed. Christian writers often maintain that it is a distinctive contribution of Christianity to ethics that it links the love of man essentially with the love of God.¹ The connection exists, I think, in Judaism. But, in any case, universalism may have very different philosophical grounds. For the Brahman it is based on the view that all share in the eternal consciousness; in Buddhism it is connected with the idea that all are linked in the chain of Karma. In Stoic theory all men share in Nature which is the rational principle of the world. Modern humanitarianism tends to see in the spiritual relations between men the nearest approximation to the divine. In this respect it resembles, as Professor Gilbert Murray points out the Stoic view: *Deus est mortali iuvare mortalem*; God is the helping of man by man.² The difficulty in all cases is to estimate the influence of these philosophical ideas on actual behaviour. The energy with which they are attacked from time to time indicates, however, that they are not without power.

A second trend clearly discernible in the history of morality is the internalization and individualization of the conscience. There gradually emerges the notion that goodness is something which the mind can apprehend as self-sustained and independent of external sanctions. Among the simpler peoples, as described by anthropologists, the sanctions behind customary rules are relatively external and prudential. They consist in the pressure of group-opinion, the fear of the vengeance of spirits or gods and especially of the misfortunes which, in accordance with prevailing magical ideas, are believed to follow a breach automatically.³ In later stages the appeal to external and prudential considerations is variously intermingled with appeals based on the inherent ethical qualities of action. "Excellent is right and endureth," says Pta-Hotep, but adds immediately, "Never has wickedness brought

¹ Cf. C. C. J. Webb, *The Contribution of Christianity to Ethics*, p. 16, and Westermarck, *Christianity and Morals*, p. 78.

² Gilbert Murray, *Stoic, Christian and Humanist*, p. 185, quoting Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II, 7, 18.

³ L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Pt. II, Ch. 2.

its venture safe to port, wrong-doing stealeth away riches.”¹ The development can be clearly traced in the history of Hebrew morals. In *Deuteronomy* emphasis is continually laid on rewards and punishments. This is much less clearly marked in the Priestly Code and in many of the Psalms, while in Rabbinical writings it is made perfectly clear that the essence of observance lies in itself and not in external reward.² The trend is, of course, continued in Christian teaching. In Greek thought the notion that the ultimate sanction of moral rules is internal appears clearly in the fifth century B.C. “Even when alone,” says Democritus, “a man ought not to say anything or do anything base. He should be ashamed before himself. He should no more do evil when no one will learn about it, than when everybody will do so ; it is best to reverence oneself.”³ Confucius said : “The good man rests content with goodness ; he that is merely wise pursues goodness in the belief that it pays to do so.”⁴

The internalization of the conscience is accompanied by its individualization. This can be seen, in the first place, in the growth of the notion of individual responsibility in criminal law. In primitive societies responsibility is collective and punishment vicarious. In later stages responsibility becomes more and more individual. This change is no doubt partly the result of the lessening of the ties of the kindred with the emergence of a centralized territorial power. The state has to curb the power of the organizations based on kinship, and, in doing so tends to deal increasingly with the individual directly rather than with the group of which he is a member.⁵ From the moral point of view the process of individualization can be followed best in the increasing stress which is laid on inward motives as distinct from outward conformity. In this, religion, by teaching that God knows the heart of man, played an important part. Already the Babylonian gods require “perfection of the heart.” In the Psalms the demand is increasingly made for a “clean heart, a pure heart.” The Rabbis stress the “duties of the heart” and they distinguish clearly

¹ A. H. Gardiner, Art. “Ethics and Morality” (Egyptian), *Enc. of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 5, p. 476.

² Montefiore, C. G., *The Hibbert Lectures*, 1892, p. 534, and Schechter, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, III, p. 49.

³ Diels, H., *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, vol. II, p. 78.

⁴ *Analects*, Bk. 14, IV, 2.

⁵ Cf. P. Fauconnet, *La Responsabilité*, Ch. VIII.

between moral obligation and legal obligation.¹ The supremacy of righteousness as a motive is the keynote of early Christianity. In all these cases religion encourages the development of the notion that morality is inward and individual. Yet parallel developments can be traced in ethical systems which are not directly based on religion. Confucian ethics, for example, insists that in all moral relations the essential thing is sincerity. Outward conformity is not enough: "Your good careful people of the village are the thieves of virtue."²

A third trend in the history of morals is the growing rationalization of the moral judgment. This is to be seen in the gradual elimination of magical elements, in the distinction which comes to be drawn between ritual rules and distinctively moral rules, in the persistent criticisms to which customary morality and the institutions embodying it are subjected and the attempts which are made at their deliberate reconstruction in the light of principles that can be rationally defended. We may in this connection distinguish three phases in the relations between reflective morality and practice or conduct. In the first, morality is dominantly customary and there is little or no reflection on the grounds of action, though if challenged traditional explanations will be forthcoming. In the second, there is growing reflection by story tellers, poets and moralists and later by philosophers who seek to disentangle the rules of action and the ideals of conduct by the method of critical analysis. In the third phase dialectical analysis begins to be combined with empirical study of the conditions and consequences of action and the study of ideals is brought into connection with the study of the conditions under which they can be brought to fruition. It is characteristic of the first phase that morals appear as a mass of particular rules defining what is expected in different situations and to which the individual submits without knowing whether there is any principle behind them. Functionally the particular rules may well be interrelated but the principles of interconnection are not known or defined. It is clear that this phase persists to a considerable extent even in advanced societies. In the second phase reflection on morals takes many forms. The earliest ethical documents are apparently collections compiled by high Egyptian officials for the guidance of their sons or other

¹ M. Gaster, Art. "Conscience" (*Jewish*), *E.R.E.*, vol. 4.

² *Doctrine of the Mean*, XXV, p. 15.

young men in training for office. It is interesting to note that these are purely secular documents, independent of religion, designed in a practical spirit for use in daily life. It is also striking that they were in no sense tribal or national, but conceived as we should say in the spirit of men of the world. The moralists of this sort did not hesitate to translate or imitate the work of writers belonging to other peoples than their own. Thus the "words of the wise" in *Proverbs* (22, 17-23, 11) follow closely, it is said, the moral treatise of Amenemope recently discovered, and two of the collections in the same book are attributed to Arab princes.¹ Moralists of this type hardly ever rise above the conventional and merely crystallize in mild platitudes the practical wisdom of their day, though here and there we find them protesting against the law's delays and the magistrates' neglect. Of a different type are the prophets who penetrate to the essentials of human relations and discover truths which the analytic thought of later generations is to explore and perhaps re-discover. Finally, in this stage, there are the philosophers who seek to clarify ethical concepts by dialectical analysis and to reduce them to system. Perhaps the main contribution of this complex phase is the gradual differentiation of ethical norms from other norms such as the religious and legal, with the result that the problem of what constitutes the distinctively ethical element in social experience emerges more clearly. In the third phase it comes to be realized that it is desirable to bring the study of ethics into closer relation with the social sciences. By this I do not mean that in ethics itself empirical theories become more dominant. That is not on the whole the case. But it is true that there is increasing recognition of the importance of viewing ethical ideals in relation to the conditions under which they can be realized. In a changing and highly complex society the moral problems that arise require for their solution very often not so much fresh moral insight as a scientific analysis of the situation which might render possible the application of known principles. We may, for example agree that the moral basis of the family as an institution is to be found in the fact that it provides conditions for an enduring love-relationship in which sex and affection are intimately fused, that it satisfies the deeply rooted parental impulses, and that it secures for the children the love and affection essential to their healthy develop-

¹ Cf. A. Lods, *La Religion d'Israel*, p. 202.

ment. But these or similar values will not in themselves help us to decide on the merits of particular systems of divorce law, or the laws governing the inheritance of property. Similarly the problem of justice between nations or social classes is often intractable not so much on account of the obscurity of the moral principles involved, but rather because of the difficulty of calculating in advance the consequences of the different lines of policy that are possible, especially the remote consequences. In any event, even if a divergence of moral principles be involved, the rational solution of a social conflict requires in addition to moral insight and the will to act on it an exact knowledge of the objective conditions of adjustment, and thus a combination of ethics with physical and social science. There are, I think, signs that the need for this combination is being increasingly realized and that we are thus entering on what I have called the third phase in the relations between ethical theory and practice.

The tendencies to moral development which I have briefly indicated are not independent. The growing rationalisation of the moral judgment is connected both with the individualization and internalization of conscience and with the growth of a spirit of impartiality and the extension of sympathy. The development in all these directions, though persistent on the whole and occurring in many different cultures, is halting and subject to arrest and even retrogression. Yet it cannot be denied that it has occurred and that at any rate the possibilities of further development along these lines have been revealed in the course of history.¹

The clearest evidence of moral progress, it seems to me, is to be found in the gradual moralization of religion. The distinction sometimes drawn between nature-religions and ethical-religions is perhaps not warranted, since there appear to be moral elements in all religions. But it seems clear that both the conception of the divine and that of an after-life are gradually transformed by growing moral insight and that in the later phases there is even a tendency to identify the spiritual with the ethical. The demand is then made that religious beliefs must satisfy ethical tests. "Values," as Höffding says, "must be discerned and produced in the world of experience before they can be conceived or assumed to exist in a higher world."² The influence of moral ideas on

¹ Cf. L. Lévy-Bruhl, *La morale et la science des mœurs*, for another view of the stages of moral development.

² H. Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 323.

religion is further seen in the fact that the sacred scriptures are continually re-interpreted so as to harmonize with changes in moral convictions. Thus, for example, when the moral opinion of mankind came to condemn slavery, the upholders of religious tradition found it possible to show that this institution had in fact been denounced in the sacred literature. Similar remarks apply to the changes which have occurred in quite recent times in Christian countries in the matter of kindness to animals. The idea of progress itself illustrates the same point. That idea was quite foreign to mediæval Christianity and has occasionally been formally denounced by Catholic authorities.¹ The modern emphasis on a dynamic view of history has led to a re-interpretation of the Christian conception of the historical process, and we find that Christian writers are anxious to show not merely that the theory of progress is compatible with Christianity but that it requires Christian principles as a necessary basis.²

An interesting light upon the problem of moral progress might reasonably be expected from a study of the relations between law and morals. But this field seems still largely neglected by students of comparative law. Many instances have been cited of apparently direct influence of moral theory on law. Thus Roman Law is said at certain stages to have been influenced by the teachings of the Stoic philosophers. In England the rise of the Court of Chancery and the development of equity are said to have been affected by the ethical ideas of the casuist literature of the sixteenth century. It is further claimed that the idea of the law of nature has been an important factor in the development of law in continental Europe of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.³ Of Bentham, Maine has said that "he did not know of a single law reform effected since his day which cannot be traced to his influence."⁴ The difficulty in all these or similar instances is to show that there is a causal connection between changes in law and changes in moral outlook. The sceptic can always argue that both series of changes are the joint product of changes of quite another kind in the social and economic structure. Thus, for example, it is argued that the change of attitude to the claims

¹ J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, p. 323.

² C. Dawson, *Progress and Religion*.

³ Roscoe Pound, *Law and Morals*, pp. 32-3.

⁴ H. S. Maine, *Early History of Institutions*, p. 397.

of the working classes, reflected both in changes of moral outlook and in law, is the joint result of the transformation which has occurred in the economic structure and in the balance of power between the social classes and that it is therefore not due primarily to moral factors. There is, so far as I can see, no sure method for isolating the various factors here involved and assigning due weight to each. It seems to be true that no series of social phenomena ethical, juridical or economic, develops independently. But if they are not independent variables, they are not on that account without importance in the causal chain. If each series varies with variations in some other series, it also acts upon it. In this sense it is perfectly possible that moral changes exercise significant influence in initiating social changes or in quickening or retarding movements otherwise initiated.

The moral progress I have so far discussed is essentially a progress in ethical conceptions acting through tradition. It consists in the clarification of ideals, in obtaining a firmer grasp of the conditions of their realization and in the widening of human sympathies through an extension of the power of imaginative identification. There is no reason to believe that any improvement has been effected in the human breed, or that the hereditary basis of character has undergone a change for the better or the worse. It is sometimes argued that it is useless to improve the forms of social organization unless the emotional constitution of mankind can also be changed.¹ But if by change is here meant a change in the hereditary constitution, the argument is far from carrying conviction. It seems to be widely agreed among biological sociologists that social development in general has not been brought about by changes in genetic structure, and there appears to be no reason why this conclusion should not apply also to moral development. The establishment of regular machinery for the public administration of justice has gradually eliminated the practice of individual retaliation and private wars, and in the case of civil disputes, has accustomed men to habits of peaceful adjustments. It will surely not be denied that this has been morally of importance, even though there is no reason to believe that a genetic change has been produced in the self-assertive impulses.

The really important question, it seems to me, is how far an

¹ C. D. Broad, *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 665.

improvement or refinement of moral conceptions can be expected to result in an improvement in social institutions and in actual conduct, and similarly how far deterioration in institutions and conduct reflects deterioration in morality. Considering the improvement in ethical conceptions which has occurred in the course of history ought we not to expect greater improvement in human institutions and conduct than we find? Do the complexities of modern life require fresh moral principles for their solution, or are the problems in essence non-moral?

We may take the present war as an example. Both sides claim that right or justice is on their side and each accuses the other of moral decadence. Moral conceptions must be very cloudy for this state of affairs to be possible. It is sometimes argued that the Nazi or Fascist philosophy involves a repudiation of morality. This would certainly be denied by the representatives of that philosophy who continually speak in the name of justice and even argue that they alone have bridged the gulf which according to them everywhere else divides law and morals. The view that the difference between the Nazis and their opponents is that the former stress the value of the community while the latter stand for the values of individual personality also fails to find confirmation. What the Nazis maintain is rather, so they say, that the individual can only find his fullest development in devoting himself to the service of the community. What does appear to be distinctive of Nazi ethical theory is the denial of universalism and the insistence that fundamental values are, so to say, tied to the *Volk* or ethnic group. But even this is not at all clear, since if taken seriously, such a theory could afford no basis for appealing as they frequently do to the sense of justice of other groups who by hypothesis have different moral standards. One is led to wonder whether the ethical theory is to be taken seriously at all and whether it is not in fact so plastic that it can be adapted at will as circumstances require.

It would seem on closer investigation of German mentality that in this as in other contexts we must not generalize about the German people as a whole but must distinguish various groups in it. There are, first, the leaders and their immediate followers. These seem to be for the most part in a state of moral nihilism, merely using various ethical theories to cloak their lust for power. There are, secondly, the loyal followers who have not repudiated

their ordinary moral principles, but who have been reduced by circumstances to a state of moral bewilderment and confusion, from which they can only escape by following the lead of those whom they trust. There are, thirdly, the indoctrinated who believe that Germany is not only the most powerful of all nations but also the most civilized and cultured and that the values which it embodies are of so high an order that all else fades in comparison. Consequently there is no action, however cruel, that cannot be justified if it is shown to be necessary in order to establish the supremacy of Germany. It will be seen that two questions are here involved, factual and ethical. The ethical question is whether the values for which Germany stands are so superior to all other values as to justify acts which otherwise would be condemned ; the factual question is whether these acts are really necessary to secure the values in question. To both questions the Nazis have given an answer which must be repudiated with horror by every impartial observer.

The case of the Nazis brings to light problems of very wide import. The amorality of the leaders can perhaps be regarded as both cause and effect of social deterioration. The group of loyal followers show a moral bewilderment which is not unintelligible, though not on that account to be condoned, in the circumstances. They have been stupefied and rendered helpless by disaster and disillusion. The third group does not lack moral fibre ; on the contrary, what they suffer from is a moral fanaticism so profound that under its influence ordinary moral standards cease to count. In different forms parallel cases of moral bewilderment on the one hand and fanaticism on the other can easily be given from other countries. It is extremely important to understand the nature of these phenomena.

There is no reason, it seems to me, for believing that the men of this age are suffering from a weakening of moral fibre. The experience of the first world war and of this shows that men are no less responsive to ideals or less tenacious of purpose than were men of former ages. Nor do I think that the mass of men are infected with the doctrine of relativity of morals preached by some of the learned. This is not true of the morally bewildered, who show rather a pathetic longing for an assured faith, nor of the fanatics who, if sincere, are the most absolute of absolutists. There are involved in the situation genuine moral difficulties and am-

biguities and it is these to which the state of the public mind must be in large measure attributed.

The first difficulty to which I shall refer is not due to a weakening of moral sentiment but rather to a growing desire to apply moral principles to the solution of economic and political problems by a larger number of people and on a scale hitherto unparalleled. There is an increasing demand that economic and political institutions shall conform to the principles of justice. Doubt begins when the attempt is made to discover the best methods for carrying them into effect. The believer in capitalism and the believer in a socialized economy may attach equal value to the free development of personality, but each is convinced that the policy of the other leads to slavery. If the matter is pursued further it is realized that the problem involves a balancing or grading of different kinds of freedom and a reliable estimate of the effects of the policy to be pursued on each kind of freedom. Neither ethics nor social science can here give certain guidance and owing to the interweaving of ends and means, facts and values, doubt regarding the one infects our faith in the other. The bewilderment which results is a sign not of moral decay but rather of moral ferment.

Another source of bewilderment is, I think, to be traced to the growing realization of the discrepancy between public and private morals. In former times the ordinary man probably did not think that relations between states came within the scope of morals at all, and, in any case, he did not feel any personal responsibility in the matter. Now, I believe, people feel to an increasing extent that states are bound by the same moral principles as are individuals. This is so far in the line of moral progress. But confusion arises when the ordinary man realizes that on behalf of their state men are expected to do acts which in the sphere of private relations they would regard as monstrous. The demand is made intelligible to him when he is told that the security of the state is an end of such supreme importance that ordinary moral rules must give way. But he must soon realize that the same type of difficulty might well arise within the state. Is the revolutionary, for example, justified in resorting to violence and brutality in order to gain an end he deems of supreme value? Here too there is involved a balancing of values or an estimation of the stringency of duties requiring a degree of moral wisdom and a knowledge of fact which, to put it mildly, are not readily

available. Furthermore, the increasing resort to violence by people who, while professing contempt for morals at the same time not only tacitly assume but proclaim that justice is on their side, cannot but add to the confusion.

A third cause of the moral uneasiness is of longer standing. This is connected with the fact that European morals are compounded of elements which have never been brought into harmony. The ethics of non-resistance and the subdual of self-assertion have never been thoroughly assimilated by the Christian peoples and have not been brought into effective synthesis with the ethics of self-realization. The result is a real lack of clarity in dealing with problems connected with the rightful use of force, and the reconciliation of freedom with order ; and the erection of a fundamentally false, but superficially plausible, antithesis between the good of the individual and the good of the community. I do not suggest that these are problems which do not permit of a solution, in terms of a combination of Greek and Christian ethics, but I do suggest that they have so far not been thus solved, and this failure may well be one of the deeper causes of the moral malaise of our times.

It will be seen that in order to remove the factors making for bewilderment that I have described, not only moral insight is required but also greater knowledge of social facts. Collectivists and individualists may differ from one another up to a point in the conception they form of the relative importance of the values involved. But they differ far more profoundly on matters which are at bottom questions of fact and these have a way of confusing the ethical issues. They have different views of the motives of action and of the possibility of changing their direction by changes in institutions ; they differ in the estimate they form of the probable effects of applying the principles of distributive justice on the total available for distribution, and so forth. These are questions of sociology and economics and not primarily of ethical theory. Similarly the problems connected with the rightful use of force involve factual issues. It is necessary to know how far force *is required* in order to attain given ends and how far force *can* attain the ends in question without distorting their nature or bringing about conflicts with other ends of equal or greater value. These again are questions of sociology and economics. It thus seems that it is only in what I have called the third phase of the relations

between ethical reflection and conduct, that namely in which ethical theory is combined with a factual study of human needs and motives and of the consequences of action, that further advance in the solutions of these problems may reasonably be expected.

The points I have tried to make may perhaps be thus briefly summarized. First, in matters concerning elementary human relations there is a certain relative constancy in moral rules; elementary moral duties are widely recognized. Secondly, in respect of these elementary duties the variations observed are traceable to a number of factors. These include differences in circumstances which affect the application made of the rules, growth of knowledge of the nature of acts and of the human agent, including the varying influence of religious and magical beliefs, the fact that a great deal of morality is accepted on authority, the limitations of sympathy connected with the emergence of classes inside the community and with rivalries between communities.¹ Thirdly, a study of the variations reveals certain trends of development. This development is not continuous and does not proceed at a uniform rate. It follows divergent lines and is subjected to cross-currents due to culture contacts. The trends show on the whole an increasing rationalization of moral rules, a growing internalization and individualization of the moral conscience and a tendency towards universalism. Fourthly, the development occurs not through alteration of genetic type but through changes in tradition. These changes are at first unreflective, but later are stimulated by reflective thought and the insight of moral teachers and, finally, attempts begin to be made to combine reflection on morals with the study of social facts, though efforts of this kind are still crude and immature. Fifthly, the development consists in the main in a clarification of ethical concepts. How far it is reflected in changes in institutions and actual behaviour is a very difficult problem. The influence of moral insight on religious development seems to be unmistakable; that it has acted on law is not so clear but probable.

Social development is not the same as moral development, and, in the main, the influence exerted by social and economic changes on morals is perhaps greater than the converse influence of changes in moral outlook on the forms of social life. In this connection

¹ For further discussion of the sources of variation in moral judgments see Westermarck, *Ethical Relativity*, and Sidgwick, *The Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau*.

it is important to avoid the error of ascribing social decay to moral deterioration, while at the same time denying to the moral factor the power of influencing society for good. In either direction the power of morality may not be very great, but it is not insignificant.

These conclusions may be criticized on various grounds. It may be argued in the first place, that they presuppose a rational standard which can be used as the basis of comparison. This must be granted and I have assumed that such a standard is attainable. It is to be noted, however, that ethical relativists do not necessarily deny the reality of moral progress. This is certainly not true of the type of relativism defended by Westermarck. His wide survey leads him to conclusions resembling in part those drawn above, and he maintains that morality has on the whole become more enlightened and reflective and that there has occurred an extension of the range of sympathy, shown in the growth of impartiality and the partial breaking down of the barriers of group morality. Whether the relativity of morals in the form worked out by Westermarck or in other forms is really consistent with the notion of progress is a question which I will not here pursue. But I think it could be shown that all forms of ethical relativity so far attempted unconsciously appeal to standards which go beyond the standards actually accepted in the working codes of existing societies.

A more serious criticism is that based on the recurrence of periods of barbarism and violence of which history is full and of which we have such terrible examples in our own times. May it not be, it will be suggested that the moral factor is essentially constant, but liable to grave lesions produced by social factors from which it recovers itself from time to time thus creating the illusion of moral progress? In particular, it is argued that the humanitarian period might well have been a temporary episode, restoring a balance previously upset by the industrial revolution and the Napoleonic wars, and is not to be taken as an indication of the line of future development.

This objection must be given considerable weight. But on the other side various arguments may be suggested. First, the constancy of the moral factor is really illusory. The demand for freedom, for example, may be very ancient, but the content of the notion of freedom has been greatly enriched in the course of

time and it will not be denied that we now know more both of its possibilities and its limitations, or that valuable experiments have been made on an increasing scale towards its attainment. There are also certain ideals which have only come to be stressed in modern times. Of special interest because of their direct connection with the emergence of the idea of progress is the growing recognition of a duty to posterity and to mankind as a whole. But even of greater importance are the ideals connected with the seeking of truth. The intrinsic value of truth was, of course, clearly recognized by the Greeks. But the virtues of truth-seeking, the cultivation of detachment, disinterestedness, the readiness to abide by the evidence, in Huxley's phrase, "veracity in thought and action and the resolute facing of the world as it is" have only entered fully into the moral conscience with the growth of modern science. These are virtues much more difficult to practise in the sphere of social investigation than in other branches of inquiry and much will depend on further progress in this direction. Secondly, the increase in the scale and complexity of social organization has altered the nature of the problems which have to be faced, and for this allowance has to be made when we are reminded of our failure to solve them. Thirdly, in the midst of the bewilderment of our times there is evidence of moral ferment. There is, in particular a growing demand that political and social policy should conform to standards of justice and a recognition that even the most fundamental institutions may be challenged in the name of justice. I think, further, that in democratic countries at least the ordinary man is coming to feel that the action taken by the state in his behalf in relation to other states concerns him deeply and that he shares in the responsibility. This is implicit in the discussion by cynics and moralists alike of what is called power politics. This movement is, no doubt, not fully articulate, but so far as it goes it is in line with the tendencies towards universalism emphasized above. It may well gain increased strength as people realize the consequences of a reign of violence and the loss of all sense of human dignity, truth and justice with which our age is threatened.

A third line of criticism comes from certain religious philosophers. They stress the inherent sinfulness of human nature which sets limits to what man can do by his own efforts. Growth, they would say, no doubt there is, but on each level there are new

dangers, and "history is not its own redeemer."¹ In particular men are apt to forget their finitude and, in their arrogance, they claim for their partial views the authority of the absolute. This tendency to self-deception together with the will to power will always wreck the hopes of the utopians and shatter the belief in man's perfectibility. From another angle, the Freudian psychologists make a similar point by stressing the aggressive elements in human nature which, they say, can never be eradicated or successfully controlled by changes in social institutions.

These criticisms would be more relevant if directed against the earlier defenders of the theory of progress who, perhaps, saw human nature in too rosy a light. But even Spencer who tended to regard progress as ultimately assured, was well aware of the possibility of retrogression and rebarbarization and of the fact that every partial development is often a hindrance to further development. Hobhouse, who, I suppose, has given the most systematic account of social development, certainly never thought of progress as automatic and has given much attention to the forces standing in its way.² The problem of the future, it should be remembered, cannot be decided by a study of past trends alone. What such a study reveals is not that there certainly has been progress, but that certain possibilities are open to mankind, and if it does not justify optimism, neither does it warrant pessimism. Further progress depends upon whether we can formulate a coherent and comprehensive conception of a good common to mankind, whether we can acquire sufficient knowledge of the conditions which are necessary for its realization, and whether we can, in the light of such knowledge, generate a common or co-operative will with sufficient energy to bring these conditions into being. The evidence of history and present conditions shows that progress in morality is halting and irregular and lags behind advance in other directions. The lag is due apparently to some extent to lack of clarity in ethical conceptions, but more so to our ignorance of the psychology of character formation and of the ways in which social institutions might be changed so as to bring them into closer conformity with ethical ideals. From this point of view it is clear that there ought to be much closer co-operation between the social sciences and social philosophy than

¹ R. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*.

² L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, Chs. 12, 14.

there is at present. The finitude of man, the limitations of his intellectual powers and the fierceness of his passions are obvious enough to warn us, as the theologians think we need to be warned, that man is no god. Short of idolatry, however, we are entitled, despite the cruelties and barbarities which abound in this world, to put some trust in human intelligence and will, and to feel justified in the hope that the energies which are now expended in mutual destruction may come to be used in the service of ends in which reasonable men can find fulfilment.

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